THE SILICON VALLEY MAFIA TECH CARTEL



A detailed look at the people who run political bribery, corruption and collusion schemes in big tech

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FORWARD

When people think about electoral bribery and political corruption, they probably can't imagine anything more than a man passing a manila envelope of cash to another man under a table at a funky diner.

In fact, modern bribery involves every other form of hidden payola *except* the envelope-under-the-table. The tricks of corruption have evolved. This book is dedicated to exposing those tactics, which are destroying America. Every citizen suffers when their elected and appointed public officials sell the government like it was a garage sale.

That is going to change. I swear to you, based on new open-source forensics software and millions of voters using the internet: ***"Deeds done in the dark will always come to light"***

I knew Mayor's of San Francisco and their families, U.S. Senators and their families, Senior White House executives and their families and the people that bribed them. Most of the tech oligarchs and politicians who spend billions of dollars controlling the media to create a facade of kindly altruism around themselves are murdering, lying, sick, thieving sociopaths. Their dirty deeds don't come-dirt-cheap. Their dirty deeds involve trillions of dollars of dirty money taken from taxpayers pockets!

Should federal law enforcement bosses at the West Coast SEC, FTC, FBI, DOJ, and other offices, be arrested for refusing to arrest crooks Elon Musk, Eric Schmidt, Larry Page, etc.? Thousands of reports of crimes against these tech mobsters have been filed yet they get "protection" instead of "prosecution"!

The lawyers at the "corporate cover-up" crooked law firms of Perkins Coie, Mofo, Covington & Burling, and Wilson Sonsini certainly should be arrested for making the law take a right-turn straight up Satan's anus.

The dirty tricks operatives Steve Westly, Steve Spinner, David Plouffe, et al, certainly deserve some federal prison pick-up-the-soap time.

If you doubt or deny any of these facts, please meet us at 450 Golden Gate Ave, on the 13th Floor in the investigator's conference room to present any facts you may have. On a live global web broadcast at that location, we accept any challenge to the veracity of these claims. If you can supply credible evidence that any assertion in here is either 1.) not true or 2.) intentioned parody that is not parody, then we will remove the assertion.

In intimate detail, here is how the crooks operate:



Figure 1: Steve Jobs was exposed putting hit jobs on competitors in the DOJ 'No Poaching' Lawsuit and his staff called him an "asshole"

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This book is cooperatively, interactively, collaboratively, authored by the individuals who witnessed these crimes, the reporters who documented these crimes, the public who suffered from these crimes and the investigators who investigators these crimes. A special thanks to the tipsters and whistle-blowers inside the White House, The FBI, The Department of Energy and City Hall's who made this all possible.

The best punishment for these bastards is to make their companies and assets lose billions of dollars in stock value by using news media, CIA and forensic tactics. The main weapon that is being used is: THE TRUTH! It is the one thing they fear most!

Please re-post this file on torrent sites, blogs, and your website to help all members of the public get involved in the interdiction of the crooks mentioned herein.



SCUMBAGS

While certain names (like Steven Chu, Larry Page, David Dummond, Lachlan Seward, Andy Rubin, Jeffrey Epstein, Elon Musk, Nicholas Guido Denton, Mark Zuckerberg, Steve Spinner, Steve Westly, Tim Draper, Vinod Khosla, Harvey Weinstein, Eric Schmidt, etc.) stick out in the current news when the topic of '*creepy asshole tech mobsters*' comes up, one name sticks out more than others.

A darling of the Silicon Valley oligarchs is Tesla Motors. We will 'pick on' them, first, because Musk and his Cartel have been so audacious in their corruption. They have bribed almost as many public officials as Google, in order to keep a lid on things. They are the poster child of dirty deeds and payola. Tesla Motors has been accused of being a front for economic, social, political, moral and ethical crimes masquerading under the **facade** of "*an altruistic 'clean-tech' company*", in order to discourage circumspection. The sketchiest things about Tesla and Elon Musk include:

- The origins of Tesla and why Elon Musk had nothing to do with creating Tesla Motors and how he thieved the company from Marty, the actual founder

- The relationship between Tesla owners and senior White House staff

- The relationship between Tesla owners and Department of Energy staff who had ownership in Tesla

- The relationship between Tesla owners and yuppie spy agency 'In-Q-Tel', many of whom now work for Musk

- The relationship between Tesla owners and political campaign financiers

- The fact that the 'Silk Road' murder and drug trafficking site was founded at Musk's SpaceX company and Musk like the lead programmer of 'Silk Road'. In-Q-Tel is deep in Musk operations, In-Q-Tel was caught with 4 tons of cocaine on it's airplanes. Drug user Musk and drugs seem to go hand-in-hand.

- The dirty quid pro quo relationship between Tesla owners and Google, especially Eric Schmidt, Musk bromance Larry Page and Google investors

- The relationship between Tesla owners and Goldman Sachs

- The relationship between Tesla owners and Russian oligarch "business men"

- The relationship between Tesla owners and media outlets such as Think Progress, New America Foundation, ALICE, Media Matters, Gawker Media, Google, and related information control consortium's

- The relationship between Tesla owners and John Doerr's Kleiner Perkins Company

- The relationship between Tesla owners, the National Venture Capitol Association, the Silicon Valley

Cartel and the coordinated venture capital “Black-listing” of Tesla competitors

- The relationship between Tesla owners and Troll Farm services that provide “click-farm”, “meat-puppet”, “sock-puppet”, “fake likes” and automated contrived social media

- The deaths, and traumatic injuries, of Tesla Motor's staff, investors, investigators and customers

- The war profiteering, and lobbied invasion efforts, by Tesla investors, for Afghanistan, Bolivian and other foreign rare earth mining contracts

- The details of the political campaign kick-backs, and the pay-offs of gratis taxpayer cash, tax credits, real estate, government contracts, write-offs, stock warrants, and other payola as criminally “unjust rewards”

- The known, and covered-up, dangers of toxic vapors, fires and explosions of lithium ion batteries

- The relationship between Tesla owners and Dianne Feinstein, her husband Richard Blum, and Harry Reid

- How specific government officials took extraordinary steps to sabotage the business competitors of their campaign financiers.

- The charges and lawsuits against Elon Musk, and Tesla Motors for Fraud, by wives, employees, founders, supplies, investors and others

- Recent leaks and disclosures

- Potential criminal charges against the suspects and the financial relationships of all suspects

- Systemized corruption and kick-back programs within state, and federal, agencies

- Covered up defects in the Tesla cars: handles, hackers crashing cars, heaters, chassis, chargers, vampire power, etc. The Lemon Law lawsuits

- Cover-ups created to protect political officials who benefited from stock, campaign support and other perks

- The planting of “Moles” and the operation of sabotage efforts against multiple competitors by Tesla staff

- The huge numbers of famous people that went to work for Musk and then quietly quit when they saw behind the curtain

- Coordinated, criminal, stock market manipulations via “*Flash Boy Algorithms*”, “*Buy Bots*”, “*Pumping via buybacks*”, “*Valuation fraud via Google ranking manipulation*”, “*Media cover-ups and news hiding via Google ranking manipulation*”, “*DOE PR Valuation boost coordination*” and direct TSLA stock chart fraud

- Who, knew what, and when they knew it about corruption by Elon Musk, Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank and the Silicon Valley oligarch Cartel

The evidence contained in this, and related reports proves, beyond a doubt, that Silicon Valley

investors, owners and government employees engaged in felony-class crimes in a coordinated, RICO and anti-trust law violating manner.

SLOW DRIP INFILTRATION

Tesla Motor's history can be described as a roller coaster. There have been many ups and downs, including a near death experience in late 2008. I, and my associates, are focused on seeing Tesla Motors indicted for RICO, Anti-trust and other corruption crimes. Much of this data was provided by ex-Tesla employees, founders and senior executives. Tesla Motors started out as one thing and was slowly taken over and turned into a political tool for an entirely different thing.



The forbidden Tesla timeline that Elon Musk does not want you to see:

1880

Detroit Electric sells Electric cars commercially across the USA

1900

38 percent of US automobiles are powered by electricity, but as Henry Ford designed the much cheaper T-Ford, the electric cars began to disappear.

1970

The price of gasoline hits record because of a series of energy crises, so the interest in electric cars increased again.

1971

June. Elon Musk was born.

1996

General Motors produced an electric car called EV1 and leased it to customers.

1999

Elon Musk sold his company Zip2 and made $22 million. He founded X.com that would become PayPal.

2002

October. Ebay, owned by Pierre Omidyar (Who finances Gawker Media and the Intercept) acquired PayPal and Elon Musk made $165 million.

2003

General Motors canceled the lease program and removed the last EV1 from the streets. They said they couldn't sell enough of the cars to make the EV1 profitable.

July. Martin Eberhard and Marc Tarpenning founded and incorporated Tesla Motors. They had earlier made a feasibility study to see if they could make an electric car. They now made a feasibility study together with AC Propulsion to see if the batteries would work.

November. The 2 employees searched for a partner to build the rest of the car. Lotus became their choice. Lotus engineers, from England, agree to provide chassis of car.

2004

February. Ian Wright, who had met Martin Eberhard while on a plane, joined the company. They finished business plan 1.0. Ian later leaves Tesla in disgust when he realizes what they are up to

March. Starting a car company is expensive, so they began to look for outside investors. Silicon Valley VC's discuss having Elon Musk take-over Tesla and get rid of the founders

As of this date CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI, OSC, and other agencies, are now recording all communications between all Silicon Valley VC's and technology companies. Those recordings still exist today.

April. Series A funding where Elon Musk was the main investor. Elon Musk had earlier aligned with JB Straubel who had friends at AC Propulsion, and the company told Elon Musk to contact Tesla. Other investors included SDL Ventures and Compass Technology Partners. JB Straubel joined the company as employee number 5.

May. An early styling study began at Tesla.

June. A technology implementation study began. Afghanistan lithium contracts for Tesla's batteries are, by now, fully controlled by White House financiers.

July. Tesla had 9 employees and moved to an office in San Carlos, California. They also made a "mule" which is a car that doesn't reproduce but you can see if the concept works. To design Mule 1 they bought an old Lotus Elise.

October. The 15 employees began to design the drivetrain component.

November. They installed the drivetrain in the Mule 1 but company engineers say the entire system needs a re-design as it is “unsafe”.

December. Tesla couldn't use the same design as the Lotus Elise, so they had a contest where Barney Hatt made the best design by copying most of the Lotus Elise.

2005

January. They made a 1/4 scale model in clay of the design Barney Hatt had made. Tesla had now 18 employees and they also took out Mule 1 for a test drive.

February. The now 23 employee strong company needed more money, so they made a series B funding. Not only Elon Musk invested more money, but also Valor Equity Partners. Tesla also opened an office in UK close to the Lotus office.

April-June. Tesla made a full-scale model in clay of the Tesla Roadster.

July. With 38 employees, they now tested a plastic model of the Roadster in a wind tunnel. It had problems with vector dynamics

August. Some of the 41 employees began developing a motor.

December. 63 employees and they began to build the Mule 2 in fiberglass.

2006

January. A drivable Tesla Mule 2 was finished. It has many technical problems and it is illegal to drive it on the road.

April. The engineers thought the Roadster was finished so they made 10 engineering prototypes (EP), which compared to a Mule can (in theory) be produced.

May. 92 employees and they finished the first EP, called EP 1. Tesla raised a series C round led by Vantage Point Partners and Elon Musk.

July. Almost no-one knew that Tesla existed, until now when Tesla showed EP 1 and EP 2 in Santa Monica, California.

August. 100 employees. Tesla crash tests and technical reports reveal fire dangers. Tesla senior staff orders the reports shredded. them. Tesla had earlier crashed a few virtual cars, but they needed to know if the computers models were accurate. They also began to show the Roadster at events to market it.

August. Elon Musk, John Doerr, Rahm Emanual, Robert Gibbs and David Axelrod discuss a quid-pro-quo scheme to advance money for the Presidential and Senate campaigns and get paid back in spades from TARP and Dept. of Energy "Loans", tax credits, stock perks and monopolies.

September. 120 employees. They made more tests, including radiated emissions and susceptibility testing. EMF emissions during charging were high and those reports were ordered shredded

October. They made a durability test, which consists of driving the Roadster on a cobblestone racetrack. The idea is to simulate 100,000 miles in 6 months. It would have taken much longer time to drive the same distance on a smooth road. Tesla realized that their computer models were inaccurate - the Roadster's transmission didn't survive the durability test.

November. 144 employees, and more tests, including driving through a saltwater bath.

December. They showed the EP 2 at the Los Angeles Auto Show.

2007

January. Tesla brought the Roadster to Arvidsjaur, Sweden, to see if it could survive winter conditions.

February. 205 employees. Tesla began to build a validation prototype (VP), where they took everything they learned from the engineering prototype. Tesla says it will build a $35 million plant in Albuquerque, to produce the Model S. They lied.

March. 230 employees and they finished the VP 1. Tesla senior staff and investors intensify private discussion with Dianne Feinstein and Richard Blum, who turn out to be the owners, managers, builders, staffing providers for Tesla's and Solyndra's land deals as well as the Senate and White House manipulators who rigged government funding for Tesla.

April. Raised more money - a series D round led by Elon Musk, Technology Partners, and Vantage Point.

June. Tesla's motor factory in Taiwan was finished and it began producing parts.

July. A new transmission was ready to try but tests showed that it had mounting issues.

August. Tesla finished the VP 10. CEO Martin Eberhard was forced out and replaced by Tesla investor Michael Marks, who would work as an interim-CEO until Tesla found a long-term CEO.

September. Tesla delayed the launch of the Roadster because they needed more time to test its durability.

October. It turned out that also the new transmission failed in the durability test. Tesla needed yet another transmission.

November. Martin Eberhard is fully forced out of the company after confronting Elon Musk regarding Musk's manipulations.

December. Interim CEO Michael Marks see the lies and leaves and is replaced by interim CEO Ze'ev Drori. Bernard Tse is contracted, by Tesla, to hide the Tesla battery explosion documents that have been uncovered.

December. Tesla says it will build it's factory in Southern California. They lied. The locals in Southern California say they felt “used” by Elon Musk in order to manipulate state and federal taxpayer dollar pitchs.

As of this date: John Doerr/Kleiner Perkins, Eric Schmidt/Google, Elon Musk/Steve Jurvetson and Rahm Emanual, Robert Gibbs, David Plouffe and other White House staff had an integrated stock, lobbying, profit and pass-along benefits and resources structure established between all of them.

2008

January. 260 employees. The VPs survived the new tests, so the Roadster was finished - except for the transmission. Tesla accountants notify Musk of impending bankruptcy

March. Tesla began production of the Roadster.

April. Tesla can't get fleet orders or sell. Bankruptcy imminent. Short term cash put in by a idge financing led by Elon Musk and Valor Equity Partners.

May. Opened a retail store in Los Angeles, and they also finished a new transmission.

June. Opened a second retail store in Menlo Park, California, and they also delivered the first Roadster to the customers. Marc Tarpenning is sickened by the Musk plot and resigns from Tesla after getting a payout to keep quiet. The Model S was announced in a press release.

August. Franz von Holzhausen joined Tesla Motors as Chief Designer

October. Elon Musk became the CEO so as to control all information in and out of tesla and prevent disclosure of organized crime funding. Tesla bankrupt on paper but cooking books to hide financial disaster.

October. Tesla tells White House and DOE, In writing, it will sell 200,000 cars by 2010. Competing applicants all say that only 10,000 to 50,000 electric cars can be sold by then. First hard evidence of Tesla “cooking the books” found.

December. White House staff order Dept. of Energy to only fund companies from their "special list" of campaign backers

December. Google investors and executives become key shareholders in Tesla and agree to control all media to benefit Tesla

December. Tesla says it will build it's factory in San Jose, CA. It lied and it is discovered that all of the different failed factory location announcements have to do with Dianne Feinstein's husband's screwed up real estate deals.

November. Tesla revealed it had requested about $400 million in loans for the Model S and powertrain manufacturing, under the Department of Energy's Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) program.

2009

March. Tesla unveiled two Model S prototypes at the Los Angeles headquarters of Tesla CEO Elon Musk's other startup, SpaceX. Tesla had decided to build a design studio at the factory. Tesla began taking reservations for the Model S. More than 500 people reserved a car in the first week.

June. Tesla gets approval for $465 million in low-interest loans from the Department of Energy in exchange for campaign funding provided by Tesla and Google VC's. Tesla has written over 30 lies in it's Dept. of Energy Application, which Steven Chu is aware of, yet ignores, at White House request.

2010

January. Tesla registered for an initial public offering of stock. Tesla uses "free" taxpayer loan to exploit taxpayer dollars to fake the value of it's stock while also receiving free tax credits which it sells at a profit in exchange for campaign funds, thus fully qualifying as an organized crime operation.

February- Dianne Feinstein and Her real estate mogul husband execute profit stock calls on the

Solyndra and NUMMI/Tesla factory properties for personal profit in exchange for campaign funding

May. Tesla bought NUMMI with taxpayer money - the former Toyota and General Motors factory in Fremont (manipulated by Feinstein), California, for $42 million. Toyota Motor and Tesla announced they will cooperate on electric vehicle development. Toyota purchased Tesla shares.

June. 800 employees. Tesla shares began trading on the Nasdaq Stock Exchange. They gained 40.5 percent.

2011

Tesla works closely with Eric Holder to avoid public investigations

2012

January. Tesla ended production of the Roadster to focus on the Model S. The roadster had already had multiple lithium battery fires which were covered up according to Tesla's Bernard Tse.

February. Tesla revealed the Model X - a small SUV and says it will go on sale in early 2014.

June. 2000 employees. The Model S was officially launched at the Fremont factory. Retail deliveries of the Model S started in the United States.

September. Unveiled the Supercharger network.

2013

May. 4000 employees.

August. First Model S in Europe. Tesla formalizes relationship with Panasonic for batteries even as Panasonic is being charged with organized crime, price fixing, dumping and the deaths of thousands of factory workers and nearby neighbors to the factories. Tesla/Panasonic “Gigafactory” plan charged with exploiting Mexican workers with lethal work environment, toxic poisoning, nearby dangers to towns.

September. Shadow team of special investigators document over 30 federal crimes that Tesla, and Tesla investors, engaged in. Federal law enforcement is ordered to: "Leave Tesla alone, for now" by White House staff.

Musk is caught on recorded audio and video admitting that Tesla was broke when it applied for Dept. of Energy funds, thus breaking the Section 136 federal law for the ATVM and LGP loans.

Hackers designate Tesla as The most easily hacked car in the world. Fears of eavesdropping and forced battery overload attacks. Chinese hackers have already penetrated all of the Model S Tesla's.

As of this date; 4 top Tesla staff and 6 related reporters and partners had died mysteriously.

2014

Chinese hackers have now fully scoured all of the servers of Silicon Valley technology companies and VC's. They learn about major Cisco vulnerabilities and use these back-doors to penetrate a large portion of the State and federal agencies of the USA.

Musk now has multiple people from In-Q-Tel working for him. In-Q-Tel is revealed as being involved in the drug trade including a seizure of 5 tons of cocaine on it's airplanes. Musk silent partner Eric Schmidt is helping fund, and promote, In-Q-Tel. The head of the largest digital drug Cartel: Silk Road, is found to be working for both Musk and Eric Schmidt. Comparisons between the Delorean cocaine issues and the Tesla drug issues are examined.

2015

Elon Musk is forced to take out loans from the same corrupt bankers he has been working with all this time because they are the only ones who are willing to participate. Musk launches a number of funding efforts as minimal demand for his products along with an extensive list of technical defects and explosions hits hard.

Multiple former employees are now leaking the dirt on Tesla. One is arrested, others turn states evidence, or whistle-blowers.

Musk announces that his toxic Nevada lithium ion factory, created with Senator Harry Reid, will try to dig up some lithium, from some nearby holes in Nevada, in order to try to distract from the fact that the majority of his lithium was always planned to come from countries his investors wanted invaded.

2020

As of this year, Elon Musk has had more PR and Marketing staff quit, or get fired, than almost any other company in history. Every PR and Marketing person that joins the company discovers the truth about Tesla Motors soon after and, unless they too are scumbags, heads for the door.


Martin Eberhard still privately refers to Elon Musk as a “sick thieving sociopath” if you bump into him at tech events.


Stay tuned.. more coming…








Viewed graphically, Elon Musk's personal timeline (tongue-in-cheek) looks a bit like this:



Born To Racist Abusive Father And Self Centered Trophy Wife
Acted Like He Was The Center Of His Own Bubble World
Family Implodes, Divorce,Father Says Wife "Bitch"
Becomes Racist and Enjoys Apartheid
Reads Porn All Day
School Mates Say Musk Was "..An Absolute Self Centered Prick"
Musk Lies With BS Story About Instantly Learning Programming
Sells Video Game For $500 Bucks That He Should Have Sold For Much More..IDIOT!



age 14
father takes him to work and makes him do real work
Because He Is Such A Lazy Ass Porn Reader
decides on his life mission - Crony Political Corruption, Bribery & Stock Market Manipulation
age 17
has existential crisis - reads The Hitchhiker's Guide to The Galaxy looking for an answer
(What A Douche Bag Way To Solve Your Mental Break Down!)
Has His Mom Get Him A Canadian Visa So He Can "Get Away From All Of Them Darkies" And Move To Canda In Hope That A Gay Justin Kind of Guy Might One Day Run Canada
moves to Canada To Pray For The Arrival Of The Foretold "Justin Of Canada"
works odd jobs, stays with relatives ...Denies Being A "Rent Boy".
1990
age 18
cold calls execs he reads about in the news asking to meet for lunch
But Not Always At A Motel 6
starts college in Ontario
gets a job shovelling dirt



top exec of bank responds and offers an internship
Get's In Trouble At Work With Others, Abuses The Coffee Machine And Other Employees
sells computers out of dorm room Pre-loaded With Porn
Is Again Called A "Prick" By His Classmates at Wharton
Creates A College Corruption Scheme Illegally Selling Booze In Dorms
Demonstrates Unstable Aptitude By Always Jumping From One Thing To Another Without Completion Say Girls
Nobody Wants To Hire Him So He Has To Do Numbskull Intern Gigs
Elon Musk And His Brother Come Up With Self Dealing Scams Where One Buys The Other's Stuff As With Solar City & Exploits Scam For Free Govt. $$
Quits Stanford University After TWO DAYS Because All Of The Kids "Were Smarter Than Him" ...and said he was "A Prick!"


1995
sleeps in office first 3 months And Pleasures Himself Under A Newspaper
Musk's Father Gives Him $28K To Stay In America And Not Around Bugging Him
1995
Starts ZIP2 With His Slimey Brother Who Helps Him With Scams And Transparency Cover Ups
1996
Raises Millions In VC Cash After Promising To Be A front For The Silicon Valley Cartel's Campaign Manipulations With The DNC
gets pushed out from CEO to CTO by his investors
1999
gets $22 Million from sale of Zip2
MUSK SPENDS NEARLY A THIRD OF IT HIRING RUSSIAN TROLLS, BOTS AND THE LARGEST ONLINE SELF-PROMOTION SYSTEM EVER CREATED
competes for customers with another banking startup Confinity
buys McLaren F1 for $1 Million - soon crashes it In Arrogant Show-Off Move To Impress Gold-Digger Girlfriend
Starts X.Com To Try To Help Silicon Valley DNC Control And Spy On Consumer Purchases
Silicon Valley Cartel Pushes Him To Go For Afghan Lithium and Congo Cobalt Child Labor Mining Corruption Exploitation Via Electric Cars


Mar 2000
merges with Confinity forming Paypal
Paypal Begins Domestic Spying On American Consumers And Creating Psych Records Based On Purchase Habits. Sells Data To The DNC
Max Levchin
argues with CTO over which operating system to use (PC or Linux)
2002
marries college girlfriend Justine
Suffers From A Number Of Infection Diseases, Some Of Them STD's
Pushes To Make PAYPAL More "Mafia Like"
Sep 2002
gets ousted as CEO from Paypal (while on honeymoon) ...FOR BEING A "PRICK"
moves to LA to be closer to the space industry and More Sex Workers
Google Founders & Musk Establish Covert PR, Financing & Political Action Efforts
Oct 2001
takes trips to Russia to Get Russian Gangster Money And Political SWag


Jun 2002
May 2002
Feb 2002
Makes Deal With Obama To Get Half Of NASA In Exchange For Funding Obama and Hillary
Paternity Lawsuit is Staged
negotiations fail.
Musk is artificially overpriced
Goldman Sachs And Wells Fargo Partner With Musk For FULL ON Stock Market Rigging
Jul 2002
Oct 2002
Musk Rumored To Have Experimented With Bisexual Relations, Possibly With Larry Page, Who He Sleeps Over With And Who Got Him A "Sleep Over"Apartment
gets $250 Million from sale of Paypal ($180M after tax)
Musk Spends Tens Of Millions Of It Creating ShareBlue-Like Fake Tesla "Fanboys" & PR HYPE
Silicon Valley Cartel Asks Musk To Take Tesla Away From Founders To Exploit Corrupt Lithium & Cobalt Mining Deals
Apr 2004
Jan 2004
2003
Musk Starts Staging The Hostile Takeover of Tesla From Founders
Lying Pig Musk Begins Planting His Moles In Tesla
Musk, Steve Jurvetson and Google Bosses prep a DNC Coup
MUSK STEALS TESLA FROM MARTY THE FOUNDER IN A TACTICAL HOSTILE TAKEOVER. MUSK HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH STARTING TESLA OR ANY USABLE IDEAS FOR THE CAR


2004
twin sons are born through IVF
Musk Must Use IVF Because Dr's Find He Has "Bad Sperm".
Mar 2006
his first ever rocket launches and explodes
Musk Is Now Fully Aligned With The CIA's In-Q-Tel And Begins Hiring Huge Numbers Of Ex Spies And GPS Fusion-Like Media Assassins
July 2006
The DNC Helps Musk Begin Full NASA Takeover
Mar 2007
2nd launch fails
end of 2006
triplet sons are born
Musk Has Now Fully Committed To Corruption, Bribery, Crony Political Cash And CIA & IN-Q-Tel Vengence Teams
Aug 2006
becomes 1st investor in SolarCity (cousins' company)
Mar 2008
Musk Arranges For His Friends And Investors To Pretend To Be Tesla Customers In Order To FAke Stock Market Valuations
Jun 2008
divorces wife
Aug 2008
3rd launch fails destroying 4 satellites aboard including NASA's



The chart (above) I found on the internet was based on published news stories about Musk and reports from his staff. Musk, who hires Gawker and Gizmodo media to run hit-jobs on ex-employees, politicians and competitors; would certainly appreciate the humor in the send-up. While some of the things in Musk's back-ground sound 'nuts'; it is true that Musk's father had sex with Musk's sister and got her pregnant. It is true that Musk had to marry one of his wives twice because of 'issues'. It is true that Musk openly promotes his drug culture, Obama DID shut down part of NASA at the exact same time he gave Elon Musk the same part of NASA - at the same time Musk's boyfriends at Google got free NASA airfield use and free NASA jet fuel for their private sex party jets, etc, etc, etc….

Tesla reported $84 million in selling, general, and administrative expenses for 2010. It is hard to pinpoint the allocation of these expenses, so you could estimate that their manufacturing employees labor costs accounted for approximately $14 million. How much of that money was shipped off to political PAC organizations, though? Things at Tesla and SpaceX seem to get put in the accounting

records costing way more than they do for anybody else. Many suspect that those mark-ups go right into Dark Money accounts to pay off Harry Reid, Dianne Feintein and other insiders.

In 2010 Tesla had 686 non-manufacturing labor employees in the US. The connections to China were beginning to show, and not in a good way.

The Dianne Feinstein family investment group held that the UNCTAD World Investment Prospects Survey 2007-09 deemed China to be the top favored FDI destination. China deeply controls the Feinstein family according to Mart Baily (A partner of Dick Blum's) and Herb Newman, a family member of the Feinstein's who staffed the Tesla and Solyndra projects. While they helped get Musk's China 'factory' created, bureaucracy and corruption have proven to be problematic while doing business there. Bureaucracy and corruption hinder FDI by increasing costs of doing business, altering the allocating of resources, and wasting valuable time. Regarding bureaucracy, foreign businesses have reported that investment decisions and approvals by Asian government ministries can drag on for long periods of time for no apparent reason. Additionally, over the past few years, many Asian government officials have been condemned under anti-corruption laws. The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) has outlawed bribes to foreign government officials in order to gain business. Tesla seems to ignore such laws.

HIDING FROM THE TRUTH

On the web, one can find numerous letters and postings to Elon Musk demanding that he publicly respond to the charges of corruption. Musk never appears in public unless he controls all sides of the conversation via covert topic embargo deals with mainstream reporters. One such letter that was delivered to Musk was the following:

AN OPEN LETTER TO TESLA MOTORS: (Public Response Required!)



Elon Musk, CEO
Tesla Motors
3500 Deer Creek
Palo Alto, CA 94304
(650) 681-5000

Dear Mr. Musk and The Tesla Board of Directors:

Recently; Numerous ex-Tesla staff and contractors, former suppliers, federal investigators, investigative reporters, investors and ex-partners of Tesla Motors have provided facts about Tesla Motors which are disturbing to the public, Congress, and the market. Please provide clarification of the following charges and concerns in order to resolve outstanding issues between the public and Tesla Motors :

- Are Tesla and Google, essentially, the same entity by virtue of the same investors, agenda and stock market manipulations?

- When damaging news about Tesla emerges, do Tesla and Google investors place multiple stock-buy orders from a multi-billion dollar slush fund in order to make it appear that individual outside investors are excited by Tesla when, in fact, it is only a small internal group of investors "pumping the market"? Does Google "bury" any negative stories about Tesla in their searches on orders from Tesla/Google investors? Is that a violation of securities laws?

- It is said that the Tesla Model S has the most surveillance devices to watch, track, listen-to and broadcast the activities of the occupants, built into it than any other car in the world. Elon Musk has personally told reporters that his cars constantly watch the driver and occupants. Why is that? Why are Tesla and Google obsessed with spying on the public?

- In multiple recorded interviews, Elon Musk is on public record telling the news media that, after careful research, the NUMMI plant in Fremont California would be a very bad choice for Tesla? Why did that suddenly change? What participation did Senator Dianne Feinstein and her husband's real estate Company CBRE have on that decision and the award of the loan to Tesla? Why do Senator Feinsteins staff now work for Tesla? Why did Glenn Greenwald call Feinstein's actions "suspicious"? What political support or funding did Tesla or Google provide to any related political officials?

- From 2008 to 2010 numerous competing electric car companies have charged that Tesla Motors placed Tesla Motors "moles" inside of their companies to intelligence-gather and cause disruption. Is that true?

- Google and Tesla motors share the same venture capital investor groups and alliances. Numerous expert at Tech-Crunch, Valleywag and other industry journals have published articles about the fact that those VC's actively collude with each other to lock competing technologies and companies out of the market and create business monopolies. Did Tesla investors and associates participate in such activities? If so, would that not be a violation of SEC laws?

- Did Tesla and/or Google reward certain politicians with campaign funding, web promotion, revolving door jobs for staff, and other incentives, in exchange for "hot-tracking" State and Federal taxpayer money for Tesla Motors?

- While other companies built consumer priced electric cars before and during Tesla's existence, why did Tesla choose to build an unaffordable car and position the marketing of it to "the 1%" when the money for that car came from the 99% taxpayers?

- Numerous cities were told that they would have the Tesla car factory and then they stated, or sued Tesla, saying Tesla acted "in bad faith" and "used false and misleading information" to induce them to provide assurances which were used to pump the stock market. Why did Tesla lead so many cities on?

- The factory that builds your batteries and the U.S. Government states, in their formal technical documents, that when Tesla batteries are on fire they emit lethal, brain-damaging, carcinogenic, liver, lung and DNA damaging fumes and smoke. Why do you not inform the public of this danger in your literature?

- Lithium ion production kills and terminally sickens workers overseas. Multiple Tesla workers have been burned alive at your factory. OSHA has launched an investigation. What have you done to prevent the accidental and long term injuries to your staff and contractors?

- Bernard Tse, and other main Tesla Engineering staff including: electric engineer Doug Bourn, electrical engineer Andrew Ingram, Brian M. Finn, senior manager of interactive electronics and George Blankenship; while investigating battery purchases for Tesla Motors, received numerous white-papers and technical documents from LG Chem, Panasonic and the U.S. D.O.E and vast numbers of other battery-makers which specifically stated that lithium-ion batteries would be "stressed" and "likely to combust" when used in the configuration which Tesla intended. They stated that the batteries were "not intended for use in cars". Why then, did Tesla still use them? What effect did the monopolistic ownership of lithium ion mining and manufacturing resources by Tesla and Google investors have on the decision to use lithium ion?

- Is it not a fact that a majority of your cars have been sold to your own investors or associates who act as "fluffers" against any bad PR?

- In multiple recorded interviews, You are on public record stating that, at the time of application for the DOE loan Tesla was on the verge of bankruptcy. The DOE loan was mandated under a Federal law known as Section 136. This law stated that no car company could receive money if it was on the verge of bankruptcy. Past accountants of Tesla have stated that Tesla was on the verge of bankruptcy at the time of the loan application. Numerous Tesla staff and contractors have verified this. Did Tesla commit a felony and acquire "unfair advantage" per the GAO?

- Relative to the number of cars sold, why has Tesla had so many Tesla drunk driver related crashes, deaths and homicides. Why are Tesla drivers killing innocent pedestrians simply because the Tesla's "smell bad"?

- Psychographic, demographic and marketing studies have been published showing that Tesla drivers have a higher-than-average inclination towards drugs, strange sexual behavior and risk. Could this account for the number of Tesla crashes and deaths?

- Is it true that safety testing was done on Tesla cars without fully charged batteries and in a moisture-locked environment because Tesla staff knew that fully charged batteries and moisture in a crash WOULD cause a fiery explosion, as they already have?

- Is it not a fact that Google deletes, or hides any bad PR about Tesla on it's network? Would this be considered stock market manipulation in violation of SEC laws?

- Numerous periodicals, including Valleywag, document the fact that Elon Musk sends spy emails to his employees, each with a few words changed in order to track them and see who might reveal anything damaging to regulators?

- Who are all of the property holders and lease-owners of the Tesla and Solyndra, past and current, real-estate?

- According to DOE staff, who were at DOE when the Tesla application was submitted, nothing that Tesla submitted was ever built by Tesla. In fact, these staff state that the vehicle that Tesla eventually sold was not even designed or engineered when Tesla was approved for the loan money, contrary to the Section 136 law requirement. They say that Tesla took the money and THEN hired people to figure out what they were going to do with it. As shown in the DOE files, the engineering of the shipping Tesla cars has no element that was submitted to DOE. Is that true?

- Elon Musks wives and founders have filed lawsuits and made public statements that he is a fraud and coerced them into participation. Is it proper fiduciary practice to allow Mr. Musk to continue with the company?

- Why did Tesla not have to pay the cash participation fee that the Section 136 law said everybody had to pay? Tesla staff stated, at numerous documented Silicon Valley open meetings that they got a "special applicant participation waiver". Why did Tesla get that waiver?

- Did Tesla Motors provide falsified information in order to acquire it's Federal funding?

- Did Tesla Motors provide falsified information in order to acquire it's Federal waivers, tax deferrals, credits and discounts?

- Kleiner Perkins and certain silicon valley VC's, all investors in a number of DOE "winners" (including Tesla, Fisker, Solyndra, A123 and others), organized meetings with a Dmitry Medvedev and other men known by the State Department, CIA, FBI and federal investigators to be involved in Russian mobsterism and then Ener1, Severstal and A123, dark-money funded and run by billionaires (many of whom own lithium mining interests) known by the State Department, the CIA and federal investigators to be involved in Russian mobsterism, were awarded taxpayer funds by Steven Chu, who was nominated by Kleiner Perkins. Was any of this a conflict of interest?

- Why is the only company to receive California State real estate exclusives, exclusive tax waivers, credits and stock enhancers and free rides on taxpayer backs also the same company who's investors were the largest funders of certain State officials?

- Federal communications monitoring of text, voice and email communications of certain highly placed Senators, lobbyists and venture capitalists from 2005 to today should be made available to ALL federal criminal investigators. Have they been? Are one or more Senators blocking this effort because they are compromised?

- Why have so many fraud lawsuits been filed against Elon Musk and Tesla Motors?

- The head of the NHTSA (Strickland) Tesla investigation quit because of increased scrutiny. The facts, such as these, demonstrate that Tesla and Fisker never should have passed any NHTSA safety review. How can the public be assured that ongoing NHTSA investigations regarding Tesla will not be rigged?

- Did Tesla Motors provide falsified information in order to acquire it's State funding? Did Tesla Motors provide falsified information in order to acquire it's State waivers, tax deferrals, credits and discounts? Did Tesla investors bribe, or influence Congress people?

- Did Tesla report tax credits as revenue/sales in stock reports in order to trick investors into thinking Tesla was making profit that it was actually not making?

- Did Tesla staff or owners investors bribe, or influence Congress people? Did Tesla staff, owners or investors provider misleading information to investors? Was there a conflict of interest between Department of Energy staff and Tesla owners, investors or staff? Was there a conflict of interest between White House staff and Tesla owners, investors or staff? Was there a conflict of interest between Senate staff and Tesla owners, investors or staff? Did Tesla Motors use taxpayer money to hire off-shore staff?

- Marketing sales staff from the ad agencies for 60 Minutes, Consumer Reports, GQ, Fortune and other mainstream periodicals have stated that Elon Musk purchased "puff piece" stories about himself in those broadcasts and magazines and that none of those stories were internally generated. Is it good fiduciary practice for an executive to use corporate resources for personal glorification?

- Did Tesla Motors use taxpayer money to purchase supplies offshore that could have been purchased in the United States? Did Tesla Motors participate in a market rigging scam to rig lithium ion purchasing for its investors? Did Tesla Motors participate in a market rigging scam to rig the electric car market for its investors? Did Tesla Motors staff, or owners, sabotage competitors?

- Did Tesla Motors staff, owners or investors exchange campaign funding quid pro quo for business financing?

- Did Silicon Valley companies, owned by Tesla investors and campaign financiers, use internet technology to falsify information to the public in order to manipulate stock market perceptions in violation of SEC, RICO, and various other laws?

- Did Tesla Motors lie about the safety metrics of its lithium ion battery system?

- Was Tesla Motors holding safety metric data in its files which differed fully from the safety metrics data it provided to investors and NHTSA?

- Did Tesla Motors violate securities law by using false information to acquire a federal loan which it then used to falsify its stock metrics in order to "pump" it's stock?

- Did Deloitte accounting firm conspire with Tesla to manipulate market metrics in violation of RICO Statutes and did that firm manipulate Department of Energy review data on Tesla's behalf?

- A U.S. Senator officiated at the opening of the Tesla NUMMI plant and lobbied for Tesla's tax waivers, credits, acquisition of NUMMI and discounts and then that U.S. Senator had their staff work in Tesla's offices. Is it a conflict of interest that this senator received campaign funding and this senator's family received real estate deals from the Tesla and, (next door to Tesla), Solyndra real estate deals?

- Did Welles Fargo conspire with Tesla to manipulate market metrics in violation of RICO Statutes?

- Did Goldman Sachs conspire with Tesla to manipulate market metrics in violation of RICO Statutes?

- Were Department of Energy staff manipulating Tesla funding data in order to favor Tesla and it's campaign funding investors in violation of RICO Statutes?

- Were Department of Energy staff manipulating Tesla funding data in order to disfavor Tesla competitors and competitors to it's campaign funding investors in violation of RICO Statutes?

- Did Tesla owners, staff or investors attempt to delay federal investigations and

indictments by asserting influence in violation of RICO Statutes and numerous other laws?

- Documents show there have been more Tesla fires that actually occurred than Tesla has reported in the media. How many actual Tesla factory fires, test car fires and Tesla battery fires have actually occurred?

- Please provide an identification matrix showing campaign backers who were lithium ion investors who had had their contacts exert influence over NHTSA decisions regarding Tesla?

- The Secretary of energy was friends with all of your investors. We have been unable to find the name of even one person from OPM and Congressional nomination file wrapper for Steven Chu's nomination, who Chu did not later give DOE $$ or perks to. Why is that?

- The U.S. Post Office, The TSA, The DOE, The GAO, Panasonic and over 100 of the leading technical companies in the world say lithium ion batteries can spontaneously explode. Why do you not disclose this to your buyers in your literature?

- The Tesla can blow-up from it's charger and/or it's batteries. Are there other dangers that have also not been disclosed?

- Is Tesla operating in violation of the patents of any other company?

- By Elon Musk's own admission, at the time of the DOE loan application all of the car designs were $100,000.00, PER CAR, over budget and they had no final design for a factory production run DFM. How could Tesla have gotten the loan with the worst debt ratio, the least engineering, the greatest financial risk and the least collateral of any applicant?

- Tesla lobbyists worked with Rahm Emanuel in the White House, to arrange their loan deal. Rahm Emanuals Senior Finance Aide was recently arrested for bribes, kickbacks, corruption and money Laundering. Steve Rattner, The West Wing "Car Czar", who Tesla investors worked with to secure the Tesla loan, was also indicted for corruption. Almost everyone at DOE involved in your loan was forced to quit or fired. Does this call your dealings into question?

- Rolls-Royce Holdings said the U.K.'s Serious Fraud Office has opened a formal investigation into bribery and corruption of government officials for cars for the 1%. Does this worry you?

- The NHTSA said that Elon Musk lied about Fire Safety Review approval and who made the request for recall and investigation. Should we trust Elon Musk?

- Tesla got another $34 MILLION of our tax money in exclusive campaign finance kickbacks for billionaires from the State of California. Why did Tesla billionaires need a few million of our tax money in a recession when people have no jobs?

- The German Tesla "Safety Review" was exposed as "Sham" in that they conducted no safety review and were just told to "pass the car" by your bankers at Deutche Bank! Why did you not disclose that the German's conducted no testing of your battery system of any nature?

- In Tesla's own filed patent applications you state that your batteries WILL explode spontaneously and kill and injure people and burn down their homes. Why did you not disclose this in buyers documentation?

- Tesla is MORE likely to catch on fire than gasoline car"per Bloomberg & MIT. Why did you not disclose this?

- Lithium Ion is "nearly impossible to extinguish, and "acts like solid rocket fuel" say firefighters. Tesla never supplied required battery company CO2 fire extinguishers to car owners. Why not?

- Federal Investigators say you are using "exploding flashlight batteries that were never intended to be used in cars, in an improperly shielded box" to power the car instead of commercial energy storage technology. They say your car has "85% less lithium crash protection on the Tesla than ANY OTHER ELECTRIC CAR". All other companies had to recall EXCEPT Tesla. Why not? What special leverage did you have?

- Over 150 defects and problems per model about the Tesla have been documented on user-forums and in the press including: "Doors lock you in and out. Bad if car on fire!"; "George Clooney Rips Tesla: 'Why Am I Always Stuck On The Side Of The F*cking Road?"; "Tesla "Satisfaction" survey authored by it's own investors/fanboys"; "Tesla seat vibration causes Anal Itching!"; "VAMPIRE POWER DEFECT slams entire Tesla Model S fleet!"; "Numerous defects documented by owners online." When the NUMMI factory was in use by GM and Toyota only 5 defects per model car produced there occurred. Even after you bought brand new robots, why did the Tesla cars get worse in a pre-configured factory with billions of dollars of past car preparation?

Thank you for your consideration. We look forward to your public response to clarify these issues and concerns.

Sincerely,

The American Independent Auto Association

The Friends of Gary Conley

Former Staff- Bright Automotive

The Ingram Fund

Brett Winston

Target News Team

Anton Westerly

CC: All Members: U.S. Congress; US AG; CA AG; Reuters, WebWire, FBI, GAO, Public Citizen

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Musk refuses to address any of the charges and has a wall of Senators, Goldman Sachs operatives, VC's and PR hype-sters that stand between him and exposures of the truth. The ex employees, reporters and whistle-blowers have offered to appear in civil jury trials, Grand Jury hearings and live televised Congressional hearings in order to prove all of the above charges. When this letter first came out, Musk hired an army of trolls and shill bloggers to nay say it, but, over time, Congressional and forensic investigations have proven every assertion in it to be true!

THE CHALLENGE OF CORRUPTION AND THE ELECTIONS



In a crime of historical proportions, White House staff, and Department of Energy leaders (managed by Steven Chu) handed a shockingly large amount of taxpayer money to a private cadre of Silicon Valley campaign financiers. They did it via those financiers green-washing front companies as part of a political kick-back scheme. You have heard of the notorious Solyndra, A123, Fisker, Ener1 and other "Cleantech Crash" failures. This was part of that mess. It was an inside job. If you watch the feature film, called: "Inside Job", you can see how it worked.

While doing this, they put sabotage and hit-job attacks on the competing applicants for the funding, who were also the competitors of the Silicon Valley campaign financiers. It was the most overt, heinous, and audacious form of crony manipulation Washington had ever conjured.

As of today, you can't find a major law enforcement agency that does not have a big case working on this. You can't find a major news organization that does not have reams of files and reports on this. You can't find a voter who does not think corruption, like this, is destroying Washington, DC.

All of those Silicon Valley oligarchs companies failed. The Silicon Valley oligarchs just wanted to get the federal cash in their bank, skim some for themselves, off the top, and let those front companies die. They didn't care, one iota, about "green energy", "sustainable power" or anything, even remotely, altruistic. They cared about cash. They cared about the "grab-it-and-go". The whole "green" thing they spouted was a smoke green to get voter sheep-like support.

The losses, from this criminal corruption scheme, to date, exceed 900 BILLION DOLLARS of the public's tax money.

This is only one of thousands, and thousands, of cases of massive corruption, with our tax money, by elected officials. You read about a new one, in the news, almost every other day.

How did this corruption become so accelerated and so pervasive?

How did these politicians decide that they could just steal with impunity, like this?

It began in 2007 when the real estate market got interesting. People told Congress that "America might fail" if we don't take drastic steps. It was suggested that all the money, that anybody could find, be put into an emergency pot to save all of the Americans.

As we all now know, while the idea might have been interesting, the execution was criminally corrupt and deviant. Instead of giving the money to American families, it was handed to a small set of bankers

and “financial speculators” who promptly stole it, later got charged with crimes (in most cases), and never did a thing with the money to help anybody but themselves.

TARP was a shambles. The banks did little, or nothing for the public. The other part of the scheme was a hard-wired load of $25 Billion dollars that Steven Chu, at the DOE, was parsing out to his friends.

In historical retrospective, based on overwhelming evidence, it is very clear to even the most naive newspaper reader, that a kick-back scheme went down. Only Elon Musk, John Doerr and their associates got the money. Only Elon Musk, John Doerr and their associates owned the supplier commodity routes. Only Elon Musk, John Doerr and their associates had the stock benefits. Only Elon Musk, John Doerr and their associates were the same campaign financiers who owned the only companies who got the cash and the government contracts. Only the competitors to Elon Musk, John Doerr and their associates got sabotaged by Steven Chu and his team while they were, exclusively, funding the asset holdings of Elon Musk, John Doerr and their associates. Only Elon Musk, John Doerr and their associates had “gifted” stock to the very elected and appointed officials who were in charge of “helping” Steven Chu hand out the cash to them. The list goes on…

Today, it is VERY clear what happened and how the kick-back scam was perpetrated.

The White House is still the boss of the DOJ, and many other law enforcement agencies. One can assume that they threatened law enforcement bosses with career, pension and stock problems unless they held off the arrests until after the 2016 elections. Is that really a good idea though?

The public is angry. They are angry about corruption and about the inability of anybody in Washington to do anything that doesn't pad their personal bank account and their personal stock portfolio.

Enter the 2016 elections. Not too long ago, the media told us it was already a “done deal”. It was going to be “Hillary Vs. Jeb”. It was resolved, just sit back and watch it happen.

But then...Not so much.

The rise of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, from impossible outliers to top tier underdogs, has shocked the people who control what you are supposed to think is happening in politics.

The public wasn't buying the spoon feeding of their “media message”. They were not so keen on getting “mood manipulated” by Facebook and Google into thinking one way, or another.

The public was not seeing any benefit from the so-called benefits they were supposed to get. The Silicon Valley oligarchs were seeing all kinds of benefits. For their 1% crowd, the economy was doing great. They got billions of free dollars, that they didn't have to work for.. wooo hooo!

In the beginning, Trump and Sanders were shunned and derided by the media. They were name called, character assassinated and diminished. That was before they started talking to the voters.

What the voters have heard, from both of these candidates, is the biggest challenge that they, or Washington, have heard, to crony capitalism, in a long time.

Candidates “normally” didn't say such things. These people were discussing the ”forbidden issues”, right out loud. IN FRONT OF EVERYONE!

It resonated with all of the voters. For all of their crazy, no hair, wild hair and “plain speakin' abrasive slang”; they said things that voters have been waiting a long time to hear.

PAYING BRIBES WITH THE STOCK MARKET

The Silicon Valley crooks use coordinated, criminal stock market manipulations via "*Flash Boy Algorithms*", "*Buy Bots*", "*Pumping via buybacks*", "*Valuation fraud via Google ranking manipulation*", "*Media cover-ups and news hiding via Google ranking manipulation*", "*DOE PR Valuation boost coordination*" and direct stock chart fraud as part of their quid pro quo scheme.

The relationship between Tesla and Google owners and Russain 'Troll Farm' services (that provide "click-farm", "meat-puppet", "sock-puppet", "fake likes" and automated contrived social media created stock market perception manipulation) is timed to fraudulently manipulate stock values which Tesla and Goldman Sachs skimmed at the peak-points. This was organized in synchronizations with policy and law pushes by U.S. Senators who own stock in those companies.

Tesla owners, and investors, acquired commodity control of Tesla supplies, especially lithium and cobalt mining, via foreign invasion rights exploitation organized by U.S. politicians for Musk.



Day Traders charge Tesla and Solyndra with being an Enron-Type Stock Pumping Swindle

This is how Tesla's and Google’s investors rigged the stock market results using computerized systems timed with Google information manipulation.

They used federal funding to hype, pump, skim and dump public stocks and manipulate the stock market. Senators and some regulators implicated in running the cover-up? Big players grabbed billions of dollars up front, for their personal pockets, while workers at the Cleantech “bait companies” lost

their jobs and their futures.

Solyndra, Tesla, Fisker and Abound investors bragged about “pulling a scrape”.

Silicon Valley venture capitalists used taxpayer loans to fake stock values and reap massive windfalls off of felony market manipulation violations under Section 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”



MONEY MAGAZINE exposed ***How Investors May Be Getting Fooled by Buybacks***. It was the Silicon Valley tech oligarchs that were organizing this scam. BERNARD CONDON revealed:

If you're puzzled why the U.S. stock market has risen so fast in a slow-growing economy, consider one of its star performers: DirecTV.

The satellite TV provider has done a great job slashing expenses and expanding abroad, and that has helped lift its earnings per share dramatically in five years. But don't be fooled. The main reason for the EPS gain has nothing to do with how well it runs its business. It's because it has engaged in a massive stock buyback program, halving the number of its shares in circulation by purchasing them from investors.

Spreading earnings over fewer shares translates into higher EPS — a lot higher in DirecTV's case. Instead of an 88 percent rise to $2.58, EPS nearly quadrupled to $5.22.

Companies have been spending big on buybacks since the 1990s. What's new is the way buybacks have exaggerated the health of many companies, suggesting through EPS that they are much better at generating profits than they actually are. The distortion is ironic. Critics say the obsessive focus on buybacks has led companies to put off replacing plant and equipment, funding research and development, and generally doing the kind of spending needed to produce rising EPS for the long run.

"It's boosted the stock market and flattered earnings, but it's very short term," says David Rosenberg, former chief economist at Merrill Lynch, now at money manager Gluskin Sheff. He calls buybacks a "sugar high."

Over the past five years, 216 companies in the S&P 500 are just like DirecTV: They are getting more of a boost in EPS from slashing share count than from running their underlying business, according to a study by consultancy Fortuna Advisors at the request of The Associated Press. The list of companies cuts across industries, and includes retailer Gap, supermarket chain Kohl's, railroad operator Norfolk Southern and drug distributor AmerisourceBergen.

The stocks of those four have more than tripled, on average, in the past five years.

Companies insist that their buybacks must be judged case by case.

"The vast majority of our shareholders are sophisticated investors who not only use EPS growth but other important measures to determine the success of our company," says Darris Gringeri, a spokesman for DirecTV.

But Fortuna CEO Gregory Milano says buybacks are a waste of money for most companies.

"It's game playing — a legitimate, legal form of manufacturing earnings growth," says Milano, author of several studies on the impact of buybacks. "A lot of people (focus on) earnings per share growth, but they don't adequately distinguish the quality of the earnings."

So powerful is the impact, it has turned what would have been basically flat or falling EPS into a gain at some companies over five years. That list includes Lockheed Martin, the military contractor, Cintas, the country's largest supplier of work uniforms, WellPoint, an insurer, and Dun and Bradstreet, a credit-rating firm.

It’s not clear investors are worried, or even aware, how much buybacks are exaggerating the underlying strength of companies. On Friday, they pushed the Standard and Poor’s 500 stock index to a record close, up 178 percent from a 12-year low in 2009.

“How much credit should a company get earning from share buybacks rather than organic growth?” asks Brian Rauscher, chief portfolio strategist at Robert W. Baird & Co, an investment company. “I think the quality of earnings has been much lower than what the headlines suggest.”

And it could get worse.

Companies in the S&P 500 have earmarked $1 trillion for buybacks over the next several years. That’s on top of $1.7 trillion they spent on them in the previous five years. The figure is staggering. It is enough money to cut a check worth $5,345 for every man, women and child in the country.

There is nothing necessarily nefarious or wrong about buybacks per se. It doesn’t seem that managements are trying to cover up a poor job of running their businesses. Even without factoring in a drop in share counts, earnings in the S&P 500 would have risen 80 percent since 2009.

The problem is that many investors are pouring money willy-nilly into companies doing buybacks as if they are always a good thing, and at every company.

A fund that tracks companies cutting shares the most, the PowerShares Buyback Achievers Portfolio, attracted $2.2 billion in new investments in the last 12 months. That is nine times what had been invested at the start of that period, according Lipper, which provides data on funds.

For their part, the companies note there are all sorts of reasons to like them besides EPS.

WellPoint points out that it has increased its cash dividend three times since 2011, a big draw for people looking for income. Cintas says that it’s timed its buybacks well, buying at a deep discount to stock price today. And DirecTV says investors judge it also by revenue and cash flow, both of which are up strongly.

What’s more, companies seem to genuinely believe their shares are a bargain and they’d be remiss for not buying, though their record of choosing the right time is poor.

The last time buybacks were running so high was 2007, right before stocks fell by more than half.

There are signs the next $1 trillion in buybacks for S&P 500 companies could also prove ill-timed. Stocks aren’t looking so cheap anymore. After a surge of nearly 30 percent last year, the S&P 500 is trading at 25 times its 10-year average earnings, as calculated by Nobel Prize winning economist Robert Shiller of Yale. That is much more expensive than the long-term average of 16.5.

Many investors assume shrinking shares automatically make remaining shares more valuable. The math is seductive. A company that has $100 in earnings and 100 shares will report $1 in earnings per share. But eliminate half the shares and the same $100 is spread over 50 shares, and EPS doubles to $2.

But that doesn’t make the shares more valuable.

Shares aren’t just a claim on short-term earnings. They are an ownership stake in an entire company, including R&D programs and its capital stock — the plants, equipment and other assets needed to

boost productivity long into the future. Critics say the lavish spending on buybacks has “crowded out” spending on such things, which is at its weakest in decades.

“It’s just like your car depreciating or your home depreciating — you have to invest,” says Gluskin Sheff’s Rosenberg, “The corporate sector has barely preventing the capital stock from becoming obsolete.”

One result: U.S. productivity, or output per hour, increased just 0.5 percent last year, a pitiful performance. It has grown by an average 2 percent a year since 1947.

If not reversed, history suggests stocks will suffer. In a 2010 study, Fortuna’s Milano found that stocks of companies that spent the most on buybacks vastly underperformed stocks of those that spent the least on them — at least over five years.

Goldman Sachs runs all of these tech crimes yet they never get prosecuted beyond tiny slaps on the wrist – See:

Goldman Sachs is still the 'giant vampire squid': When ...

https://www.independent.co.uk/independentpremium/business/goldman-sachs-banking-giant-vampire-squid-2008-change-a9323191.html
Goldman Sachs is still the 'giant vampire squid': When will it decide to change? The new leadership of the poster corporation for capitalist greed and excess is trying to project an atmosphere ...

Goldman Sachs: The Vampire Squid

Occupy Wall Street: Goldman Sachs is a Great Vampire Squid

Vampire Squid

Taming the Vampire Squid: Move Your Money

Meet Goldman Sachs, the Vampire Squid

Corbett Report - Meet Goldman Sachs, the Vampire Squid

Meet Goldman Sachs, the Vampire Squid

Meet Goldman Sachs, the Vampire Squid

Trump Embraces the Goldman Sachs Vampire Squid

Goldman Sachs: The Vampire Squid's Alum Control Two Fed ...

https://wallstreetonparade.com/2020/01/goldman-sachs-the-vampire-squids-alum-control-two-fed-banks-the-u-s-treasury-the-european-central-bank-and-the-bank-of-england/

Goldman Sachs has been variously depicted as "a great **vampire squid** wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money," by Matt Taibbi of Rolling Stone; or the amoral investment bank that bundled mortgages it knew would fail and sold them to their clients as good investments so ...

It’s unclear whether the kind of investor who dominates stock trading now cares about the long-term, though. Buybacks are one of the few sure-fire ways to push a stock higher in the short term, and investors these days are very short term.

They “don’t care what happens in three or five years,” laments Rauscher, the Baird strategist. “The market has become less of an investor culture, more of a trading one.”



The ***Californian*** revealed that crooked credits fueled a Tesla stock sale. Dianne Feinstein had a profit interest in that.

"...Concerning your May 31 editorial ("Some clean energy bets pay off nicely") on Tesla Motors paying off the government loan:

In 2010, Tesla was awarded a milestone-based loan, requiring matching private capital obtained via

public offering, by the Department of Energy as part of the Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing Loan Program. This program was signed into law by President George W. Bush in 2008, and then awarded under the Obama administration in the years that followed.

The loan payment was made using a portion of the approximately $1 billion in funds raised in the previous weeks concurrent offerings of common stock and convertible senior notes.

According to a May 8 USA Today report by James R. Healey and Fred Meier, Tesla made a first-quarter profit of $11 million on revenues of $562 million. But Tesla gets government zero-emission-vehicle (ZEV) credits for each car it builds, credits that can then be auctioned to other automakers to offset their non-zero-emission vehicles. The company income from sales of ZEVs came to about $68 million in the quarter, or 12 percent of revenue.


So, if you take away the ZEVs, Tesla lost $57 million. It sounds to me like the first-quarter profit allowed Tesla to make a stock offering to which the government loan was paid from. The profit was from government money in the way of ZEVs. Would the stock sale have been as good if Tesla had shown a $57 million loss?

It's interesting how you tied Bush to the failed Solyndra loan and President Obama to the Tesla loan, when in fact the Obama administration made both loans…."

Goldman Sachs was the "coordinating" link in almost every dirty deal under investigation.

An extensive number of recordings, by multiple whistle-blowers, and agencies, now exist, proving the stock quid pro quo scams.

News media have speculated that the actual reason for "the CleanTech Crash" may have to do with a massive embezzlement scheme.



(Eric Schmidt can afford to spend more money, per day, on bribes than your entire family will spend in ten lifetimes on basic needs expenses)

Federal and industry investigators have discovered “pump and dump” and “pump and fluff” stock scams in the clean-tech funding program. Google helped scheme up massive anti-trust violating schemes in the whole green energy boondoggle.

The use of the media and the internet by a company, or it's investors, to pump that company's stocks is a felony. The use, by a company of armies of fake bloggers, paid for by that company to post false praise in order to raise that company's stocks is a felony. In the United States, this falls under market manipulation and is prohibited under Section 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."

The CleanTech stocks that crash and then suddenly recover are getting instantly "pumped" with fake investor buys computer "flashed" to make them look like Day-traders."Pump and dumps are illegal because you are willfully attempting to manipulate the value of a security. And if you are doing this with other people as well, it's even worse because that implies it is more of a concentrated effort to do that. An example is if you and a few buddies are looking at a stock that only trades a few thousand shares a day. Between the group of you, you trade the stock so the volume is much, much higher than what it usually is. Others will notice this and think that the stock is going up by its own merits, clueless to the fact that you and your buddies are artificially driving up the price and volume. Others start buying and drive the price further based on the artificial demand you've created, and then you sell it off and the price probably tanks to where you started or less. In a sense and your buddies would be guilty of collusion and artificially manipulating the value of the security. That's why it's not fair, and understandably, that's why it's illegal. Furthermore, pump and dumps are also carried out by people that hack into others trading accounts, sell off their assets, and use the money to buy stocks involved in the pump and dump, which has the same effect of artificially driving up the price. Source: Licensed Stock Broker (http://www.sec.gov/answers/pumpdump.htm) (Watch the movie Boiler Room http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0181984/)

"Nothing wrong with buying low and selling high. But willful manipulation of worthless stocks of synthetically created Cleantech facade companies, like Abound, Solyndra, Fisker, Tesla, etc… crosses the legal boundary. When lying hype drives the price of a stock rather than financial performance of the company, the activity becomes criminal. It's considered fraud because the pumper (AKA: The Tech CEO that just got free federal cash from a kick-back program) is artificially inflating the price of a stock through false and misleading statements."



Figure 2: Musk's corporate records prove that Tesla was a payout scam from the first days that Musk stole Tesla from Marty



The Greentech VC Influence Over Washington

By [redacted] Aug. 18, 2010, 8:28am PDT [redacted]

There've been a couple articles in the past few weeks pointing to President Obama as the "[redacted]" and the [redacted]. The real trend is that venture capitalists focusing on greentech seem to have had an unprecedented influence on U.S. federal policy and allocations of the stimulus package.

When I attended the Department of Energy's (DOE) first [redacted] (Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy) earlier this year in Washington D.C., I was struck by how many venture capitalists were there. I shared a cab back to the airport with some familiar Silicon Valley faces, and was told if your firm didn't have a dedicated person in Washington — in some circles they call them lobbyists — maneuvering grant and loan programs, you weren't able to be competitive.

Just look at the figures from the stimulus package (which I am fully in support of): somewhere between $50 billion and $80 billion into clean power and energy efficiency initiatives ([redacted]

It was all ***Enron Again***: energy industry scams all work the same .

“Pump and dump” (P&D) is a form of microcap stock fraud that involves artificially inflating the price of an owned stock through false and misleading positive statements, in order to sell the cheaply purchased stock at a higher price. Tesla, Google, Netflix, Apple and Goldman Sachs are experts at this. Once the operators of the scheme “dump” their overvalued shares, the price falls and investors lose their money. Stocks that are the subject of pump and dump schemes are sometimes called “chop stocks”. While fraudsters in the past relied on cold calls, the Internet now offers a cheaper and easier way of reaching large numbers of potential investors.

Pump and dump scenarios[edit]Pump and dump schemes may take place on the Internet using an e-mail spam campaign, through media channels via a fake press release, or through telemarketing from “boiler room” brokerage houses (for example, see Boiler Room). Often the stock promoter will claim to have “inside” information about impending news. Newsletters may purport to offer unbiased recommendations, then tout a company as a “hot” stock, for their own benefit. Promoters may also post messages in chat rooms or stock message boards urging readers to buy the stock quickly.

If a Tesla promoter’s campaign to “pump” a stock is successful, it will entice unwitting investors to purchase shares of the target company. The increased demand, price, and trading volume of the stock may convince more people to believe the hype, and to buy shares as well. When the promoters behind the scheme sell (dump) their shares and stop promoting the stock, the price plummets, and other investors are left holding stock that is worth significantly less than what they paid for it.

Tesla Fraudsters frequently use this ploy with small, thinly traded companies—known as “penny stocks,” generally traded over-the-counter (in the United States, this would mean markets such as the OTC Bulletin Board or the Pink Sheets), rather than markets such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or NASDAQ—because it is easier to manipulate a stock when there is little or no independent information available about the company. The same principle applies in the United Kingdom, where target companies are typically small companies on the AIM or OFEX.

A more modern spin on this attack is known as hack, pump and dump.[4] In this form, a person purchases penny stocks in advance and then uses compromised brokerage accounts to purchase large quantities of that stock. The net result is a price increase, which is often pushed further by day traders seeing a quick advance in a stock. The holder of the stock then sells his stock at a premium.[5]

During the dot-com era, when stock-market fever was at its height and many people spent significant amounts of time on stock Internet message boards, a 15-year-old named Jonathan Lebed showed how easy it was to use the Internet to run a successful pump and dump. Lebed bought penny stocks and then promoted them on message boards, pointing at the price increase. When other investors bought the stock, Lebed sold his for a profit, leaving the other investors holding the bag. He came to the attention of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which filed a civil suit against him alleging security manipulation. Lebed settled the charges by paying a fraction of his total gains. He neither admitted nor denied wrongdoing, but promised not to manipulate securities in the future.

Enron, As late as April 2001, before the company’s collapse, Enron executives participated in an elaborate scheme of pump and dump, in addition to other illegal practices that fooled even the most experienced analysts on Wall Street. Studies of the anonymous messages posted on the Yahoo board dedicated to Enron revealed predictive messages that the company was basically a house of cards, and that investors should bail out while the stock was good. After Enron falsely reported profits which inflated the stock price, they covered the real numbers by using questionable accounting practices. 29 Enron executives sold overvalued stock for more than a billion dollars before the company went bankrupt.

Park Financial Group - In April 2007, the U.S. SEC brought charges against Park Financial Group as a result of an investigation into a pump and dump scheme during 2002-2003 of the Pink Sheet listed stock of Spear & Jackson Inc.

John Babikian got rich, authorities allege, by what is known in the business as pumping-and-dumping stocks. He was operating ‘AwesomePennyStocks’ website and the 700,000 email push hyping America West.

Langbar International - Started as Crown Corporation, Langbar was the biggest pump and dump fraud on the Alternative Investment Market, part of the London Stock Exchange. The company was at one point valued greater than $1 Billion, based on supposed bank deposits in Brazil which did not exist. None of the chief conspirators were convicted, although their whereabouts is known. A Patsy who made a negligent false statement about the assets was convicted and banned from being a director. The investors who lost as much as £100 million sued one of the fraudsters and recovered £30 million.

Pump and dump stock scams are prevalent in spam, accounting for about 15% of spam e-mail

messages. A survey of 75,000 unsolicited emails sent between January 2004 and July 2005 concluded that spammers could make an average return of 4.29% by using this method, while recipients who act on the spam message typically lose close to 5.5% of their investment within two days. A study by Böhme and Holz shows a similar effect. Stocks targeted by spam are almost always penny stocks, selling for less than $5 per share, not traded on major exchanges, are thinly traded, and are difficult or impossible to sell short. Spammers acquire stock before sending the messages, and sell the day the message is sent.

Pump and dump differs from many other forms of spam (such as advance fee fraud emails and lottery scam messages) in that it does not require the recipient to contact the spammer to collect supposed "winnings," or to transfer money from supposed bank accounts. This makes tracking the source of pump and dump spam difficult, and has also given rise to "minimalist" spam consisting of a small untraceable image file containing a picture of a stock symbol.[citation needed]

Short and distort - variant of the pump and dump scam, the "short and distort" works in the opposite manner. Instead of first buying the stock, and then artificially raising its price before selling, in a "short and distort" the scammer first short-sells the stock, and then artificially lowers the price, using the same techniques as the pump and dump but using criticism or negative predictions regarding the stock. The scammer then covers his short position when he buys back the stock at a lower price.

One method of regulating and restricting pump and dump manipulators is to target the category of stocks most often associated with this scheme. To that end, penny stocks have been the target of heightened enforcement efforts. In the United States, regulators have defined a penny stock as a security that must meet a number of specific standards. The criteria include price, market capitalization, and minimum shareholder equity. Securities traded on a national stock exchange, regardless of price, are exempt from regulatory designation as a penny stock, since it is thought that exchange traded securities are less vulnerable to manipulation. Therefore, CitiGroup (NYSE:C) and other NYSE listed securities which traded below $1.00 during the market downturn of 2008-2009, while properly regarded as "low priced" securities, were not technically "penny stocks". Although penny stock trading in the United States is now primarily controlled through rules and regulations enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the genesis of this control is found in State securities law. The State of Georgia was the first state to codify a comprehensive penny stock securities law. Secretary of State Max Cleland, whose office enforced State securities laws was a principal proponent of the legislation. Representative Chesley V. Morton, the only stockbroker in the Georgia General Assembly at the time, was principal sponsor of the bill in the House of Representatives. Georgia's penny stock law was subsequently challenged in court. However, the law was eventually upheld in U.S. District Court, and the statute became the template for laws enacted in other states. Shortly thereafter, both FINRA and the SEC enacted comprehensive revisions of their penny stock regulations. These regulations proved effective in either closing or greatly restricting broker/dealers, such as Blinder, Robinson & Company, which specialized in the penny stocks sector. Meyer Blinder was jailed for securities fraud in 1992, after the collapse of his firm. However, sanctions under these specific regulations lack an effective means to address pump and dump schemes perpetrated by unregistered groups and individuals.

See more about these stock manipulation quid pro quo political scams at:

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"One should either write ruthlessly what one believes to be the truth, or else shut up." — Arthur Koestler



When Wall Street Makes Crap Loans, It's a Crisis; When DOE's Steven Chu Does It, It's Green Energy.

SOLYNDRA AND TESLA: PUMP AND DUMP

A Wall Street Journal article quotes an investor in the bankrupt "green energy" boondoggle describing what the half-billion-dollar federal loan guarantee meant: "*There was a perceived halo around the loan . . . If we get the loan, then we can definitely go public and cash out.*" Ed Lasky at American Thinker explains:

The huge loan would be a selling point in an initial public offering. The company promoters could point out that the loan gave them credibility — that the government had vouched for their viability and prospects. The private investors would cash out and when the loan came due and the company was unable to pay, taxpayers would be the ones left holding the IOUs. Take the money and run.

It was a straight-out scam, in other words, with a major Democratic donor as one of the primary beneficiaries. An environmentally-friendly three-card monte game — burning taxpayers instead of burning CO2.

Solyndra Investor admits: we wanted the loan so we could 'go public and cash out'

- Get in, pump the stock using the federal handout, skim a profit windfall off the top, kill the company, then take another skim off of the tax loss write-off. This skim scam happened over and over in Steven Chu's world of crime.

Per Ed Lasky: A clearer picture of the underlying insider scheme at Solyndra is beginning to emerge. Yuliya Chernova of the Wall Street Journal writes a superb column today regarding all the business problems that beset the scandal plagued Solyndra. There were a litany of engineering and business problems that were very apparent to everyone except, apparently, the White House politicos that pressured career officials in the government to extend a 500 million dollar loan guarantee. The crony investors were given an unusually low interest rate for such a venture. Solyndra was first in line to get loan guarantees under the Obama program to promote solar energy ventures. Solyndra private investors were given priority in case of bankruptcy that placed their claims above those of taxpayers — a highly unusual occurrence, according to the Wall Street Journal.So who were the type of people granted such favorable treatment? Yes, Obama donors and bundlers. That has been widely publicized. But beyond that, what type of character did they possess?

One investor behind Solyndra blurted out the truth. The loan was needed and needed urgently to fatten up the company and show a going concern (with a factory, etc).Why?From the column:

There was another motivator — Solyndra's management and investors had an eye on an initial public offering.

"There was a perceived halo around the loan," said an investor with knowledge of the company. "If we get the loan, then we can definitely go public and cash out."

The huge loan would be a selling point in an initial public offering. The company promoters could point out that the loan gave them credibility — that the government had vouched for their viability and prospects.

The private investors would cash out and when the loan came due and the company was unable to pay, taxpayers would be the ones left holding the IOUs.

Take the money and run. (Read more: http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2011)

“Almost every one of the CleanTech “Winners” under the Steven Chu Department Of Energy, engaged in this kind of felony grade stock manipulation and insider exploitation knowing that all of the federal law enforcement players were controlled by the insiders with a “hands-off ” protection directive. Using newly optimized web techniques called “Flash Boy” stock processing and “blog meat puppets” they could totally manipulate the stock market and laugh in the faces of the few regulators who dared to step up. The bet that they have to make is that the Republicans do not win the majority in the 2014 Mid-Term elections….”

Micheal Lewis best-selling book “Flash Boys” reveals how much of what you think is happening, on the stock market, may be contrived false-hoods created by computerized manipulations and fake coordinated shill bloggers. The White House games the stock market to payback Silicon Valley campaign funding VC’s and the GOP blows up those very games, right afterwards, in a secret dance of stock fraud tricks. They made a mistake, this time around, and the tricks became visible to everybody in the stock market world. This, on top of the Goldman Sachs sting operation recordings, shows that something is deeply wrong in Stock Land!

In the coming mid-term elections we are seeing Barbara Streisand and DNC notables bemoan the reduced budgets they have to work with this year. Privately, the DNC is ringing their core finance base (The Silicon Valley Vc’s) telephones off the hook.

One of the most successful tactics by GOP specialists involves Tesla Motors. Called out by Mitt Romney, and other Republican notables, as White House fronts. Tesla gets strange and illogical bumps in the stock market in spite of massive numbers of lawsuits, consumer complaints, the lowest sales volume for the money invested in a car company in history, and other facts which, in a rational world, would say they should not survive.

In fact, what is happening is that the backers of Tesla, the same Silicon Valley investors who pay for the White House and DNC campaigns, “Pump” the stock from their own bank accounts each time more bad news comes out about Tesla. There are now charges that the White House is even “pumping the TSLA stock”, like it may have done on the supposed October 16, 2014 “Pump” on the overall market, in order to protect Obama’s “brand name”.

This makes the stock chart for TSLA go up but it is not from mom and pop day-traders. It is “Pumping Cash” right out of the Vc’s investment bank fronts to artificially inflate the stock.

While a final Tesla bankruptcy might seem like the dream for GOP PR; allowing them to point and say “Ha, look, another Department of Energy Crony-Kickback deal gone south”, Tesla has provided even greater grist for the GOP strategy meat-hooks.

Elon Musk’s greed and hubris blew the secret.

By forcing the Silicon Valley VC campaign backers to constantly drain their bank accounts in order to

keep Tesla looking like it is still alive, the GOP strategists are also draining the life out of the funding for mid-term and 2016 Democratic candidates.

The GOP finally figured out that almost all of the cash and web media manipulation was coming from one tiny spot in California: SandHill Road and the area around Standford University. They decided that to take down the GOP they just had to expose Silicon Valley.

Tesla was a test case and it worked well. The investment banks with auto refills on Tesla stock, running the investment funds for Doerr, Thiel, Westly, Draper and all the rest of the DNC VC's is running overtime trying to keep the stock pumped as one set of bad news after another gets exposed about Tesla.

One GOP operative claims that every Kleiner Perkins investment has been: "Targeted, tracked and media exposed"…"can you hear that giant sucking sound", he says "…that's the sound of DNC VC cash sliding into oblivion…not only are they beating a dead horse but we have infected the very horse they are beating.."

The operative claims that Musk's carve-outs for Solar, Space and batteries is his gift, by the White House for conduit-ing cash, through those, "fronts" back to DNC candidates. Sierra Nevada Corp is suing Musk's Space X, claiming similar industry rigging. Tesla has been under investigation by many parties.

People don't like taking it in the ass unexpectedly. In this case the old adage of "You F**ed me in the ass, so now I'm F***ing you guys in the ass tens times more.." Seems to be the rule of the game. This per Thomas Roster of the Palo Alto Review.

In another article, the NY Post proposed that the stock market is rigged by Tesla and Google White House campaign backers. John Crudele wrote about the **'Plunge protection' behind market's sudden recovery:**

Mysterious forces were trying their best, but they couldn't keep the stock market from swooning Wednesday.

They failed in the morning, despite massive purchases of stock index futures contracts. Within minutes of the market's opening, the Dow Jones industrial average was down 350 points. Later in the day — after a lot of shocking ebb and flow — the Dow bottomed out with a decline of 460 points.

It was only in the last hour of trading that the market saviors managed to trim the Dow loss to just 173 points. And they succeeded only after Janet Yellen's private, upbeat remarks about the economy were leaked.

Welcome to a new kind of stock market — one that the average investor should refuse to be invested in.

Anyone whose investments tightly track the major indices is now losing money since the beginning of 2014. The Dow is down 1.1 percent on the year, with the S&P and Nasdaq up 3 percent for 2014.

Just for the record, I've been telling you for years that the stock market was in a bubble and that you should enjoy it while it lasts because bubbles always pop.

Of course, if you could time the end of the bubble, you'd be doing quite well. Miss the end and you are back to where you started. Or worse off in terms of confidence and finances.

Welcome to a new kind of stock market — one that the average investor should refuse to be invested in.

I obviously don't know whether we are now seeing the end of the current stock market bubble, during which the S&P index has risen 102 percent since October 2008. But there are people like my friend Peter Grandich of Trinity Financial, who has been excellent at predicting market corrections in the past and who thinks this is the end.

I already brought up the sensitive issue of a market crash in a column on Oct. 9 that began: "Is this the month the stock market will crash?"

October is historically a spooky month for stocks, and in that column I rattled off the crashes and major price corrections of 1929, '78, '79, '87, '89 and 2008 to prove it.

Will 2014 soon be added to that list? That'll be the cliffhanger in today's column.

But let me explain about the unknown forces in the market these days. Call it by a nickname — the Plunge Protection Team. Or call it the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, the official name given to the group when it was formed by President Ronald Reagan after the market turbulence of 1989.

These forces may be working from a script in the "Doomsday Book," which the US government recently fought to keep secret when it was brought up last week during the AIG trial in Washington.

Here's the bottom line: Someone tried to rescue the market last Wednesday. And it's becoming a regular occurrence.

The details of last Wednesday morning are these: At the same time the Dow was off 350 points, the S&P index was down 43.80 points, That was an enormous decline in just 11 minutes of trading and it was an indication that Wall Street was not having a good day.

Then, someone (or something) started buying S&P futures contracts en masse. Twenty-one minutes later, the S&P index had regained 30 of those lost points and was back at 1,861.

Maybe you'll believe that there was some manipulation going on if you knew that a guy named Robert Heller, who was a member of the Federal Reserve's Board of Governors until 1989, proposed just such a rigging as soon as he left the Fed.

Look it up. Oct. 27, 1989, Wall Street Journal. Headline: "Have Fed Support Stock Market, Too." By Robert Heller, who had just left the Fed to head up the credit card company Visa.

"It would be inappropriate for the government or the central bank to buy or sell IBM or General Motors shares," Heller wrote. "Instead, the Fed could buy the broad market composites in the futures market."

In case you don't know the lingo, Heller is proposing that the Fed or government purchase stock futures contracts that track — and can influence — the major indices.

These contracts are cheap and a government could turn the whole stock market around quickly — but probably not permanently.

Wow! Doesn't that seem a lot like what happened Wednesday at 9:41 a.m., when S&P futures contracts were suddenly and mysteriously scooped up?

Let me allow Heller to finish his thought because it's important to anyone who believes in free and fair markets.

"The Fed's stock-market role ought not to be very ambitious. It should seek only to maintain the functioning of the markets — not to prop the Dow Jones or the New York Stock Exchange averages at a particular level," he continued.

But times change and so does thinking. In recent weeks, we've discovered that the CME Group, the exchange in Chicago, has an incentive program under which foreign central banks could buy stock market derivatives like the S&P contracts at a discount.

It's not that these foreign banks need a break on the price of their trading. But it does show that there is a back-door way — through foreign emissaries — for the Fed and the US government to prop up stocks like Heller suggested, and — maybe — not get caught.

Bloomberg's Simon Kennedy disclosed how Stock Markets Need $200 Billion Each Quarter From Central Bankers. He underscored the reality that the Silicon Valley venture capitalists are pumping the stock market with fake money to keep their fake companies looking like they are functional. The central-bank 'put' lives on he says.

Policy makers deny its existence, yet investors still reckon that whenever stocks and other risk assets take a tumble, the authorities will be there with calming words or economic stimulus to ensure the losses are limited.

A put option gives investors the right to sell their asset at a set price so the theory goes that central banks will ultimately provide a floor for falling asset markets to ensure they don't take economies down with them.

Last week as markets swooned again, it was St. Louis Federal Reserve President James Bullard and Bank of England Chief Economist Andrew Haldane who did the trick. Bullard said the Fed should consider delaying the end of its bond-purchase program to halt a decline in inflation expectations, while Haldane said he's less likely to vote for a U.K. rate increase than three months ago.

"These comments left markets with the impression that the 'central-bank put' is still in place," Morgan Stanley currency strategists led by London-based Hans Redeker told clients in a report yesterday.

Matt King, global head of credit strategy at Citigroup Inc., and colleagues have put a price on how much liquidity central banks need to provide each quarter to stop markets from sliding.

By estimating that zero stimulus would be consistent with a 10 percent quarterly drop in equities, they calculate it takes around $200 billion from central banks each quarter to keep markets from selling off.

With the Fed and counterparts peeling back their net liquidity injections from almost $1 trillion in 2012

toward that magic marker, King's team said "a negative reaction in markets was long overdue."

"We think the markets' weakness owes more to an almost belated reaction to a temporary lull in central bank stimulus than it does to any reduction in the effect of that stimulus in propping up asset prices," they said in an Oct. 17 report to clients.

Bank of America Merrill Lynch strategists said in a report today that another 10 percent decline in U.S. stocks might spark speculation of a fourth round of quantitative easing from the Fed. That would mimic how the Fed acted following equity declines of 11 percent in 2010 and 16 percent in 2011.

The good news for investors in the eyes of Citigroup is that although the Fed is still reversing and set to end its bond-buying this month, the European Central Bank and Bank of Japan will more than compensate with more stimulus in coming months.

The reason for the support is the fear that a prolonged sell-off in markets would upend the fragile economic outlook central banks are charged with safeguarding, they said.

"With central banks much more concerned about a return to recession than about asset-price bubbles, they have little choice but to step back in," said Citigroup.

Yves Smith states that he even found out that Goldman Sachs had made it official that the stock market is manipulated and that coordinated tech buybacks drive valuations. He says:It's remarkable that this Goldman report, and its writeup on Business Insider, is being treated with a straight face. The short version is current stock price levels are dependent on continued stock buybacks. Key sections of the story:

Goldman Sachs' David Kostin believes a temporary pullback may explain why the S&P 500 has tumbled from its all-time high of 2,019 on Sept. 19.

"Most companies are precluded from engaging in open-market stock repurchases during the five weeks before releasing earnings," Kostin notes. "For many firms, the beginning of the blackout period coincided with the S&P 500 peak on September 18. So the sell-off occurred during a time when the single largest source of equity demand was absent. Buybacks dip during earnings reporting months, which have seen 1.2 points higher realized volatility than in other months during the past 25 years."…

"We expect companies will actively repurchase shares in November and December," he writes. "Since 2007, an average of 25% of annual buybacks has occurred during the last two months of the year."

Notice how the bulk of buybacks are concentrated in the fourth quarter, with the obvious intent of goosing prices at year end so as to lead to higher executive pay for "increasing shareholder value"? In fact, these companies are being gradually liquidated. Issuing debt, which public companies have done in copious volumes since the crash, and using it to buy shares is dissipating corporate assets. They are over time shrinking their businesses. That is also reflected in aggressive headcount cuts and cost-saving measures. Even though analysts like to tout the cash that companies have sitting on their balance sheets as a source of potential investment, as we've discussed in previous posts, public companies are so terrified of even a quarterly blip in earnings due to incurring expenses relating to long-term investments that they'd rather do nothing, or go the inertial path of cutting costs to show higher profits.

But with borrowing the big source of this corporate munificence to the share-owning classes, this is a self-limiting game. But the end game could be a long time in coming. First, you have economists who believe that the stock market directly drives consumer spending, echoing the Fed's confidence in the wealth effect. For instance, see this argument from Roger Farmer (hat tip Bruegel blog):

There is a close relationship between changes in the value of the stock market and changes in the unemployment rate one quarter later. My research here, and here shows that a persistent 10% drop in the real value of the stock market is followed by a persistent 3% increase in the unemployment rate. The important word here is persistent. If the market drops 10% on Tuesday and recovers again a week later, (not an unusual movement in a volatile market), there will be no impact on the real economy. For a market panic to have real effects on Main Street it must be sustained for at least three months.

Yves here. The problem is that correlation is not causation. Significant and sustained stock market declines are almost always the result of Fed tightening. The usual lag between an interest rate cycle turn and a stock market peak historically was roughly four months, but in our new normal of seemingly permanent heavy-duty central bank meddling, old rules of thumb are to be used with great caution. Nevertheless, Greenspan was obsessed with what drove stock prices, and the Fed is unduly solicitous of asset price levels, no doubt because people like Janet Yellen have to leave their DC bubble in order to meet actual unemployed people.

Mike Whitney reminds those who manage to miss it that the Fed is so concerned about the actual and psychological impact of stock market prices that it immediately talked investors into getting back into the pool when the market started misbehaving badly last week. From Counterpunch:

For those readers who still think that the Fed doesn't meddle in the markets: Think again. Friday's stock surge had nothing to do with productivity, price, earnings, growth or any of the other so called fundamentals. It was all about manipulation; telling people what they want to hear, so they do exactly what you want them to do. The pundits calls this jawboning, and the Fed has turned it into an art-form. All [St. Louis Fed President James] Bullard did was assure investors that the Fed "has their back", and , sure enough, another wild spending spree ensued. One can only imagine the backslapping and high-fives that broke out at the Central Bank following this latest flimflam….

It's too bad the Fed can't put in a good word for the real economy while they're at it. But, oh, I forgot that the real economy is stuffed with working stiffs who don't warrant the same kind of treatment as the esteemed supermen who trade stocks for a living. Besides, the Fed doesn't give a rip about the real economy. If it did, it would have loaded up on infrastructure bonds instead of funky mortgage backed securities (MBS). The difference between the two is pretty stark: Infrastructure bonds put people to work, circulate money, boost economic activity, and strengthen growth. In contrast, MBS purchases help to fatten the bank accounts of the fraudsters who created the financial crisis while doing bupkis for the economy. Guess who the Fed chose to help out?

Do you really want to know why the Fed isn't going to end QE? Here's how Nomura's chief economist Bob Janjuah summed it up:

"I want to remind readers of a message that may be buried in the past: When QE1 ended, the S&P 500 fell just under 20% in a roughly three-month period before the QE2 recovery.

When the QE2 ended, the S&P 500 fell about 20% in a three-month period before the next Fed-inspired bounce (aided by the ECB). QE3 is ending this month…"

Is that why the Fed started jawboning QE4, to avoid the inevitable 20 percent correction?

Whitney continues with one of our favorite tropes: that all QE has done is elevate asset prices. That has not led to a recovery in anything much beyond the balance sheets of the top cohorts and the income of the top 1%. Even worse, it has provide cover for the Administration falling in with investor-favoring austerity, in the form of reducing deficit spending when it ought to be increasing it to take up the considerable and costly slack in the economy.

It's not surprising to see the Fed double down on a failed strategy. The central bank had apparently finally recognized in 2013 that QE was not helping the real economy, and they needed to exit the policy to reduce the resulting economic distortions. But they lost their nerve during last summer's taper tantrum, and turned cowardly again in response to a mere stock market hissy fit.

The Fed believes that what is good for the wealthy is good for the US, and that when they are in danger of suffering financially, the central bank should break glass and administer monetary relief. Even though the Fed may think it is serious about ending QE and eventually raising rates, as they say in Venezuela, "They have changed their minds, but they have not changed their hearts."

See more at:

'Flash Boys' and the Speed of Lies – Bloomberg View -In the last few months, I have had a strange and interesting experience. In early April, I found myself the main character in Michael Lewis's book "Flash Boys." (bloombergview.com/articles/2014-08-03/flash-boys-and-the-sp…

`Flash Boys' and the Speed of Lies: Katsuyama – Businessweek - (businessweek.com/videos/2014-08-04/flash-boys-and-the-spee…

Newsalert: 'Flash Boys' and the Speed of Lies -The total link site for the news and information junkie: Libertarianism. Property Rights. Government Corruption. Chicago Mob. Struggle Against Socialism. (nalert.blogspot.com/2014/08/flash-boys-and-speed-of-lies.html)

"Flash Boys" and the Speed of Lies – Proactiveinvestors UK - "Flash Boys" and the Speed of Lies . Here is the opening of this informative column by Brad Katsuyama for Bloomberg: In the last few months, I have had a strange and interesting experience. (proactiveinvestors.co.uk/columns/fuller-treacy-money/16720/flash-b…

Brad Katsuyama: 'Flash Boys' and the speed of lies about my … -In the last few months, I have had a strange and interesting experience. In early April, I found myself the main character in Michael Lewis's book Flash Boys. It told the story of a quest I've been on, with my colleagues, to expose and to prevent a lot of outrageous behaviour in the US stock market (nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid…)

FSN: 'Flash Boys' and the Speed of Lies | Gold and … - FSN: Europe's Tough New Regime For Banks Fails First Test In Portugal; Forex Trading Alert: EUR/USD – Time for Rebound? DoJ Subpoenas GM Over Subprime Auto Loans (

beforeitsnews.com/gold-and-precious-metals/2014/08/fsn-flas…)

WHAT TO TELL A SHILL REPORTER

When you come across a shill-reporter sock-puppet kid working for CNN or SF Gate or one of the bought-and-paid-for propaganda outlets that Musk, Zuckerberg and Schmidt control, tell them this:

Dear Fake News “Reporter:


What an obvious, overt, pandering, fake news shill you have exposed yourself as. You sold yourself and your dignity to Elon Musk. Not only did you did not discuss any of the public media issues with Musk, you ran a cover-up of most of the issues around him. How much did he pay you to whore out your journalistic dignity. We are going to make certain that EVERY past, present and future editor, and publication shareholder, sees this letter and knows that you are a hack that sells themselves for less than even a real hooker charges. Your name, on any byline, is now worth less than a pile of dog crap. Why would you sell your soul to a sociopath liar like Musk?

Even the most minimal research would reveal the following facts about Musk. You chose to hide these facts and participate in Musk’s narcissistic self-glorification agenda. You are covering up his crimes and corruption in order to buy yourself a seat at the table of Silicon Valley assholes. We hope you dine well at that repast as you consume their shit and spew out your own feces-laden copy of it.

Why would you not discuss the fact that Google and the DNC bosses will be monitoring and listening in on everything the public runs across all of Musk's Starlink SpaceX satellites! Only left wing main-stream messaging news and films will be displayed in order to steer the public into voting the Silicon Valley-approved way. Many are worried the 5G and microwave signal increase from these satellites will cause cell damage, cancer, more NSA spying and political manipulation. Why didn’t you cover those issues?

Shills and liars that work for Elon Musk (and are paid bribes and influence perks by Musk) and pretend to be “reporters” include ***Johnna Crider*** and stock market shill facade “***Cleantechnica***”; The editors of the ***San Jose Mercury News*** and the ***SFGATE.com/SF Chronicle***; All the ***Hearst Publications*** because ***Will Hearst*** is Musk’s bitch; These pandering pathetic lap dogs refuse to allow the true facts about Musk to be covered in the news because they co-profit from his corruption and PR hype. ***The Motley Fool*** breaks the SEC laws by taking bribes from Musk and then promoting stock market actions which benefits Musk. ***Gawker Media, Gizmodo, Jalopnik*** and the ***Nick Guido Denton*** tabloid empire are paid directly directly by Musk and his ***Draper/Jurvetson*** hype masters to publish pure PR bullshit For Musk.

The entire ***Shareblue*** opposition publishing taskforce is paid to hype up Musk and tear down any of his competitors. The Shareblue troll underlings include:




I'M NOT SAYING IT'S SHILLS...
BUT IT'S SHILLS...

You can’t forget the stunning pandering of ***Ashlee Vance*** who wrote the deeply masturbatory pitch book about Musk. Hyper political propaganda networks such as ***CBS News, NBC News, CNBC, Rolling Stone, Buzzfeed, Huffington Post, Mother Jones, The New Yorker, The Nation, Boston Globe,*** etc. are widely known to be simply political propaganda outlets for Musk’s political manipulators. You can expect them to never supply the truth about Musk. ***Jim Dunstan*** at ***Tech Freedom*** loves to promote BS about Musk and his boyfriends at Google.

These sites are known to have accepted bribes and perks for pretending that Musk PR was “News”:

https://gigaom.com/

www.khoslaventures.com

https://www.greenbiz.com

www.slate.com/

www.greentechmedia.com/

www.siliconbeat.com/

www.triplepundit.com/

fortune.com/

www.windpowerengineering.com

www.energytrendsinsider.com

www.geekwire.com

mediamatters.org

www.gizmodo.com

breakingenergy.com/

blogs.marketwatch.com

thinkprogress.org/

www.gawker.com

solarenergy.net

teslamotorsclub.com

act.forecastthefacts.org

archive.onearth.org

blog.ucsusa.org/

www.theenergycollective.com

www.cleantechblog.com

https://www.kcet.org

www.climatechangedispatch.com

www.dailykos.com/

www.investigativepost.org

www.fuelinggrowth.org

www.cleanenergyleaders.org

wonkette.com

These writers have no allegiance to anything but bribes!

THE MOST MIND BOGGLING LIE OF THESE SHILLS is their pervasive devotion to pitching the idea that Elon Musk's Cartel did not get taxpayer money. ***Musk has gotten billions of dollars of City, State And Federal Cash*** and exclusive tax breaks which reduce taxpayer funds for teachers and firemen. He gets taxpayer market space worth hundreds of billions of dollars too. In other words Steven Chu and the Obama White House gave Musk all the stock market valuation perks and cash to monopolize the EV market. They gave this set of perks ***exclusively*** to Musk while sabotaging his competitors at the same time. Dept of Energy and White House staff were ALSO shareholders in the Musk Cartel. Bloggers a fake "reporters" that "report" that Musk "hardly got any government help" and "paid it all back" are ***FULL FLEDGED LYING SHILLS! Musk has harmed the public, democracy, free markets and hundreds of competitors while pocketing billions of dollars that he only got because of taxpayer cash manipulations. He didn't not earn that money, he took that money from crooked political deals and bribes paid to White House staff, California Senators and Dept of Energy bosses! Tesla spends $1 million annually on Washington lobbyists. Its cars are financed by over $280 million in federal tax incentives, including a $7,500 federal tax break and millions more in state rebates and development fees. SpaceX has also received over $5 billion in government support. It has over promised and under delivered. SpaceX rockets, for example, are far less reliable than many of its competitors. This is outlined in reports from December 2017 and January 2018 in which the Department of Defense Inspector General and NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory Council described a list of security concerns they have with SpaceX, among them 33 significant non-conformities.***

Bloomberg Business News reported in November about a Tesla solar factory for which the State of New York paid $750 million based on a commitment to create 1,500 jobs. The factory had been developed for another Musk-run company, SolarCity, which Tesla bought in 2016 in a $2.6 billion deal. SolarCity had been $2.9 billion in debt. Only a relative handful of jobs have been created, and New York officials are expressing dismay. Raymond Walter, a Republican in the New York State Assembly, says he is concerned that the state "has too many eggs in the Tesla basket, which doesn't seem like a very strong basket." John Kaehny, executive director of Reinvent Albany, a nonprofit focused on government accountability, says, "It's a complete hoo-ha! These mega-subsidy deals take place in complete secrecy without scrutiny from the public."

Bloomberg News declares that this is "...a familiar playbook for Musk, start with wild promises followed by product delays, production hell, shareholder anger and finally, hopefully, redemption."

Things, however, may be even worse than they appear. Some are even speculating that Elon Musk, SpaceX and Tesla may be on their way to becoming the new Enron. Enron, the energy giant, employed approximately 20,000 people and claimed revenues of $111 billion at its peak by 2000. As it turned out, Enron used shady accounting practices to hide its losses and report profits which, in fact, did not exist. Andrew Fastow, the chief financial officer, created the scheme to falsify Enron's real financial status. In April 2001, the fraud began to unravel as analysts began to question Enron's numbers. In the end, Enron was found to have losses of $591 million and debt totaling $628 million. Stock prices declined from $90 in 2000 to less than one dollar when the scandal was exposed. Senior managers, who kept selling their stock while encouraging others to continue buying, were convicted of insider trading. In December 2001, the company declared bankruptcy.

In the view of many, Elon Musk has been engaging in similar behavior. A Bloomberg report in November suggests that SpaceX may be less than honest with its numbers, giving a false illusion of profitability. According to Bloomberg , "While SpaceX is burning through cash, disclosures to potential lenders showed the company had positive earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization of about $270 million for the 12 months through September, people with knowledge of the matter said. But that's because it included amounts that customers had prepaid and because it excluded costs related to non-core research and development...Without those adjustments, earnings were negative, they said."

According to Bloomberg , "This shouldn't come as a shock. A Wall Street Journal report from a few years ago showed that its profit margins were laser-thin. But if Musk is now going to these lengths to pad SpaceX's books to secure a loan, it appears there's a serious problem."

In the case of Tesla, the Wall Street Journal reports that, "Federal investigators are probing whether Tesla's stated information about production of its Model 3 electric sedans had misled investors about the company's business. Under examination is Tesla's public statements about Model 3 productions as compared to the number of vehicles that were actually built."

Elon Musk and his companies have a very questionable record when it comes to truth and honesty. Overstating prices to qualify for higher state tax credits seems to fit a pattern. According to a recent report in The Oregonian/Oregon Live, "The state of Oregon has recovered $13 million it paid to Tesla for solar power projects, after an investigation conclude the company inflated prices to qualify for higher tax credits."

Whatever the potential benefits of such a system, one of the disastrous consequences would be light pollution. As they traveled across the skies, thousands of Starlink satellites would effectively make astronomical images useless by leaving long luminous trails. At the March 9 “Satellite 2020” conference keynote speech, Elon Musk dismissed those worries and claimed that his satellites will do no harm to astronomical research – if need be, they will be painted black. This idea was tested with satellite 1130, “DarkSat”. The results were unconvincing, to say the least. The next generation is supposed to be less luminous than the faintest stars that can be seen with the unaided eye, but this is still far too bright for astronomers’ ultra-sensitive instruments, which can observe stellar objects four


billion times fainter than that threshold. Why did you hide, or avoid, these widely covered facts unless you are a lying shill?

The low Earth orbit region is already heavily used by scientific, remote-sensing and telecom satellites as well as the International Space Station (ISS). A large-scale increase in the number of satellites would increase the risk of space collisions and the ensuing multiplication of debris – in the worst-case scenario, it could render the LEO and near-space environment unusable. The first incident already took place: on September 2, 2019, the European Space Agency was forced to move away one of its Earth observation satellites to avoid a collision after Starlink refused to change the path of its satellite. Elon Musk asserts that all the satellites be equipped with thrusters to make them fall back on Earth once they reach the end of their active life, but that doesn't reduce the risk while they're operational. Why would you hide these facts unless you are a Musk tool.

Since the first launch, six Starlink satellites have already failed. If a mere 5% of Starlink's satellites broke down during their estimated lifespan of five to seven years, they would add many thousands of fragments of space debris to the 20,000 already under surveillance.

Musk initially planned to put a quarter of his constellation at the altitude of 1,110 km (690 miles). Seventy-five percent were due to be placed no higher than 600 km (370 miles). Below this altitude, residual atmospheric drag will eventually cause a failed satellite to fall out of orbit. On April 17, 2020, SpaceX modified its plans and requested permission for all its satellites to orbit lower than 600 km. This reduces the risk of broken-down satellite staying in high-earth orbit for centuries, but increases congestion in the low Earth orbit region.

Beyond the operational risks, building, launching and maintaining such a gigantic network of satellites would require an enormous amount of raw materials and energy. Unlike the geostationary satellites commonly used by telecoms, Starlink satellites will stay in a low Earth orbit and cross the visible sky of a given location for just a few minutes. To follow and connect to them, buyers will have to use purpose-built phased array antennas. To make them affordable, they would have to be mass produced, and SpaceX has asked permission for 1 million of them. For starters. Why did you avoid discussing the obvious megalomania of Musk's scheme?



On March 9, 2020, Elon Musk claimed that thanks to Starlink, anybody "will be able to watch high-def movies, play video games and do all the things they want to do without noticing speed". Thus, Musk explicitly underlines his wish to reinforce already massively energy-guzzling digital activities, such as video streaming and online video games. These consume just below the whole electricity consumption of Europe (if you want figures, the world digital energy consumption of 3,834 TWh expected in 2020 is comparable to the 4,077 TWh for European electricity in 2018). Their share of world greenhouse gas emissions is already 4% and could double to 8% by 2025.

Musk's declaration ends on an ominous note, in essence saying *"My clients will be able to do whatever they want, just as I am able to do whatever I want"*. Why don't you discuss Musk's overt bribery of federal officials that he pays at NHTSA, DOE, FCC, SEC and other agencies, to avoid regulation?

Why do you also ignore the following assertions?

"...Elon Musk (Along with his Silicon Valley Cartel bromance frat boy buddies Eric Schmidt and Larry Page, et al) is a mobster-class criminal sociopath who hired business assassins to attack us and operated anti-trust and RICO law violating competitor "kill programs". He used his windfall of taxpayer funded cash and Goldman Sachs assisted stock market manipulations and intelligence agency staff and tools from In-Q-Tel and Google to engage in these crimes. We have demanded that the FBI arrest him and that the SEC, FTC and NHTSA prosecute him. We will make certain that his legacy, for the rest of time, reveals the true facts about his crimes and political manipulations..."

Per his own staff, ex-wives, partners, ex-founders, suppliers, FBI, SEC, Congress and private investigators. These are all statements from court reports, investigations, FBI submissions and Congressional reports. Each numbered statement is associated with a numbered witness report

containing the evidence for the statement. Please pass this report around and post it on Tesla windshields. We demand a hearing, with Musk on-site, on a live Senate televised and webcast investigation hearing in Congress to go over each of these points.

Nobody On Earth Can Launder And Hide Illicit Cash Like Elon Musk. He's worth an estimated $39 billion, but has repeatedly said he's poor. He is a scumbag liar and a crook!

In one of a series of wild tweets posted last week, Elon Musk stated he would be "selling almost all physical possessions" and that he would "own no house." He appears to be actually following through with that promise, as chronicled in a great story in *The Wall Street Journal* about Musk's personal finances that you should go read.

According to the *WSJ*, despite being worth an estimated $39 billion on paper:

> ...he has to borrow, sometimes a lot, to pay for his lifestyle and business investments without liquidating shares that help him maintain control of the companies he runs. About half his Tesla stock is pledged as collateral for personal loans, an April 28 financial filing shows. Maintaining his equity stake—about 20%, or around $29 billion at its current valuation—is important for him to keep control over the Silicon Valley auto maker.

Musk also doesn't take a salary at Tesla, but he apparently became eligible for stock options worth more than $1 billion this week. To get that money, he will need an eye-watering *$592 million* to exercise the option, according to the *WSJ*. It's not clear if Musk has the money on hand to exercise that option or if the money raised from the house sales will be used to help pay for the sum. "Mr. Musk said he wasn't selling his possessions because he needs the money," the *WSJ* reported.

The article also lists a few times Musk has said he's cash poor. Here's one example:

> Before Tesla went public, Mr. Musk told a judge during a contentious divorce with his first wife that he had run out of cash and had taken on emergency loans from friends to support his family and pay living expenses.

Here's another:

> Last year, Mr. Musk's ability to access cash came up again during a defamation lawsuit over comments he made about a man involved in the rescue of a Thai soccer team from a flooded cave in 2018. A lawyer in the case said in a filing that Mr. Musk had described himself as "financially illiquid."

The whole article has a lot of history about Musk, interesting information about his finances backed up by regulatory filings, and numerous quotes from Musk himself, and I sincerely recommend taking 10 minutes to read it in full.

Musk has Goldman Sachs, Welles Fargo and Wilson Sonsini Mobster-Class executive bankers hide his money in a rabbit warren of HUNDREDS of trusts, shell corporations and fake charities from South Dakota, to Switzerland to the Cayman Islands to Russia.

A federal investigation to show the tentacular diagram of scams has been demanded!

FBI, SEC, FTC and citizen forensic investigators are hot on his trail, though!

These are the illicit things that sociopath narcissist Musk has engaged in with the taxpayer cash he mooched from government treasuries:

1. PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS HAVE PRODUCED REPORTS ON THE ELON MUSK AND TESLA MOTORS FRAUD, STOCK RIGGING, BRIBERY AND SAFETY INVESTIGATIONS that Musk's Silicon Valley Sandhill Road venture capitalists cover-up.
2. Musk hides his money in illicit and false-front real-estate scams to avoid taxes and to launder money.
3. "His corrupt cobalt mines promote genocide in the Congo as seen in NETFLIX Black Earth Rising".
4. "His corrupt cobalt mines promote mass rape in the Congo as seen in NETFLIX Black Earth Rising".
5. "His corrupt cobalt mines promote child slave labor in the Congo as seen in NETFLIX Black Earth
   Rising".
6. "He tries to bury his ill-gotten money from the taxpayers in gobs of real estate acquisitions and houses including his notorious purchase of the Vaughn DeGuigne Court mansion at 891 Crystal Springs Road, in Burlingame, California which is staged for his kinky sex parties and Illuminati-like cartel get-togethers..."
7. "His is not faithful to his girlfriends. Some of them are Ghislane Maxwell-type enablers, too, just to hang around his money and promote his sex schemes like Maxwell did for Epstein"
8. "The workers that build his batteries die or sicken from toxic poisoning and Musk tries to hide his dirty factories overseas"
9. "Tesla bribes U.S. Senators with cash and stock in order to get free taxpayer funds"
10. "He is addicted to drugs and booze"
11. "He has 'sociopath-class' mental issues and he is a narcissist..."
12. "Tesla has had more recalls for safety defects, per volume, than any other car maker. Musk refuses to allow the use of the word RECALL but the facts are the facts."
13. "It is so easy to hack any Tesla and crash it, break into it or give it bad braking orders that it is criminally negligent to allow Tesla's on the street. Even the Chinese have hacked Tesla's from the other side of the world! Tesla's have been hacked and remotely crashed, the drivers killed and Tesla covers this up..."
14. "His partner: Steve Jurvetson, has been charged with sex and corruption issues"
15. "He arranged government kick-backs with the White House"
16. His entire current existence is based on stock market scams created with taxpayer dollars and Goldman Sachs securities manipulations
17. "He is the world's biggest government mooch and has taken more taxpayer cash than anyone in U.S. History as a billionaire who does not need a hand-out"
18. "He is a member of the Palo Alto Tech Mafia operated by Stanford University gay frat house guys"

19."Google (who is a major Tesla investor) hides all negative Musk/Tesla news in digital media globally and hypes TSLA stock in order to profiteer with Tesla stock. This is a violation of federal SEC laws"
20."More drivers have been caught driving drunk, in Tesla's, than any other car Per Capita produced"
21."Google boss Larry Page is Musk's 'bromance' boyfriend buddy and he uses Google to cover-up Musk's scandals"
22."His so-called 'foundation" is just a payola and tax evasion scam for his family. It is a charity scam"
23."His batteries are the most dangerous use of lithium ion storage ever conceived"
24."His partner: Panasonic, has been charged with multiple corruption, dumping, price rigging and manipulation crimes around the globe"
25."Almost all of the internet 'Tesla Fanboys' are Russian troll farms and hired bloggers that Musk pays vast amounts of money to in order to hype up a fake image for him. Musk has over 1000 click-farm and Russian troll bloggers under his employ via various false-front cover organization contractors.
26."The drug and murder-for-hire website: *Silk Road*, was built at drug-enthusiast Musk's company SpaceX by Musk's programmer and Musk hires many people from a group called: In-Q-Tel, who were caught with tons of cocaine on their airplanes in a DEA raid"
27."His SpaceX is nothing more than a domestic spy satellite company"
28.In-Q-Tel supplies a number of Musk's staff, yet In-Q-Tel has been accused of numerous criminal ventures and abuses of the public.
29.You never hear about these crimes because Musk's buddies in Silicon Valley control 90% of the global media these days and they censor any bad news about Musk in order to protect their Cartel.
30."Musk's brain chip company tortures monkey's and other small animals in bad science experiments"
31."His father screwed his daughter and got her pregnant. His father seems to be a pedophile and incest participant"
32."Dianne Feinstein and her family covertly own many Musk interests and arranged for him to get his funds from the taxpayers. She helped sabotage his competitors in her district"
33."You can't put out the fires when his batteries explode say fireman because Lithium fires are military class thermo-dynamics"
34."The fumes from his lithium ion thermal battery vapors give you cancer, lung and brain damage"
35.Psychologists say that Musk is a self promoting, narcissistic, multi-billion dollar, self-aggrandizing PR hype addict.
36.Many of us know these facts from personal interaction with Musk, his companies and his politicians.
37.Everything in these reports can be proven in a jury trial, Congressional hearings or live TV debates but Musk would rather die than face uncontrolled public scrutiny.
38.Musk will do anything to keep this information from getting out, including hiring attack

services like his Fusion GPS, Black Cube, Gawker and Gizmodo Kill services.

39. While Musk's dirty deeds sound like a bad Hollywood movie script. It all really happened and there is now massive hard copy evidence to prove it.
40. Elon Musk exists because he bribed DNC politicians including Obama, Clinton and Senators Feinstein, Reid, Boxer, Harris, Spier and Pelosi to give him free taxpayer cash and government resources from the Department of Energy and the California political tax pool.
41. When you follow-the-money and the insider trading, stock ownership and crony payola kick-backs. The payola between Musk, his scummy cronies and the politicians is proven.
42. The Musk empire pays bribes in billions of dollars of Google (Where Musk's boy buddy Larry Page works), Twitter, Facebook, Tesla, Netflix and Sony Pictures stock and stock warrants which is never reported to the FEC
43. The Musk empire pays bribes in billions of dollars of Google, Twitter, Facebook, Tesla, Netflix and Sony Pictures search engine rigging and shadow-banning which is never reported to the FEC
44. The Musk empire pays bribes in free rent
45. The Musk empire pays bribes in Male and female prostitutes
46. The Musk empire pays bribes in cars
47. The Musk empire pays bribes in dinners at fancy restaurants
48. The Musk empire pays bribes in socialite party financing
49. The Musk empire pays bribes in Sports Event Tickets
50. The Musk empire pays bribes in Political campaign printing and mailing services "Donations"
51. The Musk empire pays bribes in Secret PAC Financing. Musk's empire is a massive political financing conduit for the DNC politicians via a tentacular array of covert shell corporations, trusts, 501C's and stock bribes.
52. The Musk empire pays bribes in Jobs in Corporations in Silicon Valley For The Family Members of Those Who Take Bribes And Those Manage Bribes
53. The Musk empire pays bribes in "Consulting" contracts from McKinsey Consulting as fronted pay-off gigs
54. The Musk empire pays bribes in Overpriced "Speaking Engagements" which are really just pay-offs conduited for donors
55. The Musk empire pays bribes in Private jet rides and use of Government fuel depots (ie: Google handed out NASA jet fuel to staff)
56. The Musk empire pays bribes in commercial Real Estate
57. The Musk empire pays bribes in Fake mortgages
58. The Musk empire pays bribes in The use of Cayman, Boca Des Tores, Swiss and related money-laundering accounts and The use of HSBC, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs and Deustche Bank money laundering accounts and covert stock accounts
59. The Musk empire pays bribes in Free spam and bulk mailing services owned by Silicon Valley corporations
60. The Musk empire pays bribes in the use of high tech law firms such as Perkins Coie, Wilson Sonsini, MoFo, Covington & Burling, etc. to conduit bribes to officials
61. The U.S. Energy Dept (DOE) has been covering-up organized political crime activities in which

government funds are being used as a slush-fund to pay off political campaign financiers and to pay for CIA/GPS Fusion-Class attacks on Silicon Valley business competitors via Musk political conduits.

62. Political campaign financiers and government agency staff share stock market holdings with each other under family trusts, shell corporations and layered Goldman Sachs accounts.
63. The basic Musk scam-deal goes like this: *"Obama funds Tesla, Musk conduits campaign funds to Obama, top Obama staff profit off of insider Musk stocks..."*
64. Elon Musk is a criminal, a mobster, an asshole, a balding fake-hair wearing, plastic surgery-addicted, bi-sexual douchebag, woman-abusing, sex addicted, tax evader. We can put this in writing because all of those identifications regarding Musk can be proven in court and are documented in existing lawsuits and news stories.
65. Musk exploits poor people and child slaves in the Congo and Afghanistan to mine his lithium and Cobalt. Look up this phrase on the top search engines: “child labor electric car batteries”.
66. Musk spends billions per year to hire Russian trolls, fake blogger fan-boys and buy fake news self-glory look-at-me articles about himself.
67. Musk thinks he is the 'Jesus' of Silicon Valley and he will do anything to make the public think so.
68. Musk is insecure because his father was abusive and his “trophy wife” Mother is overbearing so he developed sociopath-like mental issues.
69. Musk has been professionally diagnosed as a 'psychotic narcissist.
70. He public stated on an investor call that he uses drugs and alcohol to get through the night. We have the tapes.
71. Musk relies on Google and the DNC Main Stream News (MSN) to hide bad news about him.
72. Fake News manipulator Google is run by Larry Page. Larry is Musk's investor and bromance ‘Butt buddy’. They share an apartment.
73. Musk uses massive numbers of shell companies and trust funds to self-deal, evade the law and hide his bribes and stock market insider trading.
74. His brother ran Solar City and is now under federal investigation for securities fraud.
75. A huge number of Tesla drivers have been killed; pedestrians and oncoming drivers have also been killed, and Musk covers it up.
76. Extremist politicians and their controlled news outlets refuse to allow any articles about Musk's crimes to be printed because they benefit from Musk's crimes.
77. Investor oligarch's Tim Draper and Steve Jurvetson are so fanatical about not being embarrassed from a Tesla bankruptcy that they will pump the TSLA stock and threaten anybody who might disclose the Musk misdeeds.
78. Peter Thiel, a Musk ‘boyfriend” also protects Musk. Musk, and his cronies, use Palantir, Google and related software to scan the entire internet every few minutes for any occurrence of the words: “Musk”, “Tesla” or “Tesla Fire”. They send trolls and fake bloggers (Many of them Russian) to put pro-Musk comments on the comments section of any blogs or articles discussing those topics and try to flood out the truth about Musk.
79. In EVERY blog that you read that mentions 'Musk', at least 1/3 of the comments have been placed their by Musk's paid shills.

80. There are no “Tesla Fan Boys”. All of the fanatic Tesla comments on the internet are Musk’s, Thiel’s, Jurvetson’s and Draper’s fake fanboy trolls. Musk, himself, stays up late at night pretending to be a ‘Tesla Fan Boy’on blogs.
81. The 'Silicon Valley Mafia; cartel of frat boy sociopath venture capitalists like Steve Jurvetson, Tim Draper, Eric Schmidt, et al; threaten those who do not support the cult of Tesla or their political candidates.
82. Musk holds the record for getting sued for fraud by his investors, wives, former partners, employees, suppliers and co-founders.
83. Elon Musk has gone out of his way to hire hundreds of ex-CIA and In-Q-Tel staff and assign them to "dirty tricks teams" to attack his competitors and elected officials who Musk hates.
84. Musk never founded his companies. He took Tesla away from the founder: Marty, in a hostile take-over!
85. Musk's "Starlink" satellites are domestic spy and political manipulation tools - never get your internet from one. SpaceX is entirely a spy satellite operation.
86. The same kind of EMF radiation proven to cause cancer from cell phones exists in massive amounts in a Tesla.
87. Musk can't fix a car or build a rocket and has almost no mechanical skills he can't build or work on any of the things he made himself famous for.
88. If you pull a report of every VIN# of every Tesla ever built and cross reference that with insurance, repair and lawsuit records you will find that the "per volume" fire, crash, death and defect rate is THE WORST of any car maker in history!
89. Musk is a lying con artist and partners with Goldman Sachs to rig the stock market. Sachs has a dedicated team of 18+ men who rig stocks and valuation bumps for Musk.
90. Over 1000 witnesses can prove every one of those claims in any live televised Congressional hearing!
91. Senators Dianne Feinstein, Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Kamala Harris and their associates own the stock in Tesla Motors and/or it's suppliers and mining companies. That is why they criminally help cover-up investigations of Tesla!
92. All of this was reported, in writing, to James Comey, Patricia Rich and David Johnson at the FBI by those who supplied this information but Musk has yet to be arrested because crooked California politicians, who own his stock, protect him from arrest.
93. Why aren’t all of those parties in prison if it is so easy to prove the crime? Think back to recent history: the heads of the Department of Energy, the FBI, The DOJ and the U.S. Attorney General were kicked out of their jobs for corruption. THIS was the corruption they were doing. They all knew about this crime but they were covering it up.
94. Musk took over Tesla Motors in a hostile take-over in order to exploit lithium, cobalt and other mining corruption deals for his business partners.
95. When you take a look at the ‘lithium’ in Musk’s horrifically miss-engineered lithium ion batteries you will uncover horrible crimes engaged in to acquire it.
96. His batteries cause wars in the Congo, Afghanistan and Bolivia from the corrupt mining deals involved with mining lithium and cobalt.
97. Lithium ion batteries are insider trading-owned by ex-CIA boss Woolsey and DOE Boss Chu.

98. Lithium ion batteries excrete chemicals that mutate fetuses when they burn and destroy your brain, lungs and nervous system when they burn
99. Musk's batteries kill the factory workers who make them
100. Musk's batteries cause Panasonic to be one of the most corrupt companies in the world
101. Musk's batteries poison the Earth when disposed of
102. Musk's batteries can't be extinguished by firemen
103. Musk's batteries poison firemen when they burn
104. Musk's batteries are based on criminally corrupt mining schemes like URANIUM ONE
105. Musk's batteries have over 61 toxic chemicals in them
106. Musk's batteries come from an industry that spends billions on internet shills and trolls used to nay say all other forms of energy
107. Musk's batteries and are insider-trading owned by corrupt U.S. Senators who are running a SAFETY COVER-UP about their dangers.
108. Apple products with lithium ion batteries have been exploding and setting people on fire.
109. Over time the chemical dendrites, or deposits, inside each Musk battery grow worse and increase the chances of explosion as they age -
110. Musk's LITHIUM ION BATTERIES BECOME MORE AND MORE LIKELY TO EXPLODE AS TIME GOES ON AND AS THEY AGE. This is not a theory. This is a scientific fact. That is why you hear about more and more lithium batteries catching fire and blowing up.
111. Additionally, scientists also speculate that the increasing presence of low energy nuclear background energy and wifi energy in the environment is making lithium ion batteries explode more often lately. This theory is upheld by the increasing number of FAA reports about commercial airline cabins suddenly “filling up with toxic smoke” as some lithium ion battery explodes in someones overhead luggage. As commercial jets go higher they lose the protection of the atmosphere and are subjected to more gamma (and other) radiation from overhead. This makes the already unstable lithium ion batteries on board blow up.
112. "Bad Guys" have figured out how to make them explode remotely in devices by making the device electronics cause the batteries to overload.
113. The dangers of lithium ion batteries are hidden by CNN and Main Stream News (MSN) because pretty much only the DNC people profit from them and the DNC folks control CNN and the MSN.
114. The Obama Administration promised Silicon Valley oligarchs the market monopoly on lithium ion batteries and the sabotage of fuel cells in exchange for campaign financing and search engine rigging
115. United States Senators that are supposed to protect us from these deadly products own the stock market assets of them so they protect them and stop the FDA, OSHA, DOT & NHTSA from outlawing them.
116. Tom Steyer is a notorious DNC financier. His partner, Margaret Sullivan ran, the federal USAID agency, USAID sent all of the DNC campaign financiers in Silicon Valley a federal ‘report’ from USAID that said there was “A TRILLION DOLLARS OF LITHIUM IN AFGHANISTAN” and promised to give those lithium mines, EXCLUSIVELY, to the Silicon Valley venture capitalists if they funded and web search manipulated the election for Obama to

take over the White House. We have the documents proving this. In other words, a re-up of the Afghan War was caused by Elon Musk and it killed American soldiers so that Musk could buy more mansions and trophy wives.

117. Alkaline, NiCAD and hundreds of other battery chemistries DO NOT have all of these problems but Lithium Ion batteries get a monopoly because of politician insider trading ownerships.
118. Tesla Motors has caused far more deaths and injuries than the world generally knows about.
119. A recent fire on U.S. Highway 101 near Mountain View, CA, burned the driver alive and killed him.
120. In Florida two kids died in a Tesla, burned alive, screaming in agony.
121. A man died in agony in a Tesla crash in Malibu that set Malibu Canyon on fire.
122. A young woman, at the start of life, and her boyfriend were burned alive in their crashed Tesla.
123. There are many more deaths and crashes than you have seen in the Main Stream News (MSN) The deaths and the cover-ups are endless.
124. Senators Dianne Feinstein, Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Kamala Harris and their associates own the stock in Tesla Motors and/or it's suppliers and mining companies and they cover-up and halt investigations and laws designed to save the public. They, and their crony's, spend over $1B a year to shill and troll hype about lithium ion batteries and cover-up the dangers.
125. Lithium ion EVs are more prone to battery fires. Experts say that their lithium-ion batteries can fuel hotter fires that release toxic fumes and are more difficult to put out.
126. Lithium ion fires keep reigniting which explains why it takes so long and requires copious amounts of water or foam (it is an electric fire, after all) to smother the flames.
127. Tesla employee Bernard Tse and his team warned Elon Musk about these dangers in 2008 and they got fired and/or warned to "say nothing" by Musk.
128. Three top Tesla engineers died in a plane crash next to Tesla offices in San Carlos after two of them agreed to become whistle-blowers.
129. The DNC bosses, Congress people and federal executives own the stock in lithium, Solar and EV markets and use kickbacks from those markets (Especially via convoluted campaign finance laundering via Elon Musk) to finance the DNC.
130. The DNC bosses and Musk use character assassination as their main political tool against any member of the public who speaks out against their felony stock market scams and PizzaGate-like scandals. The Harvey Weinstein reports by Ronan Farrow show that they have teams of hired goons that they pay to destroy people's lives. They use Black Cube, Mossad, In-Q-Tel, Stratfor, Gawker Media, Gizmodo Media, Media Matters, David Brock, Sid Blumenthal, NY Times, Google servers, Facebook servers, Podesta Group, Perkins Coie, Covington & Burling and a host of "media assassins".
131. Musk's "cabin boy": Jared Birchell, runs around covering up Musk crimes all day
132. Gawker and Gizmodo Media set-up the attack stories and, in paid partnership with Google, Google kicks their attack links around the globe, in front of 8 Billion people, forever. Google locks the attack articles of its enemies on the front top search results of Google search results forever, on purpose! Google and Musk are partners-in-crime.
133. Larry Page steals technology for Google and Musk meets with Larry Page to advise him on

which technologies to steal and how to bypass FEC laws.

134. Musk has exceeded FEC campaign finance limits by billions of dollars via “in-kind” services.
135. Reports at https://www.propublica.org prove some of these assertions
136. Reports at https://www.transparency.org prove some of these assertions
137. Reports at https://www.icij.org prove some of these assertions
138. Reports at http://londonworldwide.com prove some of these assertions
139. Reports at https://stopelonfromfailingagain.com prove some of these assertions
140. Reports at https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-02-24/tesla-slams-tree-florida-bursting-flames-and-killing-driver prove some of these assertions
141. Reports at Elon Musk is a total fraud - nypost.com prove some of these assertions
142. Reports at Elon Musk is a total fraud: Truth about Tesla billionaire exposed prove some of these assertions
143. Reports at Elon Musk Passes the Hat Again on Capitol Hill… And in China prove some of these assertions
144. Reports at About Elon Musk - A WASHINGTON DC ORGANIZED CRIME prove some of these assertions
145. Reports at Mark Spiegel: Elon Musk is 'a pathological liar' prove some of these assertions
146. Reports at https://nationalnewsnetwork.net/ prove some of these assertions
147. Reports at http://www.videonet111.com prove some of these assertions
148. MUSK'S SPACEX COMPANY Will have all of it's satellites destroyed in moments as soon as China gets pissed off: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/02/12/asia-pacific/chinas-space-debris-cleanup-may-cover-story-arms-u-s-satellites-pentagon/
149. WE HAVE ASKED THE FBI, DOJ, OSC, SEC, FTC, GAO, U.S. CONGRESS, AND OTHERS, TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE MUSK AND HIS CRONY OPERATION!
150. ELON MUSK'S PAID-FOR MEDIA SHILLS COVER UP HIS CORRUPTION AND PUSH PUFF-STORIES ABOUT MUSK. NEVER TRUST THEM TO BE ANYTHING BUT BIASED PROPAGANDA OUTLETS. MANY OF THEM OWN TESLA STOCK: Electrek, Google, Facebook, CNN, Huffington Post, Dianne Feinstein's PR office, Nancy Pelosi, Steven Chu, MSNBC, PayPal, KPIX-TV, San Jose Mercury News, Any Hearst owned entity, The SF Chronicle, Motley Fool, Green Car Congress, The executive staff of the DNC, The NY Times, etc.
151. We saw Elon Musk commit crimes and we saw the Obama White House cover-up those crimes.We, and our associates, worked for Bright Automotive, Zap Electric, Aptera, Eco Motors, XPV, The United States Department of Energy and the federal Office of Management and Budget and Tesla Motors itself.Americans have an expectation that their tax dollars will be used in a fair and legal manner and not to pay off crony campaign financiers like Elon Musk.
152. Americans have an expectation that fair market competition will decide which companies get to live or die and that no campaign financiers gets to order the White House to produce the death or success decision about any American business. Elon Musk’s operation exists entirely because of criminal corruption and all of his companies must be shut down by federal law enforcement.
153. For nearly a decade, the U.S. Department of Energy has refused to comply with Freedom of

Information Act (FOIA) requests for copies of Tesla Motors entire D.O.E. funding application documents. Former D.O.E. employees have shredded copies of those documents in order to keep them from being exposed to the public and the media. Why would they do that? Because those documents reveal felony criminal fraud by Tesla Motors, federal violations of the Section 136 law requirements and manipulations of the "hard-wiring" of the entire D.O.E. program. Those documents, which we have seen (and some Senate staff have private copies of) prove that, in a side-by-side comparison with all other applicants, the Tesla application was manipulation, rigged, false-reviewed and crony-advanced in order to pay-off certain campaign financiers and damage their competitors.

154. Demand that the U.S. Department of Energy stop breaking the law and comply with the FOIA requests to stop hiding the incriminating evidence in the Tesla files. Demand that the public be shown the original paper and not the later, "doctored" versions.
155. We saw Elon Musk operate an entirely illegal and unethical program based on State and Federal corruption. We told this, in writing and in person to the U.S. Attorney General: Eric Holder, who then quit his job after we reported these facts to him.
156. We reported that Elon Musk lied about vast number of dangers of the lithium ion chemistry he was using. Nothing was done.
157. We reported that our associates at the Department of Energy were having their safety reports on lithium ion danger suppressed. Nothing was done.
158. We reported that Elon Musk's credit rating and financial records were fraudulent and amounted to "cooking the books". Nothing was done.
159. We reported bribes paid by Musk's lobbyists and associated to government officials in order to grease the skids for his crony payola. Nothing was done.
160. We reported that Goldman Sachs and Tesla Motors were operating a stock fraud pump-and-dump scam to manipulate Elon Musk's stock holdings. Nothing was done.
161. We reported over a hundred illegal and corrupt actions by Elon Musk and his mob of Silicon Valley gangsters. Nothing was done.
162. If you have an ounce of morality, then you will not want to help Musk & Tesla profit from the crony political corruption that created them. Musk exists because he bribes politicians & acts as an illegal campaign financing conduit.
163. DOT/NHTSA has covered up years of reports about an acceleration surge issue that can suddenly crash your Tesla into walls and drive it off cliffs. It is either a known hacking attack or the effect of WiFi on Tesla electronics. Either can kill you.
164. Musk & Tesla are pure evil & exist because of hyper-corruption. You don't want to contribute to their evil or be part of it in any way. You are funding evil & supporting criminal corruption by buying a Tesla or any Elon Musk owned product like Solar City, Tesla, Space X, Hyperloop, etc.!
165. Elon Musk spent more money, than any other car company in history, to do the exact same things that any other car has done, or could do, for 20 times less money. Musk's Tesla was $100,000.00 over budget, per car, at the time that Musk was handed his crony Dept. of Energy froms by Steven Chu. Musk has no clue how to operate a car company.
166. In one lawsuit it is noted that: "...Plaintiff and Tesla both applied for funds at the same time, in

the same funding cycle in the same program. Tesla had the historically epic number of horrific issues listed below, which were known to DOE at the time of application, and Plaintiffs had NONE of these issues. How can any court, or rational person, believe that Plaintiffs were not intentionally bypassed, targeted and damaged for political reasons while Tesla was simultaneously approved for political reasons, when the comparative metrics between the two applicants prove the largest merit disparity in the entire recorded history of the U.S. Department of Energy….the singular, and only, review criteria used by Department of Energy officials was: WHICH ONE BRIBED THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE GROUP FOR BARACK OBAMA?!"; Thus proving that Tesla exists because of organized-crime level political corruption.

167. Elon Musk's self-driving "autopilot" feature, which keeps crashing and failing, is his attempt to scam taxpayer cash from Dept. of Transportation and Dept. of Energy public funds. He is only trying to do it to get more free federal cash.
168. The inventor of lithium ion batteries has confessed that lithium ion batteries blow up eventually. He says that deadly dendrites plague lithium-ion battery technology. The dendrites accumulate as part of the standard charging and recharging cycle and eventually cause a short circuit that often results in a smoldering or burning battery. These dendrites are destined to eventually blow up most Tesla cars and many electronic devices using lithium ion!
169. The CIA's software designed to take over any Tesla on Earth and kill the driver, passengers and bystanders has been released in the wild and every hacker on Earth can now easily get a copy of it and kill you in your Tesla!
170. Ex-employees have leaked faked financial records, evidence of massive click-farm fake social media manipulation and evidence of unreported deaths and accidents. They say that most Tesla's have one kind of defect or another.
171. If you read about the dirty deeds and cocaine dealings with the In-Q-Tel airplanes called "Cocaine 1" & "Cocaine 2", & the corruption behind the company called In-Q-Tel & Musk's software programmer who ran "The Silk Road" drug & murder service then you must be concerned that many In-Q-Tel people work for Musk. Why does Musk need dirty druggies & spies on his payroll unless he is running covert drug and business spying activities?
172. Ex-employees, Gawker writers and gay lawyers from Covington & Burling have leaked stories that Elon Musk, Reid Hoffman, Larry Page are "butt buddies".
173. Musk is anti-American and Anti-Worker Rights and has been caught flying in H1-B cheap offshore labor and exploiting immigrants for his deadly profits. Musk hates unions and worker rights efforts.
174. Elon Musk gets the Cobalt chemical to make his lithium ion batteries from slave trade and blood-money corruption in the Congo!
175. The lithium ion batteries that Musk uses also blow up when they naturally encounter Low Energy Nuclear (LENR) effects in the ambient environment. Millions of chemicals don't blow up from LENR'd but lithium ion does!
176. If you are a Democrat then know that Elon Musk cost you the Hillary Clinton campaign because of his payola schemes. If you are a Republican, know that Elon Musk is the epitome of the worst form of DNC crony corruption you ever saw!
177. Musk bribed California politicians to give him hundreds of millions of dollars of taxpayer

dollars & resources he never earned or worked for. He only got those crony payola perks handed to him because he operated as an illicit front for corrupt campaign financing for Dianne Feinstein, Jerry Brown, Harry Reid, Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton.

178. Multiple parties have filed “Demands For The Arrest of Elon Musk” with the FBI, DOJ, AG, FTC, SEC and other law enforcement agencies. It is not likely that Musk, or his companies will survive a full investigation.

179. Tesla and Solyndra sit on the same land in Fremont, CA. Solyndra was raided by the FBI for corruption. Tesla SHOULD be raided by the FBI for corruption. Both companies had kick-back crony payola schemes with Senator Dianne Feinstein. She owned the land, lease, HR, construction company and supplier interests and stock for both companies in one of the most massive conflict-of-interest crony financing schemes in U.S. history. Elon Musk and the Feinsteins are corruption partners.

180. People who see you in a Tesla think of you as a “Tone Deaf Douchebag”, “Tesla Tool!”, “Arrogant Prick”, “Ostentatious Obama Oaf”, “Sheep”, “Mindless Yuppie Scum”, “Misogynistic Silicon Valley Clone”, “Self-promoting Elitist Douche”, “Fake News Reading Main Stream Boob”, “Naive Idiot” or other bad things.

181. Elon Musk is one of the main financiers behind Barack Obama & Hillary Clinton, both of whom have been charged with corruption. Musk endlessly tweets lies & “...No I didn’t do those bad things” BS but nobody else supports him.

182. Tesla financial records are “cooked” in a fraudulent manner to make the stock market valuation of Tesla a falsely manipulated factor. Musk uses “pre-orders”, by his own investors, to fake sales and wrote emails to customers asking them to put small deposits down so he could book them as fully paid sales in one of a large number of stock and loan valuation frauds. Musk and his investors practice stock market skims, pump-and-dumps and Flash Boy manipulations.

183. Lithium ion batteries are blowing up, starting fires &, generally, destroying people’s homes, cars, electronics & physical health. Boeing was ordered to stop flying the 787 Dreamliner because it's Lithium ion batteries are catching fire spontaneously. A group of silicon valley venture capitalists forced/leveraged the government to buy & pay for these specific batteries, that they have stock in, in order to benefit their profit margins. Other batteries don’t have these problems. They knew about the dangers from day one, but put greed ahead of safety. There are thousands & thousands of reports of spontaneous lithium ion fires but the VC's who back lithium ion pay to keep this information hushed up. Millions of these batteries have been recalled for fire risk. The VC's tried to push as many as they could before they got caught. Now they are caught. These VC's & the Senators they bribed own stock in lithium mining companies too.

184. Tesla Motors has filed a patent which states the following , THESE ARE TESLA MOTORS WORDS warning about a crisis, the level of which they never disclosed to the consumer: **“Thermal runaway is of major concern since a single incident can lead to significant property damage &, in some circumstances, bodily harm or loss of life. When a battery undergoes thermal runaway, it typically emits a large quantity of smoke, jets of flaming liquid electrolyte, & sufficient heat to lead to the combustion & destruction of materials in close proximity to the cell. If the cell undergoing thermal runaway is surrounded by one or**

more additional cells as is typical in a battery pack, then a single thermal runaway event can quickly lead to the thermal runaway of multiple cells which, in turn, can lead to much more extensive collateral damage. Regardless of whether a single cell or multiple cells are undergoing this phenomenon, if the initial fire is not extinguished immediately, subsequent fires may be caused that dramatically expand the degree of property damage. For example, the thermal runaway of a battery within an unattended laptop will likely result in not only the destruction of the laptop, but also at least partial destruction of its surroundings, e.g., home, office, car, laboratory, etc. If the laptop is on-board an aircraft, for example within the cargo hold or a luggage compartment, the ensuing smoke & fire may lead to an emergency landing or, under more dire conditions, a crash landing. Similarly, the thermal runaway of one or more batteries within the battery pack of a hybrid or electric vehicle may destroy not only the car, but may lead to a car wreck if the car is being driven or the destruction of its surroundings if the car is parked". See http://whoiselonmusk.com for more...

185. Tesla's own staff, & every fire department, have now admitted that once a lithium ion fire gets started in a Tesla, that it is impossible to extinguish burning lithium ion material. This is Telsa's own words in THEIR patent filing, (You can look it up online) saying that the risk is monumental. Tesla has 6800 lithium ion batteries, any one of which can "go thermal", start a chain reaction and blow up all of the rest of the 6800+ deadly batteries! Tesla drivers have been burned alive in thermal globs of flaming lithium ion, plastics & metal. Bystanders have heard their horrific screams of unutterable pain & terror as they were burned alive! Tesla fires can't be extinguished & the bodies are burned into "unrecognizable lumps of charred flesh", according to fireman.
186. Lithium Ion batteries "go thermal" in peoples pockets, in your notebook, especially in a Tesla & Fisker car. There are tens of thousands of articles documenting this & there is a cover-up by the VC's that fund these things to keep this fact out-of-sight. Making Lithium Ion batteries poisons the workers who make them. It is a dangerous product that is covered-up by the Obama Administration. Panasonic knows that these batteries are deadly.
187. Tesla only exists to exploit Elon Musk's briberies. The lithium ion batteries blow up when they get: wet, hot, bumped, over-charged, struck by energy fields, exposed to air or squashed. Lithium ion batteries poison the Earth & that they poison & kill the workers that make them. Lithium ion batteries come from war profiteering in Afghan & Bolivian corruption
188. Panasonic is Elon Musk's partner. Panasonic is one of the most corrupt companies in the world. Panasonic has been charged, on multiple continents with: Product dumping, bribery, collusion, price fixing, anti-trust law violations, racketeering, worker abuse, toxic poisoning of workers, & other crimes. It is no wonder that Elon Musk & Panasonic are partners. Tata Motors executive Karl Slym was killed for exposing this fact.
189. Your tax dollars were stolen in order to make Tesla Motors, as part of a political financing kick-back scam. In other words, part of your paycheck was taken away from you in order to buy hookers, rent-boys & private jets for Musk & company.
190. Tesla's are forged in criminal corruption, so anybody who drives a Tesla must be either ignorant, a weasel or one of the corrupt. The whole world now knows all of the facts in this list

so you can never plead ignorance to these crimes.

191. Telsa’s have a huge amount of highly documented defects. The defects are so extensive that Tesla made buyers sign confidentiality agreements to try to hide how messed up their cars are.
192. Tesla’s have killed more people than the main-stream news has reported. The full Tesla death-list is covered up.
193. Musk lied about why he wanted to make electric cars, when, in fact, he actually poisons the environment because Tesla investors wanted to exploit toxic minerals & materials which can't be recycled in a clean manner
194. No other electric car has been so mundane, & yet had so many problems with it, since the electric car was first sold in the 1800's. There is nothing “novel” or “amazing” about the Tesla aside from dime store parlor tricks for PR hype.
195. More drunks have crashed Tesla's, than any other per capita car in the world, per volume of cars made
196. Elon Musk's co-founders, investors, partners, wives, investors, suppliers & employees have sued him for being a fraud &, essentially, called him an "asshole" in court records.
197. Elon Musk lied on this Department of Energy funding application and the Obama Administration refuses to allow any federal employees or witnesses to testify to these facts in public due to the devastating potential results of these facts.
198. More owners of Tesla's have been found to cheat on their taxes, & be involved in abuse-based divorces, than almost any other car brand owner. Tesla owners are bad people who rationalize their poor life choices. Owning a Tesla is a red-flag for a tax audit!
199. Elon Musk will lie, cheat & steal in order to self-aggrandize & glorify his egotistical mania. Musk has been documented engaging in over 100 lies which were later proven to be false. He has spent tens of millions of dollars to buy fake news about himself on Twitter, Facebook & Google because he is such a mentally disturbed ego-maniac.
200. None of Elon Musk's companies would exist if not for taxpayer funded handouts given to him by corrupt politicians in exchange for illegal campaign finance deals with him & his investors.
201. Google, & Tesla, who are financial & political partners, have both been caught spying on consumers & manipulating Internet data in order to cover-up their complicity in huge political corruption & kick-back deals
202. Musk took U.S. taxpayer dollars from the government & then hired cheap off-shore labor & fired U.S. Union workers & domestic workers. He lied to & screwed the NUMMI workers that were working at the Fremont plant.
203. Musk has put over 18 surveillance devices in the Tesla. Anybody can hack those devices & monitor you. WORSE YET, foreign agents have hacked the Tesla & taken over the controls & driven Tesla’s into bystanders & over cliffs.
204. When Erick Strickland was head of the NHTSA he was confronted about DOT safety cover-ups of the Tesla to protect Obama. He quit 48 hours later. The DOT safety cover-ups to protect the Obama campaign finance payola scheme continue to this day. Obama’s Gibbs, Emanual, Plouffe, Axelrod and Carney quit within a week of being threatened with exposure.
205. Elon Musk paid some of the largest bribes in the history of China, facilitated by Dianne Feinstein and her Chinese spy connections, in order to get his China factory opened.

206. Tesla's have had a large number of recalls but Elon Musk refuses to call them "recalls". Tesla's have had multiple recalls for SEVERE safety dangers. DOT has been told this, in writing, for years, but wont take action in order to protect Obama.
207. Elon Musk is a bullshit artist who has no original ideas & wears black-turtle neck shirts (like Elizabeth Homes) to try to create a "cult" around himself & convince the world that he is a "Jesus-like" figure when, in fact, he is a clinical sociopath.
208. Tesla is a severe public safety hazard that has been systematically covered up by corrupt politicians.
209. Large numbers of Ex-CIA staff and In-Q-Tel spy staff work for Musk. Why does he need spies to build cars?
210. Tesla Motors batteries were promoted by those who wished to exploit the Afghanistan War for personal profit by controlling the Afghan lithium mining fields. Kleiner Perkins and Draper Fisher hyped the "...trillions of $ of lithium in Afghanistan."
211. Tesla Motors batteries blow up on their own because their chemistry causes them to be naturally defective.
212. Tesla Motors batteries blow up when they get wet because their chemistry is activated by water to make them explode.
213. Tesla Motors batteries fires cannot be put out by any common fire-fighting resources.
214. Tesla Motors batteries set themselves on fire.
215. Per Federal MSDS disclosure documents, Tesla Motors batteries emit cancer-causing vapors when they burn.
216. Tesla Motors Vehicles toxicity poison bystanders, nearby vehicular passengers, airline passengers in planes carrying said batteries in their holds, & environments where such incidents occur.
217. Tesla Motors batteries blow up when bumped by the same level of car incident that would, otherwise, only dent a normal car bumper.
218. In an accident, when a Tesla rolls over, molten metal & plastic can drip on & burn the occupants alive.
219. Tesla has multiple sexual harassment and unsafe work-place lawsuits against the company.
220. Per MSDS documents, Tesla Motors batteries emit brain damaging chemicals when they burn
221. Tesla is a stock pumping scam to profiteering on stock market peak manipulation at the expense of taxpayers.
222. Per MSDS documents, Tesla Motors batteries emit chemicals, burning, or not, that can damage an unborn fetus within the mother
223. Per MSDS documents, Tesla Motors batteries emit chemicals that can cause lung damage.
224. Per MSDS documents, Tesla Motors batteries emit chemicals that can cause liver damage.
225. Per published lawsuits & news reports, the factories that make Tesla Motors batteries have been charged with the deaths, & potentially fatal illness, of over 1000 workers & the poisoning of nearby towns.
226. Tesla Motors batteries become even more dangerous over time, particularly when tasked by electric transportation systems like Hover-boards & Tesla's. The chemistry in a lithium ion battery changes to become more unstable over time.

227. Tesla Motors batteries were never designed to be used in automobiles. Tesla used non-automotive batteries in one of the most dangerous configurations possible.
228. Tesla Motors occupants experience higher EMF radiation exposure than gasoline vehicle occupants.
229. Elon Musk's Space X vehicles & Tesla Motors vehicles have both had a higher-than-average number of explosions. This has caused outside experts to doubt Musk's ability to place safety considerations over his need for hyped-up PR.
230. Leaked Sandia National Labs & FAA research videos dramatically demonstrate the unstoppable, horrific, “re-percussive accelerating domino-effect” explosive fire effect of the Tesla Motors batteries.
231. Tesla's own “Superchargers” & home 3-prong chargers have set Tesla's, homes & businesses on fire
232. Consumer rights groups contacted Erick Strickland, the head of the NHTSA, & charged him with a cover-up. He quit days later. The NHTSA then issued a safety investigation request to Tesla Motors, which would have more publicly exposed these dangers, but the safety investigation was never under-taken due to White House requests & lobbyist bribes, from Tesla, which got the investigation shut down.
233. NEPA regulations for the Tesla NUMMI factory in California & the Nevada Tesla “Gigafactory” have been violated relative to environmental safety standards.
234. Tesla Motors vehicles are not “Factory Built” “like Ford” builds cars, as Tesla professes. They are hand built in small volumes & subjected to numerous defects. Blogs have documented hundreds of defects, as listed by Tesla owners. Tesla has lost at least one LEMON CAR LAWSUIT for defective manufacturing.
235. Tesla's “showrooms” are often “pop-up” retail storefronts that are in tight-proximity retail centers, putting it's neighbors at risk of total loss from fire damage.
236. Tesla Motors vehicles have been hacked & taken over. Their doors, steering, listening devices & navigation have been taken over by outside parties. Multiple Tesla have suddenly swerved off the road, over cliffs & into other vehicles, killing bystanders & Tesla drivers.
237. Three Tesla top engineers & two competing senior executives, all of whom had whistle-blown on Tesla, who were in perfect health one day, suddenly died mysteriously the next day.
238. Multiple employees, founders, investors, marital partners, suppliers & others have sued Tesla Motors, &/or it's senior executives for fraud. Musk had nothing to do with creating Tesla. He ran a hostile take-over of Tesla from the founders.
239. In addition to suing him, many of his former staff & partners have described Musk as an “Arrogant Prick”.
240. Main-Stream Media (MSM) have agreed not to provide news coverage of the deadly defects of the Tesla because the MSM are owned by the same politicians who own Tesla Motors. It is now legal to sue The New York Times for hiding these deadly defects, though, particularly if your family member was injured or killed because they covered-up the danger for political reasons.
241. If you think the above bullet-points are bad there are over a 1000 more. Find the book “Is Elon Musk A Fraud” online or visit https://stopelonfromfailingagain.com/ or thousands of other sites

that expose the truth about Musk & Tesla!

242. BANKRUPT MUSK – NO CASH FOR CRONY CORRUPTION. Print this out & freely re-post it on blogs & social media. Post this on bulletin boards. Put this on the windshield of every Tesla you find. Print this out & hand these out in front of every Tesla dealership: Nobody can stop you from handing these out, it is your U.S. Constitutional First Amendment Right! Pass the word! We are prepared to back up every single fact on here at any public meeting with the FBI, Congress, FTC, GAO, SEC or before a Federal Special Prosecutor.

243. The crash of a Tesla Model X through the home of South Korean singer and actor Ji Chang Son. The crash ended with the nose of the vehicle in Ji Chang Son's living room after the Tesla malfunctioned. Hundreds of such Tesla crashes have occurred, resulting in the deaths and injuries of Tesla owners, passengers, bystanders, oncoming drivers and others.

244. Following accusations by a Korean celebrity that a Tesla car spontaneously drove through a wall, the carmaker has replied that the crash was “entirely due to the man’s horrible driving” in an ongoing effort, by Tesla, to steer the blame away from Tesla faulty engineering Actor and singer Son Ji-chang (identified as Ji Chang Son in court documents) claimed he was parking his Tesla Model X SUV when the vehicle suddenly lurched forward into his living room.

245. In a lawsuit filed last week in California, Son claimed that the crash was due to “sudden unintended acceleration” and sought class-action status with other Model X owners. In a nod to the car’s ability to sense and avoid crashes, the lawsuit also hinted that the Model X should not be allowed take actions that the car “knows will result in the collision with a fixed object.”

246. In June, another California-based Model X owner, Puzant Ozbag, similarly claimed that his Model X spontaneously accelerated through a parking lot and into a wall. A special prosecutor is needed to investigate Tesla due to the huge number of cover-ups, by Tesla and the Obama Administration, to protect camapign financier Elon Musk. Jeff Sessions needs to hire a lawyer from outside the government appointed by Sessions as attorney general or, in the United States, by Congress to investigate a government official for misconduct while in office. A reasoning for such an appointment is that the governmental branch or agency may have political connections to those it might be asked to investigate. Inherently, this creates a conflict of interest and a solution is to have someone from outside the department lead the investigation. The term "special prosecutor" may have a variety of meanings from one country to the next, from one government branch to the next within the same country, and within different agencies within each government branch. Critics of the use of special prosecutors argue that these investigators act as a "fourth branch" to the government because they are not subject to limitations in spending, nor do they have deadlines to meet.

247. Attorneys carrying out special prosecutor functions in either federal or state courts of the United States are typically appointed ad hoc with representation limited to one case or a delineated series of cases that implicate compelling governmental interests, such as: Fraud (SEC, Complex, Cybercrime, Mortgages), Public Corruption, Money Laundering & Asset Forfeiture, Civil Rights, Racketeering Across State lines, Environmental Protection, National Security, Tax & Bankruptcy, Organized Crime, or International cases where the US is a party). [1] Special prosecutors in courts of the United States may either be appointed formally by one of the three branches of government in a criminal proceeding, or when dictated by federal law

or regulation, or informally in civil proceedings, and also by one of the three branches of government, or by a non-governmental entity to prosecute alleged unlawful conduct by government agents. When appointed by the judicial branch to investigate and, if justified, seek indictments in a particular judicial branch case, the attorney is called special prosecutor.[2] When appointed/hired particularly by a governmental branch or agency to investigate alleged misconduct within that branch or agency, the attorney is called independent counsel.[3] When appointed/hired by the state or political subdivision to assist in a particular judicial branch case when the public interest so requires, the attorney is called special counsel.[3] When appointed/hired by an organization, corporation, person or other non-governmental entity to investigate and, if justified, seek indictments against one or more government officials for acts committed under color of law, the attorney may be called special counsel or special prosecut. The term is sometimes used as a synonym for independent counsel, but under the former law authorizing the independent counsel, the appointment was made by a special panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Ethics in Government Act expired in 1999, and was effectively replaced by Department of Justice regulation 28 CFR Part 600, under which Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald was appointed to look into the Plame affair. The Tesla Motors and Elon Musk Case requires a Special Prosecutor.

248. ELON MUSK AND TESLA FACE CRIMINAL FRAUD CHARGES BY FEDS! MUSK FINALLY EXPOSED!
249. SEC subpoenas TESLA over Musk tweets...
250. Whistleblower posts 'flawed cars' details...
251. Elon Musk's Incredible Smoke And Mirrors Dance. Elon Musk's untraceable money laundering and political bribery scam has now been exposed. It is called an "Invisible Bridge". It is the way that covert funds move through a secret conduit of close associates and family members. Elon Musk is at the head of the conduit and his mother, brother and associates Tim Draper, Steve Jurvetson, and George Soros round out the other tentacles. With operational links through Wells Fargo Bank, Silicon Valley Bank and Goldman Sachs, the scheme is perfected corruption. The "bridge" uses a combination of fake tax evasion charities and business assets, passes through Senator's pockets and is never visible to the FBI, the FEC and the SEC unless they have very good agents assigned to the matter.
252. NTSB, DOJ, SEC and FEC have been blocked from action by DNC lobbyists.
253. The overt and arrogant Musk misdeeds have now become "obvious and RICO-violating..."
254. He is protected by Senators Reid, Harris, Pelosi and Feinstein. They are beneficiaries of the scam. Musk’s self promoting, narcissistic, multi-billion dollar, self-aggrandizing PR hype. Elon Musk exists because he bribed DNC politicians including Obama, Clinton and Senators Feinstein, Reid, Boxer, Harris, Spier and Pelosi to give him free taxpayer cash and government resources from the Department of Energy and the California political tax pool. This is proven when you follow-the-money and the insider trading, stock ownership and crony payola kick-backs.
255. He is protected by the Clinton and Obama organizations along with most of the DNC. He finances these politicians via this scheme.
256. The U.S. Dept of Energy (DOE) has been covering-up organized crime activities at DOE in

which DOE funds are being used as a slush-fund to pay off DNC campaign financiers and to pay for Fusion-GPS attacks on Silicon Valley business competitors.

257. DNC campaign financiers and DOE staff share stock market holdings with each other under family trusts, shell corporations and layered Goldman Sachs accounts. The deal was: Obama funds Tesla, Musk conduits campaign funds to Obama, top Obama staff profit off of insider Musk stocks.

258. Elon Musk is a criminal, a mobster, an asshole, a balding fake-hair wearing, plastic surgery-addicted, bi-sexual douchebag, woman-abusing, sex addicted, tax evader.

259. Musk exploits poor people and child slaves in the Congo and Afghanistan to mine his lithium and Cobalt. Look up this phrase on the top search engines: “child labor electric car batteries”

260. Musk spends billions per year to hire Russian trolls, fake blogger fan-boys and buy fake news self-glory look-at-me articles about himself. Musk thinks he is the 'Jesus' of Silicon Valley and he will do anything to make the public think so. Musk is insecure because his father was abusive and his “trophy wife” Mother is overbearing so he developed sociopath-like mental issues.

261. Musk has been professionally diagnosed as a 'psychotic narcissist.

262. Musk uses shell companies and trust funds to self-deal, evade the law and hide his bribes and stock market insider trading. His brother ran Solar City and is now under federal investigation for securities fraud.

263. A huge number of Tesla drivers, per capita, have been killed; pedestrians and oncoming drivers have also been killed, and Musk covers it up.

264. The DNC and the MSM refuse to allow any articles about Musk's crimes to be printed because they benefit from Musk's crimes.

265. VC’s Tim Draper and Steve Jurvetson are so fanatical about not being embarrassed from a Tesla bankruptcy that they will pump the TSLA stock and threaten anybody who might disclose the Musk misdeeds.

266. Peter Thiel, a Musk ‘boyfriend” also protects Musk. Musk, and his cronies, use Palantir, Google and related software to scan the entire internet every few minutes for any occurrence of the words: “Musk”, “Tesla” or “Tesla Fire”. They send trolls and fake bloggers (Many of them Russian) to put pro-Musk comments on the comments section of any blogs or articles discussing those topics and try to flood out the truth about Musk. In EVERY blog that you read that mentions 'Musk', at least 1/3 of the comments have been placed their by Musk's paid shills.

267. There are no “Tesla Fan Boys”. All of the fanatic Tesla comments on the internet are Musk’s, Thiel’s, Jurvetson’s and Draper’s fake fanboy trolls. Musk, himself, stays up late at night pretending to be a ‘Tesla Fan Boy’on blogs.

268. Main Stream DNC-biased News organizations who refuse to cover the story reveal themselves as shills for Musk

269. The Silicon Valley Mafia promotes Musk as a "Tech God" leader but, in reality Musk is the same kind of "Leader" as Charles Manson, Jim Jones, David Koresh, Swami Rajneesh and Al Capone.

270. His own people have sued him for fraud and lies once they realized that Musk-ism and Scientology had so much in common.

271. The 'Silicon Valley Mafia; cartel of frat boy sociopath venture capitalists like Steve Jurvetson, Tim Draper, Eric Schmidt, et al; threaten those who do not support the cult of Tesla or their political candidates.
272. Musk holds the Silicon Valley record for getting sued for fraud by his investors, wives, former partners, employees, suppliers and co-founders.
273. Elon Musk has gone out of his way to hire hundreds of ex-CIA and In-Q-Tel staff and assign them to "dirty tricks teams" to attack his competitors and elected officials who Musk hates.
274. Musk and his culture are being sued for abuse to women and blacks and the Unions hate him for lying to them.
275. https://stopelonfromfailingagain.com reveals even more Musk lies.
276. Musk never founded his companies. He took Tesla away from the founder: Marty, in a hostile take-over!
277. Musk's "Starlink" satellites are domestic spy and political manipulation tools - never get your internet from anything SpaceX has launched. SpaceX is entirely a domestic spy operation.
278. Musk's "Mars" scheme is just a PR distraction to keep the news from looking too close at SPACEX domestic spying satellites.
279. The same kind of EMF radiation proven to cause cancer from cell phones exists in massive amounts in a Tesla.
280. Musk can't fix a car or build a rocket and has almost no mechanical skills.
281. If you pull a report of every VIN# of every Tesla ever built and cross reference that with insurance, repair and lawsuit records you will find that the "per volume" fire, crash, death and defect rate is THE WORST of any car maker in history! Musk's lobbyists have bribed DOT and NHTSA to stall safety inspections.
282. NO COMPLETE UNCOMPROMISING SAFETY REPORT ON TESLA CARS HAS EVER BEEN PUBLISHED but we have a copy of a hushed up report that would put Tesla out of business.
283. Musk's 'Autopilot' system is a scam to get government cash BUT IT NEVER WORKS. The Tesla 'Autopilot' has crashed into police cars, pedestrians, swamps and driven owners over cliffs.
284. Musk is a lying con artist and partners with Goldman Sachs to rig the stock market. Sachs has a dedicated team of 18 men who rig stocks and valuation bumps for Musk.
285. The "Silk Road" Cocaine and Murder-For-Hire website was created at Musk's SpaceX
286. Musk's In-Q-Tel staff ran two transport planes filled with drugs; listed as "Cocaine 1" on FAA records.
287. Senators Dianne Feinstein, Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Kamala Harris and their associates own the stock in Tesla Motors and/or it's suppliers and mining companies. That is why they criminally help cover-up investigations of Tesla!
288. All of this was reported, in writing, to James Comey, Patricia Rich and David Johnson at the FBI.
289. Tesla and Solyndra sit on the same land and share staff, contracts and lobbying. California politicians own parts of both companies.
290. Musk took over Tesla Motors in a hostile take-over in order to exploit lithium, cobalt and other

mining corruption deals for his business partners.

291. The ‘lithium’ in Musk’s horrifically miss-engineered lithium ion batteries cause wars in the Congo over mining corruption.
292. Afghanistan and Bolivian mobsters benefit from the corrupt mining deals involved with mining lithium and cobalt for Elon Musk's batteries.
293. Elon Musk opened a factory in China to try to avoid American worker safety laws because all of the labor cheats and safety violations he had engaged in, in America, were catching up to him. He neglected to provide adequate worker safety to quarantine for the coronavirus, though.
294. Elon Musk's Lithium ion batteries are insider trading-owned by ex-CIA boss Woolsey and DOE Boss Chu and they engaged in extreme conflict-of-interest to help Musk.
295. Elon Musk's Lithium ion batteries excrete chemicals that mutate fetuses when they burn.
296. Elon Musk's Lithium ion batteries destroy your brain, lungs and nervous system when they burn.
297. Elon Musk's Lithium ion batteries kill the factory workers who make them.
298. Elon Musk's Lithium ion batteries cause Panasonic to be one of the most corrupt companies in the world.
299. Elon Musk's Lithium ion batteries poison the Earth when disposed of.
300. Elon Musk's Lithium ion batteries can't be extinguished by firemen because water makes them explode even more and then explode again hours later.
301. Elon Musk's Lithium ion batteries have chemical dendrites and deposition massing issues (revealed by X-Ray analysis) which makes them more and more likely to explode as they age.
302. Elon Musk's Lithium ion batteries poison firemen when they burn.
303. Elon Musk's Lithium ion batteries are based on criminally corrupt mining schemes like URANIUM ONE.
304. Elon Musk's Lithium ion batteries have over 61 toxic chemicals in them.
305. Elon Musk's Lithium ion batteries come from an industry that spends billions on internet shills and trolls that they hire to nay say all other forms of energy
306. Elon Musk's Lithium ion batteries are insider-trading owned by corrupt U.S. Senators who are running a SAFETY COVER-UP about their dangers.
307. Apple products with lithium ion batteries have been exploding and setting people on fire.
308. Over time the chemical dendrites, or deposits, inside each battery grow worse and increase the chances of explosion as they age - LITHIUM ION BATTERIES BECOME MORE AND MORE LIKELY TO EXPLODE AS TIME GOES ON AND AS THEY AGE. This is not a theory. This is a scientific fact. That is why you hear about more and more lithium batteries catching fire and blowing up. Additionally, scientists also speculate that the increasing presence of low energy nuclear background energy and wifi energy in the environment is making lithium ion batteries explode more often lately. This is upheld by the increasing number of FAA reports about commercial airline cabins suddenly “filling up with toxic smoke” as some lithium ion battery explodes in someones overhead luggage. As commercial jets go higher they lose the protection of the atmosphere and are subjected to more gamma (and other) radiation from overhead. This makes the already unstable lithium ion batteries on board blow up.
309. Tesla owner's had had more DUI's, abuse filings in divorce proceedings and crashes than any

other car maker PER VOLUME. This makes Tesla the #1 car for douche bags and scummy people.

310. Tesla's own federal patent filing records confirm that Tesla batteries are as dangerous as this document reports.
311. Political activist George Soros owns part of Tesla Motors so that Soros can help conduit DNC cash.
312. The Obama Administration promised Silicon Valley oligarchs the market monopoly on lithium ion batteries and the sabotage of fuel cells in exchange for campaign financing and search engine rigging.
313. United States Senators that are supposed to protect us from these deadly products own the stock market assets of them so they protect them and stop the FDA, OSHA, DOT & NHTSA from outlawing them.
314. There have been thousands of defect reports filed on Tesla cars.
315. Tom Steyer is a notorious DNC financier. His partner, Margaret Sullivan ran, the federal USAID agency, USAID sent all of the DNC campaign financiers in Silicon Valley a federal 'report' from USAID that said there was "A TRILLION DOLLARS OF LITHIUM IN AFGHANISTAN" and promised to give those lithium mines, EXCLUSIVELY, to the Silicon Valley venture capitalists if they funded and web search manipulated the election for Obama to take over the White House. We have the documents proving this. In other words, a re-up of the Afghan War was caused by Elon Musk and it killed American soldiers so that Musk could buy more mansions and trophy wives.
316. If a Tesla battery gets wet it will explode and cause all of the other batteries to explode in a "cascade of explosions".
317. Water makes Tesla batteries explode.
318. In an accident, when a Tesla rolls over, molten metal & plastic can drip on & burn the occupants alive and seal them in molten metal.
319. Alkaline, NiCAD and hundreds of other battery chemistries DO NOT have all of these problems but Lithium Ion batteries get a monopoly because of politician insider trading owner-ships.
320. Tesla Motors has caused far more deaths and injuries than the world generally knows about.
321. A recent fire on U.S. Highway 101 near Mountain View, CA, burned the driver alive and killed him.
322. In Florida two kids died in a Tesla, burned alive, screaming in agony.
323. A man died in agony in a Tesla crash in Malibu that set Malibu Canyon on fire.
324. A young woman, at the start of life, and her boyfriend were burned alive in their crashed Tesla.
325. There are many more deaths and crashes than you have seen in the Main Stream News (MSN) The deaths and the cover-ups are endless.
326. Senators Dianne Feinstein, Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Kamala Harris and their associates own the stock in Tesla Motors and/or it's suppliers and mining companies and they cover-up and halt investigations and laws designed to save the public.
327. Elon Musk's Lithium ion battery partners spend over $1B a year to shill and troll hype about lithium ion batteries and cover-up the dangers.

328. Lithium ion EVs are more prone to battery fires.
329. Experts say that their lithium-ion batteries can fuel hotter fires that release toxic fumes and are more difficult to put out. Lithium ion fires keep reigniting which explains why it takes so long and requires copious amounts of water or foam (it is an electric fire, after all) to smother the flames.
330. Tesla employee Bernard Tse and his team warned Elon Musk about these dangers in 2008 and they got fired and/or warned to "say nothing" by Musk.
331. Three top Tesla engineers died in a plane crash next to Tesla offices in San Carlos after two of them agreed to become whistle-blowers. Another whistle-blower has suggested they were killed in a "Boston Brakes" hit-job.
332. The DNC bosses, Congress people and federal executives own the stock in lithium, Solar and EV markets and use kickbacks from those markets (Especially via convoluted campaign finance laundering via Elon Musk) to finance the DNC.
333. The DNC bosses and Musk use character assassination as their main political tool against any member of the public who speaks out against their felony stock market scams and PizzaGate-like scandals. The Harvey Weinstein reports by Ronan Farrow show that they have teams of hired goons that they pay to destroy people's lives.
334. Musk uses Black Cube, Mossad, In-Q-Tel, Stratfor, Gawker Media, Gizmodo Media, Media Matters, David Brock, Sid Blumenthal, NY Times, Google servers, Facebook servers, Podesta Group, Perkins Coie, Covington & Burling and a host of "media assassins".
335. Musk buddies: Gawker and Gizmodo Media set-up the attack stories and, in paid partnership with Google, Google kicks their attack links around the globe, in front of 8 Billion people, forever. Google locks the attack articles of its enemies on the front top search results of Google search results forever, on purpose! Google and Musk are partners-in-crime.
336. Larry Page steals technology for Google and Musk meets with Larry Page to advise him on which technologies to steal and how to bypass FEC laws.
337. Musk has exceeded FEC campaign finance limits by billions of dollars via “in-kind” services.
338. Had the full scope of these facts been acted on during the Obama Administration, Barack Obama would have become the first modern sitting President to have been arrested in the White House. Barack Obama was fully aware of these schemes, crony payola deals and corruption crimes and discussed the implementation of these crimes, daily, with Rahm Emanuel, David Plouffe, Steven Rattner, Robert Gibbs, John Podesta, David Axelrod, Eric Holder and Jay Carney in the Oval Office.
339. THIS corruption involves TRILLIONS of dollars of corrupt mining deals, automotive and energy monopolies!
340. THIS is why the federal budget analysis reports are showing TRILLIONS of dollars of 'untraceable' losses from the United States Treasury from 2006 up to today!
341. THIS is why a large number of reporters, whistle-blowers and prosecutors suddenly, and mysteriously turned up dead!
342. The company that Elon Musk built to usher in the electric-car future might not have enough cash to make it through the calendar year without stock markets scams being used to keep it alive.

343.Tesla again fell far short of its own production targets for the mass-market Model 3 sedan
344. Another person died in a crash involving its assisted-driving feature.
345.Musk entered into a public dispute with federal safety regulators.
346.Tesla's once high-flying stock, buffeted by a downgrade from credit analysts, has dropped 24 percent from its peak in September but Silicon Valley Vc's will pump it up to save face.
347.No one has raised or spent money the way Elon Musk has; Nor has any other chief executive officer of a public company made a bankruptcy joke on Twitter at a time when so much seemed to be unraveling.
348.Tesla is going through money so fast that, without additional financing, there is now a genuine risk that the 15-year-old company could run out of cash in 2018. The company burns through more than $6,500 every minute, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Free cash flow—the amount of cash a company generates after accounting for capital expenditures—has been negative for five consecutive quarters. That will be a key figure to watch when Tesla reports earnings May 2. Read the full story here: https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-tesla-burns-cash/
349.In years to come, we will all look back and wonder how so many people were taken in by this shyster, who makes Enron look honest.
350.One of Tesla's greatest strengths is its ability to monetize the patience and goodwill of its customers and loyal fans. The company is sitting on a staggering $854 million in customer deposits as of the end of 2017.
351.Since Tesla sells its products direct to consumers, without relying on a dealer network, customer deposits are cash payments that essentially serve as interest-free loans—and these loans can stretch on for years. If Tesla were to go bankrupt, those deposit holders would likely be wiped out.
352.Tesla is holding customer deposits for two vehicles that aren't even in production yet: an electric Tesla Semi ($20,000 deposit) and a next-generation Roadster (either $50,000 down or the $250,000 retail price paid up front to reserve a limited edition). Even customers interested in installing an array of solar roof panels or the company's Powerwall home battery must hand over $1,000 to place an order.
353.Tesla doesn't break out deposit numbers by car, but the vast majority comes from $1,000 reservations for the Model 3. When Musk first introduced the lower-priced sedan in March 2016, fans stood in long lines at Tesla stores. Two years later, the slower-than-expected pace of production means that most of the more than 400,000 reservation holders are still waiting. And new people appear to be joining the queue: As of April, the company reported "net Model 3 reservations remained stable."
354.There's an additional source of free money from loyal believers: An unknown number of customers have paid up for vehicle features—$3,000 for "Full Self Driving" capability, for example—that Tesla thus far hasn't figured out or released to anyone.
355.Elon Musk cooked the books by emailing interested sales prospects and asked them to put a deposit down before each quarter ended so he could book their tiny deposits as fully transacted $60K+ "sales" before each quarter closed.
356.Elon Musk and SpaceX are being sued by multiple employees for "lying about safety

standards, safety records" and deadly safety defects.

357. The Elon Musk Tesla Money Laundering Board Of Directors is as full of fraud and corruption as Musk. Birds of a feather stick together and the Jurvetson, Draper, Musk, et al; clan of corruption runs deep. The Board of Directors can't operate their scam without the whole pack of thieves and liars in place. An outsider will break theirs swamp of tax evasion, Dark Money political bribes, off-shore cash, self-dealing, book-cooking, real estate fraud, expense padding and other nefarious deeds.

358. Dianne Feinstein's family member: Herb Newman of Sausalito, California's HR firm: Newman Search (415 332-8425) has a company as of 1972 with the sole purpose of setting up investment bank deals with the People's Republic of China. Feinstein arranged for Newman to provide the staffing for Tesla and Solyndra. Dianne Fenstein has been under investigation for spy activities with China and her senior aide was arrested as a Chinese top spy. In 1973 Mr. Newman arrived in Canton at the invitation of the Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Trade. (CCPIT). He and his company MVTC were one of fifty businesses to be invited to the Canton Trade Fair held in Kwangchow China. In 1978 Mr. Newman founded China Investments and in partnership with California Trade Delegations both companies as members of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce began taking US Corporations to China. Mr. Newman along with one of his associates at the time Mr. Darryl Schoon helped organize Senator Dianne Feinstein's first trip to China in conjunction with the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce. Herb Newman, Mart Bailey and Feinstein's Husband; Dick Blum are on intelligence agency watch-lists, and under electronic surveillance, for potentially corrupt deals with China, Tesla and Solyndra.

359. Dianne Feinstein's husband owns CBRE which owns the real estate contracts for both Tesla and Solyndra.

360. Dianne Feinstein's family owns interests in the construction companies hired by both Tesla and Solyndra.

361. Dianne Feinstein had her staff warn other California businesses away from using the NUMMI car factory in order to protect the real estate deal for both Tesla ans CBRE, which is owned by her husband.

362. Tesla began real estate deals in multiple states and then cancelled them at the last minute, which got them sued for fraud and charged with "lying" to different communities. They started, and then pulled out of these different building (San Jose, Southern California, New Mexico, Etc.) deals, because CBRE and Feinstein were trying to leverage real estate profit exploitation using taxpayer funding.

363. Panasonic and Tesla have known for decades that the Panasonic 18650 batteries used in the Tesla suffer from multiple chemistry degradation defects which will almost always make them eventually explode or "go thermal". The defects include: 1.) LENR activation, 2.) Dendrite lengthening, 3.) Particle congealing, 4.) Chemistry evolution and other defects. The Tesla projects is, essentially, a failed product product dumping effort of a failed and dangerous battery product.

364. Elon Musk has demanded that his employees sign "loyalty pledges", "vows" and engage in Omerta's in order to keep the corruption details of Tesla from being exposed to the public.

365. Tesla insider Antonio Gracias is the mob boss insider at Tesla who arranges media hit-jobs on

those who displease Musk.

366.The NHTSB has issued requests to Tesla for safety tests and data that Tesla never complied with. Instead, Tesla paid bribes, which were referred to as "fees" to avoid having to complete those tests. An independent group of outside investigators issued a damning safety report to the NHTSB demanding that Tesla be compelled to produce the safety tests in 2010 but Obama appointed NHTSB executives buried the report and protected Tesla in order to keep the connection between Obama's funding and Tesla protected. NHTSB boss: Strickland, an Obama insider, was confronted with this in Washington, DC and resigned from his job 48 hours later. NHTSB has still not acted on the severe Tesla safety defects that have been reported since 2009.

367.An SEC investigation of Musk uncovered horrific evidence of Musk corruption but the SEC could not report or act on it because Obama congressional bosses and lobbyists got the SEC investigation "limited" to only examine a single Twitter "Tweet" from Musk.

368.Elon Musk is protected by top DOJ, SEC, CFTC, FEC and other Obama left-over staff as well as 45 U.S. Senators and top Federal Reserve members and Goldman Sachs, who live in terror that exposure of the entire Elon Musk financial food-chain will topple the entire DNC Dark Money payola scam. This is the reason that Tesla can get away with so much obvious and overt corruption and still continue operations. Tesla Motors book-cooking, financial frauds and political payola conduits, if fully revealed, would change the course of political influence in America.

369.Elon Musk has been sued by a man that Musk called a "Pedo", yet Musk's own father has been accused of child sex abuse, racism and, indeed, got his own daughter pregnant!

370.Elon Musk's mother has been accused of being a "self-indulgent trophy wife" who Musk was trained by to be an arrogant elitist. Her hatred of black people was imbued on Musk who has been sued by black people at his company for "running a racist culture".

371.Elon Musk divorced the same woman twice because she knew his dirty little secret and threatened to out him if he did not keep the deal going. She was hired to "act" as his wife.

372. Musical artist Iggy Azalea was at a Musk Party, with other friends, who captured Elon Musk on video on drugs and in weird sex acts. Musk had Iggy's camera stolen at the party to hie the evidence but he did not get the other cameras and did not realize that some of those cameras placed their images and videos directly on the Cloud, where hackers acquired them.

373.With cover-up help from Eric Holder, Steven Chu, Obama, Valarie Jarret, DNC FBI agents, Perkins Coie, Covington and Burling, Wilson Sonsini, etc; sociopath Musk actually believes he is "untouchable" and that he can get away with anything. His downfall will be the same downfall of every narcissist sociopath oligarch throughout all of recorded history.

374.Elon Musk is a drug addict. A simple urine and blood test proves it. Musk's downfall and the downfall of John DeLorean are seeming to align.

375.Dianne Feinstein and Nancy Pelosi are violating the law protecting Tesla by withholding investigations and prosecutions? Why are they allowing American citizens to continue to die from the 1.) "sudden acceleration electronics defect"; 2.) "The failed Auto-pilot electronics defect"3.) "The deteriorating and deadly lithium ion batteries" and 4.) numerous other defects widely documented in the news media and filed lawsuits?

376.Elon Musk exists because he bribed DNC politicians including Obama, Clinton and Senators

Feinstein, Reid, Boxer, Harris, Spier and Pelosi to give him free taxpayer cash and government resources. This is proven when you follow-the-money and the insider trading, stock ownership and crony payola kick-backs.

377. The Energy Dept (DOE) has been covering-up organized crime activities at DOE in which DOE funds are being used as a slush-fund to pay off DNC campaign financiers and to pay for CIA/GPS Fusion-Class attacks on Silicon Valley business competitors.
378. DNC campaign financiers and DOE staff share stock market holdings with each other under family trusts, shell corporations and layered Goldman Sachs accounts. The deal was: Obama funds Tesla, Musk conduits campaign funds to Obama, top Obama staff profit off of insider Musk stocks.
379. Musk exploits poor people and child slaves in the Congo and Afghanistan to mine his lithium and Cobalt. Look up this phrase on the top search engines: “child labor electric car batteries”.
380. The Silicon Valley Paypal Mafia promotes Musk as a "Tech God" leader but, in reality Musk is the same kind of "Leader" as Charles Manson, Jim Jones, David Koresh, Swami Rajneesh and Al Capone. His own people have sued him for fraud and lies once they realized that Musk-ism and Scientology had so much in common.
381. Musk holds the record for getting sued for fraud by his investors, wives, former partners, employees, suppliers and co-founders. Elon Musk has gone out of his way to hire hundreds of ex-CIA and In-Q-Tel staff and assign them to "dirty tricks teams" to attack his competitors and elected officials who Musk hates.
382. Musk and his culture are being sued for abuse to women and blacks and the Unions hate him for lying to them. https://stopelonfromfailingagain.com reveals even more Musk lies.
383. THIS corruption is what all of the big political scandals are about today!
384. THIS corruption involves TRILLIONS of dollars of corrupt mining deals, automotive and energy monopolies!
385. THIS is why the federal budget analysis reports are showing TRILLIONS of dollars of 'untraceable' losses from the United States Treasury from 2006 up to today!
386. THIS is why a large number of reporters, whistle-blowers and prosecutors suddenly, and mysteriously turned up dead!
387. THIS can all be proven in jury trial and in live televised Congressional hearings!
388. This is all being covered up because top State and Federal officials are in on it, own the stock in it and are so deeply involved in it that they could go to Federal prison when this all comes out.
389. The anxieties that lurk beneath the tremendous ambition of Tesla Inc. moved into the forefront in recent weeks. The company again **fell far short** of its own production targets for the mass-market Model 3 sedan, another person **died in a crash** involving its assisted-driving feature and Musk entered into **a public dispute** with federal safety regulators. Tesla’s once high-flying stock, buffeted by a downgrade from credit analysts, has dropped 24 percent from its peak in September.
390. There’s a good reason to worry: No one has raised or spent money the way Elon Musk has. Nor has any other chief executive officer of a public company made a **bankruptcy joke** on Twitter at a time when so much seemed to be unraveling.

391. Tesla is going through money so fast that, without additional financing, there is now a genuine risk that the 15-year-old company could run out of cash in 2018. The company burns through more than $6,500 every minute, according to **data compiled by Bloomberg**. Free cash flow—the amount of cash a company generates after accounting for capital expenditures—has been negative for five consecutive quarters. That will be a key figure to watch when Tesla reports earnings May 2.Read the full story here: **https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-tesla-burns-cash/**
392. In years to come, we will all look back and wonder how so many people were taken in by this shyster, who makes Enron look honest.A
393. lot of Musk's money has been extracted from suckers, who think he is God's gift, as Bloomberg reports:One of Tesla's greatest strengths is its ability to monetize the patience and goodwill of its customers and loyal fans. The company is sitting on a staggering $854 million in customer deposits as of the end of 2017.
394. Since Tesla sells its products direct to consumers, without relying on a dealer network, customer deposits are cash payments that essentially serve as interest-free loans—and these loans can stretch on for years. If Tesla were to go bankrupt, those deposit holders would likely be wiped out.
395. Tesla is holding customer deposits for two vehicles that aren't even in production yet: an electric Tesla Semi ($20,000 deposit) and a next-generation Roadster (either $50,000 down or the $250,000 retail price paid up front to reserve a limited edition). Even customers interested in installing an array of solar roof panels or the company's Powerwall home battery must hand over $1,000 to place an order.
396. Tesla doesn't break out deposit numbers by car, but the vast majority comes from $1,000 reservations for the Model 3. When Musk first introduced the lower-priced sedan in March 2016, fans stood in long lines at Tesla stores. Two years later, the **slower-than-expected pace of production** means that most of the more than 400,000 reservation holders are still waiting. And new people appear to be joining the queue: As of April, the company reported "net Model 3 reservations remained stable."
397. There's an additional source of free money from loyal believers: An unknown number of customers have paid up for vehicle features—$3,000 for "Full Self Driving" capability, for example—that Tesla thus far hasn't figured out or released to anyone.
398. The consumer psychology that sees hundreds of thousands of people essentially extending an interest-free loan to a public company is unusual, to say the least. I think the phrase "more money than sense" rather sums it up
399. Apple and Google also named in US lawsuit over Congolese child cobalt mining deaths for Elon Musk's Tesla Cars. Dell, Microsoft and Tesla also among tech firms named in case brought by families of children killed or injured while mining in DRC.'I saw the unbearable grief inflicted on families by cobalt mining. I pray for chan Elon Musk's cobalt extraction in DRC has been linked to child labour.
400. A landmark legal case has been launched against the world's largest tech companies by Congolese families who say their children were killed or maimed while mining for cobalt used to power smartphones, laptops and electric cars, the Guardian can reveal.

401. Apple, Google, Dell, Microsoft and Tesla have been named as defendants in a lawsuit filed in Washington DC by human rights firm International Rights Advocates on behalf of 14 parents and children from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The lawsuit accuses the companies of aiding and abetting in the death and serious injury of children who they claim were working in cobalt mines in their supply chain.
402. The lawsuit argues that Apple, Google, Dell, Microsoft and Tesla all aided and abetted the mining companies that profited from the labour of children who were forced to work in dangerous conditions – conditions that ultimately led to death and serious injury. The families argue in the claim that their children were working illegally at mines owned by UK mining company Glencore. The court papers allege that cobalt from the Glencore-owned mines is sold to Umicore, a Brussels-based metal and mining trader, which then sells battery-grade cobalt to Apple, Google, Tesla, Microsoft and Dell.
403. Other plaintiffs in the court documents say they worked at mines owned by Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, a major Chinese cobalt firm, which the lawsuit claims supplies Apple, Dell, and Microsoft and is likely to supply the other defendants.
404. Another child, referred to as John Doe 1, says that he started working in the mines when he was nine. The lawsuit claims that earlier this year, he was working as a human mule for Kamoto Copper Company, carrying bags of cobalt rocks for $0.75 a day, when he fell into a tunnel. After he was dragged out of the tunnel by fellow workers, he says he was left alone on the ground at the mining site until his parents heard about the accident and arrived to help him. He is now paralysed from the chest down and will never walk again.
405. Other families included in the claim say that their children were killed in tunnel collapses or suffered serious injuries such as smashed limbs and broken spines while crawling through tunnels or carrying heavy loads. The families say that none were paid any compensation for the deaths and injuries.
406. One of the central allegations in the lawsuit is that Apple, Google, Dell, Microsoft and Tesla were aware and had “specific knowledge” that the cobalt they use in their products is linked to child labour performed in hazardous conditions, and were complicit in the forced labour of the children
407. **Is is charged that the Musk empire is an organized crime program that exists between Silicon Valley tech oligarchs, investment banks, U.S. Senators, government agency staff and White House staff who engage in these crimes.**
408. **That public officials knowingly participate in these crimes by failing to report their associates who engage in these illicit actions and by hiring suppliers who operate these illicit activities.**
409. **That the Musk empire suspects manipulate government funds for their personal profiteering at the expense of domestic citizen taxpayers like us.**
410. **That the Musk empire suspects operate a vast stock market manipulation program, as a core function of their operations, and those illicit deeds function at the expense of the public to render unjust gain to public officials.**
411. **That the Musk empire suspects contract a known group of lobbyists, corrupt law firms, unethical CPA's, corrupt investment banks and specialized corruption services providers**

to attack, defame, physically harm, character assassinate, black-list and/or kill those they dislike and they harmed many persons with those acts.

412. **That the Musk empire suspects operate an Epstein-like sex-trafficking network of prostitutes and sexual extortion activities and locations for the engagement of said activities and for the bribery of cohorts via sex workers and that Musk was a personal associate of Jeffrey Epstein.**
413. **That the Musk empire suspects engage in electronic attacks and manipulations including hacking, election manipulation, media censorship and internet search results manipulation in order to mask their schemes.**
414. **That the Musk empire suspects engage in Lois Lerner-like, SPYGATE-like, VA whistleblower-like reprisal and retribution attacks using government agencies like SSA, DOJ, FBI, LSC, HUD, HHS, DOE, Etc**
415. **It is demanded that Elon Musk be arrested on RICO Racketeering, Anti-Trust, Tax Evasion, Bribery, and related charges!**
416. Elon Musk had sex with a young non-age-appropriate rock and roll girl and got her pregnant.
417. Elon Musk dated anal sex advocate Gwenyth Paltrow who later told her friends that he was full of shit.
418. Elon Musk divorced one actress, then had to remarry her because she had the goods on him.
419. Video exists of Elon Musk at various sex parties.
420. Elon Musk dated Johnny Depp's girlfriend Amber Heard who thought that Musk was even more controlling than Johnny Depp.
421. The NUMMI car factory that Musk took over was first called, by Musk, in the media "non-functional". Even the two major car makers that were using it had abandoned it. Feinstein make Musk take it because here husband's company: CBRE Realty, managed the property around it.
422. Musk never made good on his promises to NUMMI workers or the Unions representing the NUMMI factory.
423. After getting an insane amount of exclusive free cash from the taxpayers, Musk flew workers in from overseas.
424. Multiple women have charged Musk for sexual abuse and factory misogyny.
425. Musk couldn't make it in college and bailed out.
426. Far more SpaceX rockets have exploded and fully failed than the public is aware of.
427. Musk said he would already have sent his buddies around the moon but many potential passengers have bailed out after they saw the due diligence on SpaceX lack of experience.
428. Musk, Draper, Page, Westly, Schmidt, Brin and other famous tech asshole billionaires have formally agreed to run a "cartel" to control news, information and industries.
429. Inside the Tesla that Elon Musk had SpaceX put in orbit is a "confession folder" that would destroy Musk if anyone went up and got it.
430. Elon Musk believes he could kill someone and not get in trouble because he has so many California Senator's, Tier one law firms and former White House staff protecting him.
431. Elon Musk is the Citizen Kane of the modern world. He thinks he is the Al Capone of Technology. He uses things that appear to be all "crunchy granola" on the surface to steal taxpayer subsidies with the help of corrupt politicians.

432.Aside from Musk's own personal dirty operations and orders, the largest facilitator of his crimes is the large group of men inside Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan dedicated to supporting his crimes and corruptions.
433.Through covert conduits, Elon Musk pays blogger James Ayre to shill is schemes online.
434.Musk's entire media plan is self-promotional aggrandizing and fake virtue-signaling to keep the news off his case.
435.The SEC made him quit but he just changed one letterhead graphic and nothing else. Musk still runs Tesla and the rest of the empire just like he always did.
436.Musk covertly funds abortion projects because he gets so many girls pregnant and refuses to use a condom.
437.Deutsche Bank is the other biggest player in the Musk Empire money laundering, political payola and corruption crimes.
438.Musk stole most of his designs from others, as proven by the U.S. Patent office and previous publications.
439.When Elon Musk's Hyper-loop crashes, it will turn all of the passengers into a bloody applesauce like nightmare.
440.Musk's 5G SpaceX Starlink Satellites could destroy the environment, will add to the cancer-causing radiation of the Earth and are to be used to spy on consumer's uses of the internet.
441.In lawsuits, Musk always pleads that he "has no money".
442.X-Ray analysis by over 40 major laboratories prove that Elon Musk's lithium ion batteries have severe and constantly degrading defects inherent in their construction. Musk has known about these dangers for decades but chose to work with Panasonic to cover it up.
443.Elon Musk lost a LEMON CAR lawsuit proving that his cars are poorly designed and manufactured.
444.Elon Musk's union negotiating tactics are: "delay, deny, defer and claim to be conducting a fake study..."
445.Elon Musk's take-over of Tesla from Martin Eberhardt, the actual founder, was based on an Obama Administration scheme to exploit Lithium mines in Afghanistan and Cobalt mines in the Congo, which Obama financiers had bought the rights to. Frank Guistra and Goldman Sachs helped come up with this scheme.
446.A famous article about SpaceX quotes a top Musk staff staffer saying Musk is a "liar".
447.A top SpaceX engineer has sued Spacex for lying about rocket safety and says that Musk does not care about science, he cares about publicity.
448.Most of the "famous" people Musk hired, quit after seeing what a sham his operations are.
449.Jared Birchell, of Burlingame, is terrified that Musk will have him killed because he knows "where the bodies are buried", but he has to act demure and "stay-off-the-press-radar" for now to keep Musk from paying too much attention to him.
450.Every property that Musk owned has been bugged by government, news or competitor specialists.
451.Musk takes a number of drugs for mental issues yet he runs companies with products that can easily kill their users. Many think that he should be under closer federal supervision.
452.The U.S. Department of Energy PR Department has been ordered by Obama officials (who,

shockingly, are still there even during the Trump Administration) to always hype up Musk because, WHEN Musk fully fails, it will prove that the Department of Energy funded him because ***Obama ordered them*** to and not *based* on **any** merits. Most every Applicant for DOE funds beat Musk on every merit EXCEPT CRONYISM!

453. Trump-hating Elon Musk wanted to nay say Trump by subjecting Tesla workers to COVID death by refusing to close plant
454. Musk uses his own workers to play deadly politics with their lives in COVID closure he refused
455. Musk totally lied about his capacity, ability and knowledge to make COVID ventilators in order to scam political funding
456. Musk sent snoring devices instead of ventilators and lied about those products in order to Virtue Signal for his own hype
457. Musk has had babies with many women in an Epstein-like master plan to seed the world with his DNA so that mini-Musk's will live on forever. Each ex-baby momma has been paid massive sums to keep quiet about his misdeeds.
458. Musk uses his many mansions to hide money and operate tax manipulation efforts.
459. The "Mainstream Media" is controlled by Democrat bosses who refuse to allow any negative news to be printed about Musk because Musk conduits funds to the DNC.
460. One of Musk's 'baby ovens' known as "Grimes' has been revealed to have been used as a "sex toy for Musk" by Grimes friends.
461. The U.S. Department of Energy has a federal policy of promoting Musk's hype because they are liable for criminal prosecution because Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and his staff helped organize Musk's embezzlement of taxpayer funded monies and insider-traded on that profiteering.
462. Failing Elon Musk tries to make Alameda County pay for his failed NUMMI factory by using COVID as an excuse!

Why do you ignore, or cover-up, the fact that Musk is an organizer of the Malignant Narcissism And Cartel of the Silicon Valley Billionaire Frat Boy Club?

At almost every juncture, Elon Musk has made egotistical decisions that lead to more failures. His behavior is that of a person who has no care or concern for the health, safety and welfare of the American people. Nothing could epitomize that more perfectly than his grotesque suggestions that we should shoot nuclear bombs off on Mars or that nobody will care that his Starlink Satellites are designed to spy on the public. This would seem comical, and entirely unbelievable, if it had not actually happened.

In 2006 the many scientists told Elon Musk and his advisers of the high likelihood that a pandemic of lithium ion battery explosions would strike the nation and advised the incoming administration to take appropriate steps to reduce its impact. Obama officials hid the dangers because they owned stock in lithium and cobalt mines for those batteries, particularly in Afghanistan.

In November of 2007, the experts warned Obama that the country was likely to be afflicted with a devastating pandemic of lithium ion originating from Asian and Russian oligarchs.

In January 2009, the Obama administration was told by its own experts, Bernard Tse and his team who knew Tesla bosses, Sandia and others that the lithium ion batteries in Tesla cars had degrading chemistry which become a global pandemic of auto danger. Again, Obama chose inaction.

Obama and Musk have deprived Democratic-led regions of the country from receiving needed safety reviews of Tesla cars.

Over the year's since 2006, Americans working with the DOE, NHTSA, SEC and other groups accelerated warnings to Obama officials. These engineers and other science professionals were intentionally ignored in order to protect politicians stock market profits.

In these, and any other examples, Musk and his inner circle of White House and Senate insiders ignored or purged experts and other truth-tellers, and lied about, misrepresented, deflected or denied the dire threat to the American people posed by the lithium ion battery scam.

Considered in total, Musk and his regime have shown themselves to be incompetent, callous, malevolent and deeply cruel in their response to the Tesla safety issue crisis (as well as to a plethora of other issues).

But to merely document the Musk regime's deadly failures in response to the dangers of his companies is to ignore the most important question: What are Musk's and his advisers' underlying motivations?

This forensic question must be answered if we are ever to have a full accounting of the Musk Corruption, and see justice done for the voters, the dead tesla victims and those who will die in the future as well as the damage done to the broader American community.

The coordinated 'main-stream' media's preferred storyline that suggests Musk is simply incompetent doesn't add up because Muskhas made the wrong decision every single time in terms of how crises like this are supposed to be dealt with. (i.e. Be consistent, transparent, factual, and credible.) It's increasingly not believable for the left-wing press to suggest that Musk has been distracted or inept during this crisis, in part because of the level of his uselessness has become so staggering.

Maybe Musk is vengeful. Maybe he wants to wreck the economy to create investment opportunities? He's under the thumb of a foreign entity? He wants to cause panic and cancel the November elections? He's a fatalist? Who knows. And honestly, the specific "why" isn't what matters now. What matters is asking the difficult questions and pondering what the Musk oligarchy is truly about, no matter what lurks in the shadows…

Now the press needs to shift some of its focus and ask the truly alarming questions about Musk and his motives. Because we still don't know why he essentially ordered his companies to embark on such sinister ventures involving slicing up brains; over-priced deadly cars for rich douche-bags; digging holes for billionaire hide-outs, launching domestic spy satellites and manipulating elections along with his boyfriend: Larry Page, etc...

Psychologist and psychotherapists have an answer: Elon Musk is a ***"malignant narcissist"***. Musk's mental pathologies inexorably compel him to hurt and defraud large numbers of people — including his own supporters.

Exports have looked at Musk's borderline personality disorders. They explais that sadism and violence are central to Musk’s malignant narcissism and his decision-making about his self-promotion. They warn that Musk is abuser locked into a deeply dysfunctional relationship with the American people and that, like other sadists, Musk enjoys causing harm and suffering to any that do not recognize his "tech Jesus" self-proclaimed superiority.

Ultimately, all psychologists generally concludes that Musk is engaging in “democidal behavior” in partnership with Obama and Pelosi and cautions that the many dead and injured (so far) from the Tesla fires and crashes are not simply collateral damage from the Musk madness, but rather the logical outcome of Musk’s apparent mental pathologies and the poor decisions that flow from them.

Musk is both denying responsibility by saying things such as, “I take no responsibility. We’ve done everything right.” But at the same time, Musk is also sabotaging the efforts to stop the corruption in his empire. This is a very important aspect of Musk’s behavior. Musk is not just deflecting blame onto others, he is actively interfering with the politicianss’ ability to do their job by controlled Senators with bribes. Musk is not just incompetent. He is actively engaging in sabotage against competitors and reporters who speak the truth about him.

You might wonder: How does someone with his type of mind reconcile claims like “I have total power” with “I take no responsibility”? He has said both things within a few days of each other. Well; That is a function of how the psychology of a malignant narcissist is structured. When Musk says things such as, “I have total power,” that’s the grandiosity. “I’m in total control” is a function of Musk’s paranoia, where everything bad is projected outward. Therefore, anything negative or bad is someone else’s fault. Bad things are 'other people' in Musk ’s mind. The grandiosity and “greatness” are all him. Musk’s mind runs on a formula which bends and twists facts, ideas and memories to suit his malignant narcissism. This is why Musk contradicts himself so easily. He lies and makes things up. His fantasies all serve his malignant narcissism and the world he has created in his own mind about his greatness.

Another component of Musk’s malignant narcissism is sadism. That part of Musk’s mind is more hidden. People such as Musk are malignant-narcissist sadists because they, at some deep level, are driven to cause harm to other people. Musk’s life is proof of this. His pedo father and trophy wife narcissist mother demonstrate his roots. He enjoys ripping people off and humiliating people. He does this manically and gleefully. He has lied thousands of times. He threatens people online and elsewhere. Most psychologists believe that Elon Musk is also a sexual sadist, who on some basic level enjoys and is aroused by watching people be afraid of him. In his mind, Musk is creating chaos and instability so that he can feel powerful.

Professor of psychiatry and psychoanalyst Otto Kernberg called that phenomenon “omnipotent destructiveness.” The bullying, the violence, the destruction, frightening people, humiliating people, getting revenge and the like — such behavior is what Elon Musk has done his whole life. It is who Elon Musk really is. Unfortunately, too many people are still in denial of that fact.

Musk has to create and control a field of negative corrupting energy around himself. For example, he pressures the scientific experts to bend the truth to his dreamworld during his press conferences. The scientists are basically Musk’s hostages. The American people are hostages as well to Elon Musk's lies.

We are being abused by him. We know that Musk is lying. We know that he’s doing nothing to help us. We feel helpless to do anything to stop him. It is causing collective mental despair. It is not that all Americans are suckers or dupes, it is that Musk is a master at such cruel and manipulative behavior.

Elon Musk is a master at getting negative attention, and the more people he can shock and upset, the better.

Malignant narcissists like Elon Musk view other human beings as kindling wood to be burned for their own personal enrichment, media enlargement and hype expansion.

Follow the facts to the obvious and true conclusion. If all the facts show that Elon Musk (and his little boy buddies Larry Page, Eric Schmidt, John Doerr, Reid Hoffman, Steve Westly, etc.) is a malignant narcissist with these powerful sadistic tendencies, this omnipotent destructiveness, where he’s getting pleasure and a sense of power from dominating people and degrading people and destroying people and plundering people and laying waste to people, both psychologically and physically, then to deny such obvious facts is willful ignorance.

When Musk is finally exposed, like Elizabeth Holmes and Theranos or ENRON, it will be glorious.

Rather than making a prediction as to Musk's specific actions when the emperor has no clothes, it is more helpful to describe the type of actions he will take. Rather than trying to say, “This is the move he’ll make.” Like in a relationship, Elon Musk is the abuser. He is the husband or father who is abusing his partner or children or other relatives. The American people are like a woman who is leaving her abuser. She tells her abuser, “That’s it! I am done with you!” She has her keys in hand and is opening the door of the house or apartment to finally leave. What happens? The democidal maniac Elon Musk will attack us, badly. Make no mistake. Elon Musk is going to find a way to attack and cause great harm to the American people if he believes that he will be fully exposed. He will use his spy satellites, his media controls, his remote controlled cars, his stock market manipulation tools, his Goldman Sachs economic destruction team and more. Musk will continue his crimes and shills like you will cover for him, unless the FBI finally arrests him.. and hopefully, you too.

Elon Musk's Hyperloop predicted to turn human beings into “bloody applesauce”. Musk's latest taxpayer hand-out scam!

Put a crowd of human beings in a can and connect that can to the ground in a line that never varies. Shoot that can down the line at speeds so high that any error, even the tiniest one, could turn the people inside, instantly, into what one investigator calls “bloody human applesauce”.

An earthquake, ISIS, a way-ward pick-up truck, a flood, a tornado, a cow on the tracks, a computer error, a driver mis-calculation, a confused self-diving car, a hacker attack, a solar flare, a fallen tree and hundreds of other possibilities could kill every passenger, at once, in the most horrible manner possible. It is a disaster nightmare guaranteed to happen. The ambulance drivers will be picking up the victims with a sponge.

For those who wish to do harm to others, now increasing in the new world, the Hyperloop gives them a perfectly timed opportunity to create a small anomaly which will cause an epic amount of death. The Hyperloop could not be a worse-timed, more ill-conceived operation.

Musk insists: “Oh we will have the latest technology. Nothing will happen.” But that is what the other CEO's of the companies that had terrible disasters said. The many filed lawsuits against Musk, for fraud; demonstrate that he has a loose relationship with the truth and a close relationship with “Hype”.

Regular trains have been suffering horrible human disasters, now featured in full color on You Tube, in increasing numbers. What kind of naiveté is making the Hyperloop people believe that they are immune to reality?

It is the open-eyed naiveté of Greed!

You see, Elon Musk has long been associated with railroad baron: Richard Blum. Richard “Dick” Blum of the railroad property of the FBI-raided Solyndra and next door property Tesla; Richard Blum of the high speed rail project so corrupt that a law had to be made to try to slow him down; Richard Blum who has a wife named Dianne Ferinstein, who keeps routing state and federal tax dollar kick-backs to all of Elon Musk's companies. Many think that the “Hyperloop” is an attempt to bypass the curtailment of the Feinstein/Blum's other railroad project. “THAT” Richard Blum is also under investigation for profiteering, Chinese contractors, Post Office real estate scams, University regent rigging, and more.

Musk uses hype to baffle Senators into giving him billions of taxpayer dollars for all of his companies so that he can turn around and fund their campaigns with the very same money. It is called a “kick-back” scheme.

Musk's billions and his Tesla, Solar City and Space X could not possibly still be alive without tens of billions of dollars of tax credits, free real estate, fee waivers and cash that state and federal agency heads just handed him in exchange for some “perks”. The Hyperloop is the same story. Hyperloop can't exist without government kick-backs. Nobody in the consumer market asked for a “Hyperloop”. As usual, all of the media stories and blogs expressing excitement about the Hyperloop have been traced back to Elon Musk, and his Troll Farms. It is nearly a joke that Musk's latest hype-scam actually has the word “Hype” in it! It is, as if, he is taunting the authorities. He believes that corrupt Senators protect him from prosecution. That bet may be running out.

Musk, and his Google investment partners, have been handed, as a kick-back, most of NASA, free NASA jet fuel for their private jets, free NASA airfields, Free NASA buildings, Free financing for their car, solar and spy satellite factories, Free H1-B overseas labor, and more..on the backs of the public.

While the inevitable disaster of “human sausage” is horrific, the disaster of allowing Elon Musk to engage in another corrupt hype-scam, on the pain of the taxpayer, is the biggest, most horrific, disaster of all.

The Bottom Line: You and Musk are equally dishonorable crooks. You are helping Musk use our tax money to conduct crimes and you are protecting him with your PR hype lies.

We urge you to send this letter to Elon Musk and each of the “executive” front people at his companies. We urge Musk and his front operators to respond in writing to each of the charges in this letter, in

writing, as well as in a Jury Trial and a public Congressional hearing.

THE CRIME OF THE CENTURY

Current best evidence, and witness testimony, appears to confirm that 6 Senior Obama White House staff (Gibbs, Axelrod, Plouffe, Rattner, Emanual, etc.) and 3 Agency heads (Chu, Holder, etc.) colluded in an organized crime operation, within The White House, which ended up defrauding the U.S. Government, and Taxpayers, of over $200 Billion. Their scheme involved acquiring campaign funds from UAW (Over-seen by Rattner with the Detroit gang) and related unions.

Is the DOJ being ordered not to file anti-trust actions on the Silicon Valley BIG 6? because they are the biggest campaign donors?"

Silicon Valley billionaires in exchange for give-away taxpayer money for their personal investments. At least 3 Senators (Feinstein, Reid, Pelosi, etc.) participated in the scam. Most of the persons of interest also had insider trading stock profit schemes running through all of the deals. This is the manner in which Tesla, Solyndra, Ener1, Abound and the bulk of the Clean-Tech deals were done. Skims as "finders fees" and "transaction fees" went into each of their pockets via stealthed routes and took place at each transaction point in the process, assisted by Goldman Sachs. To date; thousands of points of evidence have been documented by Press and Civic investigations. Financial records, emails, phone calls, staff testimony, stock records, trust filings, SEC documents, GAO records and NSA archives confirm everything beyond a shadow of a doubt. The FBI and DOJ have been ordered, by Senior White House officials, not to investigate, nor to respond to witnesses or interview any subjects which would reveal information that would require them to fully engage in the prosecution. NSA has complete records of all illicit actions but cannot supply the recordings, or data, without a subpoena from a Special Prosecutor. The impunity and arrogance that the Billionaires and fixers have strutted their "nobody is going to come after us as long as our guy is in office" attitude has subsided as they see that the end is nigh. Some reporters have significant evidential files and are awaiting other legal developments in order to coincide information release.

THE COVERED-UP DEATHS AND SAFETY DEFECTS

How does a company bypass the oversight that citizens pay for to get away with murder?



Figure 3: Typical Tesla spontaneous battery fire and cancer-causing smoke

By Susan Johnlo For Web Times **(Based on actual events)**

The sun glistened off the sleek futuristic body of the six figure Tesla sports car as it careened around the next curve of the beautiful Malibu coastal highway.

Below, the Pacific Ocean spread out to the horizon in an endless carpet of blue, undulating waves and sparkling wonder.

Nickleback was blaring from the speakers of the car, the driver's hair was tossed in the wind, his popped collar was flapping in the high speed rush of air and his Ray Bans barely hid his I-own-the-world feeling of delight in the moment.

Then the gates of hell opened up…

The car suddenly swerved, it dived straight off the cliff. Did the driver smell the smoke, or see the flames first? We may never be sure.

Was the, notoriously, hackable Tesla suddenly taken over by Chinese hackers, who had found his car IP address on the internet? That is another question that has yet to be resolved.

What is certain, is the horrific death that then followed. As investigators, safety engineers and fire officials detail the sequence of events, the results require a warning to readers: Do not read further if

you have a weak stomach –

First, lithium ion battery number 862, in the floor pan of the car, experienced the collapsing housing of the lightweight aluminum box housing that surrounded it. The collapsing metal pierced the skin of the first battery. This was caused by the first rock that the lower corner of the Tesla floor pan slammed into.

The rapid compression, and distortion of the 3 inch long Tesla battery caused that battery to buckle and forced the metal compounds inside, the lithium ion core battery chemicals, to experience the force as a pyrotechnic trigger. This, then caused that battery to release vapors, while at the same time, igniting those vapors like a little hand-grenade.

This battery had just been struck, ignited and exploded, and in that fire and explosion it was releasing gases which the driver was inhaling in his last moments of life. Those gasses have been publicly documented by The FDA, OSHA, Panasonic , and hundreds of other laboratory-grade facilities, to be the cause of cancer, liver damage, neurological damage, fetal damage and other deadly health issues.

If this driver had not been killed by the fire and explosions, he would have had a longer, slower set of lethal issues to contend with.

Back to battery number 862; a few milliseconds after battery number 862 experienced the catastrophic explosion, battery number 863, right next to it, experienced the same devastating failure. This was followed by battery number 864, then number 865, then number 866, milliseconds apart. A chain reaction of self-igniting thermal hell was underway and no fireman could stop it now, nor, could they stop it after the crash.

The unstoppable nature of this lithium ion battery fire, set Malibu Canyon, itself, on fire.

So these flashlight-type batteries, that every Tesla driver is sitting on top of, are going off like military grade incendiary devices, during this crash, one-after-the-other.

These flashlight batteries were never made to be used in cars. Safety engineers say that Elon Musk’s decision to use these batteries, in this way, was based on rapid profit exploitation, and not on proper engineering.

Be that as it may, we are now mid-way through the slow motion movie of this crash. The batteries are exploding, one after the other, the car is plowing through the rocks and debris as it dives off the cliff. But the horror has only begun. How many batteries do we have to watch explode in this single vehicle? NEARLY 8000 EXPLODING BATTERIES.

Let us stop and consider this fact.

Where only one in 40 gasoline tanks, in each regular car accident, ever explodes. Here, in one car, you have nearly 8000 possibilities of an explosion AND each battery, that explodes, has an extremely high likelihood of setting off, all the rest, in a chain reaction. Do you like those odds? You have a 400% better chance of winning the lottery.

In our slow motion analysis, we have only crossed the half-way point in the accident. The front of the car is crumpling, the heavy batteries are being thrown upwards, through the floor of the car, to cover the driver in exploding lithium metal particles, and the cockpit of the car is filling up with some of the

most toxic fumes you can legally produce.



Figure 4: Typical Tesla spontaneous battery fire and cancer-causing smoke

Still, the worst is yet to come.

The special alloys, which Tesla decided to make its car out of, turn out to interact with the exploding batteries to cause an effect called alloy conflagration. The very metal of the Tesla car has now been set on fire by the massive heat from these exploding batteries. The car has turned into the public version of a military phosphorous bomb, one of the most hideous military weapons of all time. This burning metal composition is worse than napalm, it can burn all the way through your face, your skull, and any bones in your body. It is a fire that almost nothing can extinguish.

Molten, flaming metal is dripping on the driver and it is coming from every side of the car, surrounding him in a fireball of deadly metal lava.

The car has finally come to a rest in a fireball. The driver is consumed in a nightmare of fire, dripping molten metal and deadly toxic smoke. The pain is beyond comprehension.

He is, in the same moment, burned to death, asphyxiated and entombed in red hot liquid metal.

The resulting fire, in the Canyon, is, at first, unstoppable and threatens the entire community of homes.



Figure 5: Typical Tesla spontaneous battery fire and cancer-causing smoke

The first responder's attempts to douse the car fire, only make it worse! Water, it turns out, makes lithium ion batteries explode all over again. The car has been filled with a type of battery that mere bumps, and water, can cause to explode. Let me repeat this for emphasis: WATER MAKES LITHIUM ION BATTERIES EXPLODE. Not only does water not put out lithium ion fires, IT MAKES THEM WORSE!

Hours later, after the car has burned itself out, the first responders try to recover the body.

The problem is, they can't recognize a body. The driver has been burned into an unrecognizable lump of melted plastic, molten metal and human flesh.

His lovely drive down the coast ended in a horror as awful as any nightmare midnight movie.

So this use, of this battery, in this way, was decided by the very Senators and billionaire campaign investors who owned the stock in this battery. If you wonder why a deadly choice, like this, was made about a battery that already had all of these dangers fully documented, on federal record; the answer can be found in one word: Corruption.

This massive oversight, putting the public at such risk, took place because a kick-back scheme was created by Mr. Musk, and his campaign finance partners. They chose greed, over scientific facts. Those chose mining commodity deals, and expediency, over proper engineering. They chose corruption, over anything else.

So, when you buy a Tesla, you need to think about your own safety and the safety of the American political system. Consider not supporting corruption and consider supporting the safety of yourself and

your family: Buy an Audi!



Figure 6: Typical Tesla spontaneous battery fire and cancer-causing smoke



Figure 7: The Department Of Energy 'Cleantech' funds were the largest DARK MONEY scam in history

Dear Tesla Car Owners:

People think you support corruption when they see you drive it. Give it back to the dealer with this note and get your money back:

- Tesla said they were going to BUILD a Factory in San Jose. They had no intention of building a factory and just wanted to trick state and city officials into signing their appeal letters. The factory was never built. Tesla investors sought to get real estate profits from the land deal. Tesla said they were going to BUILD a Factory in New Mexico. They are being sued in New Mexico for is lie. They had no intention of building a factory and just wanted to trick state and city officials into signing their appeal letters. The factory was never built. Tesla investors sought to get real state profits from the land deal. Tesla said they were going to BUILD a Factory in Downey, CA. They had no intention of building a factory and just wanted to trick state and city officials into signing their appeal letters. The factory was never built. Tesla investors sought to get real estate profits from the land deal.

- Tesla fired multiple workers without notice. They have been sued by those workers and lost those lawsuits. When this got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through? Corruption? Tesla had no factory but DOE rejected other applicants for not having a factory. When this got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through? Corruption?

- Tesla was $100,000.00 off on their BOM calculations per car. When this got other applicants

declined, how did Tesla get through? Corruption? Deloitte was both the accountant for Tesla and the accounting reviewer for DOE. With Tesla's at-application-time credit and numbers actually so bad, one has to wonder what was up. When this got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through? Corruption?

- Tesla and DOE staff were supplied by McKinsey. Mckinsey wrote all of the green energy plans and white papers for David Axelrod to give to the White House. Mckinsey staff have now gone to jail. Tesla and Fisker investors are best friends with McKinsey senior executives. One Mckinsey executive, associated with a jailed McKinsey senior executive, is now dead from "natural causes". The heads of the DOE loan Program: Matt Rogers and Steve Spinner, were working for McKinsey while also working at the DOE loan program as "deciders" for Steven Chu. When this got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through? Corruption?

- Tesla made a deal with DOE staff to spiff the loan announcement in order to hype the stock market in order to fake up stock sales. When this got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through? Corruption? DOE had IBM consulting, in Virginia, do Tesla's "due diligence". IBM consulting was a contractor to Tesla. IBM Consulting supplied the DOE loan staff that McKinsey did not supply. IBM consulting only gave Tesla their top score. The reviews by IBM consulting, which operating under a variety of names from a fake office, now seem to have been manipulated in favor of Tesla. When this got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through? Corruption?

- Tesla investors emailed and phone called the White House and Senior DOE staff to make quid-pro-quo deals which are now documented. When this got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through? Corruption?

- Tesla got their inside Senator to give them only-for-Tesla factory tax reductions, green tax credits and other special finance perks that allowed Tesla to book profit that did not actually exist. When this got other applicants in trouble, how did Tesla get through? Corruption?

- At the time of application, Tesla had no prototype of the car that was to be factory produced (The roadster was not at all the car produced), no design CAD, no factory production files and no engineering for factory machine automation. When this got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through? Corruption?

- Tesla was caught sending out letters to customers telling them to close deposits so they could fake orders before the earnings call. When this got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through?Corruption?

- Tesla engaged in a conflict-of-interest with a Senator and her real-estate family for Tesla and Solyndra land, and adjacent land, in Fremont, Ca. How did Tesla get this through? Corruption?

- Tesla had one of the worst credit ratings at the time of application. Even today, to pay back all of Tesla's investors is nearly impossible. When this got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through? Tesla had one of the worst debt ratios at the time of application. When this got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through? Corruption?

- The cost, BOM, time-to-market, range and domestic jobs metrics was lower in Tesla's

application than most other applicants. When better ratings got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through? DOE staff made a deal with Tesla to swap Detroit stock to cook up the books for the application. When this got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through? Corruption?

- Tesla made a deal to hire union workers for the NUMMI plant then fired most of them and hired H1B foreign workers with taxpayer money. When this got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through? Corruption?

-Tesla provided no collateral for their loan application and had no assets of value. When this got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through? Corruption?

- Tesla buys the majority of its parts from non-American suppliers. When this got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through? Corruption?

- Tesla hired multiple “famous auto people” who then quit when they say what Tesla was up to. When this got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through? Corruption? - Tesla said they were going to build and sell over 500,000 cars as of today’s date. They have missed every milestone and sold less than 5000 cars. When this got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through? Corruption? - Tesla could not make their payments and got their deal custom-changed multiple times. When this got other applicants declined, how did Tesla get through? Corruption?

WHO DO THEY HIRE TO PRODUCE THEIR FAKE TESLA ‘FAN-BOY’ POSTINGS?



Tesla, and Elon Musk, working with their financial partners at Google, are famous for flooding blogs with meat puppets, shills, sock puppets and a variety of fake Tesla troll shill comments in order to make it look like Elon Musk, and his stock assets, are popular. Doug Bock Clark has exposed one of the many services the Silicon Valley oligarchs, Musk in particular, use to fake their media facades:

Every morning, Kim Casipong strolls past barbed wire, six dogs, and a watchman in order to get to her job in a pink apartment building decorated with ornate stonework in Lapu-Lapu City. The building towers above the slums surrounding it—houses made of scrap wood with muddy goat pens in place of yards. She is a pretty, milk-skinned, 17-year-old girl who loves the movie Frozen and whose favorite pastime is singing karaoke. She is on her way to do her part in bringing down Facebook.

Casipong huffs to the third floor of the apartment building, opens a door decorated with a crucifix, and greets her co-workers. The curtains are drawn, and the artificial moonlight of computer screens illuminates the room. Eight workers sit in two rows, their tools arranged on their desks: a computer, a minaret of cell phone SIM cards, and an old cell phone. Tens of thousands of additional SIM cards are taped into bricks and stored under chairs, on top of computers, and in old instant noodle boxes around the room.

Richard Braggs, Casipongs boss, sits at a desk positioned behind his employees, occasionally glancing up from his double monitor to survey their screens. Even in the gloom, he wears Ray-Ban sunglasses to shield his eyes from the glare of his computer. (Richard Braggs is the alias he uses for business purposes; he uses a number of pseudonyms for various online activities.)

Casipong inserts earbuds, queues up dance music—Paramore and Avicii—and checks her clients

instructions. Their specifications are often quite pointed. A São Paulo gym might request 75 female Brazilian fitness fanatics, or a Castro-district bar might want 1,000 gay men living in San Francisco. Her current order is the most common: Facebook profiles of beautiful American women between the ages of 20 and 30. Once theyve received the accounts, the client will probably use them to sell Facebook likes to customers looking for an illicit social media boost.

Most of the accounts Casipong creates are sold to these digital middlemen—click farms as they have come to be known. Just as fast as Silicon Valley conjures something valuable from digital ephemera, click farms seek ways to create counterfeits. Google buy Facebook likes and youll see how easy it is to purchase black-market influence on the Internet: 1,000 Facebook likes for $29.99; 1,000 Twitter followers for $12; or any other type of fake social media credential, from YouTube views to Pinterest followers to SoundCloud plays. Social media is now the engine of the Internet, but that engine is running on some pretty suspect fuel.

Casipong plays her role in hijacking the currencies of social media—Facebook likes, Twitter followers—by performing the same routine over and over again. She starts by entering the clients specifications into the website Fake Name Generator, which returns a sociologically realistic identity: Ashley Nivens, 21, from Nashville, Tennessee, now a student at New York University who works part time at American Apparel. (Ashley Nivens is a composite based on Casipongs standard procedures, not the name of an actual person or account.) She then creates an email account. The email address forms the foundation of Ashley Nivenss Facebook account, which is fleshed out with a profile picture from a photo library that Braggss workers have compiled by scraping dating sites. The whole time, a proxy server makes it seem as though she is accessing the Internet from Manhattan, and software disables the cookies that Facebook uses to track suspicious activity.

Next, she inserts a SIM card into a Nokia cell phone, a pre-touch-screen antique thats been used so much the digits on its keypad have worn away. Once the phone is live, she types its number into Nivenss Facebook profile and waits for a verification code to arrive via text message. She enters the code into Facebook and—voilà!—Ashley Nivens is, according to Facebooks security algorithms, a real person. The whole process takes about three minutes.

Casipong sometimes wonders what happens to profiles like these once she turns them over to the clients. In fact, her whole job seems strange to her and the purpose of all these accounts somewhat mysterious. Still, she forgets this for long stretches of time: Shes young, she can do an almost perfect karaoke rendition of Mariah Careys We Belong Together, and she dreams of finishing college at the University of Cebu City after shes saved enough money from working for Braggs. Once she earns a degree in Web design, shell join the Philippine diaspora and find a job in Australia, New Zealand, or the United States. And during weekends, maybe she can lead a life similar to Nivenss.

When Casipong stands up a little after 6 p.m., a nightshift worker is waiting to take her chair.

Once, if you wanted to make money scamming people on the Internet, you used email. For two years, Braggs made his living spamming half a billion email addresses, hawking blueprints for a mythical perpetual energy machine or e-books that explained the secret to winning the lottery. Filipinos even invented a term for this kind of work, onlining, and, for about a decade, email spamming was a semi-

honorable career path in Cebu City, the metropolitan area that encompasses Lapu-Lapu City and is one of the foremost business-outsource processing centers in the world. (Ring JPMorgan Chase or Microsoft customer support, and theres a good chance youll be connected to a Filipino in Cebu City whose excellent English is part of the legacy of the American colonization of the Philippines.) Successful onliners became the nouveau riche of Cebu City. A notorious set of six brothers formed a spamming cooperative and built a row of mansions amid the slums. They threw all-night parties with roving guitarists serenading scores of guests, while they drank beer and devoured lechón, Philippine whole-roasted pig.

But between 2010 and 2012, teams of Internet security researchers and law enforcement officials dismantled several spambot networks across the world. These efforts, combined with the improved defenses of email hosts, effectively disabled many onliners in Cebu City. They had to look for new ways to make money.

Social medias takeover of the Internet has been swift and dramatic. From 2005 to 2012, the percentage of Internet-using, American adults on a social media platform mushroomed from 8 to 70 percent. In 2005, Facebook had 5.5 million users; at the end of 2014, Facebook claimed 1.39 billion active monthly users—about one for every five people in the world and a little less than half of all people with Internet access.

In 2009, Facebook introduced the like button, which quickly became a way for people to celebrate an engagement or the birth of a baby, but also for brands to get people to endorse their products. Companies loved social media for the ostensible humanity it lent them; and sales leads that came through social media, studies showed, had a much higher chance of converting into actual purchases. Google and Bings algorithms take social media into account, so large followings could also improve a companys position in search-engine rankings, where appearing even one slot higher can mean significant additional revenue. Researchers have also found that having lots of followers attracts even more followers, continually amplifying a companys or individuals reach. And while the impact of traditional advertising is difficult to quantify, social media counters are much more transparent.

Celebrities—and more minor personalities, like bloggers trying to get endorsement deals—have increasingly found their value measured in Facebook fans and Twitter followers, the payments they receive proportionate to their social media clout. Khloé Kardashian reportedly earns around $13,000 every time she tweets things like, Want to know how Old Navy makes your butt look scary good? to her 13.6 million followers. Politicians desire large followings for obvious reasons. Even ordinary people have discovered perks to having an extensive social media presence. Some employers, for instance, now require social media savvy for jobs in marketing, PR, or tech. All these logical incentives aside, the imperatives are not always rational. A growing body of research has begun to unpack the envy and insecurity that social media can generate—the pernicious sense that your friends are gaining Twitter followers much faster than you.

To help companies, celebrities, and everyday people boost their social media standing, onliners set up Internet stores—click farms—where customers can buy social media influence. Click farms can be found across the globe, but are most commonly based in the developing world. They exist in India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and the Philippines, and may also exist in Eastern Europe, Mexico, and Iraq. A

small number of click farms employ manual labor, a dozen or so people who manipulate Facebook accounts individually to create the likes that they sell. But most click farms are run by smaller teams that manage software to give digital life to accounts like Ashley Nivens. What Braggs runs is actually referred to as an account farm—he makes the accounts and software that click farms use.

In terms of their professionalism, click farms range widely. Some maintain promotional newsletters, subscription packages, and 24/7 customer service. One of the more polished, We Sell Likes, was founded by a former Silicon Valley SEO professional. Others are much less formal: a freelancer sitting in front of his computer all day and selling the services of hundreds of social media accounts through websites like SEO Clerks. Last November, The New York Times reported that teenagers were licensing Twitter click-farm software to supplement their allowances.

Richards account farm feels more like a startup than a developing-world sweatshop.

But the stakes are much larger than pocket money. Researchers estimate that the market for fake Twitter followers was worth between $40 million and $360 million in 2013, and that the market for Facebook spam was worth $87 million to $390 million. Italian Internet security researcher Andrea Stroppa has suggested that the market for fake Facebook likes could exceed even that. International corporations like Pepsi, Coca-Cola, Mercedes-Benz, and Louis Vuitton have all been accused of employing click farms, and celebrities such as 50 Cent, Paris Hilton, and LeAnn Rimes, have been implicated in buying fake followers. During his 2012 presidential campaign, Mitt Romney gained more than 100,000 Twitter followers in a single weekend, despite averaging only 4,000 new followers a day previously. (His campaign denied having bought any fakes.) One Indonesian click farmer told me that he had funneled two million Facebook likes to a candidate in his nations hotly contested July 2014 presidential election.

Two of the most crucial rules of Facebooks terms of service are: You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than yourself without permission, and You will not create more than one personal account. The law of one person, one account is meant to guarantee that Facebook is the most real place on the Internet: The roughly six billion likes the company processes every day are supposed to be a quantification of homo sapien emotion. Other social media platforms, like Twitter, allow for more than one account per user, but, ultimately, the medium is predicated on the idea that its digital world is an accurate extension of the physical world.

Click farms jeopardize the existential foundation of social media: the idea that the interactions on it are between real people. Just as importantly, they undermine the assumption that advertisers can use the medium to efficiently reach real people who will shell out real money. More than $16 billion was spent worldwide on social media advertising in 2014; this money is the primary revenue for social media companies. If social media is no longer made up of people, what is it?

It was never Braggss intention to make a career of onlining. He dreamed of becoming a pilot and even went to flight school. (He still recalls the Leonardo da Vinci quote: Once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk the earth with your eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you will always long to return.) Financial problems forced him to give up on his plan when he was in his early

thirties, and, for nearly a decade, he survived on menial jobs: running a coffee stall at the bazaar, working construction, and chauffeuring tourists. One day, when he was driving a group of Koreans to a brothel—the destination for most of his customers—they offered him a turn with the high-class prostitute they were planning to employ. Braggs began searching for a way out.

Braggs got into onlining in 2011 after a friend who had struck it rich spamming gave him the software to start his own operation. When Braggss email spam business failed in 2012, he opened his own click farm, manually forging thousands of Facebook accounts and selling likes from them, incrementally hiring workers as his business grew. When he realized that he could make more money by supplying click farms with the products they needed—i.e., profiles and software to animate those profiles—he reorganized his business.

By July 2013, he was making phone verified accounts—or PVAs—full time. He hired 17 employees, including Casipong, and established round-the-clock shifts so his farm never went dark. Casipong guesses that she makes over 100 Facebook PVAs a day. Other employees average more than 150. Braggs sells PVAs for 70 cents; premium PVAs—accounts that are fleshed out with more than bare-bones biographical details—can be bought for $1.50.

Since his business began, Braggs has expanded into Yahoo, Gmail, and Twitter PVAs, and his customers have used the fake accounts in all sorts of scams: On the dating site Tinder, for example, Braggs said he believes seductive women solicited male users for pay-to-access porn sites. His biggest order, he told me, was for Chinese hackers trying to fleece the digital payment exchange Stellar; he hired every freelance worker he could find, but he was still only able to fulfill a small portion of it.

In many ways, Braggss account farm operates similarly to the outsourcing and industrial businesses that Cebu City is famous for. He relies on the infrastructure that carries the call center and technical support data to Cebu City from around the globe in order to pipe his forged profiles to his clients. He even benefits from cheap local resources—though instead of exploiting the Philippines old-growth rainforest timber, he processes SIM cards dropped off by men on motorcycles, paying a few cents for a card that would sell for $5 to $10 in the United States. Workers willing to do repetitive manual labor are not in short supply, either.

But Braggss account farm feels more like a startup than a developing-world sweatshop. Most of his employees are young IT university graduates infused with the excitement of beating the system. There is an office puppy named Hacker, and Braggs pays for a cook to prepare lunch for the employees every day. Casipong earns about $215 a month, significantly more than the minimum wage for a domestic helper, which is as low as $34 a month. Braggs pays his nightshift workers extra, and some of his employees reportedly choose to become nocturnal for the additional wages.

Click farms jeopardize the existential foundation of social media: the idea that the interactions on it are between real people.

The Philippines has the highest rate of unemployment in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Casipong is aware of the alternative employment options: Cebu City is the cybersex capital of the Philippines, and illegal firework factories in the slums announce their presence every few weeks with a bang. Braggss employees seem genuinely happy; their main complaint was laggy Internet that

disrupted the music they streamed while working. Many spoke of Braggs as a Horatio Alger*style role model.?In the fictionalized biography Braggs maintains on the website of his account farm, he calls himself the Robin Hood of Facebook marketing, and this contrarian idealism extends to his general attitude about life. His hero is the tribal chieftain Lapu-Lapu—the namesake of his city—famous for slaying the Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan, who, in the name of capitalism and colonialism, was the first man to circumnavigate the globe. He has no desire to stay up all night answering questions about credit cards and Windows glitches for people on the other side of the world. Why shouldnt he feel proud of providing decent salaries to 17 workers, or paying for the school fees of his girlfriends younger sister or the local kids basketball jerseys? Hes a self-made man, trained on YouTube tutorials and in chat rooms; to this day, he types hunt-and-peck style, never having learned QWERTY.

What he and click-farm managers are doing is not illegal in the Philippines. Facebooks terms of service are not international law. In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission and attorneys general from several states have legislated against fake reviews—false endorsements on Amazon, for example. But no formal ruling has been passed down on inauthentic likes. Click farming raises serious consumer protection questions, said Ian Ayres, a specialist in contract law and a professor at Yales law and business schools. To participate as a buyer or a seller in the traditional click-farming market seems a clear wrong. But the actual law is less explicit. And Braggs has his own business ethics: Hes not hacking anyones bank account, only offering a service that people are clamoring to pay for and providing for himself, his family, and his countrymen.

For years, Facebook encouraged brands to use social media as a free way to connect with fans. Companies would post content, and Facebook would show it to a large percentage of the people who had liked those companies, free of charge: This was the so-called organic reach of a post. But, over the last few years, with a noticeably precipitous drop in late 2013, Facebook has steadily decreased the organic reach of posts; now, when a company posts something, it only reaches about 6 percent of the profiles that have already liked that company, and Facebook plans to decrease that reach further. This has meant that companies struggle to access most of the fans they have accumulated unless they pay Facebook to advertise. But as Facebook becomes more of a paid billboard, click-farm bots can disrupt the efforts of companies that advertise with Facebook—and, sometimes, even render them pointless.

Heres how this can happen. Second Floor Music, an independent, Manhattan-based jazz publishing company that represents critically acclaimed but lesser-known composers, was the kind of small business built on its history and reputation: Five Grammy certificates hung on the walls, and jazz legends and up-and-comers dropped by the studio to rehearse. It was not, however, exactly forward-leaning when it came to social media marketing. But it was also ideally positioned to take advantage of Facebooks advertising services: Its products targeted a niche audience that was often hard to reach, but which Facebook, with its vast trove of personal data, could easily access.

So in September 2013, Second Floor Music launched a Facebook advertising campaign for the Facebook page of Jazz Lead Sheets, a Second Floor Music website that allowed customers to download sheet music and song recordings. Because more than one-third of Jazz Lead Sheets business came from international clients, Second Floor Music asked Facebook to put ads in front of people from around the world, and paid Facebook a few cents each time one of them liked the page for Jazz Lead Sheets.

A young jazz singer employed by Second Floor Music named Rachel Nash Bronstein ended up overseeing the Facebook campaign. At first, Bronstein was exhilarated by how fast the Facebook page gained fans, hundreds within weeks. But then she began to notice that the fan activity—liking posts, commenting, etc.—on the page had plummeted. When Bronstein examined the profiles, her heart sank. Many of them hailed from Iraq. A lot of the profiles didnt display any English. None of them evidenced any interest in jazz.

Its impossible to pinpoint how these profiles ended up fans of Jazz Lead Sheets. (Facebook is fiercely secretive about how its internal algorithms work.) But when Bronstein paid Facebook to place her advertisement, Facebook may have put the ads in front of accounts that had already liked thousands of pages, figuring that those accounts were more likely to click on the ad. And those accounts were likely run by click farms. (The average American user only likes 70 pages.) Because many fake accounts are programmed to disguise their mercenary activities by liking lots of pages (not just their clients), these bots were primed to like the Jazz Lead Sheets page. And because click-farm accounts often are programmed to move in coordination, so that they are easier to control, having one bot like a page could have caused others to follow, setting off a cascade of fake likes.

These fake likes weren't just an empty number. Whenever Second Floor Music posted content, Facebooks algorithms placed it on the newsfeeds of a small, random sample of fans—the people who had liked Second Floor Music—and measured how many engaged with the content. High levels of engagement meant that the content was deemed interesting and redistributed to more fans for free—the main goal of most businesses that use social media is to reach this tipping point where content spreads virally. But the fake fans never engaged, depressing each posts score and leaving it dead on arrival. The social media boost Bronstein had paid for never happened. Even worse, she now had thousands of fake fans who made it nearly impossible to reach her real fans. Bronstein struggled to get help from Facebook, reaching out repeatedly through help forums, but, in the end, she scrapped the original page and started again from scratch. Second Floor Music had effectively paid to ruin one of its flagship Facebook pages.

Across Facebook, well-intentioned companies and organizations have found themselves in this predicament. Small businesses ranging from Bay Area startups to Toronto magazine publishers have reported similar problems, and Internet forums and blogs are rife with related tales. Corporations with professional teams managing their Facebook pages and large advertising budgets seem to treat this kind of artificial appreciation as the price of doing business. But the side effects of click farms are a real threat to small businesses with slimmer margins for error and without the know-how to effectively target their ads. (Its worth noting that small businesses are the focus of a Facebook marketing push that has involved nationwide outreach and efforts to streamline the companys advertising platform. Since Second Floor Musics first campaign, Facebook has made more tools available for advertisers to direct and monitor their ads. A year later, Bronstein ran another campaign that worked much better than the first.)

From January 2013 to February 2014, a global team of researchers from the Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, Microsofts and AT&Ts research labs, as well as Boston and Northeastern Universities, conducted an experiment designed to determine just how often advertising campaigns

resulted in likes from fake profiles. The researchers ran ten Facebook advertising campaigns, and when they analyzed the likes resulting from those campaigns, they found that 1,867 of the 2,767 likes—or about 67 percent—appeared to be illegitimate. After being informed of these suspicions, Facebook corroborated much of the teams work by erasing 1,730 of the likes. Sympathetic researchers from a study run by the online marketing website Search Engine Journal have suggested that targeted Facebook advertisements can yield suspicious likes at a rate above 50 percent. In the fall of 2014, Professor Emiliano De Cristofaro of the University College of London presented research which found that even a page explicitly labeled as fake gained followers—the vast majority presumably bots.

The bot buildup can even affect companies that arent advertising with Facebook, but are just passively hoping their pages gain real fans. In 2014, Harvard Universitys Facebook fans were most engaged in Dhaka, Bangladesh. (They stated that they did not pay for likes.) A 2012 article in The New York Times suggested that as much as 70 percent of President Obamas 19 million Twitter followers were fake. (His campaign denied buying followers.) Less prominent pages from across the world—from those belonging to the English metal band Red Seas Fire to international bloggers—have been spontaneously overwhelmed by bots that are attempting to mask their illicit activity by glomming on to real social media profiles.

How Do San Francisco ANTIFA programmers Build a Facebook Bot for Elon Musk?

(Its easy!)

Pick a name: Fake Name Generator is great for this. One click will get you a full identity: From name, to age, to job—it can even provide a blood type.

Create an email account: If you want a bulletproof bot, make a phone-verified Gmail account using the same SIM cards you are using to verify your fake Facebook account.

Make sure your stealth software is on: Your proxy server should show that youre working from someplace innocuous. Dont forget to disable the cookies that might snag you.

Create a profile: Using the details from Fake Name Generator, flesh out your Facebook account. Dating websites are a great place to steal photos.

Phone verify the account: Install a SIM card into a cell phone and type the phone number into Facebooks phone-verification feature. Wait for Facebook to text you a verification code. Enter the code.

Add some frills to the profile: Everything from favorite movies to photo albums, which you can just copy from other profiles. A bot looks a lot more authentic if it has friends, so make sure to send a few requests. If youre working for a big account farm, you can probably friend some real people who are in on the scam.

Control your bot with the software: Once youve made thousands of bots, youre not going to want to manually manipulate them. Purchase a program to automate your bots to act real.


Watch out for the social media police: Facebook is hunting you, so be careful. Newly made bots are subject to extra scrutiny, so let your bot marinate for a few weeks. Dont go overboard on liking too many things. You'll probably want to maintain a lot of accounts, so they can work in shifts. Whenever you're paid to like one thing, like a few other random things to create a smokescreen of activity.

And if you are caught: Don't sweat it! Facebook is more likely to temporarily disable the like function of the account than delete it. But if the heats getting to be too much, just delete the account and reuse the phone number to make a new one. Your business wont miss a beat.

This February, Facebook stated that about 7 percent of its then 1.39 billion accounts were fake or duplicate, and that up to 28 million were undesirable—used for activities like spamming. In August 2014, Twitter disclosed in filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission that 23 million—or 8.5 percent—of its 270 million accounts were automated.

Almost since their inception, social media companies have tried to limit this kind of digital-influence inflation. YouTube periodically examines videos with suspicious numbers of views. In December 2014, in what was called the Instagram Rapture, the platform cleaned up a number of accounts; Justin Bieber lost 15 percent of his followers. Facebook is constantly refining its defenses; the verification processes that take up so much of Casipongs time are part of that effort. In some countries, Facebook has even

requested pictures of government IDs from suspicious accounts. (They've mostly avoided this tactic in the United States, where it has triggered a backlash.) As a Facebook spokesperson said in a statement last August: We have a real incentive to aggressively go after this activity because people want authentic connections on Facebook, and businesses use our platform to deliver real business results. Inauthentic interactions run counter to these goals, so we are constantly working to detect fraudulent activity and shut it down. In April, the spokesperson continued: Fraudulent activity has always been a tiny fraction of overall activity on our service, but recently we have developed new pattern recognition technologies that have mostly halted the major exchanges of fake like activity.



At the same time, however, it is in the interest of Facebook and other platforms to downplay the severity of the problem. Twitter has recognized that more than 8 percent of its accounts are automated, but it says not all of these are malicious—i.e, run by click farms or used for spam—suggesting that many are used for legitimate purposes, like tweeting the scores of sports games. The company has reported that 5 percent of its accounts are malicious, but researchers have suggested the actual figure is at least double that.

These estimates are contentious because in 2014, more than 90 percent of Facebooks $12.5 billion in revenue and about 90 percent of Twitters $1.4 billion in revenue came from advertising. If researchers are correct that advertising on social media leads to a high percentage of fake likes and fans and followers, the entire business model could be called into question by advertisers. What incentive do companies have to buy ads that target digital ghosts? As Internet security researcher Stroppa said, The worth of Twitter is based on their active and total numbers of accounts. If they ban fake profiles, then they will lose an important percentage of their user base. Brands have begun to report dissatisfaction with Facebook marketing, wrote Nate Elliott, a vice president for the technology and market research company Forrester Research, in an email. If fake profiles are a widespread problem, then it may turn out Facebooks value to marketers is even lower than we thought.

Facebook, Twitter, and other platforms claim to successfully police their populations, but evidence suggests otherwise. The Max Planck team found that more than 90 percent of accounts they flagged as black market were not eliminated after four months, even though Facebook had erased many of the fake likes that these accounts had created. De Cristofaro found that Facebook caught less than 1 percent of the fake profiles he investigated. The number was even lower for high-quality accounts: For the month that he monitored 621 active profiles from a high-end click farm, only one was canceled. When I looked through the accounts managed by Braggss account farm and several other click farms, time-stamps revealed that the majority had been lurking on the network for several years. Many had even attracted real friends, either through automation or because their profile pictures had intrigued actual people; attractive women created by Braggss account farm often get approached with explicit overtures. (Unless clients specify other identities for PVAs, Braggs instructs his workers to make sexy women.)

And just as onliners quickly shifted when email spam was no longer viable, click farms have wiggled away from efforts to rein them in. To my eye, Braggss premium PVAs are almost impossible to differentiate from the real deal. (Casipong fills the photo albums of her premium PVAs with pictures that remind her of one of her favorite blogs, Humans of New York, and adds quotes like hakuna matata, which she has no idea comes from The Lion King.) Experts believe that without computer-aided analysis, this extra camouflage makes it almost impossible to finger any click farmers couture bot.

If Facebook comes to suspect that Ashley Nivens is not, in fact, a real person, and suspends her account, Braggs will have Casipong unearth the appropriate SIM card from the tens of thousands of cards organized and stacked around Braggss shop, insert it into a phone, and answer Facebooks text message: Yes, she is a human. Basically, Braggs said when we met last September, theres nothing Facebook can do to stop me. Facebook has shut down his personal account, but Braggs laughs it off: Why would I need one Facebook account when Ive got thousands? The main limiting factor for his business is a somewhat unpredictable supply of SIM cards.

Last September, Braggs drove out of Lapu-Lapu City to one of the new luxury subdivisions springing up amid the wetlands and mangrove forests. He had purchased a house there and construction was underway. The streets were lined with boxy, concrete, two-story houses fronted by grass lawns—a Philippine version of the American dream, but with half the square footage of their Western counterparts and with roving goats nibbling their shrubbery. It is here that the ex-pats who run the nearby factories live.

The house was Braggss reward for working weekends and never taking a vacation. He had been so busy that two months had passed since he had visited, and he had to argue with the guards to be let into the gated community. The lawn outside Braggss house was chest-high, with saplings rising above the brush. His girlfriend—the first worker at his click farm—followed behind as Braggs pushed through the young jungle. This was the woman he would marry. This was where his children would be raised. This was where he would move his account farm once the electricity was turned on. The exterior of the house was finished, but the interior was bare. He stopped at the front door of his new home and he patted his pocket, worried that he had forgotten the key.

It seems impossible that Facebook, with its army of elite coders and multibillion-dollar war chest, wont

eventually crush Braggs. The company knows his real name. It barrages his inboxes with cease-and-desist orders. But hes hopeful. Every system is made by humans, Braggs told me, so there is always a way to beat it.

Here is a funny account of (PARODY) Senior Tesla Motors Media Consultant quitting and exposing Tesla.

“Top Tesla PR dude says stupid, stupid news reporters now using facts instead of tesla talking points, thus ruining the whole deal

Fremont, CA- As of today, there is no mention of Buzz Flapjaw on any Tesla Motors website. His name appears to have been scrubbed from all Tesla media.

Buzz is a legend in the corporate communications industry, but he now has no relationship with Tesla Motors, certainly as of this weekend.

Buzz said, The PRESS ARE IDIOTS! in national press releases (the results of which are shown below):

He went on to say: The Stupid, Stupid news reporters are now using facts, hard data and detailed research to write their stories about Tesla Motors and Elon Musk, instead of the extensive and carefully prepared talking points we gave their news directors. You would think that our investors ad money would still give us control of the media but apparently not..

“(Fucking Glenn Greenwald)”, He muttered under his breath.. (“Jay Carney would never let this shit happen when he controlled the news”) he continued to mutter to himself

Buzz elaborated: Only those of us inside Tesla can truly describe the kool aid colors (Teslas fanboy shill bloggers favorite drink) of the bright Tesla future and the wonderfulness of just being a Rich Frat Boy Democrat, err,.. uh Tesla Owner

Formerly with Enron, Buzz moved on to run the General Motors ignition key safety group, and was stolen by Elon Musk (Who stole Tesla from Martin Eberhardt), from GM when his valuable disinformation skills were noted. Buzz expressed his angst and frustration with the constant concerns over Teslas stock activities and the reference to Tesla as a creepy taxpayer swindle-scam created to manipulate the stock market and exploit tax credits which Teslas investors bribed into place.

THAT IS JUST WRONG!, Raged Buzz, there is nothing creepy about it!

Buzz also commented on other controversies: Senator Feinstein DID NOT put herself on the intelligence committee just so she could get a heads-up just before she gets caught. She did not take bribes! Our investors huge cash payments to her PAC are irrelevant, as are the insider stocks and real estate holdings her, and her family, profited on and we only hired her staff to help them out, not as revolving door bribes, people are just making things up! The fact that Elon Musk had a personal relationship with her had nothing to do with it! If you ignore the direct connection between Solyndra and Tesla, and all of the investors who are also campaign donors, which are all on the same land, you can just err...uhm.. Benghazi!, Said Buzz.

Also commenting on the Tesla fires, he admonished: OK, so the Tesla patents do say, in no uncertain language, that the Tesla batteries will blow up and kill your family and burn your house down, but that

is not why we were just giving the patents away. Also, even though every major university has said that they way we configured the NOT APPROVED FOR CARS batteries creates ‘the most likely scenario for an explosive fire, of any lithium ion configuration on EARTH, the handful of cars we have sold only blow up a little bit and the cancer-causing gas they emit can be avoided if you get 2 miles away from them very fast while holding your breath.

He went on: ..Tesla is getting a raw deal, you need to just ignore all the dead, and burned alive, Tesla car and battery factory workers..for GODS SAKES, all but three of them are in CHINA..They are ASIANS, they are not AMERICANS!.. who cares?! We asked him to discuss the safety issues: Look, he said: Yes, we all know that Teslas have killed multiple people and that there are multiple homicide charges but it wasnt like the car killed people, except some of them.

We asked Mr. Flapjaw about the connection between all of Googles executives and investors, Teslas investors and campaign contributions that line up in a very symmetrical way to the Department of Energy funding. Buzz exclaimed: What!? You have a problem with symmetry? Look at the Tesla! It is design perfection. It is perfectly symmetrical. Symmetry is GOOD. You try to make it sound like kick-backs are a bad thing.. call them ‘campaign support resources‘, that doesnt sound so bad, heh?, he wiped his brow and continued.. So what if Google controls the media and hides all the investigations about Tesla, it is better than letting voters get all upset!

The various charges that Tesla is an organized crime operation created as a kick-back scheme to control stock market valuations was taken to Mr. Erick Holder for comment. His secretary stated that: Mr. Holder cannot speak to you right now, he is very busy very, very busy. He has a lot on his mind right now. He has to redo his stock portfolio before Monday and all kinds of things..

Buzz expects to begin work on his new job as lobbyist for the new CIGARETTES COME FROM PLANTS AND ARE GREEN AND GOOD FOR YOU Campaign.

When asked for comment, Mitt Romney merely smirked in a knowing kind a way

We asked Buzz if it is true that Robert Gibbs, Jay Carney and Erick Holder told Elon Musk that he could pretty much kill and eat human babies and we can keep it from getting ACTUAL media coverage. Buzz walked away…”

While that was a funny account of a typical Tesla shill, much of it is accurate in scope.

SILICON VALLEY SHAREHOLDER SUITS PROVE TECH LIES ABOUT PRODUCT SAFETY

- Dozens of fraud lawsuits now produced over tesla fraud by shareholders and insiders. charges eric holder with running cover-up to protect the white house!

- Charges tesla is a total criminal enterprise created to kick-back funds to silicon valley campaign funding vcs!

By Paul Carr

Tesla fire: Out of the battery fire, into the shareholder lawsuit.

Tesla shareholder Ross Weintraub has filed a derivative suit against the company and its board members — including CEO Elon Musk — alleging that a series of dishonest statements made about safety and profitability caused Teslas stock price to drop on multiple occasions.

A derivative suit is a legal tool used by shareholders who want to force a company to take corrective action against its own executives or, in this case, to take action directly if board members are unlikely to act. It should be noted that, to many, shareholder lawsuits are like patent trolls: An unfortunate cost of doing big business and not something that inherently bodes badly. Also, in Teslas case, their stock isnt that far off its 52 week high (Chart via Google):

In the complaint, filed in Northern California District Court, and embedded below, Weintraub alleges a long history of dishonesty by the company and by Musk himself, including allegations that Tesla board members:

'allowed the Company to embark on a campaign of false and misleading statements designed to convince the market that the Model S was literally the safest car in existence.'

'allowed the Company to misrepresent the low height and configuration of the Model S battery pack as enhancing the vehicles safety, without disclosing its very significant vulnerabilities for high-intensity fires.'

' egregiously allowed the Company to misrepresent the Model Ss history of fire incidents which included at least three very significant fires requiring first responder intervention.'

And that Elon Musk himself

'falsely claimed that [t]hroughout all our crash tests, throughout all similar incidents with vehicles on the road, never once has there been a fire. When a Model S fire later occurred during the relevant time period, a Tesla spokesperson falsely stated, This is the first fire. Thus, by the third Model S fire, the Individual Defendants were still causing or allowing Tesla to represent that there were low probabilities of such fires while simultaneously denying that a recall was necessary.'

‘gave several interviews during which he downplayed this Model S fire and worse, failed to disclose that another Model S had been consumed by fire in Mexico on October 18, 2013 According to allegations in the Federal Securities Action, defendant E. Musk, with knowledge of the fire and inspection, unilaterally determined that the fire was not relevant to investors due to the circumstances under which it arose.’

The lawsuit further claims that Musk and his fellow board members conduct has significantly and materially damaged the Company. By virtue of the Individual Defendants breaches of fiduciary duties, the Company faces a lawsuit alleging violations of the federal securities laws and Tesla has suffered significant disruption of, and damage to, its business, its reputation and goodwill.

It then goes on to list various conflicts held by board members which would make it unlikely that they would take action against Musk of their own volition. These include the fact that board member Steve Jurvetson of DFJ is an investor in other Musk companies including Solar City and Space X.

The suit demands a jury trial. The company has until the end of this week to respond or face a judgement by default.

Paul Carr is editorial director of Pando. Previously he was founder and editor in chief of NSFWCORP.

Another Tesla lie that has shareholders up-in-arms is the ‘The Tesla Patent Giveaway’ smoke screen scam!

Tesla has announced that they are giving their patents away, patents which state, in no uncertain terms, that their batteries can kill you, burn you and your family, set your house on fire, set your office or parking structure on fire (Not to mention the cancer-causing fumes they release). Tesla own engineers wrote that in the their patents and Musk signed off on those patents.

So thats nice, they are giving them away. Who does this benefit?

Since 2006, EVERY SINGLE new electric car company has been sabotaged by Musk and his Silicon Valley investors, The Detroit Big 3 (SEE THIS LINK) !!! and/or the Department of Energy. Over 200 electric car companies tried to launch and every single one got lied to and stonewalled by the DOE, sabotaged by outsider take-overs who offered an investment and then generated a take-over EXACTLY like Musk did; Blockaded, by mutual agreement by the VCs; and/or regulated into non-operation by laws which were written so only the Detroit Big 3 could pass them.

So, Musk appears to be making all nice-nice by giving away the patents but in reality, they cant be used by anyone but the Detroit Big 3 because anybody else will be forced to endure the above-mentioned sabotage efforts. The Detroit BIg 3 already have tons of their own patents and avoid any NIH (Not Invented Here) outsider technologies. So, what good are they?

There is no possible way to start, or run, an electric car company in America because Musk and his VCs along with DOE and Detroit have built a cartel that kills off any competitors. (With a little help from Robert Gibbs and Jay Carney)

Does President Obama care that they made him look like a fool for destroying his Miillion Electric Cars on Americas roads promise to the Public? The sabotage was intentional! They used taxpayer money to do it! Shouldnt the WHITE HOUSE be a little bit pissed off? Yet, another thing, the President has to first find out about by reading about it in the paper?

Here is another reason why the tesla patents are worthless and giving them away is like giving away grass to cows.

Almost every electric car company that starts to get traction has a hostile takeover attempt. Later stage parties create a dispute which causes the founder to be forced out, bought out, quit or otherwise stop providing the impetus to deliver a disruptive technology. The process has now occurred so many times that it is beginning to look like an intentionally crafted standardized strategy by third-parties who fear market diffusion. It happened to XP but they overcame it. The new management usually accidently tanks the company. Lets try to guess who the third-parties might beBUT:

What better way to control a market than to control all of the funding for that market and then have all that controlled funding administrated by your people who have been placed in, and around, a federal agency! Its the Takeover Game on a whole new level. Do people really do these sorts of things? Imagine megalomaniac car, energy and materials company heads with billions of dollars that want to control hundreds of billions of dollars and have insane egos. The Musk patent scam was just more PR and media manipulation hype.

WHO ARE SILICON VALLEY'S MEDIA BITCHES?

-THE LIST OF THEIR HIRED MEDIA SHILLS

Which media outlets cover-up Tesla Motors misdeeds and abuses?

Which ones are run, or directed, by Teslas investors seeking to manipulate stock values?

Lets track, chart and document which media outlets are willfully smoke-screening Tesla Motors. Which outlets publish counter-stories when other outlets publish negative disclosure about Tesla to try to cover-up, or flood-out, the Tesla issues and charges?

Some reporters are compensated by Teslas IR Department, PR contractors, founders, VC and banking groups with either cash, discounts, tickets, jobs, advertising contracts, sex workers, meals, travel and/or political access.

Which outlets now have documented tracking evidence, that can be exhibited in court?:

— Google (Investors)- owners of:

* Hundreds of online news outlets

* Also via web routing manipulation

— Hearst Communications (Investors)- owners of:

* SF Gate

* SF Chronicle

* 15 daily and 34 weekly newspapers including

* Houston Chronicle

* San Francisco Chronicle

* San Antonio Express-News

* Albany Times Union

* Hundreds of magazines around the world, including

* Good Housekeeping

* Cosmopolitan

* ELLE

* "O"

* The Oprah Magazine

* 29 television stations, which reach a combined 18 percent of U.S. viewers; ownership in leading cable networks, including Lifetime, A&E, HISTORY and ESPN; significant holdings in automotive, electronic and medical/pharmaceutical business information companies

* a 50 percent stake in global ratings agency Fitch Group

* Internet and marketing services businesses

* television production

* etc

— Gawker Media (White House Character Attack Conduit)- owners of:

* Gawker

* Gizmodo

* Jalopnik

* Kinja

* Deadspin

* Kotaku

* Jezebel

* Valleywag

* Lifehacker

* 109

etc

— The A.L.I.C.E. Alliance (Investor-Syncronized Reporters)- Controllers of:

* Stands for: American Legislative and Issue Campaign Exchange

* 1400 coordinated reporters using the Alice News Alertsin order to seek to cover up campaign backer crimes with

synchronized story releases, include:

* The top two political reporters for The Huffington Post

* A Reuters reporter

* The editor of The Nation magazine

* A producer for Al Jazeera America television

* A U.S. News & World Report columnist

* Approximately two dozen Huffington Post contributors

* All of Gamechanger Salon

* Sally Kohn, formerly a Fox News contributor, now works for CNN

* Amanda Terkel, the Senior Political Reporter and Politics Managing Editor at The Huffington Post

* The Huffington Posts Washington bureau chief, Ryan Grim.

* A former New York Times freelance columnist who now works as an energy and commodities reporter for Thomson Reuters is also a member of Gamechanger Salon.

* Anna Louie Sussman is listed as an investigative reporter and journalist on the Gamechanger

Salon membership list, and while her beat focuses on energy issues, she has also writes about local and international human rights and social justice issues according to her website.

* Katrina vanden Heuvel is the editor and publisher of The Nation magazine, a prominent and well-known periodical of leftwing political and social thought. She is also a member of Gamechanger Salon and a regular opinion writer for the online edition of The Washington Post.

* Lisa Graves, who leads the Madison, Wisconsin-based Center for Media and Democracy, is also a member of Gamechanger Salon, and * according to e-mails reviewed by Media Trackers * regularly promotes material developed by CMD to attack ALEC and the right-of-center lawmakers who tend to make up the majority of ALECs active legislative membership.

* Vanden Heuvel suggested in her column that liberals support the efforts of the American Legislative and Issue Campaign Exchange * ALICE (a leftwing counterpart to ALEC) * and the Progressive States Network.

* Jordan Flaherty was, as of last year, a producer for Al Jazeera America television. He is also listed as a member of Gamechanger Salon and for a while he occasionally blogged for The Huffington Post.

* In addition to working at the left-leaning American Sustainable Business Council, David Brodwin writes an online column for U.S. News & World Report.

— Motley Fool

— The Street

— The San Jose Mercury News

— Think Progress

— New America Foundation

— Blogger & Pundit Shills: (Noise For Hire)

--- Ricky Munarriz- Motley Fool

— Jennifer Burke- Market News Call

— Emily Watson- Consensus Press

— Michelle Jones- The Street

— Elaine Kwei- Jefferies

— Adam Jonas- Morgan Stanley

— Sue Chang- Market Watch

— Ben Eisen- Market Watch

— Chris Ciaccia- The Street

— Michael Aragon- Market News

— Patrick Hoge- SF Business Times

— Leigh Drogen- Seeking Alpha

— Raj Gupta- McKinsey Consulting

— Max Greenberg at Media Matters

— John Volker at Green Car

— Tamara Rutter on Motley Fool

— CNNs Paul Lamonica

— John Rosevear at the Motley Fool

— Leilani Munter AKA Carbon Free Girl

— Kevin Bullis at MIT Technology Review

Their key handlers are the following folks:

- The DC Crowd

The main issues with this group of crooks is: Revolving door jobs for Lobbyists and Senator's staff; Real estate kickback scheme re: Tesla & Solyndra properties; abuse of tax incentives in exchange for campaign contributions, abuse of cleantech credits in exchange for campaign issues; improper relationships with Senators; Kick-backs; Fraud lawsuits underway; running a “DO NOT FUND” list to protect Silicon Valley Cartel; Arranging quid-pro-quo funds-for-campaign contributions and funds-for-SEO-rigging and funds-for voter search-engine-mood manipulation; kickbacks; Misdeeds recorded by multiple law enforcement and intelligence agencies;

Key Characters in the Scandal:

- WHITE HOUSE -
- Rahm Emanual- White House (Terminated- Chicago finance head indicted for Corruption) (Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- Robert Gibbs- White House (Terminated)(Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- David Axelrod- White House (Terminated)(Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- Barack Obama- White House, Senior Executive Valerie Jarrett- White House(24/7 DS)
- Larry Summers- White House (Fired)(Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- Bill Daley- White House (Terminated)(Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- Steve Rattner- White House Car Deals Director (Fired- Indicted in NY State for SEC Fraud/Corruption)(Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- Jay Carney- White House (Forced to resign) (24/7 DS)
- David Plouffe- White House (Forced to Resign) Arranged deals between VC campaign Donors (24/7 DS)
- Eric Holder- DOJ (Forced to resign) Staff & VC Protections and blockade of FBI and Special Prosecutor deployments

- The Silicon Valley Cartel

The main issues with this group of crooks is: Revolving door jobs for Lobbyists and Senator's staff; Real estate kickback scheme re: Tesla & Solyndra properties; abuse of tax incentives in exchange for campaign contributions, abuse of cleantech credits in exchange for campaign issues; improper relationships with Senators; Kick-backs; Fraud lawsuits underway; running a “DO NOT FUND” list to protect Silicon Valley Cartel; Arranging quid-pro-quo funds-for-campaign contributions and funds-for-

SEO-rigging and funds-for search-engine-mood manipulation; kickbacks; Ran Illuminati-like frat-house boys club with goal of taking control of government policy process and creating monopolies which only profited their cartel; Misdeeds recorded by multiple law enforcement and intelligence agencies; Colluded together to rig markets in order to cut out those who were not in “the club”; Colluded on database to ensure that no VC funded a “black-listed” non-club member; Ordered Silicon Valley web companies they controlled to run SEO and perception manipulation programs to control voters perceptions; Pretended to review entrepreneurs new ideas and then rejected the good ideas and handed them over to another VC in “the club” so that VC could have their “entrepreneurs in residence” copy the ideas without paying the creator of the idea; Organized vast whitepaper authoring program with McKinsey Consulting which was distributed to Congress and White House to sell funding of DOE ATVM & LG programs which they had pre-rigged to benefit only companies they already owned part of; Fully meets definition of “Organized Crime”; Arranged with White House staff to make sure only their companies got funded in exchange for campaign cash and services to DNC candidates; Pre-acquired investments in minerals found almost exclusively in Afghanistan and then promoted Afghan war in order to monopolize those minerals; May have arranged some of the suspected murders in Victims List, below;

- Larry Page- (Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- Eric Schmidt- (Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- John Doerr- (Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- Steve Westly- Campaign Bundler (Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- Richard Blum- Senator Feinsteins Husband (Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- Ray Lane- (Charged with Federal Tax Fraud)(Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- Elon Musk- CEO - Tesla (Under Investigation & in multiple lawsuits for fraud)(24/7 DS)
- Andy Bechtolsheim- Insider campaign backer (Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- Vinod Khosla- Campaign backer (Under Investigation and in multiple lawsuits)(24/7 DS)
- Martin LaGod- Campaign backer (Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- Ira Ehrenpreis- Campaign backer (Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- Eric Strickland- Campaign backer (Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- Tom Perkins- Campaign backer (Under Investigation, slammed by public and media)(24/7 DS)
- Tim Draper- Campaign backer (Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- Tom Styer- Campaign backer (Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- Lloyd Craig Blankfein- Head of Goldman Sachs (Under Investigation)
- Raj Gupta- McKinsey Fixer (Indicted, Jailed)(Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)

- Brian Goncher- Deloitte VC intermediary (Under Investigation)(24/7 DS)
- Goldman Sachs (Suspected of staging most of the TARP/DOE deals for personal gain & insider payouts)(24/7 DS)
- Kleiner Perkins (Campaign funder who received massive windfalls from Russian mining & tech start-up rigging)(24/7 DS)
- Draper Fisher (Campaign funder who received massive windfalls from Russian mining & tech start-up rigging)(24/7 DS)

- The Compromised Senators & Governors

The main issues with this group of crooks is: Organized Crime; abuse of tax incentives in exchange for campaign contributions, abuse of cleantech credits in exchange for campaign issues; improper relationships with constituents; Kick-backs; Fraud lawsuits underway; Contract rigging; Lithium cartel organization for Afghan war; Insider trading; Market rigging for family advantage; Misdeeds recorded by multiple law enforcement and intelligence agencies; All of the below received exclusive insider trading family gains and perks from the DOE & TARP funding winners that they hand-held through the funding process while sabotaging applicants who weren?t in ?The Club?;

- Dianne Feinstein- Senator (Under Investigation) Wife of Silicon Valley Cartel Member Richard Blum (24/7 DS)
- Harry Reid- Senator- Solar factory guru, Congress lead (24/7 DS)
- Senator Calderone- (Indicted & charged with corruption)(24/7 DS)
- Leland Yee- Senator (Indicted & charged with corruption) (24/7 DS)
- Nancy Pelosi (24/7 DS)
- Barbara Boxer (24/7 DS)
- Arnold Schwarzenegger (24/7 DS)

PAYING A SENATOR TO BE YOUR DOG

Based on published federal and media investigations, it appears that White House Staff and Silicon Valley billionaires engaged in a racketeering operation to manipulate hundreds of billions of dollars of taxpayer funds into their own pockets via TARP and Department of Energy funding programs created for the purpose of running this scam. The individuals involved, are charged with organized crime activities, by investigators, but major regulatory agency executives have participated in delays, and cover-ups, in order to prevent effective prosecution of the parties involved.

The Silicon Valley Cartel bought Senators with stock warrants and rigged the internet for their exclusive benefits in exchange for crony government deals.

All of the parties involved in the swindle have now had their communications, meetings, money paths, beneficiary routes and competing interest attacks tracked, documented and verified. Major banking and corporate entities participated in the crimes and, while all of the banks have been charged with other crimes, they have yet to be prosecuted for this crime. Any jury trial evidence presentation opportunity can now clearly document the crimes, the players and the facts of this case. The many investigators, journalists and members of the public, who participated in the assembly of this evidence, challenge all parties to come forward in a live, televised, open public hearing to confirm, or deny, these facts. Read the facts, decide for yourself.

Tesla is located at: 45500 Fremont Blvd., Fremont, CA 94538 & Solyndra: 47488 Kato Road, Fremont, CA, 94538; they are walking distance from each other and CBRE runs both buildings and the boss of CBRE sleeps with Feinstein. Feinstein's ex-staff & lobbyists work there now. She opened both plants and lobbied them into existence in that location. All that taxpayer money went to those two lots yet hundreds of other applicants were ""killed off"": COINCIDENCE?

Al Jazeera ripped Feinstein's colleague, one Mr. Calderone, a new one per an FBI sting operation. He's off to jail soon. You can see the movie about his crimes on America Tonite. Will he roll over on Feinstein and the Senate bribes-for-laws program? It is early in the game and pleas are only just getting discussed. Ms. Feinstein has some movies out too:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-r6qsQNURow

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-r6qsQNURow

http://www.carandsenatormovie.com

Says Feinstein: ""I can't believe I keep getting away with all this shit but they never shut me down so screw it, I'm sad all the way to the bank""

Who is Elon Musk’s lobbyist, landlord, builder, shareholder and Senator: Dianne Feinstein?

"If you were in the Senate and you had been involved in corruption things, you would want to try to get yourself on the Senate Intelligence Committee so you could use, and monitor, agency information and resources to make sure nobody found out about the corruption things you and your husband were doing. Let?s take Dianne Feinstein and her husband Richard Blum and his CBRE and vast other stealth companies and funds. When she was mayor of San Francisco, the San Francisco newspapers were rife with charges of corruption and cronyism about her. Her associate, Roger Boas, went to federal prison for corruption in City Hall AND for child prostitutes. Police reports show that he used child prostitutes plus sent prostitutes out to buy favors for City Hall corrupt winner/loser rigged selections. She personally interceded in getting Solyndra funded from taxpayer dollars and getting them to build the Solyndra buildings where it benefited her husbands business connections. Her Family made profits off of Solyndra getting picked as a DOE funding ?winner?.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vv86dCW85uw

She personally interceded in getting Tesla funded from taxpayer dollars, and getting them to acquire buildings (physically next to Solyndra in the boondocks of Fremont, California) and equipment where it benefited her husbands business connections. Her Family made profits off of Tesla getting picked as a DOE funding ?winner?. Guardian staff report that her husband has made multiple trips to Mongolia transporting cash for deals and now holds business interests there on mining companies that make materials for electric car batteries and other interests that she fought for bill or budget passage on. They have airport records, travel expense reports and photographs of him in Mongolia meeting with sketchy Chinese and Asian Business men.

They state that he took suitcases full of cash to Mongolia. Why did Feinstein not properly document this in her disclosures? What intelligence did Blum get near, or to, China? Richard Blum got a group of Silicon Valley VC?s to buy votes, get out the vote for her and push votes to get her on Committee when she was hanging by a thread from previous near-catches of their misdeeds according to a former reporter from ValleyWag. Feinstein wrote laws regarding the Regents of California which benefited her husband. If you web search their names and ?Corruption? or ?Crony? you will find a vast number of stories about all kinds of kickbacks that the Feinstein/Blums have been charged with. And a person like this has acess to all the secret files? When you chart out all of the front companies, fake family trusts under other trusts, Blum offshore accounts in Belize, The Caymans and other interesting places, companies behind other companies between her and Mr. Blum, you have a facade of misdirection and phoney business names that would make any spy envious. Feinstein?s bills and budgets tie back to more false front organizations that benefit her family interests than almost any other person in the Senate per the latest research from The Guardian.

If you were someone like that you would certainly try to get yourself on the intelligence committee so you could have the first clue when you were about to get caught and to steer investigations away from your crony deals. You would certainly support domestic phone-tapping because you would order such taps on your public-interest agency enemies like the ACLU and BigGovernment.com and The Schweizer team in order to keep an eye on them. Of course she is fighting on behalf of ongoing domestic spying. It is how she covers her ass. UPDATE: Here is a teeny, tiny selection of the many corruption charges against Feinstein:

https://www.sodahead.com/united-states/dianne-feinstein-the-most-corrupt-person-in-congress-routes-even-more-money-to-husbands-firm/question-3651127/

http://capoliticalnews.com/2013/06/03/more-dianne-feinstein-corruption-husband-given-exclusive-to-sell-56-post-offices-6-commission/

http://www.blacklistednews.com/Senator_Feinstein%E2%80%99s_Husband_Stands_to_Make_Millions_from_USPS_Contract/26454/0/38/38/Y/M.html

https://vidrebel.wordpress.com/2013/01/06/dianne-feinstein-thy-name-is-corruption/

http://www.salon.com/2012/07/24/dianne_feinsteins_espionage/

http://www.activistpost.com/2013/06/keeping-it-in-family-senator-feinsteins.html

http://www.libertynewsonline.com/article_301_33364.php http://newsbusters.org/node/12481

http://foundsf.org/index.php?title=Richard_C._Blum_and_Dianne_Feinstein:_The_Power_Couple_of_California

http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/19023-sen-feinstein-wants-to-strip-independent-journalists-rights

http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/crime/item/15579-snopes-misses-larger-story-on-sales-of-post-offices-by-california-sen-feinstein-s-husband-s-company

http://ridgecrest.blogspot.de/2007/04/feinstein-corruption-scandal.html

http://littlecountrylost.blogspot.de/2007/12/diane-feinstein-corrupt-war-profiteer.html

https://spotlightoncorruption.wordpress.com/tag/dianne-feinstein/

http://www.conservapedia.com/Dianne_Feinstein

http://dcclothesline.com/2013/01/25/why-america-can-not-trust-the-motives-of-dianne-feinstein/ "

"Greenwald asks: ""What is the relationship between Feinstein's husband's company: CBRE; and the Tesla, Solyndra and other Green Loan Real Estate deals?"" and thousands more? How is it even remotely possible that this person is in a public office? Who do we trust anymore? Didn?t we hire these people to go Washington to serve each individual living in America? Am I confused on the concept? I thought getting elected was like winning the best student award so you could go impress us with great deeds as opposed to winning American Idol where you can go impress us with great greed!

Demand Answers:How many times has Richard Blum been to Mongolia and what did he take with him that he did not return with and what did he return with that he did not take with him?

"Why did Feinstein and her staff sabotage other companies trying to use NUMMI? What is the relationship between the Comptroller of Fremont California, the Mayor and Feinsteins staff? Elon Musk is on public record, published and recorded in national media, saying that NUMMI is no good for Tesla and a bad choice for Tesla. Why did Feinstein make him flip flop? What is the relationship

between NUMMI, the properties adjacent to NUMMI, The adjacent Solyndra property and the real-estate company owned by Feinsteins husband: CBRE? Why do the Feinstein staff that helped get TESLA its taxpayer money now work FOR TESLA? Isn't that illegal? Isn't that unethical? Do the CIA, The NSA and federal investigators have recordings of Feinstein breaking the law? Did Snowden get some of that data in his cache? Is that why Snowden and Greenwald are so comfortable mouthing off to Feinstein? What is going on in that meeting with the City of Fremont insiders that Feinstein's chief of staff headed up and who recorded that on their cell phone? It sounds suspicious. Why did TOYOTA and GENERAL MOTORS say that NUMMI was a ""failed plant""? What was the fire and explosion that the Fremont fire department responded to at the Tesla Nummi plant?.... no, not the second one where the hot metal burned the workers, the earlier one? Why did Feinstein met with UAW representatives and promise them NUMMI jobs if they supported requested issues and then how many UAW jobs did Musk actually keep on site? Why does LinkedIn show a huge number of Tesla H1-B lawyer hires advertised when all workers were supposed to be American's per the U.S. tax dollar funding? There are many more questions the federal investigators are asking, let's keep an eye on this...

"GLENN GREENWALD: I think Dianne Feinstein may be the most Orwellian political official in Washington. It is hard to imagine having a government more secretive than the United States. Virtually everything that government does, ?"

democracynow.org/2013/6/7/a_massive_surveillance_state_g?

"Now Feinstein is trying to cover her tracks and act like she thinks spying on American?s who were trying to end cronyism was ?unacceptable?. Don?t buy her sudden change of tone. It is all a cover, just like all of her husbands vast network of cover organizations and secret VC kickback networks. If you want to do really big crimes in Washington, you get Feinstein to watch the databases to make sure nobody gets wind of it. It is like the one bank robber that sits in the car to listen to the police scanner during the bank robbery."

"If Feinstein?s husband, her driver or her staff turns out to be a spy for China, wouldn?t that just suck the big one? How can she have so many nasty news articles about her online in very detailed stories by very famous journalists and Washington has never held an investigation on her?" - 2008

Her Husband’s Business Ties to China Dog Feinstein, and for good reason.

"For years, international financier Richard C. Blum’s vast business portfolio has persisted as a nettlesome issue for his wife, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), a vocal proponent of increased China trade. Three years ago, he vowed to turn over any profits from his China investments to ?"

http://articles.latimes.com/2000/oct/20/news/mn-39450

Ok, Here is the most extreme theory ever, but it is amusing: “..."Google, Twitter and Facebook are actually spy agency sting operations and were originally created as such. They conduited the money through Kleiner Perkins offices to launder it. They paid Kleiner?s people off by giving them monopolies on the electric car and battery industries and associated mining interests.?"

California Senator Diane Feinstein abruptly resigned her position as the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Military Construction Appropriations Subcommittee (MILCON).The MILCON

subcommittee is in charge of supervising military construction. The committee also oversees ""quality of life"" issues for veterans, which includes building housing for military families and operating hospitals and clinics for wounded soldiers. During her six years as MILCON leader Senator Feinstein had a conflict of interest due to her husband Richard C. Blum's ownership of two major defense contractors, who were awarded billions of dollars for military construction projects that were approved by Senator Feinstein. That's Billion with a capitol B. My very own California Senator Diane Feinstein may have just hit one out of the park folks. By directing Billions of dollars of our tax dollars to her husbands companies, DiFi may have have set a new record for corruption. According to a report compiled by MetroActive a San Francisco area newspaper Diane Feinstein used insider information to direct billions of dollars of military construction projects to companies, URS Corporation and Perini Corporation, that were owned or controlled by her husband.

While setting MILCON agendas for many years, Feinstein, 73, supervised her own staff of military construction experts as they carefully examined the details of each proposal. She lobbied Pentagon officials in public hearings to support defense projects that she favored, some of which already were or subsequently became URS or Perini contracts. From 2001 to 2005, URS earned $792 million from military construction and environmental cleanup projects approved by MILCON; Perini earned $759 million from such MILCON projects."

792 million and 759 million works out to 1.551 Billion dollars. And what portion of this billion and a half dollars did DiFi and her husband pocket?

In 2005, Roll Call calculated Feinstein's wealth at $40 million, up $10 million from just a year earlier. Reports show her family earned between $500,000 and $5 million from capital gains on URS and Perini stock. From CB Richard Ellis, her husband earned from $1.3 million to $4 million. Public records show Blum's company paid $4 a share for controlling interest in Perini, and later sold about three million shares for $23.75 each. The report also showed URS' military construction work in 2000 was only $24 million, but the next year, when Feinstein took over as MILCON chair, military construction earned URS $185 million. Additionally, its military construction architectural and engineering revenue rose from $108,000 in 2000 to $142 million in 2001, a thousand-fold increase. In late 2005, Blum sold 5.5 million URS shares, worth $220 million"

So a US Senator has used insider information to direct billions of tax payer dollars to her husband's companies and yet I have not seen one word of this in a single antique media outlet. Where is the outrage, where is the indignation, where are CNN, Fox, MSNBC, NBC, ABC, CBS news? And even more importantly where is an investigation by the Senate Rules Committee? Oh wait, Difi is the newly appointed chairman of the Rules Committee so I guess we can rule out an investigtion there. So after pocketing over as much as 300 million dollars as a direct result of her involvement with the MILCON committee DiFi just walks away unscathed? Where is the investigation and where is DiFi's resignation followed shortly by her indictment? Or does that only happen to Republicans? Full information can be found here and here and here."

The federal investigation of DiFi is under deepest security because she keeps pulling the plug on the stings and research in her current position, but multiple agencies are still working the case and now

multiple news organizations so her day will come."

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HfyLcXlJRUU

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uiv1Wc2PdM4

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BsKdJFJtcvI

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2E7FjZ1VCs

http://www.salon.com/2012/07/24/dianne_feinsteins_espionage/

Adding fuel to the fires of suspicion is Tesla's refusal to answer these questions in a responsive manner. Why won't Elon Musk answer these questions in front of the U.S. Congress during a live broadcast:

"We are most interested in having Elon Musk answer these, and other questions, in front of the U.S. Congress during a live broadcast: Deposition Draft 2.7 (complied by reporters & public submissions) - Would Tesla Motors exist today, if Senators, DOE and campaign staff had not been bribed in 2007, 2008 and 2009? - Has your company, or anyone associated with your company, ever hired multitudes of fake bloggers to post fake positive reviews about Tesla motors in order to create a fake perception of interest? - Has Tesla Motors ever compensated a publisher, or industrial rating company, for contrived positive reviews or ratings? - Does Tesla Motors believe that the coordinated manipulation of the public perception of a company, trading on the stock market, via the dissemination of inaccurate data, by the company spokespeople, is not stock fraud and a not a violation of SEC laws? - What percentage of Tesla Motors do Google's investors, staff and executives own cumulatively? - How much money did those Tesla/Google investors contribute to election campaigns from 2007 to today? Which campaigns? Did the winners in any of those campaigns award U.S. taxpayer funds to the portfolio companies of those investors? How much money? - When Tesla Motors applied for the Department of Energy funds Elon Musk stated that Tesla was in exceptional financial health, yet now Elon Musk, and his senior staff, have been recorded stating that the company was nearly bankrupt then. In light of these more recent revelations, is that not a felony violation of the federal ""Section 136 Law"" which states that 'a company cannot be on the verge of bankruptcy or it shall not receive Department of Energy funds'? New disclosures show that Tesla stated information in it's federal application which Tesla's founders and staff have stated they knew was false at the time. Should Tesla be prosecuted for this? - Did Deloitte, under contract to Tesla, arrange false accounting via the Tesla Wells Fargo bank account while Deloitte was also acting, in conflict of interest, as the Department of Energy reviewer of applicants? - Does Tesla Motors have a confidential relationship with a national group of reporters, from different publications, who have agreed to release Tesla-positive news spin stories on a synchronized basis, at the same time, in order to coverup Tesla investigation disclosures and artificially accelerate stock market vales? Has Tesla Motors arranged with Google to have negative Tesla Motors stories down-ranked while having positive Tesla stories up-ranked? Would that be considered stock fraud? - How many Senators and their families, that you are aware of, own stock in Tesla Motors? - Was Elon Musk promised any NASA contracts, in advance of the closure of a portion

of NASA, in exchange for campaign funding from Tesla and Google investors? - How many Senators, their families and Google-related investors, that you are aware of, hold stock in lithium-ion battery related companies? - Has Steven Chu, the former head of the Department of Energy, ever had a personal relationship with any Tesla staff or investors? - Has Senator Dianne Feinstein, or her family, ever had a personal relationship with any Tesla staff or investors? - Why are Tesla and Solyndra on the same physical plot of land? - Has anyone from Senator Dianne Feinstein's office also worked for Tesla Motors and/or Solyndra? - Did Dianne Feinstein's husband, Richard Blum, ever travel to Mongolia to arrange for resource deals beneficial to Tesla's investors? - Has anyone associated with Senator Dianne Feinstein's family, named Herb Newman of Sausalito, California, ever supplied staffing to Tesla Motors? - Has anyone associated with Senator Dianne Feinstein's family had any relationship with the real estate transactions involving Tesla and/or Solyndra real estate? - Now that the CIA has hacked into Dianne and Kathryn Feinsteins computers and all of Richard Blum's personal and business computers, do you think they found anything incriminating? Do you think the NSA phone and email records from 2007, to today, show anything incriminating? - Federal whistle-blowers have stated that Tesla Motors was involved in a felony funding kick-back scheme with Dianne Feinstein. Is that true? - If these charges are true, did you think you would never be caught because the same people who put Eric Holder and Steven Chu in office are paying for the cover-up? Now that Steven Chu has been terminated and Eric Holder is facing multiple charges of contempt, are still feeling so cocky? - Communications between The California, Fremont City Administrators, Dianne Feinstein's senior staffer (M. Nelson) and the general management of NUMMI indicate that economic and political pressure was used to manipulate a deal structure. What is your comment on these revelations? - Panasonic, your battery partner, has been charged with organized crime, dumping, price fixing, the deaths of thousands of battery workers from toxic poisoning and with building lethal battery factories that destroyed all of the towns near them. Is that a problem? - You said, in writing, in your DOE application documents that the car to be produced with the DOE money was all designed and engineered, yet every aspect of the released model S was designed and engineered AFTER you received the DOE money! Did you lie on your application? - Do your battery packs release toxic and/or cancer causing fumes when they burn? - What was your relationship with Eric Strickland, the head of the National Highway Transportation safety agency who quit his job 48 hours after being notified that the toxic Tesla report he knew about was going public? - Did you falsify lithium-ion safety reports? - Bernard Tse, your battery program director, and 7 other senior staff, provided your company with numerous severely concerning lithium-ion safety reports which were never presented to the Department of Energy. Were these reports covered up because the Senators and Investors of Google and Tesla all have ownership interest in the lithium-ion industry? - Has Elon Musk ever spied on his own employees and competitors? - Has Elon Musk ever undertaken sabotage programs against his competitors? - Did your SEC filings use tax credits from the White House to make Tesla look like it had profits? - Did Elon Musk actually found Tesla or did Martin Eberhard found Tesla and Elon Musk then came in later and stole it from him in a hostile takeover? - You said their were no chances of fire yet you have had two recalls in order to install fire prevention systems AFTER there were fires. Why is that? - What was Tesla's debt ratio at the time that Tesla applied for the DOE loan? Why do you think Tesla had the worse debt ratio of any applicant yet Tesla was awarded funds with almost no review? - Why has Tesla spent billions, and a decade, to only sell a few cars when all of your competitors have done 20 times

better on less money and in less time? Why are over 200 technical problems with the car documented online by Tesla owners yet you say nothing about those problems? Why are you being sued for fraud under the Federal ""Lemon Law""? - Why were your cars $100,000.00 over budget PER CAR, at the time of your Department of Energy loan application, yet nobody at the DOE commented about that in their review notes? - Did Steven Chu's senior staff: Matt Rogers and Steven Spinner have any relationship with Tesla-related investors prior to Chu hiring them at the DOE? Was it coincidental that McKinsey Consulting, the company they worked for, produced all of the pitch documents for the White House and Congress, which were used to steer the Federal funds to Tesla Motors? - Was Tesla Motors funded as a gift to campaign investors? - Did you lie about asking the NHTSA to conduct a safety study on your car when, in fact, the NHTSA first asked Tesla for a study after fires were reported? Did you then bribe NHTSA officials to halt the request for an investigation after you plea-bargained to install a ""titanium safety shield"" which, in fact, only solves a small portion of the potentially lethal dangers from your battery pack? Is your battery pack made up of ""non-automotive"" batteries which are being used in the wrong way relative to what they were built for? - Are you trying to build a battery factory not far from Mexico in order to take advantage of Mexican workers? Are you concerned that most battery factory workers in China were poisoned with toxins? Are you concerned that your battery factory will ENCOURAGE immigration abuse and devastate our border? - The founders ex-partners, investors, buyers, suppliers, employees and ex wives have sued Elon Musk for fraud? What does that say about Mr. Musk? - How many of your employees have been burned alive at your factories? Has OSHA ever fined you? - If somebody puts a bunson burner or torch under a Tesla, will it blow up? If hackers hack the easily hacked Tesla, can they make the battery charging system overload and blow up? If so, did you inform the NHTSA of this in writing? When? - Did California State Officials, in Sacramento, California, ever manipulate tax laws and decisions to exclusively benefit Tesla Motors in exchange for perks? - What percentage of your buyers have killed members of the public with their Tesla Vehicles? Why is that number, in relative terms, higher than any other car company? - What percentage of your buyers have crashed their Tesla's while driving drunk, destroying public property, homes and Tesla's? Why is that number, in relative terms, higher than any other car company? - Have White House staff agreed to protect Tesla, at all costs, in order to keep Mitt Romney's prediction from coming true and to cover campaign funding billionaires? - Did Tesla representatives meet with Rahm Emanual, David Axelrod, David Plouffe or their campaign staff prior to the Election of President Obama? - Is it not true that you have sold 4000% less cars than you told the U.S. Government, in writing, you would sell by this date, in your DOE application documents? - Why did you switch your factory plans between 5 different cities, during the DOE loan process, when you told everyone that your factory location was already a done deal? - Do your VC investors pump the stock market rating by buying their own Tesla stock when bad news comes out about Tesla in order to create a synthetic cover-story short term stock rise? Would that be considered part of a stock fraud activity? - What is the relationship between Tesla's investors, Google's investors and the VC funds of Richard Blum, Dianne Feinsteins husband?"

THE PAYPAL MAFIA DRINKS IT'S OWN KOOL AID



Figure 8: Anal sex, manipulating elections, 3-way orgies and beer

Big Tech has conspired to collude to placing restrictions on its platforms that hampered the flow of potentially damaging information about presidential candidates that pay them a tithe. They have always done this to take out competitors, to hype their boyfriend Elon Musk over his competitors and hide the truth about Musk and to push their own stock valuations

It is "election tampering" and the rigged lack of search results on Google, in select topics, proves the claim. Thousands of well-documented claims of Google's handling of manipulation are easily found in federal reports.

As one broadcaster noted:

> One of the first things that we should be honest about is one of the worst forms of election tampering took place far from polling sites. It wasn't votes from dead people. Those are bad, but they weren't the worst thing. The worst things are more obvious than that.
>
> The worst thing was Silicon Valley.
>
> The tech monopolies spent the final weeks of the presidential election suppressing the voices of Trump supporter's and hiding damaging information about his opponent Joe Biden. That happened. We saw it firsthand. We experienced it. You may have, too.
>
> In August, Facebook banned the pro-Trump super PAC committee To Defend the President from buying any campaign advertising. What? What election has that happened in? None.
>
> Just a few weeks ago, as you well know, The New York Post published true and accurate details of the Biden family's lucrative and damaging overseas influence-peddling operation, which was real, which Joe Biden knew about.
>
> Facebook, in turn, limited the distribution of this article, and Twitter blocked people from posting it. In other words, they censored it. They kept people from knowing about it, and on what basis? Nothing in those articles was untrue, but they censored it anyway, along with any content that was critical of lockdowns and mandatory mask-wearing. Why? Because Biden supported those.
>
> There are many threads to this. There is overwhelming evidence this happens — we'll just pick one piece, a report from Breitbart.
>
> They took a lot of time to look into what Google was doing to them. They found that Google suppressed its stories about Joe Biden in the middle of 2020 through Election Day, suppressed them.
>
> Quote, "Clicks and impressions to Breitbart News from 'Joe Biden' Google searches displayed a healthy pattern of activity in the middle of 2020 when they suddenly flatlined … the plunge first occurred after a major update to Google's search algorithm in May 2020."
>
> Ask anybody in digital news, do searches for the names of candidates decline as we get closer to the election? No, probably not. In fact, they accelerate, but not if Google is censoring you, which is what they were doing.
>
> None of this is normal. It doesn't matter how often or how emphatically CNN encourages it, tells you it's fine, tells you it is necessary to suppress disinformation, is totally wrong, and it's crazy.
>
> Democracy cannot survive tampering like that. The Biden campaign knows exactly what happened. They know exactly the degree to which they benefited from it, and that's why they are rewarding their co-conspirators in Big Tech with even more power.

> Biden apparently has already hired Jessica Hertz, that’s Facebook’s former associate general counsel, as well as Cynthia Hogan, the former Apple vice president for government affairs. Oh, kind of an inside game. Yeah.
>
> Reportedly Biden is also considering naming Eric Schmidt, the former top executive in Google and a big Biden donor to his technology industry task force in the White House. This is not a matter of rewarding your supporters. It’s much bigger than that, and it’s of deep concern to every American.
>
> If we are going to have real and fair elections going forward, then we have to end Silicon Valley’s total control of information. It’s the first thing we must do. We can’t have free and fair elections without that. If voters aren’t allowed to learn critical facts about political candidates before they vote, you can’t have a democracy.
>
> And of course, that’s why they are doing it.

Just to be clear, Crooked insiders from every political party participated in the crime. It cost taxpayers over six trillion dollars in losses. The most notorious Senators in the country are trying to keep it covered up. The main part of the scam is called 'Dark Money Trickle Laundering'. It works via corrupt Senators, criminally illicit law firms, dirty lobbyists, fake charities, sociopath tech billionaires, mobster CPA's and covert dynastic family trust funds. The taxpayers of the USA are the helpless victims of this crime and the SEC, FEC, DOJ, DOE, and other agencies, refuse to help them because the agency bosses get paid by the crooks! America was created as a 'one person = one vote' nation but 320 elitist billionaires bribed their way to get 500,000+ votes for each one of themselves! In other words: you get one vote but they use criminally illicit schemes to steal millions of votes for a few hundred corrupt guys. That's just not fair and it is time for some payback!

The Silicon Valley Mafia (PayPal Mafia) is The Sandhill Road Venture Capital frat boy company bosses in Palo Alto, their National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) partners (Greylock Capital; Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, Draper, Khosla Ventures, etc.) and the tech companies (Google, Tesla, Facebook, Amazon, Twitter, Linkedin, etc.) they control. They are sometimes referred to as "The Deep State". They have purchased California, New York and Washington, DC politicians (mostly Senators) who they also control. The names of the worst-200 most horrific and sociopath-like members are listed in these reports. They hire dirty law firms like MoFo, Wilson Sonsini, Covington, Perkins, etc. and dirty lobbyists like McBee, Podesta, Blumenthal, etc. to do their dirty deeds.

They hire rogue ex-intelligence agents to operate Fusion GPS, Gawker/Gizmodo, Black Cube, ShareBlue, New America, In-Q-Tel, Podesta Group, Media Matters, etc. massive media attack programs against competitors, reporters and outsiders. They collude on black-lists, valuation controls, election manipulation, search engine rigging, domestic spying for political manipulation, stock rigging, insider trading, Jeffrey Epstein-like executive prostitute sex-trafficking clubs, trophy wife assignments, the bribery of politicians and worse. They are felons who bribe politicians to halt investigations and interdiction efforts.

They have quid-pro-quo stock market bribe deals with Senators Reid, Feinstein, Harris, Boxer, Spier, etc. For example, in the CleanTech Crash: Every single Dept of Energy executive, and related Senator,

owns stock market assets in Tesla, Fisker, Solyndra, Ener1, etc. so they blockaded and sabotaged every applicant who competed with their holdings in a RICO-violating, felony organized crime, using taxpayer funds, in order to profit at the expense of taxpayers.

They are widely covered in news media articles as: 'sex abusers, cult enthusiasts, elitists, rapists, woman beaters, probiosis abusers, sexual work extortion operators, extremists, arrogant clones of each other, tone deaf, echo-chamber reinforcing, misogynist, racist, manipulative, insecure, covertly gay, corrupt, thieves' and other anti-social revelations. The divorce court and lawsuit federal court records on them prove that they are sex-abusing sociopaths.

They use their monopolistic control of the internet to massively and exclusively scale services that only they control and use to abuse the public's privacy, human rights, invention rights and information. They run their cartel like the old Italian Mafia once did.

Google's Larry Page, his boyfriend Elon Musk; Google's Eric Schmidt, Andy Rubin, David Drummond, Kent Walker, Jared Cohen and Sergy Brin; Political manipulators David Plouffe, Steve Westly, Steve Spinner and Vinod Khosla; Sociopath billionaires Reid Hoffman, Richard Blum, Jeff Epstein, Tim Draper, Steve Jurvetson, etc. all order their staff and associates to: bribe politicians; operate sex trafficking for them; manipulate stock market valuations; launder money; run off-shore tax evasion schemes; black-list employees and competitors; hide, down-rank, DNS dead-hole, shadow-ban, censor and server obfuscate enemies on the entire web; rig the U.S. Patent Office; help them cheat on their wives; and engage in massive volumes of insider, illicit, RICO and anti-trust violating crimes while bribing public officials to avoid prosecution.

We demand that the FBI arrest them for RICO, Anti-Trust and related organized crime operations!

We have placed more software sensors on more server networks globally than anyone else has ever announced. When Google-Alphabet-YouTube Shadow Bans, DNS re-routes, Hides, Demonetizes, Search Manipulates, Server Table Edits, Censors, Election Rigs, SEO limits, etc; our links, we record it, document it technically and report it to every regulatory and publishing group in the world. We also compile the data into evidence for lawsuits against Google and each Google executive. Our insiders work at the deepest levels of their operation. It isn't nice to mess with Mother Nature or Freedom Of Speech. It's worse to run tax evasion, sex trafficking, dark money funds, real estate fraud and other crimes from inside Google!

My associates have placed autonomous monitoring applications on a vast number of co-location servers, shared hosting ISP's, stand-alone servers and sites around the world that have been operating for over ten years. We log: 1.) Google's search results compared to other search engines, 2.) Google's DNS and spoofing activities, 3.) Google's results on 100 key search terms including search terms of assets, candidates and business associates connected to Google (ie: "Obama", "Elon Musk", "Election Results", etc.), 4.) Where Google sends data from users clicking on Google supplied links, 5.) Where fabricated "mole" data that was injected as user data ultimately ended up later, 6.) Google's election manipulation attempts, and other metrics. The results prove that Google abuses the market, the public, privacy rights, politics and human rights.

So *Google*, every time you do it, you are just digging your own grave and giving us all the proof we

need to wipe you out, process anti-trust filings and expose your monopolist, sex trafficking, sociopath owners!

There is massive corruption & bribery in California and Washington DC today and it is financed and organized by the oligarchs of Palo Alto. Eric Schmidt may think he is safe hiding away in his mountain top mansion in the mid-west but a 6-person strike team can penetrate that building in 5 minutes and have him face-down on the ground in handcuffs with ease.

Originally, PayPal was a money-transfer service offered by a company called Confinity which was acquired by X.com in 1999. Later X.com was renamed PayPal and purchased by eBay in 2002.[3][4] The original PayPal employees had difficulty adjusting to eBay's more traditional corporate culture and within four years all but 12 of the first 50 employees had left.[*citation needed*] They remained connected as social and business acquaintances,[*citation needed*] and a number of them worked together to form new companies in subsequent years. This group of PayPal alumni became so prolific that the term PayPal Mafia was coined.[3] The term[4][5] gained even wider exposure when a 2007 article in *Fortune* magazine used the phrase in its headline and featured a photo of former PayPal employees in gangster attire.[4]

Individuals whom the media refers to as members of the PayPal Mafia include:

- Peter Thiel, PayPal founder and former chief executive officer who is sometimes referred to as the "don" of the PayPal Mafia[6]
- Max Levchin, Founder and chief technology officer at PayPal sometimes called the "consigliere" of the PayPal Mafia[4][7]
- Elon Musk, is founder of X.com which acquired the company Confinity. Musk later became a co-founder of Tesla Inc, he then founded SpaceX, Neuralink, OpenAI, The Boring Company, and is the Chairman of SolarCity[3][8][9]
- David O. Sacks, former PayPal COO who later founded Geni.com and Yammer[3]
- Scott Banister, former Ironport CTO and PayPal board member[10]
- Roelof Botha, former PayPal CFO who later became a partner of venture capital firm Sequoia Capital[11]
- Steve Chen, former PayPal engineer who co-founded YouTube.[12]
- David Gausebeck, former PayPal Technical Architect, co-creator of the Gausebeck-Levchin test, co-founder of Matterport Inc., a digital 3-D modeling company. [13]
- Reid Hoffman, former executive vice president who later founded LinkedIn and was an early investor in Facebook, Aviary,[14] Friendster, Six Apart, Zynga, IronPort, Flickr, Digg, Grockit, Ping.fm, Nanosolar, Care.com, Knewton, Kongregate, Last.fm, Ning, and Technorati[3][15][16]
- Ken Howery, former PayPal CFO who became a partner at Founders Fund[17]
- Chad Hurley, former PayPal web designer who co-founded YouTube[8]
- Eric M. Jackson, who wrote the book *The PayPal Wars* and became chief executive officer of WND Books and co-founded CapLinked.[18]
- Jawed Karim, former PayPal engineer who co-founded YouTube.[11] The first YouTube video, Me at the zoo, uploaded by Karim on April 23, 2005.
- Jared Kopf, former PayPal (executive assistant to Peter Thiel) who co-founded Slide, HomeRun

and NextRoll.

- Joe Lonsdale, co-founder of Palantir, Addepar, and OpenGov. Founding partner of investment firms 8VC and Formation 8
- Dave McClure, a former PayPal marketing director, a super angel investor for start up companies[19] and founder of 500 Startups which has hit 500+ investments. [20]
- Andrew McCormack, co-founder of Valar Ventures [21][11]
- Luke Nosek, PayPal co-founder and former vice president of marketing and strategy, became a partner at Founders Fund with Peter Thiel and Ken Howery[22]
- Jason Portnoy, former vice president of financial planning and analysis who later became CFO at Peter Thiel's Clarium Capital, CFO at Palantir Technologies, and founding partner at Subtraction Capital.
- Keith Rabois, a former executive at PayPal who later worked at LinkedIn, Slide, Square, Khosla Ventures, and currently with Peter Thiel at Founders Fund, and personally invested in Tokbox, Xoom, Slide, LinkedIn, Geni, Room 9 Entertainment, YouTube, and Yelp.[11]
- Jack Selby, former vice president of corporate and international development at PayPal who co-founded Clarium Capital with Peter Thiel, later becoming managing director of Grandmaster Capital Management.[23]
- Premal Shah, former product manager at PayPal, became the founding president of Kiva.org.[4]
- Russel Simmons, former PayPal engineer who co-founded Yelp Inc.[11]
- Jeremy Stoppelman, former vice president of technology at PayPal who later co-founded Yelp, Inc.[3][6][24][25][26]
- Yishan Wong, a former engineering manager at PayPal, later worked at Facebook and became the CEO of Reddit.[27][28]

Eric, Elon and Mark bribe California & DC politicians. Crony politicians are being paid bribes with Billions of dollars of Google, Twitter, Facebook, Tesla, Netflix and Sony Pictures stock and stock warrants which is never reported to the FEC; Billions of dollars of Google, Twitter, Facebook, Tesla, Netflix and Sony Pictures search engine rigging and shadow-banning which is never reported to the FEC; Free rent; Rare-Earth mining rights; Male and female prostitutes; Cars; Dinners; Party Financing; Sports Event Tickets; Political campaign printing and mailing services "Donations"; Secret PAC Financing; Jobs in Corporations in Silicon Valley For The Family Members of Those Who Take Bribes And Those Who Take Bribes; "Consulting" contracts from McKinsey as fronted pay-off gigs; Overpriced "Speaking Engagements" which are really just pay-offs conduited for donors; Gallery art; Private jet rides and the use of Government fuel depots (ie: Google handed out NASA jet fuel to staff); Recreational drugs; Real Estate; Fake mortgages; The use of Cayman, Boca Des Tores, Swiss and related money-laundering accounts; The use of HSBC, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs and Deustche Bank money laundering accounts and covert stock accounts; Free spam and bulk mailing services owned by Silicon Valley corporations; Use of high tech law firms such as Perkins Coie, Wilson Sonsini, MoFo, Covington & Burling, etc. to conduit bribes to officials; and other means now documented by us, The FBI, the FTC, The SEC, The FEC and journalists.

Hired assassins John Hermann, David Plouffe, Joe Rhode, Adrian Covert, John Cook, David Brock, Gabrial Darbyshire, Ian Fette, and the rest, should know: We hired the greatest intelligence and law

enforcement, investigative experts in the world to track you down and place you under a lifetime of surveillance. Every illegal drug and sex worker you buy is reported. Every tax evasion and money laundering scheme you engage in is reported. Everything you will ever do will be monitored and reported to the authorities. Every contact you have with a political operative, anywhere, is monitored. You accepted compensation to try to kill us, slander us, libel us and defame us. You chose your fate when you accepted the "kill orders". Never, ever, go to sleep at night thinking you will ever get away with it. Our contractors will always be watching you, forever! I, and my associates, are the victims of these crimes and the witnesses that saw these crimes and suffered the attacks. Every independent journalist, investigator, public citizen sleuth and forensic expert we can find, in every nation on Earth that wants to end corruption, is coming for you. We are the people that will never let up until we get justice. We are the people that are terminating (using 100% legal tactics) every oligarch and politician that engaged in these crimes and the cover-ups.

To get billions of dollars of campaign cash from Silicon Valley, David Plouffe and John Podesta went around the valley and promised the oligarchs and exclusive on trillions of dollars of rare earth mining deals. They said" The future of Silicon Valley may lie in the mountains of Afghanistan. They pitched a war.

Richard Byrne Reilly of VENTUREBEAT describes it all:

The future of Silicon Valley's technological prowess may well lie in the war-scarred mountains and salt flats of Western Afghanistan.

United States Geological Survey teams discovered one of the world's largest untapped reserves of lithium there six years ago. *(***Editorial Team Note:** *Right about the time the DOE started rounding up the key ATVM and LG program insiders)* The USGS was scouting the volatile country at the behest of the U.S. Department of Defense's Task Force for Business and Stability Operations. Lithium is a soft metal used to make the lithium-ion and lithium-polymer batteries essential for powering desktop computers, laptops, smartphones, and tablets. And increasingly, electric cars like Tesla's.

The vast discovery could very well propel Afghanistan — a war-ravaged land with a population of 31 million largely uneducated Pashtuns and Tajiks, and whose primary exports today are opium, hashish, and marijuana — into becoming the world's next "Saudi Arabia of lithium," according to an internal Pentagon memo cited by the *New York Times.*

The USGS survey report on Afghanistan that detailed the findings also noted that, in addition to lithium, the country also contains huge deposits of iron ore, gold, cobalt, copper, and potash, among many other valuable minerals.

"The mineral wealth there is astonishing," said professor Michel Chossudovsky of the Montreal-based Center for Research and Globalization, who has written extensively on Afghanistan.

A conservative estimate of the riches is $1 trillion. In some circles, it's as high as $5 trillion.

In Silicon Valley and beyond, tech companies like Apple, Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, Samsung, Sony, and Tesla rely on continual, and uninterrupted, access to lithium, as lithium-

based batteries are the primary power storage devices in their mobile hardware.

Without these batteries, MacBooks, iPads, iPhones, Kindles, Nooks, Galaxy IIIs, Chromebooks, and, yes, Tesla Model S cars would be largely worthless. If forced to use older, nonlithium batteries, their battery lives would certainly be much shorter.

The world's current lithium heavyweight is Bolivia, the biggest exporter of the element. There, in the swamps and marshlands of the southern region of the country near where the borders of Chile and Argentina meet, are the biggest deposits.

Canada, China, Australia, and Serbia also have varying amounts of lithium, but not as much as Bolivia.

Or apparently, Afghanistan.

Enough to last a lifetime?

Depending on who you talk to, the current lithium global reserves are adequate for at least another generation of lithium-ion battery manufacturers to produce them.

But not everybody thinks so, and some say the light metal compound may someday run dry. That could in turn spell trouble for any company whose business depends on light and portable mobile electronics — unless someone comes up with an alternative to lithium batteries before then.

The experts VentureBeat interviewed pointed to sharp year-on-year increases in the demand for lithium. That's putting heavy pressure on existing stockpiles.

According to Lithium Americas, a Canadian lithium-mining company with significant business interests in Argentina, lithium demand will more than double in the next 10 years, while lithium prices have nearly quadrupled during the same timeframe.

Tesla, for its part, is in the process of investing up to $5 billion to build its own lithium-ion Gigafactory in Texas, a plant capable of churning out 500,000 expensive battery packs a year by 2020 for its line of zero-emission, all-electric cars.

A Tesla spokeswoman did not return calls seeking comment.

As a potential source to feed that demand, enter Afghanistan.

"At some point, if present trends continue, demand [for lithium] will outstrip the supply. And again, at some point, the market for lithium-ion could get so big that it actually affects the supply chain," said Donald R. Sadoway, a professor of the Materials Chemistry Department of Materials Science and Engineering at MIT.

Looking at Afghanistan, Sadoway says the war-ravaged nation, which has no effective mining infrastructure in place, may well be attractive to the world's mining outfits.

"In this regard," Sadoway, one of the world's foremost experts on energy sources, says, "the deposits in Afghanistan could be important."

Andrew Chung, a venture capitalist with Khosla Ventures in Silicon Valley who has invested in multiple startups producing alternative batteries, says lithium-ion batteries are limited in their lifetime

cycles, scalability, and cost. Despite this, Chung says, he can understand how the untapped reserves of Afghan lithium are now an increasing focus.

“It is an issue of the supply chain, whether it’s Afghanistan or other [countries]. There is a finite supply, and lithium-ion will continue to be the [power] choice for the next decade,” Chung said.

Some of the Valley’s biggest and most powerful tech companies either declined to comment for this story or never returned calls. But they didn’t deny the importance of lithium-ion batteries.

For instance, an Apple spokesperson declined to comment for this story but provided VentureBeat with a 2014 “Suppliers List” of the 200-plus vendors it uses to produce its products. A related post made the Cupertino, Calif.-based company’s commitment to lithium batteries clear, at least in the short term.

“Rechargeable, lithium-based technology currently provides the best performance for your Apple notebook computer, iPod, iPhone, or iPad,” the Apple post says.

Sony Energy Devices Corp. invented the lithium-ion battery in 1994. It was hailed as a breakthrough, providing longer battery life and without the “memory effect” that gradually reduced the effective capacity of previous types of batteries.

Since then, companies have gradually refined lithium battery technology but have not succeeded in moving beyond it. Indeed, early Tesla cars are actually powered by large packs of industry-standard lithium-ion battery cells — the same type of cells found in many laptop batteries.

And here is where it gets interesting.

Sharply increasing demand

If electric car manufacturers begin ramping up production of lithium-ion battery-powered cars, the global demand for lithium will skyrocket. This could potentially come about at the same time for increasing demand for handheld consumer goods like tablets and laptops, Chung said, thus creating a perfect storm.

“So you want to start looking at other sources producing it with current supplies being called into question, if we move more toward production of electric cars,” Chung said.

Which is why, increasingly, eyes are turning to Afghanistan and its new purported lithium reserves, a country long referred to as the “graveyard of empires.” The U.S. invaded Afghanistan after the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and according to iCasualties, 2,315 American servicemen and women have been killed there.

Analyst Jay Jacobs of Global X Funds in New York, which has interests in lithium mining, said demand for the compound is growing, and that “there are two regions that have been revealed to contain huge lithium reserves: Afghanistan and Bolivia.”

William Tahil, a respected lithium expert who lives in France and is the general director for Material International Research, argues that lithium deposits in Bolivia will at some point be depleted.

Jacobs was sanguine about safely extracting lithium from Afghanistan. He said political risks there were considerable.

“With that being said, should there be a substantial and sustained increase in demand for lithium, lithium miners may become increasingly interested in the country as it has an abundance of the resource,” Jacobs said.

It was the Soviets who first discovered the country’s deposits when they invaded in 1979. Soviet geologists began mapping Afghanistan’s lithium, gold, and potash fields but abandoned their efforts after the former communist superpower pulled out of the country in 1989.

But with a weak and corruption-plagued “central government,” Afghanistan is now ripe for the picking, Chossudovsky said. Indeed, the country is still very much divided into fiefdoms, with the Muslim fundamentalist Taliban, warlords, and drug traffickers controlling large swaths of the country — and using violence to advance their interests.

“There’s no question the mining companies will go in there. No question. There’s no real functioning government there to reap the foreign investment of the mineral deposits. This makes it all the more enticing to the mining companies because nobody in the government of [President] Hamid Karzai will be regulating the bonanza of lithium, so they can do what they want,” he said.

Jockeying for position

For its part, the U.S. government, which helped locate the lithium deposits using flyovers with a sensor-filled Lockheed P-3 Orion and teams of geologists fielding soil samples, knows a potential gold rush when it sees one. And it has no intention of being left on the sidelines. Especially since the Chinese are now — and quickly — making deals with Afghan pols for mineral rights to copper deposits.

The USGS did return multiple calls seeking comment. Nor did the Pentagon.

Despite what some say are the shortcomings of lithium-ion batteries, venture capitalists and investors continue pouring money into them. Amprius, a lithium battery maker based in Sunnyvale, Calif., snared a $30 million infusion round of investor cash in January.

Over at the Afghan embassy in Washington, D.C., the Afghans are licking their lips at the potential lithium and mineral windfall despite the country’s continued conflict with a resurgent Taliban. What this may portend for the impoverished and war-torn nation is anybody’s guess. But the Afghans are playing up the finds — or they were, until recently.

“In recent years, headlines from the Afghan mineral sector have competed to outdo each other in scale: from the landmark $3 billion Chinese investment in the Aynak copper concession to the astounding survey work of the U.S., Afghan, and British Geological Services estimating anywhere between $1 trillion and $3 trillion in mineral potential, to the historic $11 billion deal now being finalized with an Indian consortium for the Hajigak iron ore concession,” said a posting on the Afghani Washington DC website.

The post has since been removed.

Afghanistan’s ambassador to the U.S., Eklil Hakimi, presided over a press conference at the Afghan embassy in Washington, D.C., on March 10, where he talked about the untapped deposits, along with

reps from the USGS and other U.S. politicians.

But Hakimi, through a spokesman, told me he simply didn't have the time to talk.

Solyndra, Abound and Tesla need these chemicals. The investors and the campaign backers and the product owners are all the same people. Tesla doesn't care about selling cars, they car about selling LITHIUM. The car is like the handle for the razor blade, they want to sell the razor blades, not the shaver. But the idiots backing the scheme rushed into it, without checking into things, because they saw all the free Department of Energy and TARP cash. They did not realize that Lithium blows up all the time and, when mixed, becomes a "Cancer Cocktail", gives off toxic smoke, kills factory workers and is just kinda' bad stuff… ooops

The Audacity of Scope

If you think that the size and audaciousness of the crime being examined is almost inconceivable, think again. The greatest crimes are committed in plain sight.

Who would have imagined, at the time, that regular people would try to kill all of the Jews in Germany?

We rarely even consider the fact that a group of people captured, dragged half way around the planet, and raped and beat the black people of Africa.

You see the great piles of skulls from Southeast Asian genocides; how did that happen?

Big crazy crimes DO happen.

While a trillion dollar lithium scam may sound like a wild proposition, so did other things until you later realized: "OMG, these awful things actually happened!".

Even though conventional wisdom may push against the concept, history has shown that assumption to be the fools errand.

Over 185 people that complained about the PayPal Mafia guys suddenly turned up dead under strange and unexpected circumstances.

NEWS DIAGRAMS AND CRIME CHARTS




Figure 9: The players in the crimes are well known but there are almost no federal cops with the will to act



Figure 10: Lithium, Cobalt and rare earth overseas mining scams were what the "green energy" schemes were all about



Figure 11: Over 300 lobbyists, investment bankers, CBRE staff and CPA's keep the Feinstein scam humming along every day



Figure 12: The scams happened in plain sight




Figure 13: Does anybody actually believe nobody knew?

U.S. House of Representatives

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

Darrell Issa (CA-49), Chairman



The Department of Energy's Disastrous Management of Loan Guarantee Program

STAFF REPORT
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
112TH CONGRESS
March 20, 2012

Figure 14: Multiple federal investigations have exposed the corruption but "someone" keeps stopping the FBI from making the arrests



Figure 15: The Feinstein family has the most political and financial conflicts-of-interests of any politician



Figure 16: The "PayPal Mafia", The "Silicon Valley Mafia", The "Deep State" and The "Sandhill Mob" are all the same people



Figure 17: Every law enforcement and regulatory agency knows about this but cover-ups keep arrests from being made




Figure 18: 90% of the Dept of Energy money went to "DARK MONEY" conduits to pay quid pro quo

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President Obama meets with Apple's Steve Jobs, heads to Palo … - … President Barack Obama on Thursday stopped in Silicon Valley for the one thing this high … he sought funds for the Democratic National Committee. Advertisement "It's an extraordinary honor to host the … Obama's stop in the Bay Area scored big money for the Democrats, … - siliconvalley.com/ci_16402906

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12,000 missing Tesla electric cars! waning demand, tesla pumping stock, cooking the books? - Many have charged that Tesla's own shareholders are the buyers of Tesla's in order to make demand look better.– Bad reputation from Tesla and fraud lawsuits against Elon Musk taking their toll - – Senator: "If we find out the White House is helping Tesla "pump stock" in order to protect Tesla's, and

the White House's, mutual cross-investment, then that could mean felony jail time for somebody.." -***The bottom line: Elon Musk, Larry Page, Mark Zuckerberg, Eric Schmidt are lying pieces of shit -*** http://www.cantechletter.com/2014/11/geeks-reading-list-week-november-21st-2014/

I have to be very careful what I say here, however, as a general rule, declining demand in the early adopter market is not a promising development for a technology company, or, in the case of Tesla, an automobile manufacturer. As with other remarkable observations regarding Tesla (fires, Trabant level reliability, etc.) no doubt a positive spin will be placed on this or, alternatively, aspersions will be cast on the data themselves. Nonetheless, as I said, declining demand in your early adopter market, especially when it is the US, is never a good sign. Never, ever, ever, a good sign.

"Tesla Motors (TSLA) is slowly ramping up production. Demand for its electric sedans allegedly remains high. Yet far fewer of the vehicles are making their way onto U.S. roads this year. In the first nine months of 2014, the number of U.S. registrations of Tesla vehicles fell by one-third to 9,331, according to an analysis of public records by Hedges & Co., an Ohio-based market-research firm. In the same period, however, Tesla said it delivered 21,821 cars—a 40 percent increase from a year earlier. What happened to the other 12,490 cars?" Brian said this. He is a Partner at J Capital Partners, a new breed of investment bank focused on non resource growth companies with special emphasis on technology companies. He has been part of the technology industry for a third of a century. For 13 years he was an electronics designer and software developer. He designed early generation PCs, mobile phones (including cell phones) and a number of embedded systems which are still in use today. He then became a sell-side research analyst for the next 20 years, where he was ranked the #1 tech analyst in Canada for six consecutive years, named one of the best in the world, and won a number of awards for stock-picking and estimating. **For more on this see: TESLA MOTORS – ANOTHER WALL STREET SCAM** – James Quinn … -There's one story in cleantech today: Tesla Motors' public sale. The electric car maker just raised the bar on its IPO, slated for tomorrow, increasing the number of shares for sale from 11.1 million to 13.3 million. (seekingalpha.com/instablog/239719-james-quinn/80801-tesla-…)

Even FORBES admits Tesla is a Scam! | PUBLIC CRIME INVESTIGATIONS - Tesla Motors another big scam? – Stormfront - The Fine Print in Tesla's IPO: No Profit, No Product, No Problem By SAM GUSTIN Posted 5:00 PM 02/03/10 So what if Tesla Motors, the luxury electric-car maker, lost $31 million in the first nine months of last year and $236 million since its inception. (stormfront.org/forum/t724957/)

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Anatomy of A Civic Corruption Case- San Francisco- The Bridge To Sin. The cold case that is now very hot! investigators now have the final pieces of the puzzle! Link to story: http://wp.me/p4e1uX-2LV Draft 6.3 - Part 1- The Golden Days - "See how the Golden Gate Bridge and a little bridge between two buildings at Embarcadero Center connected to an organized crime and child sex abuse ring for billionaires in A billion dollar real estate political kickback scam, by San Francisco ""elites"", to create an owned and controlled Senator. Interesting that one has posted pictures of them-self dancing and hugging very young girls on Facebook, one was arrested and indicted for running an underage prostitution ring for billionaire campaign backers and San Francisco ""elites"", One (A senior public official) had their daughter removed from their home by the police because she was sexually abused (Police reports available) and one was charged with hiring underage prostitutes. " "You would think it would be hard to be indicted for BOTH running a child prostitution ring for Pacific Heights billionaires AND helping to embezzle government funds for Moscone Convention Center AND Embarcadero Center but one managed to do both, on behalf of the others. James Bronkema was known as David Rockefeller's ""Bag Man"" on the West Coast. He looked exactly like the greedy little ""Monopoly Man"" Billionaire on the game-board and even sported the same mustache and vest just to make the point that he was not only corrupt, he was BAD ASS CORRUPT and he would get the Rockefellers on your ass if you messed with him! When a real estate or political policy action needed to be greased, Bronkema or Coblentz showed up with the cash for the Supervisors, inspectors and public policy-types. Bronkema was one of the creators of ""Flower"" and ran the cash into John Molinari's Mayoral campaign. He put his girl-friends in executive city jobs as payoff for services rendered. Their hope was to move Molinari from Mayor, to Senator to Governor and on up... but that didn't work out..... when the FBI showed up on some doorsteps. Bronkema ran the Business Bureau, The Golden Gate Bridge, Embarcadero Center and Rockre, a ""private business operations group"" for the Rockefellers. He funneled kickbacks, crony deals and special favors from San Rafael to Oakland to

City Hall. When his manipulations went international, he cooked his own goose. John Molinari ""Old School""They got a different party to play Senator and Molinari was forgotten but not forgiven for his false campaign district address, tax form creativity and family police incidents. A bug was placed in Molinari's Classic Jaguar and feds got quite a bit of dirt on old-school San Francisco corruption off of Molinari's North Beach idle chatter. Molinari then turned State's evidence. Once Molinari ate it in the elections, they plowed all of the cash into Feinstein. A key associate (Goudie, aligned with Molinari) was a top Presidential appointee and campaign funder who was arrested and indicted for federal funds fraud in the Christopher Columbus Scandal which emulated the Golden Gate Bridge Scandal with the same consultants. (Check out his old Facebook page)."

CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS AND THE MOBSTERS: In a special event scam, that Molionari and Bronkema schemed up, (that was a bigger Disaster than the recent SF America's Cup), quite a bit of taxpayer cash went sideways. Said Marin County activist, Gene Pratt: ""The Golden Gate Bridge District is a bunch of Crooks"" TERRY SELLARDS: The PitchMan. The new Silicon Valley Prostitution cases have opened up the Old San Francisco child prostitution cases, as girls reveal decades of abuse and finally tell reporters what really happened back then. Which Silicon Valley and SF Venture Capitalists, who you see quoted in the news lately, were founders of ""Flower"" the top secret San Francisco underage sex ring for billionaires , held in the billionaires hotels so surveillance security could be totally controlled, (With SF, NYC and Silicon Valley Branches), which is, apparently, still operating? Why are they so excited about all of the underage girls coming over the border in the Mexican child border crisis? Why are Silicon Valley CEO's and VC's so supportive of ""child Immigrants""? Paying a bribe for real estate exclusives was often done with cash and hookers, known as ""pink cash"" in SF. Why was NAMBLA allowed to thrive in San Francisco at the time, Including being given San Francisco Public Libraries, On Potrero hill and in other locations, to hold their secret ""how to abuse children"" meetings? (See FBI reports on NAMBLA) Which San Francisco billionaire VC, in the news lately for other reasons, has a regular weekly appointment to have six nude girls come over and read him books from his library while he pleasures himself? Which one is under investigation regarding a murder and an attempted murder? Which one ordered a ""hit"" on someone? Part of Kubrick's film: ""Eyes Wide Shut"" was based on ""Flower"". The cost for a young virgin started at $50,000.00. Taking her virginity was called: ""picking a flower"". Run all of the names on your database and draw the financial, business and personal connections and see how interesting this case REALLY is! Who was the bigger real estate guru: Blum, Rockefeller or Shorenstein? What do Dianne Feinstein, Richard Blum, James Bronkema, Roger Boas, John Molinari and David Rockefeller all have in common? All them reported to WHO? Nobody can now say they ""didn't know what was going on!"" The evidence overtly implicates all of the players. Was there a different reason, than we were told, that Mayor George Moscone was killed? Dan White said he was ""drugged up on Twinkies"", was he drugged up on something else so he could carry out his ""kill orders"" from on high? Who went to federal prison and who didn't? Who ordered the case shut down, but who kept working on it because they thought there was a major cover-up going on? Who took the fall while the others kept on keeping on? Who paid for who's political campaign..and still does? Who pulls who's strings? Who is under 24 hour digital device surveillance by 5 different agencies? (Answer: EVERY SINGLE ONE OF THEM, THEIR FAMILIES AND ASSOCIATES) What is a RICO? What did federal investigators find when

they set-up an office in one of the suspects condo buildings across from his office above Chevy's Restaurant? How bad is running a child prostitution ring for the San Francisco elite and Silicon Valley founders? How much, in bribes and corruption, did the exclusive little bridge from one Embarcadero Center to another, over the public road, really cost Boas, Rockefeller, Molinari, Bronkema and Feinstein? Who is still operating as a front for whom? Let's discuss. Send in your links. Watch for the YOUTUBE VIDEO: Anatomy of A Civic Corruption Case and please ask PBS Frontline to pick up the full length version! Please ask City, State and Federal agencies to OFFICIALLY RE-OPEN THIS CASE! TA- Former FB*, Associate Producer/ D- SF Chron, FG, J- Worked with Bruce Brugman, GG, HJK, R- Latimes, Wspo-G, bSpecial thanks to D at Regional Federal Office"

SAN FRANCISCO'S COLDEST CASE / A coverup is still suspected ... - 6 Feb 2003 ... ... chief administrative officer under mayors George Moscone and Dianne Feinstein. ... Campaign posters of Boas dotted the city, and a prostitute ... on the brothel operators, Roger Boas and seven other customers, including … www.sfgate.com/ magazine/ article/ SAN-FRANCISCO-S-COLDEST-CASE-A-coverup-is-still-2669756.php

This bridge broke the camels back and connects, politically and financially, to The Golden Gate Bridge District which was, at the time, operated as a private government for personal profit by the suspects. These is the only real estate project in the City that got this deal...bribes DO work!.... until you get caught! Notice the ""bunker-like"" Compound construction of Embarcadero Center shaped like the Bohemian Club ""Owl Books"" To protect the identity of the abused girl, we will not show the un-blurred form but it, and associated files, can be seen at SFPD, FBI and WIKILEAKS via FOIAThe complexities of sex party and secret meeting hiding. When you make a chart of all of these people and their political, personal and business connections, almost everything is revealed . / Says David: ""The greatest fun you will ever have, in your life, is dropping these names into a Federal Cross-Checker, like XKEYSCORE, FCCPS, or NCVS, and watching the results! Afterwards, add ""Feinstein"", or ""Saxeena"", and try it again. Wow! Epic!" David T. is a Federal Special Investigator. Says David: ""The greatest fun you will ever have, in your life, is dropping these names into a Federal Cross-Checker, like XKEYSCORE, FCCPS, or NCVS, and watching the results! Afterwards, add ""Feinstein"", or ""Saxeena"", and try it again. Wow! Epic!"" David also stated that: ""John Goudie's (Of Christopher Columbus Anniversary Fame) stand-alone case files, by themselves, are a week of Ludlum-class reading. He was so old-school"" The most interesting lines of connection in the organized crime databases go from David Rockefeller to Tony Blair To Rakesh Saxeena (Tony Blair interceded in Saxeena's trial in England over Blackwater gun running, a case that ties back to Senator Leland Yee's arrest) to Wendy Deng to Rupert Murduch. Said David: ""Sierra Leone is the most out of the way, tiny, sad little country but the mega-billionaires will do anything to get the raw gemstones and mineral ore buried under it..... Rakesh Saxeena is the most dashing, undercover, mysterious, amazing spooky guy you will ever meet in your life. Rockefeller may think he is bad-ass but he is in kindergarten compared to Rakesh. Is he evil, Is he secretly saving countries or secretly destroying them?...hard to say..... Oh, and by the way, The Illuminati never, ever, call themselves ""The Illuminati"".... There are five groups of ""businessmen s clubs"" who get together to plan laws, purchases and contracts that will increase their stock value and profits. They do share common beliefs but not all five share the same beliefs so they are always in a subtle war. From time-to-time some jump

ship from one group to another. It's as simple as that..... They love the myth of the ""Illuminati"" because it creates confusion and disinformation. The ""Illuminati"" are a bullshit myth. The businessmens clubs are the real deal and you can see them at work in the headlines every week. The 'ceremonies' at the Grove and the Masons and the other outfits are simple psychological reinforcement tactics to make them all feel more bonded and ""above it all"". It works."" Goudie was trying to copy the financial skimming scam that the Golden Gate Bridge directors were using for their Golden Gate Bridge Anniversary scheme to fund campaigns and personal hobbies. Goudies business partners ratted him out, though, first claiming he killed his wife, by bludgeoning, to get the attention of the feds. Goudie went to prison but various murder claims never stuck."

"Now that key players are either dead, indicted, arrested or otherwise interdicted, the rest of the story can be revealed. Rockefeller and Bronkema came up with a plan to build the downtown version of The Bohemian Grove; A financial district compound which was totally under their control and that could cut off the ""little people"" of the outside world unless they were needed to deliver sandwiches or run errands. All of the Bohemian Grovers and cartel planners could be in the same buildings, keep their girls in the adjacent condo's and it would be one big happy, corrupt, family. You will find, in records searches, that almost everyone from the spooky Bohemian Grove sex and monopoly planning club, also had offices in the Embarcadero Center compound.

"James Bronkema[/caption] A walk around San Francisco's Embarcadero Center reveals a Q-Sensitive militaristic facade of concrete bunker-like structures where you can never walk without 3 cameras on you at all times. Metal sign-plates in the ground remind you that you are not in the outside world and that you better watch your P's and Q's. An ideal configuration for a modern version of the Speak-Easy, ready to hide dirty deeds upon a ""Cheese it, The Cops"" internal announcement signal. There is only one way in and one way out for the entries, all carefully guarded and monitored. Bronk, a builder, was trained by the Rockefellers in ""private governments"". He honed his skills running the Golden Gate Bridge, it's own private government suspended in a no-mans land between San Francisco and Marin Counties, but accountable to no one. It was supposed to stop charging tolls once the bridge was paid for but the cash flow from taxpayer to bridge director pockets was so good, they figured, ""why kill the golden cow"". Many bridge directors have now faced the law over ""accounting discrepancies. Bridge Directors are now pretty much under permanent 24 hour digital law enforcement surveillance because they tend to be so naughty. The entire foundation of the house circled on the right was built from stolen Golden Gate Bridge steel, paid for by taxpayers money, and looks right in the window of another Golden Gate Bridge executives home (the house circled on the left).Then the operation moved up. Big Office complexes with their own bridges between buildings (So you never had to interact with the commoners) and fancy hotel chains that were hidden behind layers of trusts, assumed names, holding companies, corporate facades and inter-level contracts were the new private government. This was the perfect layout to evade law enforcement. Not only could you trot parades of hookers in, and out and ditch the video, you could have all kinds of secret sketchy meetings. The Pacific Union Club, (The Original Bohemian Grove Urban Compound) on top of Nob Hill, has a little Victorian house across the street. (next to the parking garage) from it on California Street. That house has a tunnel under the street to the Pacific Union Club for bringing the Hookers in; according to Tommy, the former car lot attendant. That pales in comparison to the Bronkema/Rockefeller scheme. After each sex party, or

sketchy meeting, they would order all of the security cameras to have a Lois Lerner-like hard drive crash. They believed this destroyed all of the evidence. They controlled all of the buildings and all of the security, they could do as they please...they thought. Some former security guards saw the profit potential in hanging onto some of those tapes and hard-drives before they got wiped. The Girlfriend The recent death-by-hooker of the ultra high tech Google executive shows that even the most savvy ultra-rich geeks can't hide from surveillance camera interdiction. The cool thing about cameras is that they turn all audio and video into a signal, the interesting thing about that is that any signal can be intercepted, even before it reaches the security office. Let's repeat: Somebody else can ALWAYS get the signal before it gets to where the bad guys think it is going to go! Private activists now have Bohemian Grove under personal drone surveillance, camera interdiction and, the wilder ones, have pre-climbed Redwood trees, in advance of the retreat, and placed hidden micro-tiny chip cameras high up in the bark of the redwoods... this will be interesting. But, this was part of the downfall. Those who believe they are immune from the law finally make pretty big mistakes. Their ego and power mania's always bring them down. When Bronk and his Rockre associates started meeting with NGO's, Nigerian Oilfield barons, The notorious Rakesh Saxeena (Look him up) and middle east mining heads; Interpol, GCHQ and all kinds of law enforcement people became interested. To his dying day, James Bronkema denied that he was ""A Bohemian Grove Grand Wizard"", or ""West Coast Grand Master of the Illuminati"" or anything ""creepy or mysterious"". ""I am merely a humble servant to the world's needs"", he said in one of his last communications with a reporter... To be continued... TT- Brugman Team, df- Arn- LATIMES 4, df, FOIA data. Thanks to The Washington Post!! Special thanks to the staff of Mother Jones and SALON.COM (NOTE: This collaborative Wiki Article may be freely reprinted) SEE ALSO: BAY AREA CORRUPTION SEE ALSO: THE FEINSTEIN INVESTIGATION SEE ALSO: THE CALIFORNIA CONNECTION" "NOTE: SOMO STAFF Interviewed one of the suspects daughters, now adult, who was sexually abused by one of the very powerful suspects. For her protection, we have all agreed to confidentiality. We have placed a recording of that interview in multiple secure repositories for safety."

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Janet Rivas Boessenecker Tonnemacher is the best friend of Kathryn Feinstein, **Dianne Feinstein's** Daughter. Janet and Kathryn knew how to party and Kathryn would really rag on her mom, back in the day. Janet married a judge in Sonoma. Dianne Feinstein was elected San Francisco's first female mayor in 1979 and ... was employed by a public affairs group that was interested in criminal justice. www.notablebiographies.com/Du-Fi/Feinstein-Dianne.html

"Now some people might read this and say to themselves: ""This is all too creepy, I don't live in this world, I don't want to know about this. I just want to drive my Escalade and pick up the eggs at the store each morning"" But the fact is, You DO live in this world. IF you choose to ignore the facts that create the world you live in, then you make yourself like a farm animal, a cow, breeding stock to be harvested for revenue. Do you really want to be that dumb and used? You really might want to think about helping law enforcement to bust the bad guys and helping politicians to make laws that help the public and not the campaign billionaires." Sandy Martin

Alex Shoumatoff **on the Bohemian Club** | Vanity Fair - May 2009 ... An undated photograph from inside the Bohemian Grove; John 'Jock' ... Aside from the prostitutes who are rumored to be visited by randy ...www.vanityfair.com/style/features/2009/05/bohemian-grove200905

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"Worst case scenario: **Egomaniac billionaires,** who loved sex with children, controlled the real estate deals in San Francisco, because they needed to feel powerful. They had George Moscone killed

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48 Hours Mystery: Who killed Natalie Antonetti? - CBS News - "Call to police from an angry wife blows a decades-old Texas cold case wide open. ... horrible scene,"" Johnny Goudie told CBS News correspondent Tracy Smith." www.cbsnews.com/news/48-hours-mystery-who-killed-natalie-antonetti/

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'**92 Columbus Jubilee Is Mired in Problems** - New York Times - "18 Dec 1990 ... The chairman, John N. Goudie, a Republican fund-raiser in Miami, said ... by the Christopher Columbus Quincentenary Jubilee Commission …" - www.nytimes.com/ 1990/ 12/ 18/ us/ 92-columbus-jubilee-is-mired-in-problems.html - - Highlight http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OT0ogt70Jgk http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MuothhAstp4 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vYpto7CdqP0 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OlUi-aq_z_s http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wa_Wo4hbh50

Stephen J. Summerhill and John Alexander Williams, Sinking Columbus: Contested History ... Appalachian State University, headed the Christopher Columbus ... sponsors. Goudie could not even attract support from Hispanic American." - www.learner.org/courses/worldhistory/support/reading_2_3.pdf - - Highlight

Articles citations with the tag: COLUMBUS, Christopher, 1451-1506 " -"Results 1 - 50 ... Describes the presumed landing place of Christopher Columbus in the New .... Columbus Quincentenary Jubilee Commission, John Goudie." - connection.ebscohost.com/ tag/ COLUMBUS%252C%2BChristopher%252C%2B1451-1506

Goodbye, Columbus by Garry Wills | The New York Review of Books " - "22 Nov 1990 ... The Conquest of Paradise: Christopher Columbus and the Columbian ... When I interviewed John Goudie in his Florida real estate office, …" - www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1990/nov/22/goodbye-columbus/

U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein publicly accuses CIA of criminal ... -11 Mar 2014 ... WASHINGTON ? The head of the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee accused the CIA Tuesday of criminal activity in improperly searching a … - news.nationalpost.com/ 2014/ 03/ 11/ u-s-senator-dianne-feinstein-publicly-accuses-cia-of-criminal-activit y-airing-intense-dispute-with-spy-agency/

Meet CISA - Dianne Feinstein's Latest Attack on ... - Prison Planet.com - Unsurprisingly, the only ?distinctly native American criminal class,? as ... Cisa is what Senator Dianne Feinstein, the bill's chief backer and the …" - www.prisonplanet.com/ meet-cisa-dianne-feinsteins-latest-attack-on-privacy-civil-liberties- and-the-internet.html - - Highlight http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=blssXVvoQOE

Elon Musk discusses Tesla and Space Xs near-bankruptcies during - Aug 8, 2013 On Thursday, Elon Musk and Richard Branson sat down for a Hangout video chat with Google for Entrepreneurs to talk about the struggles and - www.theverge.com/ 2013/ 8/ 8/ 4602772/ elon-musk-richard-branson-google-hangout-offers-startup-ceo-advice

David Axelrod was stunned when Bill O'Reilly ... - Crooks and Liars -"Sep 11, 2009 ... After Wednesday night's speech, Bill O was running with McCain's original idea to ""fix"" health care by opening up all insurance ..." - www.crooksandliars.com/ john-amato/ david-axelrod-was-stunned-when-bill-ore

"David Axelrod Got It All Wrong: How He, The ... - Crooks and Liars "-"Jun 10, 2012 ... One of our objectives at The Winning Words Project is to help our elected officials , including (and especially!) the president, articulate the ..." - www.crooksandliars.com/ jill-w-klausen/ how-president-obama-democrats-shoul -

David Axelrod: Mitt Romney's Motto Is 'The Buck ... - Crooks and Liars - "Jul 16, 2012 ... Broadcast media seems to be quite obtuse when it comes to the overall implications of the Bain controversies over the past two weeks. This is ..." - www.crooksandliars.com/ karoli/ david-axelrod-mitt-romneys-motto-buck-stops

David Axelrod: Barack Obama's street fighter | Observer profile … - "Aug 4, 2012 ... The president's man: David Axelrod and Barack Obama. ... Clearly, by hook or by crook, Axelrod intends to go out on a winning note. David …" - www.theguardian.com/ theobserver/ 2012/ aug/ 05/ observer-profile-david-axelrod

Michelle Obama, david axelrod, in it up to their ears in criminal ... " -"Jun 19, 2009 ... she is just an angry America hating militant who is a crook like her ... 2006 recommended that the hospital hire the firm of David Axelrod, who a …" - www.sodahead.com/ united-states/ michelle-obamadavid-axelrodin-it-up-to-their-ears-in-criminal-activit y-of-patient-dumping-in-healt/ question-443611/ - - Highlight

The Crook | THE ROYCROFT REPORT - "Dec 11, 2013 ... The Crook. with one comment ... Merchants Of Despair : Barack Obama, David Axelrod, Harry Reid and Tim Geithner. In ""un-categorized""- www.theroycroftreport.com/2013/12/11/the-crook/

Culture of Corruption: Obama and His Team of Tax Cheats, Crooks ... " -Culture of Corruption: Obama and His Team of Tax Cheats, Crooks, and ..... of Chicago Medical Center, aided by Obama's senior adviser, David Axelrod." - www.barnesandnoble.com/ w/ culture-of-corruption-michelle-malkin/ 1102115516?ean=9781596981096

David Axelrod, Lefty Lumberjack | The American Spectator " --Obama's main man will do whatever it takes to fell Republicans and conservatives. Where does his ruthlessness and drive come from?- www.spectator.org/articles/36072/david-axelrod-lefty-lumberjack - -

Coinkadink: one Cain accuser lives in David Axelrod's building - ... Coinkadink: one Cain accuser lives in David Axelrod's building; another serves in ..... Climate Crook James Hansen: on the Government Dole. - directorblue.blogspot.com/ 2011/ 11/ coinkadink-one-cain-accuser-lives-in.html -

David Axelrod's Curious Optimism - The Daily Beast - "24 Sep 2010 ... David Axelrod: Skeptics Are Wrong ..... Best Supporting Actor Oscar for his hilarious turn as Otto, an Anglophobe crook, in this 1988 comedy." - www.thedailybeast.com/ articles/ 2010/ 09/ 24/ david-axelrods-curious-optimism.html

All the president's men go after Romney | The Daily Caller -30 Oct 2011 ... This charge was escalated Sunday when David Axelrod, one of Obama's top ... The messages have not accused him of being a crook." - **www.dailycaller.com/ 2011/ 10/ 30/ all-the-presidents-men-go-after-romney/**

NOTE: Notice that Elon Musk's boyfriends at Google have hidden most of the links, above from the internet, or buried them from being easily found.

HOT KEY LINKS:

Dr. Robert **Epstein** on **Google's** ability to affect the ...

https://www.foxnews.com/transcript/dr-robert-epstein-on-googles-ability-to-affect-the-outcome-of-elections

Dr. Robert **Epstein** on **Google's** ability to affect the outcome of **elections**. Senior research psychologist at the American Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology Dr. Robert **Epstein** joins ...

Dr. Robert **Epstein**: **Google** Will Shift 10% of Voters to ...

https://www.breitbart.com/tech/2020/07/10/dr-robert-epstein-google-will-shift-10-of-voters-to-make-trump-a-blip-in-history/

Jul 10, 2020Dr. Robert **Epstein**, the senior research psychologist at the American Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology, joined Breitbart News' Editor-in-Chief Alex Marlow on Breitbart News Daily to discuss **how Google** hopes to shift 10 percent of the voting public away from Trump to fulfill a company executive's stated goal of making populism nothing more than a "blip in history."

Malzberg | Epstein Google could rig 2016 election for Democrats

Dr. Robert Epstein testified Google's search engine was able to manipula…

Robert Epstein Testimony On Google Interference In …

Dr. Robert Epstein on Google's ability to affect the outcome of elect…

Dr. Robert Epstein: How Google Manipulates Elections

The Real Election Hacking - Dr. Robert Epstein Testifies About…

'If Google were honest, they'd be concerned about messing with th…

Dr. Robert Epstein: Google's Search Engine Was Able to Manipulate Vot…

[7] Google Will Steal This Election w/ Dr. Robert Epstein

How Google is poised to steal the election

Dr. Robert **Epstein**: Study claims **Google** reflected 'very ...

https://www.foxnews.com/media/google-bias-search-results-trump-clinton-epstein-levin

Google allegedly offered search results during the 2016 **election** season that manipulated voters in Hillary Clinton's favor, according to research psychologist Dr. Robert **Epstein**.

Dr. Robert **Epstein** Warns Big Tech Can **Rig** 2020 **Election** ...

https://monkeyviral.com/dr-robert-epstein-warns-big-tech-can-rig-2020-election/

Prominent liberal **Google** critic Dr. Robert **Epstein** wrote an op-ed warning that Big Tech companies can **rig** the 2020 **election** and "make the Russians look like rank amateurs." "President Donald Trump can't win the 2020 **election**," wrote Dr. Robert **Epstein**, a senior researcher at the American Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology and former Editor-in-chief of "Psychology ...

Wife of Whistleblower, Who Exposed **How Google** Rigged ...

https://newspunch.com/wife-whistleblower-google-rig-election-hillary-dies-car-crash/

The wife of a **Google** whistleblower, who exposed **how** Big Tech tried to **rig** the 2016 **election** in favor of Hillary Clinton, died Friday night following a car crash. Psychology professor, Robert **Epstein**, 66, announced the passing of his wife, Misti Dawn Vaughn.

Liberal Professor Warns: **Google** Manipulating Voters 'on a ...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rNvgl38TLvI

Dr. Robert **Epstein** told Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) on Tuesday that **Google** can manipulate votes by using tools that they have at their disposal exclusively, and tha...

'Trump can't win the 2020 **election**': Dr. Robert **Epstein** ...

https://www.theblaze.com/glenn-radio/big-tech-threat-to-2020-election

Dr. Robert **Epstein**, senior research psychologist at the American Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology in California, has been researching the impact of online censorship since 2013. He joined the "Glenn Beck Program" on Monday to expose the power that leftist tech giants, such as **Google** and Facebook, have to sway U.S. **elections** through

How Google Could **Rig** the 2016 **Election** - POLITICO Magazine

https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/how-google-could-rig-the-2016-election-121548

How Google Could **Rig** the 2016 **Election**. ... Robert **Epstein** is senior research psychologist at the

American Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology and the former editor-in-chief of ...

This psychologist claims **Google** search results unfairly ...

https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-google-search-bias-elections-20190322-story.html

Mar 22, 2019The idea that **Google** is subtly pushing masses of voters to the left has the ring of conspiracy, and thus the work of Robert **Epstein** is warmly embraced by conservative lawmakers — as well as a ...

How Google Could **Rig** the 2016 **Election** - Robert **Epstein** ...

https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/how-google-could-rig-the-2016-election-121548_Page2.html

2016. **How Google** Could **Rig** the 2016 **Election**. **Google** has the ability to drive millions of votes to a candidate with no one the wiser. By ROBERT **EPSTEIN**

Google flipped seats, shifted millions of votes to Dems in ...

https://www.rt.com/usa/454653-epstein-interview-google-elections/

Epstein's study of three 2018 California House races found **Google** played the deciding role in flipping those Republican-held seats to the Democrats, influencing millions of undecided voters by controlling what they saw when they searched 500 **election**-related terms. **Google's** results showed a "significant liberal bias," unlike Bing's or ...

Dr. Robert **Epstein**: **Google** Has the 'Power to Flip ...

https://www.breitbart.com/tech/2018/05/03/robert-epstein/

May 3, 2018"That's right and of course in most **elections**, especially close ones, it's the undecided people who determine the outcome of the **election**, so if you can swing a lot of undecided people — and **Google** has at least three ways to do that that we're studying," responded **Epstein**.

Robert **Epstein** - Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Epstein

After this incident, **Epstein** offered other criticism of **Google's** practices. In 2013, he wrote in Time magazine that **Google** had "a fundamentally deceptive business model". In 2015, he said that **Google** could **rig** the 2016 US presidential **election** and that search engine manipulation was "a serious threat to the democratic system of government".

Wife of Whistleblower, Who Exposed **How Google** Rigged ...

https://nworeport.me/2019/12/31/wife-of-whistleblower-who-exposed-how-google-rigged-election-for-hillary-dies-in-car-crash/

Source: Sean Adl-Tabatabai The wife of a **Google** whistleblower, who exposed **how** Big Tech tried to **rig** the 2016 **election** in favor of Hillary Clinton, died Friday night following a car crash. Psychology

professor, Robert **Epstein**, 66, announced the passing of his wife, Misti Dawn Vaughn. The heartbreaking tweet described **how** Misti died after her vehicle spun…

How Google could **rig** the 2016 **election** - POLITICO

https://www.politico.eu/article/google-2016-election-us-candidates-search/

How Google could **rig** the 2016 **election Google** has the ability to drive millions of votes to a candidate with no one the wiser. Given that many **elections** are won by small margins, this gives **Google** the power, right now, to flip upwards of 25 percent of the national **elections** worldwide.

Search engine manipulation effect - Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Search_engine_manipulation_effect

The search engine manipulation effect (SEME) is the change in consumer preferences from manipulations of search results by search engine providers. SEME is one of the largest behavioral effects ever discovered. This includes voting preferences. A 2015 study indicated that such manipulations could shift the voting preferences of undecided voters by 20 percent or more and up to 80 percent in ...

Google could '**rig** the 2016 **election,**' researcher says

https://money.cnn.com/2015/08/20/technology/google-2016-election/index.html

Aug 20, 2015**Google's** influence on the 2016 **election** could tip the scales in favor of its own chosen candidate, says behavioral psychologist Robert **Epstein**.

Liberal professor warns Big Tech will go 'all out' to ...

https://www.theblaze.com/glenn-radio/robert-epstein-election-

Dr. Robert **Epstein**, a senior research psychologist at the American Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology or AIBRT, joined the "Glenn Beck Radio Program" on Monday, to expose the serious threat tech giants such as **Google**, Facebook, and Twitter pose to "free and fair" **elections** by dramatically shifting voting preferences through search-res

We Can Stop Big Tech NOW!

https://mygoogleresearch.com

Google-and-the-Gang probably stole the 2020 **election** without people knowing and without leaving a paper trail. No law can stop them, but monitoring systems, like the ones Dr. **Epstein** set up in 2016, 2018, & 2020, can. By exposing their manipulations, we can get them to back off. If we don't monitor, we will be surrendering our democracy to Big Tech - possibly forever.

Google Critic Killed in "Ironic" Car Accident: Struck by ...

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/google-critic-killed-in-i_b_5351458

Most recently, he conducted a series of experiments that prompted media coverage worldwide which

appear to show that **Google** can determine the outcome of close **elections** by biasing search rankings to favor certain candidates. Based on those experiments, **Epstein** claimed that to protect voters from undue influence, **Google's** ubiquitous search engine would need to be regulated and monitored, with ...

Explained: **Google** Could Manipulate 15 Million Votes in 2020

 https://www.independentsentinel.com/explained-google-could-manipulate-15-million-votes-in-2020/

Dr. **Epstein** is a Senior Research Psychologist for the American Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology who is monitoring **Google's** alleged deceitful marketing practices aimed at swinging the **election** to the Democrat candidates in 2020. His credentials and education are impressive.

Fact-Checking Trump's Claim That **Google** 'Manipulated ...

 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/us/politics/google-votes-election-trump.html

Aug 19, 2019In a 2017 white paper, Mr. **Epstein** examined **how Google** Search might have influenced undecided voters in the 2016 **election** by providing more positive results for one candidate than the other. He ...

Google could **'rig** the 2016 **election,'** researcher says ...

 https://cnnphilippines.com/world/2015/08/21/Google-could-rig-2016-election-researcher-says-Robert-Epstein.html

"**Google** could easily be flipping **elections** worldwide as you read this," **Epstein** said. This story was first published on CNN.com, " **Google** could **'rig** the 2016 **election,'** researcher says ." POST A ...

New Movie Claims **Google** Handed the Popular Vote to Hillary ...

 https://pjmedia.com/news-and-politics/tyler-o-neil/2018/09/23/new-movie-claims-google-handed-the-popular-vote-to-hillary-clinton-in-2016-n61052

Epstein made a stir in 2015 by reporting in Politico that **Google** could "**rig**" the 2016 **election**. This story discussed the results of his study, which was published in the Proceedings of the ...

Google's Hypocrisy | HuffPost

 https://www.huffpost.com/entry/googles-hypocrisy_b_8253332

Google has spoken. Apparently shaken by my recent article in Politico-- "**How Google** Can **Rig** the 2016 **Election**" --**Google's** head of search, Dr. Amit Singhal, has published a critique--"A Flawed **Elections** Conspiracy Theory." I encourage you to read it closely.

Dr. Robert **Epstein**: Hillary Clinton, whom I have strongly ...

 https://www.investmentwatchblog.com/dr-robert-epstein-hillary-clinton-whom-i-have-strongly-supported-for-many-years-told-blatant-lies-about-me-today/

Dr. Robert **Epstein** on Whether **Google** Can **Rig** the Presidential **Election** PoliticKING with Larry KingSep 04 '15. Could the technology behemoth **Google** actually **rig** the upcoming presidential

election? Larry discusses with distinguished scholar, scientist and award-winning author Dr. Robert **Epstein** on PoliticKING. Dr. **Epstein** expands on the ...

Google and Big Tech bias hurts democracy, not just ...

https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/09/13/google-big-tech-bias-hurts-democracy-not-just-conservatives-column/1265020002/

Sep 13, 2018Not just conservatives: **Google** and Big Tech can shift millions of votes in any direction Donald Trump is more right than he knows. My research suggests **Google** and Big Tech can manipulate voters in ...

Can **Google rig elections**? | **Election** Universe

https://electionuniverse.com/2015/09/can-google-rig-elections/

"**How Google** Could **Rig** the 2016 **Election**" is the title of an article written by Robert **Epstein** and published by Politico in August.. According to **Epstein**, Senior Research Psychologist at the American Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology, "**Google** has amassed far more power to control **elections** than any company in history has ever had."

Dr. Robert **Epstein** Warns Big Tech Can **Rig** 2020 **Election** ...

https://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/techwatch/alexander-hall/2020/02/26/dr-robert-epstein-warns-big-tech-can-rig-2020-election

Prominent liberal **Google** critic Dr. Robert **Epstein** wrote an op-ed warning that Big Tech companies can **rig** the 2020 **election** and "make the Russians look like rank amateurs." "President Donald Trump can't win the 2020 **election**," wrote Dr. Robert **Epstein**, a senior researcher at the American Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology and former Editor-in-chief of "Psychology ...

Wife of Whistleblower, Who Exposed **How Google** Rigged ...

https://nworeport.me/2019/12/31/wife-of-whistleblower-who-exposed-how-google-rigged-election-for-hillary-dies-in-car-crash/

Source: Sean Adl-Tabatabai The wife of a **Google** whistleblower, who exposed **how** Big Tech tried to **rig** the 2016 **election** in favor of Hillary Clinton, died Friday night following a car crash. Psychology professor, Robert **Epstein**, 66, announced the passing of his wife, Misti Dawn Vaughn. The heartbreaking tweet described **how** Misti died after her vehicle spun…

Prof who says **Google** 'gave Hillary almost 3M votes through ...

https://www.the-sun.com/news/284747/professor-robert-epstein-hillary-clinton-google-votes/

Epstein inferred this alleged **Google** interference influenced the popular vote in favor of Clinton. She received 2,864,974 more votes than her opponent Donald Trump in the 2016 **election**. He alleged as many as 15 million votes could be impacted in the 2020 **election** and claimed **Google's** "Go Vote"

display gave Dems a leg up of 800,000 vote.

Can **Google Rig Elections**? | MetaFilter

https://www.metafilter.com/152368/Can-Google-Rig-Elections

Can **Google Rig Elections**? August 23, 2015 1:40 PM Subscribe A fascinating article by Robert **Epstein** at Politico.com about **Google's** Search Engine Manipulation Effect (SEME) work, and whether and **how** they'd be able to influence an **election**.

Congressional Testimony: **Google** Gave Hillary Millions Of ...

https://clashdaily.com/2019/07/congressional-testimony-google-gave-hillary-millions-of-votes-15-million-more-at-risk-in-2020-video/

At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, "**Google** and Censorship through Search Engines," Dr. Robert **Epstein**, who researches the impact of **Google**, informed the hearing that "upwards of 15 million votes" were in jeopardy in the 2020 **election**.During his testimony, **Epstein** told Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) that in 2016, **Google** gave at least 2.6 million votes to Democratic candidate Hillary ...

Internet Research Psychologist: **Google** Search Results Can ...

https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2019/07/internet-research-psychologist-google-search-results-can-sway-us-elections-by-millions-of-voters-by-pushing-fake-news-for-the-left/

Google helped Democrats in the 2018 **election** through biased results as well - 14. This number is based on data captured by **Epstein's** monitoring system, which preserved more than 47,000 **election** searches on **Google**, Bing, and Yahoo, along with the nearly 400,000 web pages to which the search results linked.

The Real **Election** Hacking - Dr. Robert **Epstein** Testifies ...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mb0QG3Ld-pg

Forget Russia! **Google** actually CHANGED VOTES. This is the real **election** hacking! Dr. Robert **Epstein** Senate testimony July, 16, 2019 Dr. Robert **Epstein** Inte...

Top Psychologist: **Google's** Algorithm Will **Rig** the **Election** ...

https://www.prisonplanet.com/top-psychologist-googles-algorithm-will-rig-the-election-for-hillary.html

In August last year, Politico reported on **how** "**Google** could **rig** the 2016 **election**" by altering its search algorithms. **Epstein** also noted that Facebook has the power to shift up to 600,000 voters on **election** day by simply sending out targeted reminders to Hillary Clinton supporters telling them to vote, while not sending out the same ...

Could **Google** Actually **Rig** An **Election**? - Matter

https://www.mttr.io/blog/google/google-actually-rig-election/

As a public company, **Google** is also one of the biggest supporters of the Clinton campaign, spending millions in political lobbying. **Google** definitely has the motivation needed to **rig** an **election**. But we're going to need a bit more contextual evidence than SourceFed and **Epstein** can offer to believe **Google** is currently rigging an **election**.

Could **Google** influence the presidential **election** ...

https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/10/could-google-influence-presidential-election

How much could **Google** influence the 2016 **election**? By **Epstein's** calculations, biased **Google** results could shift the vote in November by up to 2%, or about 2.6 million votes. ... But **Epstein** ...

VIDEO: Dr. Robert **Epstein** On **Google's** 'Very Dramatic Bias ...

https://100percentfedup.com/video-dr-robert-epstein-on-googles-very-dramatic-bias-towards-hillary-in-2016-election/

Dr. Robert **Epstein** joined Mark Levin to discuss the results of his study that exposes **Google** for political bias in favor of Hillary Clinton in the 2016 **election**. Levin starts by saying this is probably the most important show he's ever done…that's a big deal! Hillary Clinton tried to shut down claims in the **Epstein** […]

Whistleblower: "**Google** Planning to **Rig Elections** and ...

https://sarahwestall.com/whistleblower-google-planning-to-rig-elections-and-overthrow-u-s-government/

"**Google** Snowden moment" Project Veritas has released hundreds of internal **Google** documents leaked by Vorhies. Among those documents is a file called "news black list site for **google** now." The document, according to Vorhies, is a "black list," which restricts certain websites from appearing on news feeds for an Android **Google** product.

Can **Google rig elections**? - the rebuttal | **Election** Universe

https://electionuniverse.com/2015/10/can-google-rigging-elections-the-rebuttal/

Can **Google rig elections**? - the rebuttal ⌂ Back To Homepage. October 08 2015, 14:09 Amit Singhal, senior vice president and software engineer at **Google**, responded Robert **Epstein's** article which suggested that **Google** had the power to shift the voting preferences of undecided voters.

Internet Studies - Robert **Epstein**

https://www.drrobertepstein.com/index.php/internet-studies

Dr. **Epstein's** Politico essay, "**How Google** Could **Rig** the 2016 **Election**," can be downloaded here. A related article, "The New Mind Control," published in Aeon magazine - which has been viewed more than 250,000 times - can be downloaded here. To view Dr. **Epstein** talking about SEME on the Larry King Show, click here.

Search engine manipulation effect - Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Search_engine_manipulation_effect

The search engine manipulation effect (SEME) is the change in consumer preferences from manipulations of search results by search engine providers. SEME is one of the largest behavioral effects ever discovered. This includes voting preferences.A 2015 study indicated that such manipulations could shift the voting preferences of undecided voters by 20 percent or more and up to 80 percent in some ...

Did a **Google** Exec Admit to Rigging Search Results Against ...

https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/google-exec-rigging-trump/

A satirical web site published a fictitious article claiming that an exec at **Google** admitted to rigging search results against President Trump.

Google Whistleblower and Hillary Clinton Critic Dr. Robert ...

https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2020/01/google-whistleblower-and-hillary-clinton-critic-dr-robert-epstein-suggests-wifes-fatal-car-crash-not-an-accident-im-not-suicidal-hear-that-hillary/

Liberal professor Dr. Robert **Epstein** over the summer blew the whistle and warned Congress during his testimony that **Google** was manipulating voters 'on a massive scale.' Dr. **Epstein** stated that last year he briefed a group of state AGs about **Google's** power to **rig elections**, and one of them said, "I think you're going to…

Google could '**rig** the 2016 **election,**' researcher says

https://www.fox13now.com/2015/08/20/google-could-rig-the-2016-election-researcher-says/

Though **Epstein** falls short of saying that **Google** would **rig** an **election**, he points to historical precedent suggesting that **Google** wouldn't be alone if it tried.

Google Sent a Biased Vote Reminder. Senators Want Answers.

https://pjmedia.com/election/tyler-o-neil/2020/11/09/report-google-sent-liberals-but-not-conservatives-a-vote-reminder-gop-senators-want-to-know-why-n1133468

Just a few days before **Election** Day, **Epstein** warned Fox News' Tucker Carlson that **Google's** search engine has a "very substantial pro-liberal bias" and could swing 15 million votes in the ...

Are **Google** and Facebook really suppressing conservative ...

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/dec/04/google-facebook-anti-conservative-bias-claims

Dec 4, 2018Images of Barack Obama with Mark Zuckerberg and Eric Schmidt suddenly appear as **Epstein** describes **how Google** and Facebook could **rig** an **election** in favor of one candidate. Facebook Twitter Pinterest

Google likely shifted undecided voters in 2018 **election** ...

https://www.studentnewsdaily.com/example-of-media-bias/google-likely-shifted-undecided-voters-in-2018-election-researcher-says/

Additional commentaries by Dr. **Epstein**: **How Google** Could **Rig** the 2016 **Election**" published at Politico in 2015. 10 Ways Big Tech Can Shift Millions of Votes in the November Elections—Without Anyone Knowing - Sept. 26, 2018; **How Google** Shifts Votes: A 'Go Vote' Reminder Is Not Always What You Think It Is - Jan. 2, 2019

Google Rigs Elections, No Russian Needed (**Google** = Israeli ...

https://www.veteranstoday.com/2018/09/21/google-rigs-elections-no-russian-needed-google-israeli-mafia/

"Research I have been directing in recent years suggests that **Google**, Inc., has amassed far more power to control **elections** — indeed, to control a wide variety of opinions and beliefs — than any company in history has ever had," research psychologist Robert **Epstein** says.

Google Influenced Midterm **Elections**; Prevented Republicans ...

https://newspunch.com/google-influenced-midterm-elections-prevented-republicans-winning/

Google deliberately built biases into its search results in order to **rig** the **election** in favor of the Democratic party, according to stunning new research. The study was conducted by Dr. Robert **Epstein** - founder of the Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies.

How Google Could **Rig** the 2016 **Election** - Robert **Epstein** ...

https://www.opednews.com/Quicklink/How-Google-Could-Rig-the-2-in-Best_Web_OpEds-Control_Election-Cyber-Fraud_Election-Systems-And-Software_Election-Tampering-150821-263.html

QuickLink: **How Google** Could **Rig** the 2016 **Election** - Robert **Epstein** - POLITICO Magazine - (Image by warrenski) Details DMCAAmerica's next president could be eased into office not just by TV ads ...

How Google Could **Rig** the 2016 **Election** - Democratic ...

https://www.democraticunderground.com/10141182685

Source: Politico **Google** has the ability to drive millions of votes to a candidate with no one the wiser. By ROBERT **EPSTEIN** August 19, 2015 **Google's** search algorithm can easily shift the voting preferences of undecided voters by 20 percent or more—up to 80 percent in some demographic groups —with virtually no one knowing they are being manipulated, according to experiments I conducted ...

Wife of **Google** Whistleblower Who Claimed Tech Giant **Rigs** ...

https://nationalfile.com/wife-of-google-whistleblower-who-claimed-tech-giant-rigs-elections-for-democrats-dies-in-car-accident/

Epstein testified before Congress that **Google** is capable of swinging millions of votes for the Democrats, and suggested they may have already employed some of their tactics in 2018 and 2016.

Specifically, **Epstein** claimed that, according to his research, **Google** attempted to give Clinton an advantage in the 2016 presidential **election**.

How Google Shifts Votes: A 'Go Vote' Reminder Is Not ...

https://www.theepochtimes.com/another-way-google-manipulates-votes-without-us-knowing-a-go-vote-reminder-is-not-what-you-think-it-is_2754073.html

Commentary. If you accessed the **Google** search engine on **Election** Day in 2018, you were probably amused and delighted to see the words "Go Vote" where the word "**Google**" usually is. Perhaps ...

Prof who says **Google** 'gave Hillary almost 3M votes through ...

https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/10782079/prof-who-says-google-gave-hillary-almost-3m-votes-through-election-meddling-says-his-wifes-death-was-no-accident/

Epstein claimed **Google** gave' millions of ... of state AGs about #**Google's** power to **rig elections**. ... could be impacted in the 2020 **election** and claimed **Google's** "Go Vote" display gave Dems a leg ...

How Google Could **Rig** the 2016 **Election** - Schwartzreport

https://www.schwartzreport.net/how-google-could-rig-the-2016-election/

Given that many **elections** are won by small margins, this gives **Google** the power, right now, to flip upwards of 25 percent of the national **elections** worldwide. In the United States, half of our presidential **elections** have been won by margins under 7.6 percent, and the 2012 **election** was won by a margin of only 3.9 percent—well within **Google's** ...

Could **Google Rig** the 2016 **Election**? Don't Believe the Hype.

https://www.thedailybeast.com/could-google-rig-the-2016-election-dont-believe-the-hype

The story started when a political science colleague pointed us to an article in Politico headlined, "**How Google** Could **Rig** the 2016 **Election**," which made an astounding claim:

Robert **Epstein** - Politico

https://www.politico.eu/author/robert-epstein/

A president who once seemed impervious to October surprises is suddenly confronting one big enough to alter the **election** outcome. 10/2/20, 2:28 PM CEST. ... Archives for ROBERT **EPSTEIN**. ... **How Google** could **rig** the 2016 **election**. 8/20/15, 10:04 AM CET. **Google** has the ability to drive millions of votes to a candidate with no one the wiser ...

Shocking Report That **Google** Influenced the 2016 **Election**

https://www.independentsentinel.com/shocking-report-that-google-influenced-the-2016-election/

A shocking report by Tucker Carlson exposed an email obtained from a **Google** insider that proves they influenced the 2016 **election** to steer voters to Hillary Clinton. "An email obtained exclusively by this show reveals that a senior **Google** employee deployed the company's resources to increase voter

turnout in ways she believed would help the ...

Google is 'trying to **rig** the **election**' in 2020 - Trump ...

https://www.rt.com/usa/462726-google-is-trying-to-rig-election/

"They're trying to **rig** the **election**" in 2020, Trump said, seemingly singling out **Google** in an interview with Fox Business on Wednesday.. Trump blasted Twitter and **Google** for silencing conservative voices and harboring "hatred for the Republicans." "Twitter is just terrible, what they do.

Google Whistleblower And Hillary Clinton Critic Dr. Robert ...

https://www.teaparty.org/google-whistleblower-and-hillary-clinton-critic-dr-robert-epstein-suggests-wifes-fatal-car-crash-not-an-accident-im-not-suicidal-hear-that-hillary-425518/

Dr. **Epstein** stated that last year he briefed a group of state AGs about **Google's** power to **rig elections**, and one of them said, "I think you're going to die in an accident in a few months." A few months later on December 27, 2019, his young, beautiful wife, Misti died a horrific violent death in a car crash.

Did someone murder the wife of a **Google** whistleblower ...

https://thedailycoin.org/2020/01/21/did-someone-murder-the-wife-of-a-google-whistleblower-whose-research-implicated-the-tech-giant-in-election-meddling/

Epstein moved to cover his tracks, so to speak. Through extensive research, **Epstein**, a psychologist by training, discovered that through algorithm manipulation, **Google** and other social media giants can influence voting patterns. Their control of information flows can influence **election** outcomes.

Google Attempted to **Rig** 2016 **Election** for Hillary Clinton ...

https://neonnettle.com/news/5035-google-attempted-to-rig-2016-election-for-hillary-clinton-email-chain-reveals

Eliana Murillo, **Google's** Multicultural Marketing, discussed rigging the **election** for Hillary Clinton. In the emails, a **Google** executive describes efforts to pay for free rides for a certain sect of the population to the polls-a get-out-the-vote for Hispanic voters operation-and **how** these efforts were because she thought it would help Hillary Clinton win the general **election** in 2016 ...

Trump: **Google** and Twitter are 'trying to **rig** the **election** ...

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7184367/Trump-says-government-SUE-Google-Twitter-trying-rig-election.html

Donald Trump said Wednesday that social media and online search companies like Twitter and **Google** are 'trying to **rig** the **election**' in 2020 by skewing ... as family of **Epstein's** 'madam' launch ...

Did **Google** Assassinate Wife Of Whistleblower Who Exposed ...

https://www.sgtreport.com/2020/01/did-google-assassinate-wife-of-whistleblower-who-exposed-the-search-engine/

Criticism of **Google**. In 2013, **Epstein** wrote in Time magazine that **Google** had "a fundamentally deceptive business model". In 2015, he said that **Google** could **rig** the 2016 US presidential **election** and that search engine manipulation was "a serious threat to the democratic system of government".

Undercover video shows senior **Google** executive vowing to ...

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7178881/Undercover-video-shows-senior-Google-executive-vowing-prevent-Trump-situation.html

A senior **Google** executive has been caught on an undercover video appearing to suggest the company is trying to stop 'the next Trump situation' in the 2020 presidential **election**.. Secret footage ...

Google Could **'Rig** the 2016 **Election,'** Researchers Claim ...

https://fortune.com/2015/08/23/research-google-rig-election/

Research psychologist Robert **Epstein** conducted a study that shows **Google** has the power to sway voter opinion and **rig** the 2016 **election**.

When will **Google** defend democracy? - The Conversation

https://theconversation.com/when-will-google-defend-democracy-96838

But in 2015, my mentor at the time Robert **Epstein** published an article in Politico - entitled "**How Google** Could **Rig** the 2016 **Election**" - and that did the trick.

Did Someone Sabotage Dr. Robert **Epstein's** Website? - The ...

https://www.thepostemail.com/2020/01/20/did-someone-sabotage-dr-robert-epsteins-website/

They have since the 2008 and 2012 **election** cycle been less obvious in this … maybe trying to cover their tracks a wee bit by loosening up on what they did. I have no doubt that Dr. Robert **Epstein** is in the cross hairs of **Google**, Facebook, and Twitter and they will use every subtle tool at their disposal to minimize his research findings.

Experts: Trump **Google** voter manipulation claims based on ...

https://www.businessinsider.com/red-flags-in-trump-google-bias-millions-votes-report-2019-8?op=1

The 2.6 million Clinton vote number appears to have originally turned up in a 2017 study coauthored by **Epstein**, which sought to find whether **Google** introduced bias in search results ahead of the ...

Will **Google Rig Election** for Hillary? Far Fetched: Experts ...

https://trofire.com/2015/08/22/will-google-rig-election-for-hillary-far-fetched-experts-say-they-easily-could-and-might-have-done-it-in/

Epstein and Robertson conducted five experiments in the US and India, demonstrating that internet search results can and do affect **election** outcomes - particularly in very tight races. ... To read more on this topic, click **How Google** Could **Rig** the 2016 **Election Google** has the ability to drive millions of votes to a candidate with no one the ...

Trump Drops The Hammer On **Google** For Trying To **Rig** 2016 ...

https://teapartypac.org/trump-drops-the-hammer-on-google-for-trying-to-rig-2016-election/

In a recently released Senate report, Dr. Robert **Epstein**, a psychologist, author, and professor, **Google** manipulated at least 2.6 million votes, 10+ million votes in Clinton's favor. Dr. **Epstein**, inconveniently for the narrative of the left-wing media outlets trying to claim that Trump is lying about **Google's** manipulation of the **election**, is ...

Researchers say, **Google** can **rig** presidential polls » Flatimes

https://flatimes.com/researchers-google-can-rig-presidential-polls/

Epstein further stated that given that many **elections** are won by small margins, this gives **Google** the power to "flip upwards of 25 percent of the national **elections** worldwide." He said that since half of presidential **elections** in the United States have been won by margins under 7.6 percent, the ability to decide the final outcome of a ...

How Google's Search Rankings Could Manipulate **Elections** ...

https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2014/06/09/how-googles-search-rankings-could-manipulate-elections-and-end-democracy

This is exactly what **Google** claimed was the explanation for Barack Obama's consistently high search rankings in the months leading up to the 2008 and 2012 presidential **elections**. Let's play ...

Google Whistleblower Suspects Wife's Fatal Car Crash Was ...

https://clashdaily.com/2020/01/google-whistleblower-suspects-wifes-fatal-car-crash-was-not-an-accident/

You may remember the Robert **Epstein** stories we covered last year, testifying before Congress exactly **HOW Google** results can swing **elections** by millions or even tens of millions. Robert **Epstein**, 66, said in July the internet giant's methods 'gave' millions of votes to Hillary Clinton during the 2016 presidential **election**.

Research Shows **Google's** Search Manipulations Tried To **Rig** ...

https://documenttruth.com/?p=20073

Google employees, including at least six high-ranking executives, donated more than $1.3 million to Clinton's 2016 campaign. Call it censorship or manipulation, but the truth is…Google attempted to **rig** the **election** for Hillary Clinton by manipulating searches and suggestions, and therefore, voters minds.

Sex-and-drug parties are common in **Silicon Valley** ...

https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2018/01/02/brotopia-emily-chang-silicon-valley-sex-scene.html

Drug-fueled **sex** parties are a common and barely hidden phenomenon in **Silicon Valley's** venture and

startup world, according to an explosive excerpt from Bloomberg technology reporter Emily Chang's ...

Indictment of Ayahuasca Kingpin Ties Bronfman and Epstein ...

https://lena-mozya.ru/2019/12/indictment-of-ayahuasca-kingpin-ties-bronfman-and-epstein-sex-cults-to-silicon-valleys-mind-war/

INDICTMENT OF DRUG KINGPIN TIES BRONFMAN AND EPSTEIN **SEX CULTS** TO **SILICON VALLEY'S** 'DARK ENLIGHTENMENT' by Dr. Leonard G. Horowitz and Sherri Kane. with excerpts from the authors' latest book, Ayahuasca Death **Cult**: The Psycho-Spiritual Delusion

How the Tech **Sex Cult** in New York and **Silicon Valley** ...

testimony111.com/index.php?post/THE-TECH-SEX-CULT-IN-NEW-YORK-AND-SILICON-VALLEY

silicon valley sex cult; the jeffrey epstein **silicon valley sex cult** chapter; share on social media ...

How the Tech **Sex Cult** in New York and **Silicon Valley** ...

nationalnewsnetwork.net/index.php?post/THE-TECH-SEX-CULT-IN-NEW-YORK-AND-SILICON-VALLEY

HOW THE TECH **SEX CULT** IN NEW YORK AND **SILICON VALLEY** OPERATES. By Standford_Research_Center55 on -, - - **SEX** TRAFFICKING - Permalink Emily Chang; Emily Chang and **Silicon Valley Sex Cults**

Inside the End of the NXIVM **Sex Cult** - Vanity Fair

https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/06/inside-the-end-nxivm-empowerment-sex-cult

Raniere began making a pyramid scheme of this **sex cult**, pushing the first group of women to become "first-line masters" and recruit other women to be their slaves; all slaves were required to ...

Silicon Valley's Strange, Apocalyptic **Cult** | Mind Matters

https://mindmatters.ai/2019/05/silicon-valleys-strange-apocalyptic-cult/

Silicon Valley's Strange, Apocalyptic **Cult** Key **Valley** figures hope to beat death the transhumanist way. Oh, by the way, YOU are doomed Denyse O'Leary May 27, 2019 Religion, Social Factors, Technocracy

How **Silicon Valley's** feature creep is ruining **sex** toys ...

https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/27/17165390/smart-sex-toys-connected-apps-data-tech

The **Silicon Valley** approach is bad for **sex** toys because it's generally bad for consumer products. And as long as companies are designing toys with an eye toward securing VC funding, we'll be ...

Silicon Valley Satanists - IlluminatiWatcher

https://illuminatiwatcher.com/silicon-valley-satanists/

Part of this movement of the new age of YOLO is the open sexual expressions found with hookup apps such as Tinder. We can also see evidence of this in **Silicon Valley** when Gilfoyle propositions Dinesh to have **sex** with his girlfriend. More was to be said on this by LaVey in Satanic **Sex**:

Beware: **Silicon Valley's** cultists want to turn you into a ...

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/03/hi-tech-silicon-valley-cult-populism

Jan 3, 2016Love & **sex** Home & garden Health & fitness Family Travel ... **Silicon Valley's** cultists want to turn you into a disruptive deviant ... Like all good **cults**, such firms tap into our inner quest for ...

Leader of NXIVM **sex cult** gets 120 years in prison

https://news.yahoo.com/leader-nxivm-sex-cult-gets-212514317.html

Keith Raniere was sentenced Tuesday to 120 years in prison after being convicted of running a **sex** trafficking **cult** called NXIVM.Raniere founded and ran NXIVM, which he branded as a self-improvement business. But prosecutors say it was a front for Raniere to traffic women and girls and mentally, physically

JaysAnalysis.com **Sex Cults**, **Silicon Valley**, CIA Hollywood ...

https://jaysanalysis.com/2018/08/09/sex-cults-silicon-valley-cia-hollywood-technocracy-cfr-jay-dyer/

Sex Cults, **Silicon Valley**, CIA Hollywood, Technocracy & CFR - Jay Dyer . 1 stars. Register to vote! Published On August 9, 2018 » 1241 Views» By admin » 80s arcana, Books/Literature, Comedy, Comedy Videos, Conspiracy, Culture, Esoteric Hollywood Episodes, Featured, Film Review/Analysis, Philosophy, Psy Ops, The Jay Show, Video ...

Theranos, Elizabeth Holmes, and the **Cult** of **Silicon Valley** ...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ta1DqI4xDRw

Elizabeth Holmes became a **Silicon Valley** celebrity after she dropped out of Stanford at 19 to start a company called Theranos. We sat down with John Carreyro...

Beware of the **Silicon Valley cult** - thinkfaster.co

https://thinkfaster.co/2015/12/beware-of-the-silicon-valley-cult/

There's a **cult** calling, and it's located in Northern California. Usually, you get the call from a recruiter, attempting to convince you to join their company because it's Special and Unique. If you accept their offer, here are some of the benefits: For the privilege of being a member of the **cult**, you get to take half of your market rate in salary in exchange for equity that will most likely be ...

The **Silicon Valley** Sexual Predator **Cult** - Eagle Rising

https://eaglerising.com/the-silicon-valley-sexual-predator-cult/

There is a **Silicon Valley** sexual predator subculture that hides itself under the guise of "setting a new paradigm of behavior." There is a **Silicon Valley** sexual predator culture that helps explain a lot of sexual harassment and worse allegations. This was exposed recently by Emily Chang in Vanity Fair. These parties claim to be about being ...

The Werewolf **Cult** of **Silicon Valley**

https://blindfieldjournal.com/2020/10/25/the-werewolf-cult-of-silicon-valley/

The Werewolf **Cult** of **Silicon Valley**. Posted on October 25, 2020 October 25, 2020 by blindfieldcollective Posted in Uncategorized. By Lucy Blissett . Epochs throw up the monsters they need. History can be written of monsters, and in them. We experience the conjunctions of certain werewolves and crisis-gnawed feudalism, of Cthulhu and rupturing ...

Convicted **sex cult** figure says he's innocent

https://news.yahoo.com/convicted-sex-cult-figure-says-233927888.html

Keith Raniere, who was convicted of **sex** trafficking, racketeering and possession of child pornography in connection with his role in the alleged **sex cult** called NXIVM (pronounced "nexium") says he's innocent and wants a new trial, a request that a judge denied Friday.. In an interview that aired Friday on "NBC Nightly News with Lester Holt," Raniere acknowledged he was a leader in an ...

Ex-startup staffer: **Silicon Valley** has **cult** mentality ...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9dUwNtZ1dwM

Dan Lyons talks to CNNMoney's Laurie Segall about the stranger side of working at a startup.

What **Silicon Valley** company is most **cult**-like? - Quora

https://www.quora.com/What-Silicon-Valley-company-is-most-cult-like?share=1

Cult like.. You mean everyone shares the exact same values, dresses the same way, eats together the same things, has the same interests, and generally do not have any family? Jeezus, that's every company. Google is populated with the most overrefi...

Let's Take the **Cult** out of **Silicon Valley** Culture | Kellblog

https://kellblog.com/2019/02/13/lets-take-the-cult-out-of-culture/

But sometimes **Silicon Valley cults** are not benevolent - Theranos being the best recent example. Continuing to work in such environments, prioritizing the needs of the **cult** over common sense and business ethics can do lasting damage to your personal relationships, to your health, and to your career.

This Oregon tantric **sex cult** committed the largest ...

https://theplaidzebra.com/oregon-tantric-sex-cult-bioterrorism-on-us-soil/

The **cult** was at its height for the four years between 1981 and 1985. A typical day was a mash-up of work, meditation, drugs, prayer and **sex**. For Rajneesh and Patel, it was also a money-making scheme.

Silicon Valley Cults? : **cults** - reddit

https://www.reddit.com/r/cults/comments/ajossd/silicon_valley_cults/

Silicon Valley Cults? Close. 18. Posted by. u/ChildOfComplexity. 11 months ago. Archived. **Silicon Valley Cults**? I know there are a number of vague new age gurus feeding on the tech community in San Francisco and just generally where there is money and a spiritual void it's prime for **cult** activity. Anyone have any insight into the scene there?

Silicon Valley's power **cults** | Salon.com

https://www.salon.com/1997/12/18/cov_18books/

Dec 18, 1997**Silicon** Valley's power **cults**: At Intel, Oracle and Apple, you can't escape the grip of a Fearless Leader -- or a paranoid one. Scott Rosenberg reviews three new computer-business books.

Cults - GBFSV SPIRITUAL ABUSE VICTIMS' RECOVERY

https://gbfsvchurchabuse.org/tag/cults/

Posts about **Cults** written by M. Deservebetter. Note: My former pastors/elders at Grace Bible Fellowship of **Silicon Valley** use undue influence on church members, complete with threats in meetings that church members are ordered to, demands for "obedience" to a senior pastor (Cliff McManis) with FAKE degrees incluing a FAKE Ph.D. from a diploma mill, excommunications and shunnings of church ...

It is time to directly confront the **Silicon Valley** ...

https://europetodaynews.wordpress.com/2017/04/28/it-is-time-to-directly-confront-the-silicon-valley-cultists-and-demand-fbi-congressional-and-sec-investigation/

Elitist **Cult**. **Silicon Valley** elitists believe they are better than everyone else. **Silicon Valley's** Kleiner Perkins founder: VC Tom Perkins, said that poor people must be "Nazi's" for not accepting the "superior intellect" of VC's. **Silicon Valley's** Kleiner Perkins VC Vinod Khosla, took over California's favorite public beach ...

Amanda Knox supports NXIVM **sex cult** leader Keith Raniere ...

https://sportsgrindentertainment.com/amanda-knox-supports-nxivm-sex-cult-leader-keith-raniere/

Amanda Knox is demanding answers about NXIVM **cult** leader Keith Raniere's 2019 conviction. Knox signed a petition questioning whether there was "prosecutorial misconduct" in the case, which led to Raniere being found guilty of **sex** trafficking among other crimes. Knox knows a thing or two about sensationalized trials as her 2009 murder conviction was ultimately […]

Burning Man 2018: **Silicon Valley's Cult**-Like Desert Festival

https://www.technocracy.news/burning-man-2018-silicon-valleys-cult-like-desert-festival/

It's the ultimate annual destination for top **Silicon Valley** techies to practice hedonistic pleasure, drugs,

eastern spirituality and social engineering. This year could see as many as 100,000 people create a pop-up city in a northern Nevada desert. The Utopia-like Technocrat culture is 'other-worldly'.

The Gary Null Show -Wikipedia: **Silicon Valley's Cult** of ...

https://prn.fm/gary-null-show-wikipedia-silicon-valleys-cult-medical-misinformation-07-01-19/

Download HereWikipedia: **Silicon Valley's Cult** of Medical Misinformation Richard Gale & Gary Null Progressive Radio Network, June 28, 2019 Americans are spending more money on diagnostic tests, surgeries and other medical procedures than ever before. They are also consuming more pills and medications and will receive more treatments than at any other time in US history.

Silicon Valley (TV series) - Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Head

Silicon Valley is an American comedy television series created by Mike Judge, John Altschuler and Dave Krinsky.It premiered on HBO on April 6, 2014, running for a total of six seasons of 53 episodes. The series finale aired on December 8, 2019. The series, a parody of **Silicon Valley** culture, focuses on Richard Hendricks (Thomas Middleditch), a programmer who founds a startup company called ...

Silicon Valley's Cult of Nothing - The Baffler

https://thebaffler.com/latest/cult-of-nothing

Like so much **Silicon Valley** newspeak, the myth of the immaterial is actually a **cult** of the very, very material. Small consumer tech now matches expensive watches and jewelry as commodity fetishism, and Apple is the undisputed champion, creating a powerful mythology around their pricey products.

"Oh My God, This Is So F---ed Up": Inside **Silicon Valley's** ...

https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/01/brotopia-silicon-valley-secretive-orgiastic-inner-sanctum

For successful women in **Silicon Valley**, the drug-and-**sex**-party scene is a minefield to navigate. This isn't a matter of Bay Area tech women being more prudish than most; I doubt recent history ...

Silicon Valley Cults? : **cults** - reddit

https://www.reddit.com/r/cults/comments/ajossd/silicon_valley_cults/

Silicon Valley Cults? Close. 18. Posted by. u/ChildOfComplexity. 11 months ago. Archived. **Silicon Valley Cults**? I know there are a number of vague new age gurus feeding on the tech community in San Francisco and just generally where there is money and a spiritual void it's prime for **cult** activity. Anyone have any insight into the scene there?

The **cult** of the founder and **Silicon Valley's** lack of moral ...

https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/20/the-cult-of-the-founder-and-silicon-valleys-lack-of-moral-authority/

Sep 20, 2019The **cult** of the founder and **Silicon Valley's** lack of moral authority. Kate Clark Alex

Wilhelm 1 year Hello and welcome back to ...

Burning Man 2018: **Silicon Valley's Cult**-Like Desert Festival

https://www.technocracy.news/burning-man-2018-silicon-valleys-cult-like-desert-festival/

It's the ultimate annual destination for top **Silicon Valley** techies to practice hedonistic pleasure, drugs, eastern spirituality and social engineering. This year could see as many as 100,000 people create a pop-up city in a northern Nevada desert. The Utopia-like Technocrat culture is 'other-worldly'.

How The Story Of R. Kelly's "**Sex Cult**" Finally Went Public ...

https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jimderogatis/i-thought-the-world-would-never-know-about-r-kelly

How The Story Of R. Kelly's "**Sex Cult**" Finally Went Public — And Quickly Exploded. I spent almost 20 years reporting on R. Kelly, and nine months trying to find an outlet to publish the story of the "**sex cult**" that would — finally — get the world's attention. (An excerpt from Soulless: The Case Against R. Kelly.)

r/cults - Theranos - **Silicon Valley's** Greatest Failure ...

https://www.reddit.com/r/cults/comments/awhog9/theranos_silicon_valleys_greatest_failure_2019/

Theranos - **Silicon Valley's** Greatest Failure (2019) - What seemed like one of the most ground breaking companies of the 21st century ended up being one of **Silicon Valley's** greatest failures. How did Elizabeth Holmes manage to fool the world?

Silicon Valley's Cult of Nothing - The Baffler

https://thebaffler.com/latest/cult-of-nothing

Like so much **Silicon Valley** newspeak, the myth of the immaterial is actually a **cult** of the very, very material. Small consumer tech now matches expensive watches and jewelry as commodity fetishism, and Apple is the undisputed champion, creating a powerful mythology around their pricey products.

It is time to directly confront the **Silicon Valley** ...

https://europetodaynews.wordpress.com/2017/04/28/it-is-time-to-directly-confront-the-silicon-valley-cultists-and-demand-fbi-congressional-and-sec-investigation/

Elitist **Cult**. **Silicon Valley** elitists believe they are better than everyone else. **Silicon Valley's** Kleiner Perkins founder: VC Tom Perkins, said that poor people must be "Nazi's" for not accepting the "superior intellect" of VC's. **Silicon Valley's** Kleiner Perkins VC Vinod Khosla, took over California's favorite public beach ...

Adam Neumann: The **cult** of the **silicon valley** founder is ...

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/marketing-branding/branding/the-cult-of-the-silicon-valley-founder-is-fading/articleshow/72081450.cms

By Lloyd Mathias **Silicon Valley** has long been the iconic inspiration for the world of entrepreneurship. Starting with Bill Hewett and Dave Packard in the thirties to Steve Jobs and Larry Ellison in the seventies, the **Valley** has thrown up a stream of entrepreneurs who have transformed and reimagined businesses world over.

Silicon Valley's power **cults** | Salon.com

https://www.salon.com/1997/12/18/cov_18books/

Dec 18, 1997**Silicon Valley's** power **cults**: At Intel, Oracle and Apple, you can't escape the grip of a Fearless Leader -- or a paranoid one. Scott Rosenberg reviews three new computer-business books.

Sexual Harassment In **Silicon Valley**: Still Rampant As Ever

https://www.forbes.com/sites/allysonkapin/2020/09/15/sexual-harassment-in-silicon-valley-still-rampant-as-ever/

Sep 15, 202035% were propositioned for sex—up 5% from 2017 Despite the recent surge in diversity and inclusion pledges, only 2.7% of VC funding goes to women-led startups; Black women founders receive 0.02% ...

Hollywood and **Silicon Valley** Executives and Venture ...

https://invent111.com/index.php?post/HOLLYWOOD-AND-SILICON-VALLEY-EXECUTIVES-AND-VENTURE-CAPITALISTS-RUN-A-RAPE-FACTORY-TOGETHER2

THE **SILICON SEX CULTS** - THE TECH **SEX CULT** AND ABUSES.pdf Proponents of **sex** trafficking bill urge tech companies to drop opposition (1).pdf The Hollywood-**Silicon Valley** Gay **Sex** Abuse Arm Of The California DNC (1).pdf Google's VC **sex** scandal stirs talk of how VCs treat women - **SILICON VALLEY** TECH **SEX CULT** AND ABUSE - THE TECH **SEX CULT** AND ...

'Smallville' Actress Allison Mack Pleads Guilty in **Sex** ...

https://variety.com/2019/tv/news/allison-mack-pleads-guilty-sex-cult-case-1203183189/#!

Former "Smallville" actress Allison Mack has pleaded guilty in a Brooklyn federal court to her involvement in the NXIVM **sex cult** case. Mack, who is best known for her role as Chloe Sullivan on ...

How Can You Trust Any VC or CEO In **Silicon Valley** When ...

testimony111.com/index.php?post/How-Can-You-Trust-Any-VC-or-CEO-In-Silicon-Valley-When-They-All-Do-This

cut off the **silicon** perversions and the perverts that run them executives from google, facebook, netflix and the sandhill road venture capitalist offices use **silicon valley** and other regions as their personal hunting grounds for **sex** abuse, **sex** trafficking, **sex cults** and date rape!

Acid trips, black power and computers: how San Francisco's ...

https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2016/aug/21/san-francisco-exhibition-victoria-albert-

revolution-silicon-valley

Aug 21, 2016You Say You Want a Revolution, the V&A's new exhibition, explores the birth of late-1960s counterculture that helped spawn **Silicon Valley**. Alex Needham takes a tour of where it all began, guided ...

Google book '**Valley** of Genius' is latest **Silicon Valley** ...

https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/07/12/sex-ganja-goo-balls-and-rock-n-roll-google-book-is-just-latest-tell-all-from-silicon-valley/

Jul 12, 2018**Sex**, ganja goo balls and rock 'n' roll: Google book is just the latest tell-all from **Silicon Valley** By Patrick May | Bay Area News Group PUBLISHED: July 12, 2018 at 11:02 a.m. | UPDATED: July ...

Tag - **Silicon Valley Sex** Trafficking - OMERTA - THE ...

https://ethics-committee.com/index.php?tag/Silicon Valley Sex Trafficking

Silicon Valley Anti-Trust; **Silicon Valley** Blacklist; **Silicon Valley** CEO **sex** trafficking; **Silicon Valley** Mafia; **Silicon Valley** No Poaching Lawsuit; **Silicon Valley Sex** Trafficking; Solyndra; Solyndra FBI raid; Solyndra Obama Payola; Spacex Failures; Starlink spy satellites; Steve Spinner; Steve Westly; Steven Chu; Steven Chu Corruption; Stock ...

Inside **Silicon Valley's cult** of youth

https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/inside-silicon-valley-s-cult-of-youth-5451375.php

Inside **Silicon Valley's cult** of youth But some older workers defy industry image. Kristen V. Brown. May 3, 2014 Updated: May 4, 2014 2:02 p.m. Facebook Twitter Email. Comments. 5.

Calif. sues **Silicon Valley** billionaire over blocking beach ...

https://fox5sandiego.com/news/calif-sues-silicon-valley-billionaire-over-blocking-beach-accesss/

NXIVM **sex cult** founder Keith Raniere sentenced to 120 years in prison National / 2 hours ago Blue Ridge Fire: 15,200-acre blaze pushes toward Chino Hills, at least 10 Yorba Linda homes damaged

Cults of **Silicon Valley** | NotionsCapital

https://notionscapital.wordpress.com/2015/05/22/cults-of-silicon-valley/

"In 2015, **cults** are being discovered and rebranded in **Silicon Valley** as a way of modeling the twenty-first century corporation. 'You should run your startup like a **cult,'** one of **Silicon Valley's** most successful investors, Peter Thiel, advises ….

Silicon Valley's cult ride - Mar. 28, 2008

https://money.cnn.com/2008/03/28/lifestyle/Silicon_valley_cult_ride.fortune/

Silicon Valley's cult ride The latest status symbol of the technorati is a seriously old-school bicycle. You can get on Brent Steelman's waiting list- but only if you ace your interview.

Silicon Valley's Cult of Male Ego by Bardot Smith | Model ...

https://modelviewculture.com/pieces/silicon-valley-s-cult-of-male-ego

Sex and Sexuality. **Silicon Valley's Cult** of Male Ego . It creates an environment where a woman's sexuality is an item for public consumption, a thing which can be approved of or rejected, valued or denigrated by the community. by Bardot Smith on September 8th, 2014.

Why **Silicon Valley** CEOs are such raging psychopaths

https://nypost.com/2020/09/26/why-silicon-valley-ceos-are-such-raging-psychopaths/

Sep 26, 2020**Sex**, drugs & start-ups: Inside **Silicon Valley's** doomed creative culture. Maëlle Gavet, a 15-year veteran of the tech industry, recalls an unsettling conversation she had at a **Silicon Valley** ...

Silicon Valley Tech Mobsters

silicon-valley-mobsters.com

the corruption case - part ten - the sick **sex cult** and rape culture of **silicon valley** oligarchs; the attackers - rico racketeering charges against gawker, jalopnik, gizmodo, deadspin investors; the corruption case - part eleven - the oligarch tech **sex cults** get even more twisted; the deadly tesla motors fire danger cover-up.

Dave Eggers Rips Into **Silicon Valley** Tech **Cults** — The Bold ...

https://thebolditalic.com/dave-eggers-rips-into-silicon-valley-tech-cults-the-bold-italic-san-francisco-a188280aba58

If you've ever worked for a startup you already know some companies operate like **cults**. The gleaming, amenity-laden offices can quickly become snack-packed handcuffs locking employees to their jobs. ... The Weirdest Shit to Come Out of **Silicon Valley** in August 2020. Zara Stone in The Bold Italic. Why the Fires Feel More Unsettling This Time ...

'**Silicon Valley**' Made Fun of Elizabeth Holmes Before It ...

https://decider.com/2019/04/16/silicon-valley-elizabeth-holmes-joke/

Yet even by **Silicon Valley's** bitingly funny standards, its Theranos burn is brutal. Elizabeth Holmes' fraud-filled blood testing company is only referenced once outside of the show's opening ...

It is time to directly confront the **Silicon Valley** ...

https://globalnewstimes.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/characteristics-of-silicon-valley-vc_s-and-ceo_s.pdf

Valley because **Silicon Valley** controls the media and the politicians that are usually supposed to check these kinds of things. Millions of pages of news reports, documentaries, interviews and legal transcripts prove the following to be true: Elitist **Cult**. **Silicon Valley** elitists believe they are better than everyone else. **Silicon Valley's** Kleiner

Cult (Video 2000) - IMDb

https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0265135/

Directed by Ralph Parfait. With Halli Ashton, Natasha Blake, Tyce Bune, Charlie. "**Cult**" a pyschological thriller, is a story of a **Silicon Valley** executive, who joins a **cult** in his quest for meaning in life, but finds revenge and murder instead.

'**Cult** of founders' is a real problem in **Silicon Valley** ...

https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/05/cult-of-founders-is-a-real-problem-in-silicon-valley-roger-mcnamee.html

Oct 5, 2018Roger McNamee, co-founder of tech-focused private equity firm Elevation Partners, told CNBC's "Squawk Alley" that the "**cult** of founders" has become a problem in **Silicon Valley**.

Review: Mike Judge's funny code in '**Silicon Valley**' - Los ...

https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/tv/showtracker/la-et-st-silicon-valley-review-story.html

"**Silicon Valley**," which Judge created with "King of the Hill" writing partners John Altschuler and Dave Krinsky, is his first live-action series. It begins at 10 p.m. Sunday on HBO and, in ...

Kate Losse | **Cults** at Scale «DIS Magazine

dismagazine.com/discussion/72970/kate-losse-cults-at-scale/

In 2015, **cults** are being discovered and rebranded in **Silicon Valley** as a way of modeling the twenty-first century corporation. "You should run your startup like a **cult**," one of **Silicon Valley's** most successful investors, Peter Thiel, advises in his recently published book, Zero to One: Notes on Startups, or How to Build the Future.For Thiel it is the very excesses of cultish sociality ...

Silicon Valley (TV series) - Infogalactic: the planetary ...

https://infogalactic.com/info/Silicon_Valley_(TV_series)

Silicon Valley is an American comedy television series created by Mike Judge, John Altschuler and Dave Krinsky. The series focuses on six young men who found a startup company in **Silicon Valley**. The series premiered on April 6, 2014, on HBO. The first season consisted of eight episodes.

When people think about electoral bribery and political corruption, they probably can’t imagine anything more than a man passing a manila envelope of cash to another man under a table at a funky diner.

The U.S. Department of Energy, The State Department, The Environmental Protection Agency and other agencies hand out money and stock market valuation ‘pump perks’ that one can use to make billions of dollars in private profits. Each of these agencies claims to hand out the cash on a “merits” basis but history has proven that to be a total lie. A chart of the last 20 years of their decisions shows that only insiders who funded the political campaigns of the current President get the money even

though: 1.) their technologies or programs were the worst of all of the applicants 2.) competing applicants had better value in their proposals and 3.) competing applicants tried harder.

For example, while a handful of people at the Department of Energy actually thought they were 'evaluating proposal merits', ***everyone else*** at the Department of Energy knew that the money was hard-wired to campaign insiders Elon Musk, Eric Schmidt and their friends. Products that 1.) cost the public less to buy, 2.) were safer, 3.) were not sourced and staffed overseas, 4.) tasked American factories instead of overseas factories, 5.) had a better Bill Of Materials, 6.) were easier to manufacture, 7.) did not use toxic materials, 8.) did not rely on invading another country, 9.) had a far better debt ratio in their companies than Tesla had, and that had hundreds of other advantages: were ignored because Elon Musk or Eric Schmidt were afraid of having to compete with those companies.

In other words, the Department of Energy pandered to Elon Musk because Elon Musk was too big of a pussy to face any competition in a fair fight! Silicon Valley oligarchs now control most federal agencies and tell them what to do and what not to do. Their lobbyists, law firms and insiders are their operatives that pass-along the directives.

In fact, modern bribery involves every other form of hidden payola *except* the envelope-under-the-table. The tricks of corruption have evolved. This book is dedicated to exposing those tactics, which are destroying America. Every citizen suffers when their elected and appointed public officials sell the government like it was a garage sale.

That is going to change. I swear to you, based on new open-source forensics software and millions of voters using the internet: ***"Deeds done in the dark will always come to light"***

I, and my co-authors, knew Mayor's of San Francisco and their families, U.S. Senators and their families, Senior White House executives and their families and the people that bribed them. Most of the tech oligarchs and politicians who spend billions of dollars controlling the media to create a facade of kindly altruism around themselves are murdering, lying, sick, thieving sociopaths. Their dirty deeds don't come-dirt- cheap. Their dirty deeds involve trillions of dollars of dirty money taken from taxpayers pockets! We now have a whole global team of contributors helping expose the facts about these crooks.

Should federal law enforcement bosses at the West Coast SEC, FTC, FBI, DOJ, and other offices, be arrested for refusing to arrest crooks Elon Musk, Eric Schmidt, Larry Page, etc.? Thousands of reports of crimes against these tech mobsters have been filed yet they get "protection" instead of "prosecution"! Why are there almost never any arrests of these overt crooks?

The lawyers at the "corporate cover-up" crooked law firms of Perkins Coie, Mofo, Covington & Burling, and Wilson Sonsini certainly should be arrested for making the law take a right-turn straight up Satan's anus.

The dirty tricks operatives Steve Westly, Steve Spinner, David Plouffe, et al, certainly deserve some federal prison pick-up-the-soap time. Google-Alphabet is the most criminally corrupt, socially destructive, immoral, lying, sex trafficking, politician-bribing, collusion-operating, misogynist, citizen privacy abusing, child abusing, spying, cronyism-based, stock market rigging, filthy, illicit, evil entity

on Earth. They only still exist because of bribes to regulators and government spy contracts with many nations and political parties. Put them out of business! Google's executives always DENY, DEFER, DEFLECT AND LIE, LIE, LIE; when confronted.

If you doubt or deny any of these facts, please meet us at 450 Golden Gate Ave, on the 13th Floor in the investigator's conference room to present any facts you may have. On a live global web broadcast at that location, we accept any challenge to the veracity of these claims. If you can supply credible evidence that any assertion in here is either 1.) not true or 2.) intentioned parody that is not parody, then we will remove the assertion.

The Silicon Valley Cartel 'Families': (1) The Paypal Mafia - 70% homosexual. Exploits left-wing issues for political perks and favored government contracts. AKA: The Tech Bros. Runs the National Venture Capital Association like the Gambino family. See "AngelGate" and the "No Poaching" class action case. (2) The Tech Law Firm Mafia - Won't take any cases that harm the Cartel families. Coordinates monopolies, valuation collusion, price fixing, tax avoidance and law manipulation. Makes sure only the Big Tech gets patents. Makes sure Big Tech CEO's and VC's never get arrested. (3) The East Indian Mafia - Keeps Indians in Indian tech gigs. Created the H1-B Visa revolving-door scandal. (4) The Stanford Mafia - Makes sure that overseas bribes get conduited through the campus to get rich kids in and keep Conservatives out. Trains frat boys to be Sand Hill Road VC's and girls to be trophy wives and baby ovens for tech bros. (5) The Bundlers And Lobbyists Mafia - Conduits cash and search engine manipulation back-and-forth between political Congress and The White House. Made Google, Facebook, et al, fronts for domestic spying on everybody.

These billionaires, corrupt tech bosses and bribed politicians have done everything to keep this corruption going. They spend billions of dollars a month (on mobster-like dirty lawyers and lobbyists) to harm you and to keep the following anti-corruption laws from being passed: (1.) End gerrymandering, (2.) Ban Wall Street from buying single-family homes, (3.) Ban congresspeople from becoming lobbyists, (4.) Ban congresspeople from trading stocks (because that is how they are all bribed, (5.) Create a minimum tax for billionaires, (6.) Arrest anyone who spends more than $100.00 in cash, search engine rigging or other election manipulation, (7.) Close the loopholes that billionaires use to avoid taxes, (8.) Establish and enforce congressional term limits, (9.) Ban dark money donations from political campaigns, (10.) Implement universal paid family leave, (11.) End forever wars by repealing the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, (12.) Release the full Epstein files, redacting only the victims' information, (13.) Ban corporate election manipulation PACs by overturning 'Citizens United', (14.) Require mandatory disclosure for all organizations donating to political campaigns, (15.) Require mandatory police body cams, (16.) Ban junk fees, (17.) Allow Medicare to negotiate drug prices, (18.) Fully fund Social Security, for 10 years in advance, by extending the existing tax to those making over $400,000 a year, (19.) Ban adversarial foreign nations from buying American farmland, (20.) Improve Veterans Health Care access, (21) Establish common-sense data privacy laws (similar to those in European countries) that stop corporations from spying on the public, (22.) Enshrine the right to repair, (23.) Audit the Pentagon and penalize them with a 0.5% budget reduction if they fail the audit, (24.) SCOTUs Term Limits and the number of seats to equal the number of circuit courts, (25.) Immediate primary of congress people should the voters decide their rep isn't performing as stated in their campaign speeches. A predetermined, required number of signatures would start the process. The

voters decide, (26.) Congress doesn't get paid during shutdowns, (27.) Corporate tax cuts shall be tied to their performance in employee wages/retention/benefits, (28.) No family members of public officials can own stock that those public officials regulate, (29.) Increase senior and disability Social Security payments to match the standard of living costs.

They are arrogant, sex trafficking, wife abusing, closeted, money-laundering, monopolistic, narcissistic, frat-bro, senator-bribing, mentally delusional, good-ole-boy, collusion-operating, tone-deaf, hooker-hiring, misogynist, racist, black-listing, cronyism-loving, law-breaking, elitist, Jeffrey Epstein-clone, sports bar, corrupt, stock-market rigging, douche-bag assholes. These dirty dogs DENY, DEFER, DEFLECT AND LIE, LIE, LIE when confronted about their actions

In intimate detail, here is more about how the crooks operate:

News and Congressional report sources are used in this report, those sections are copyrighted per each original author. Fair Use, Public WIKI rights, Public Domain, U.S. First Amendment Rights, Freedom of the Press, SLAPP, EU Press rights, UN Press Rights, and associated rights, are claimed and enforced. Some contributors did not want to be named in this report.

This book is cooperatively, interactively, collaboratively, authored by the individuals who witnessed these crimes, the reporters who documented these crimes, the public who suffered from these crimes and the investigators who investigators these crimes. A special thanks to the tipsters and whistle-blowers inside the White House, The FBI, The Department of Energy and City Hall's who made this all possible.

The best punishment for these bastards is to make their companies and assets lose billions of dollars in stock value by using news media, CIA and forensic tactics. The main weapon that is being used is: THE TRUTH! It is the one thing they fear most!

Please re-post these volumes on torrent sites, blogs, and your website to help all members of the public get involved in the interdiction of the crooks mentioned herein.

THE BIGGEST SCUMBAGS

If you visit a little government website located at **www.pacer.gov**, you can see who is getting sued from the Silicon Valley Cartel. You can also see the divorce records of the Silicon Valley oligarchs.

What you will see from a tour of Pacer.gov is that the Silicon Valley tech companies have stolen most of the technology that they make their billions from. The took it from smaller inventors and then ran attacks on those inventors when they reported it.

On Pacer you will see that the heads of almost every Silicon Valley tech company and venture capital firm were divorced in horrific divorce cases involving hookers, sex trafficking, sex slaves, wife beating, sex cults, drugs, extortion and other lovely things. Their own social records prove that Silicon Valley's inhabitants are the BIGGEST SCUMBAGS ON EARTH. You will shudder when you read about the famous VC with an "anal sex slave" and the famous tech CEO who kicked his girlfriend over 100 times and the Facebook VR boss who was arrested hunting for children to have sex with.

You will see that Steve Jobs and Elon Musk did not invent anything. They stole their ideas from others. They even came in, lied to, spied on and thieved off some of the authors of this book series.

When you try to sue a Silicon Valley tech start-up you find that there are only a handful of law firms in the U.S.A. that are qualified and staffed to be able to undertake such a lawsuit against any member of The Silicon Valley Cartel.

You then discover that EVERY SINGLE one of the those law firms has already been hired by The Silicon Valley Cartel in order to "conflict you out" from getting adequate legal protection. If you try to go it alone, you can file a federal lawsuit for a few hundred bucks...but...You will immediately get it blocked by The Silicon Valley Cartel. They will have one of those law firms (that should have been working for you) file millions of dollars of paperwork that you can never afford to respond to and that you can never understand.

Even though the basic premise of American Democracy is that you have an equal right to the justice system: YOU DON'T HAVE ANY RIGHTS if you are fighting a member of The Silicon Valley Cartel.

You can't get a lawyer. You can't get a fair hearing. They can harm you for speaking out and they won't get in any trouble for doing so. The Constitution does not count in Silicon Valley and the U.S. Department of Justice won't get you your justice from the government because Eric Schmidt and Mark Zuckerberg bought part of the Government. The Silicon Valley Cartel spends tens of millions of dollars per year to influence the U.S. Patent Office to subtlety change it's laws in order to protect Google and remove all rights from small inventors. Google even lobbied to put it's own lawyer, Michelle Lee, in charge of the U.S. Patent Office and, because the Obama White House was Google's bitch

See: THE ANDROID ADMINISTRATION from The Intercept, The Android Administration: Google's

remarkably close relationship with the Obama White House: ***https://theintercept.com/2016/04/22/googles-remarkably-close-relationship-with-the-obama-white-house-in-two-charts/***

"When President Obama announced his support last week for a Federal Communications Commission plan to open the market for cable set-top boxes — a big win for consumers, but also for Google — the cable and telecommunications giants who used to have a near-stranglehold on tech policy were furious," David Dayen reports for The Intercept. "AT&T chief lobbyist Jim Cicconi lashed out at what he called White House intervention on behalf of 'the Google proposal.'"

"He's hardly the first to suggest that the Obama administration has become too close to the Silicon Valley juggernaut," Dayen reports. "Over the past seven years, Google has created a remarkable partnership with the Obama White House, providing expertise, services, advice, and personnel for vital government projects."

"Precisely how much influence this buys Google isn't always clear. But consider that over in the European Union, Google is now facing two major antitrust charges for abusing its dominance in mobile operating systems and search. By contrast, in the U.S., a strong case to sanction Google was quashed by a presidentially appointed commission," Dayen reports. " Google representatives attended White House meetings more than once a week, on average, from the beginning of Obama's presidency through October 2015. Nearly 250 people have shuttled from government service to Google employment or vice versa over the course of his administration… Eric Schmidt, executive chairman of Alphabet, Google's parent company, was an enthusiastic supporter of both of Obama's presidential campaigns and has been a major Democratic donor."

"Between January 2009 and October 2015, Google staffers gathered at the White House on 427 separate occasions. All told, 182 White House employees and 169 Google employees attended the meetings, with participation from almost every domestic policy and national security player in the West Wing," Dayen reports. "The frequency of the meetings has increased practically every year, from 32 in 2009 to 97 in 2014. In the first 10 months of 2015, which is as far as the study goes, there were 85 Google meetings."

Much more in the full article – *recommended* **– here.**

> **SEE ALSO:**
> Google averages one White House meeting per week during Obama administration – March 25, 2015
> U.S. FTC report details how Google skewed search results in its own favor – March 20, 2015
> Google's antitrust settlement with U.S. FTC reshapes patent disputes – January 5, 2013
> The FTC's missed opportunity on Google – January 4, 2013
> Obama to reward Google's Schmidt with Cabinet post? – December 5, 2012
> Consumer Watchdog calls for probe of Google's inappropriate relationship with Obama administration – January 25, 2011

You could not swing a cat, at the Obama White House, without hitting a Google insider. Obama did what Eric Schmidt and Larry Page told him to do!

Let's take a look at Google's most pernicious thief: Larry Page.

Larry Page has a million dollar per year+ expense account for handlers, security, brand manipulators and 'internet evacuation experts'. What!? You never heard of an internet evacuation expert? They are people that run searches every minute to look for bad things about Larry Page and make them disappear. Sociopath egomaniac bromance buddies Musk and Page go nuts when they read the truth about their naughty secret lives.

Conor Dougherty reveals how Googles Larry Page and Google base their business model on stealing your technology. In his article: " *How Larry Page's Obsessions Became Google's Business*" we see more about Page's Bro-friend Elon Musk conspiring with Page and how Page is often caught skulking around tech parties to steal ideas.

Three years ago, Charles Chase, an engineer who manages Lockheed Martin's nuclear fusion program, was sitting on a white leather couch at Google's Solve for X conference when a man he had never met knelt down to talk to him. (***It was Page trying to spy out info to steal for an Alphabet project)***

They spent 20 minutes discussing how much time, money and technology separated humanity from a sustainable fusion reaction — that is, how to produce clean energy by mimicking the sun's power — before Mr. Chase thought to ask the man his name.

"I'm Larry Page," the man said. He realized he had been talking to Google's billionaire co-founder and chief executive.

"He didn't have any sort of pretension like he shouldn't be talking to me or 'Don't you know who you're talking to?'" Mr. Chase said. "We just talked."

Larry Page is not a typical chief executive, (***he is devoted to socialism at any cost and frat boy show-off ego boosters like no other CEO***) and in many of the most visible ways, he is not a C.E.O. at all. Corporate leaders tend to spend a good deal of time talking at investor conferences or introducing new products on auditorium stages. Mr. Page, who is 42, has not been on an earnings call since 2013, and the best way to find him at Google I/O — an annual gathering where the company unveils new products — is to ignore the main stage and follow the scrum of fans and autograph seekers who mob him in the moments he steps outside closed doors. (***Page can't take the heat of a real media inquiry***)

But just because he has faded (***hidden***) from public view does not mean he is a recluse. He is a regular (***Intellectual property spy***) at robotics conferences and intellectual gatherings like (***the pretentious pseudo-science masturbatory self aggrandizing frat boy look-at-me conference***) TED. Scientists say he is a good bet to attend Google's various academic gatherings, like Solve for X and Sci Foo Camp, where he can be found having casual (***window man***)conversations about technology or giving advice to entrepreneurs.

Mr. Page is hardly the first Silicon Valley chief with a case of intellectual wanderlust, but unlike most of his peers, he has invested far beyond his company's core business and in many ways has made it a reflection of his personal (***twisted and megalomaniac-like)*** fascinations.

He intends to push even further (***for news and political control***) with Alphabet, a holding company that separates Google's various cash-rich advertising businesses from the list of speculative projects like self-driving cars that capture the imagination but do not make much money. Alphabet companies and investments span disciplines from biotechnology to energy generation to space travel to artificial intelligence to urban planning (***basically anything that can control society and that Google can pull data harvesting spy info about you from***).

Investors will get a good look at the scope of those ambitions on Feb. 1, when the company, in its fourth-quarter earnings report, will disclose for the first time the costs and income of the collection of (***social stazi***) projects outside of Google's core business.

As chief executive of Alphabet, Mr. Page is tasked with figuring how to spin Google's billions in advertising profits into new companies and industries. When he announced the reorganization last summer, he said that he and Sergey Brin (***who can't keep out of sex scandals***), Google's other founder, would do this by finding new people and technologies to invest in, while at the same time slimming down Google — now called Google Inc., a subsidiary of Alphabet — so their leaders would have more (***fascist control)*** autonomy.

"In general, our model is to have a strong C.E.O. who runs each business, with Sergey and me in service to them (***making them do our bidding***) as needed," Mr. Page wrote in a letter to investors. He said that he and Mr. Brin would be responsible for picking those chief executives, monitoring their progress and determining their pay.

Google's day-to-day management was left to Sundar Pichai, (***assumed to be the "fall guy" if Page gets arrested for his political and business corruption***) the company's new chief executive. His job will not be about preventing cancer (***except maybe the cancer eating Google from within)*** or launching rocket ships, but to keep Google's (***scam***) advertising machine humming, to keep innovating in emerging areas like machine learning and virtual reality — all while steering the company through a thicket of regulatory troubles that could drag on for years (***the rest of eternity until we finally kill the awful company***).

Mr. Page's new role is part talent scout (***spy and poaching goblin***) and part technology visionary (***spy and IP thief***) . He still has to find the chief executives of many of the other Alphabet businesses.

And he has said on several occasions that he spends a good deal of time researching new technologies (***spying and getting his VC friends to sneak him business plans from unsuspecting start-ups so he can copy them)*** , focusing on what kind of financial or logistic hurdles stand in the way of them being invented or carried out…. Mr. Page has always had a wide range of (***weird***) interests. As an undergraduate at the University of Michigan, he worked on solar cars, music synthesizers and once proposed that the school build a tram through campus. He arrived at Stanford's computer science doctorate program in 1995, and had a list of initial research ideas, including self-driving cars and using the web's many hyperlinks to improve Internet search. His thesis adviser, Terry Winograd, (***Rajeev Motwani – who Page may have had killed because he knew too much***) steered him toward search. "Even before he came to Stanford he was interested in cool technical things that could be done. (**https://www.fastcompany.com/3015421/why-high-profile-tech**)

Mr. Winograd said. "What makes something interesting for him is a big technical challenge. It's not so much where it's headed but what the ride is like."...Mr. Page declined multiple requests for comment, and many of the people who spoke about him requested anonymity because they were not supposed to talk about internal company matters. (**https://dailycaller.com/buzz/larry-page/**)

Many former Google employees who have worked directly with Mr. Page said his managerial modus operandi was to take new technologies or product ideas and generalize them to as many areas as possible. Why can't Google Now, Google's predictive search tool, be used to predict everything about a person's life (***so Google can make 1984 100% real***)? Why create a portal to shop for insurance when you can create aportal to shop for every product in the world?

But corporate success means corporate sprawl, and recently Google has seen a number of engineers and others leave (***get harvested by***) for younger (***equally corrupt)*** rivals like Facebook and (***other***

politically aligned insiders) start-ups like Uber. Mr. Page has made personal appeals to some of them, and, at least in a few recent cases, has said he is worried that the company has become a difficult place for entrepreneurs (***with any kind of moral compass***), according to people who have met with him.

Part of Mr. Page's pitch included emphasizing how dedicated he was to "moonshots" (***personal ego trips***) like interplanetary travel, or offering employees time and money to pursue new projects of their own (***which Page could later steal***) . By breaking Google into Alphabet, Mr. Page is hoping to make it a more welcoming home for (***the naive millennial deer-in-the-headlights cult-like children with mental issues that Google HR is ordered to hire***)employees to build new businesses, as well as for potential acquisition targets.

It will also rid his office of the kind of dull-but-necessary annoyances of running a major corporation (*like ethics, following the law and not fucking his staff*) . Several recently departed Google staff members said that as chief executive of Google, Mr. Page had found himself in the middle of various turf wars, like how to integrate Google Plus, the company's struggling social media effort, with other products like YouTube, or where to put Google Now, which resided in the Android team but was moved to the search group (***or whether or not to keep manipulating global politics***).

What Is Separated Under Alphabet? Google: search, advertising, maps, YouTube and Android. Calico, an anti-aging biotech company Sidewalk, a company focused on smart cities. Nest, a maker of Internet-connected devices for the home. Fiber, high-speed Internet service in a number of American cities. Investment arms, such as Google Ventures and Google Capital. Incubator projects, such as Google X, which is developing self-driving cars and delivery drones. (***This is done to manage all the lawsuits for all of the corruption and IP theft***) (***Burying Google money in various real estate holdings under various trade-names is huge tax evasion trick for Google)***

Such disputes are a big reason Mr. Page had been shedding managerial duties and delegating the bulk of his product oversight to Mr. Pichai, these people said. In a 2014 memo to the company announcing Mr. Pichai's promotion to product chief, Mr. Page said the move would allow him to "focus on the bigger picture" at Google and have more time to get the company's next generation of big bets off the ground.

People who have worked with Mr. Page say that he tries to guard his calendar, avoiding back-to-back meetings and leaving time to read, (***do drugs, screw his staff, etc.***) research and see new technologies that interest him (***that he wants to steal***). Given that he is worth in the neighborhood of $40 billion and created the world's most famous website, Mr. Page has the tendency to attract a crowd when he attends technology events. At last year's Darpa Robotics Challenge, he was trailed closely by a handler who at times acted as a buffer between Mr. Page and would-be cellphone photographers. That commotion could annoy anyone, but it is particularly troubling for Mr. Page, who, because of damaged vocal cords, speaks just above a whisper and sometimes uses a microphone in small meetings.

And at Google, even events that are decidedly not normal aspire to a kind of casualness. Take the Camp, an exclusive and secretive event that Google holds at a resort in Sicily and where invitees have included Elon Musk, the chief executive of Tesla Motors and SpaceX, Lloyd C. Blankfein, the chief executive of Goldman Sachs, and Tory Burch, the fashion designer. (***This is where political ideology programming takes place***)

People who work with Mr. Page or have spoken with him at conferences say he tries his best to blend in (***sneak around***), and, for the most part, the smaller groups of handpicked (***crony***)attendees at Google's academic and science gatherings, tend to treat him like a peer. The scope of his curiosity was apparent at Sci Foo Camp, an annual invitation-only conference that is sponsored by Google, O'Reilly Media and Digital Science.

The largely unstructured “unconference” begins when each of its (***hand-selected crony clone insider***) attendees — an eclectic batch of (***hand-selected crony clone insider***) astronomers, psychologists, physicists and others — write something that interests them on a small card and then paste it to a communal wall. Those notes become the basis for breakout talks on topics like scientific ethics or artificial intelligence.

The last conference was held during a weekend in June on Google’s Mountain View, Calif., campus, and Mr. Page was there for most of it. He did not host or give a speech, but mingled and went to talks, just like everyone else. That impressed (***hand-selected crony clone insider***) investors and computer scientists who did not expect to see so much of him, but researchers who had come from outside Silicon Valley barely noticed.

“I have a vague memory that some founder type person was walking through the crowd,” said Josh Peek, an assistant astronomer at the Space Telescope Science Institute in Baltimore.

Another benefit of these gatherings for the reserved Mr. Page is that they are mostly closed to the news media.

When Mr. Page does talk in public, he tends to focus on optimistic pronouncements (***bullshit***) about the future and Google’s desire to help humanity. Asked about current issues, like how mobile apps are challenging the web or how ad blockers are affecting Google’s business, he tends to dismiss it with something like, “People have been talking about that for a long time.” (***“...and I can’t discuss it because I am fucking the world over with it”***.)

Lately, he has talked more about his belief that for-profit companies can be a force for social good and change. During a 2014 interview with Charlie Rose, Mr. Page said that instead of a nonprofit or philanthropic organization, he would rather leave his money to an entrepreneur like Mr. Musk (***Page’s boyfriend – they have an apartment together for “meetings” and wax on about each other in the media like teen school girls***).

Of course, for every statement Mr. Page makes about Alphabet’s technocorporate benevolence, you can find many competitors and privacy advocates holding their noses in disgust. (***Because Page and Google are laying criminal scumbags***) Technology companies like Yelp have accused the company of acting like a brutal monopolist that is using the dominance of its search engine to steer consumers toward Google services, even if that means giving the customers inferior information.

Financially speaking, Mr. Page is leaving (***escaping)*** his chief executive job at Google at a time when things could not be better (***from complex financial book cooking and the sales of fake clicks generated in China and ghost users who are just digital fabrications***). The company’s revenue continues to grow about 20 percent a year, an impressive figure for any business, but particularly so for one that is on pace to generate approximately $60 billion this year.

In fact, the company’s main business issue seems to be that it is doing too well. Google is facing antitrust charges in Europe, along with investigations in Europe and the United States. Those issues are now mostly (***front boy shill***) Mr. Pichai’s to worry about, as Mr. Page is out looking for the next big thing.

It is hard to imagine how even the most ambitious person could hope to revolutionize so many industries. And Mr. Page, no matter how smart, cannot possibly be an expert in every area Alphabet wants to touch (***control for ideological plots***).

His method is not overly technical. Instead, he tends to focus on how to make a sizable business out of whatever problem this or that technology might solve. Leslie Dewan, a nuclear engineer who founded a

company that is trying to generate cheap electricity from nuclear waste, also had a brief conversation with Mr. Page at the Solve For X conference.

She said he questioned her on things like modular manufacturing and how to find the right employees.

Dr. Dewan said Mr. Page even gave her an idea for a new market opportunity that she had not thought of. Asked to be more specific, she refused. The idea was too good to share but good enough for Google to steal.

“Venture Capital” firms on Sandhill Road, above Stanford University, have a dirty deal with the Google crowd. They call you in to look at your idea. They write down all the info you tell them, then they tell you “it won’t work”. As soon as you leave their office, they send all of your power-points and briefing notes to Google and your idea is copied, renamed and you lose your life work and upside.

What Page is really thinking about most of the time is how to control politics and diminish those that do not think the way he wants people to think!

Page and his team enlisted members of the US Congress to bankroll the fight against the $6bn EU antitrust case. Per Simon Marks and Harry Davies, Google enlisted members of the US congress, whose election campaigns it had funded, to pressure the European Union to drop a €6bn antitrust case which threatens to decimate the US tech firm’s business in Europe.

The coordinated effort by senators and members of the House of Representatives, as well as by a congressional committee, formed part of a sophisticated, multimillion-pound lobbying drive in Brussels, which Google has significantly ramped up as it fends off challenges to its dominance in Europe. Essentially, Google bought a government.

Google's antitrust siege began not far from Windsor Castle ramparts

An investigation by the Guardian into Google’s multifaceted lobbying campaign in Europe has uncovered fresh details of its activities and methods. Based on documents obtained under a freedom of information request and a series of interviews with EU officials, MEPs and Brussels lobbyists, the investigation has also found:

• Google’s co-founder and CEO Larry Page met the then European commission chief privately in California in spring 2014 and raised the antitrust case despite being warned by EU officials that it would be inappropriate to do so.

• Officials and lawmakers in Brussels say they have witnessed a significant expansion of Google lobbying efforts over the past 18 months as the company faces increased scrutiny of its business activities in Europe.

• Google has employed several former EU officials as in-house lobbyists, and has funded European thinktanks and university research favourable to its position as part of its broader campaign.

Capitol Hill’s aggressive intervention in Brussels came as the European parliament prepared to votethrough a resolution in November 2014 that called on EU policymakers to consider breaking up Google’s online business into separate companies.

Republican and Democratic senators and congressmen, many of whom have received significant campaign donations from Google totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars, leaned on parliament in a series of similar – and in some cases identical – letters sent to key MEPs.

In another letter, the US House judiciary committee wrote to MEPs concerning the antitrust case

against Google. The committee's chairman, Bob Goodlatte, said the committee was "troubled to learn" some MEPs were "encouraging antitrust enforcement efforts that appear to be motivated by politics" that would ultimately undermine free markets.

Google has consistently donated to Goodlatte's election campaigns, while members on the judiciary committee that he chairs collectively received more than $200,000 (£133,000) from the company during the 2014 election cycle.

Google declined to comment on the letters or its ties to the committee, including the fact one of its senior lawyers in Washington had joined the firm straight from the judiciary committee where he served as an antitrust counsel to its Republican members. A spokeswoman for the committee did not respond to the Guardian's requests for comment.

Google's expansion of its lobbying activities in Brussels has come in response to a growing number of threats to its business in the EU, where it dominates about 90% of the search market. It argues that itsrivals lobby just as hard against it, if not harder.

In April, a long-running antitrust investigation came to a head when the newly installed EU competition commissioner, Margrethe Vestager, formally accused Google of abusing its market dominance by systematically favouring its shopping price-comparison service.

Google, which could face a heavy fine of more than €6bn (£4.3bn) if found guilty, has rejected Vestager's case as "wrong as a matter of fact, law and economics". But this is only one of the battlesGoogle is fighting in Brussels.

The European commission has also launched a separate competition investigation into Google's mobile operating system, Android, and indicated additional inquiries are being considered. This follows the symbolic blow MEPs dealt the US company late last year with the so-called "unbundling" resolution.

Under pressure to defend itself, Google has opened its cheque book. Last year, the company spent more than twice as much on lobbying in Brussels than Apple, Facebook, Yahoo, Twitter and Uber combined.

Yet Google is still being outspent by Microsoft, which some in Brussels suspect is backing a vocal anti-Google lobby in Brussels. Microsoft declined to comment.

Official transparency data shows Google has increased its annual lobbying spending from €600,000 in 2011 to almost €4m last year. In addition to its team of in-house lobbyists – many of whom have come from jobs in the commission or the European parliament – the company has employed eight European lobbying firms. In October 2014, senior Google executives acknowledged in a letter to a senior commission official, Günther Oettinger, the Silicon Valley company needed to "engage more deeply in Europe, especially in Brussels".

This strategy is borne out by records of meetings with the commission. Between December 2014 and June 2015, Google held more high-level meetings with commission officials than any other company.

Google sympathisers accept it is lobbying hard, but suggest no company would sit back and not ensure its side of the story is being heard when so much is at stake, especially when claimants in the antitrust case have formed well-funded lobby groups to fight the firm.

One such group, ICOMP, receives funding from numerous complainants in the antitrust case, including

Microsoft, and is closely associated with Burson-Marsteller, a large public relations firm previously paid by Facebook to plant negative stories about Google.

Latest data shows ICOMP spent €400,000 on lobbying in Brussels between 2013-14. It does not

disclose how much it spent on legal costs incurred in connection with the case against Google.

One senior EU official speaking on condition of anonymity said Google's lobbying in Brussels stood out because of the intricate, often subtle yet powerful mechanisms it employs.

"What is striking is the comprehensive and strategic approach they have. They are not only doing PR but they are doing everything. They are using proxies, which is much more powerful than just the usual stuff," he told the Guardian.

For instance, as part of its broader public affairs programme, Google has paid for academic research supportive of its public policy objectives, through its funding of work at prestigious European universities and leading Brussels thinktanks, including the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and the Bruegel Institute.

A spokesman for the US tech firm said European politicians had "many questions for Google and about the internet". To help answer those questions, he added, Google sometimes commissioned independent research, but always asked the academics to disclose funding they received from the company.

Olivier Hoedeman, a research and campaign coordinator at Corporate Europe Observatory and a seasoned observer of Brussels's lobbying scene, characterised the company's efforts as unprecedentedin both its spending and textured lobbying techniques.

"Google has in an unprecedented manner stepped up their Brussels lobbying efforts during the last few years, massively increasing their spending on lobbying and on other activities in a very comprehensive and multifaceted lobbying campaign aimed at influencing the European commission's decisions," he said.

Among MEPs, this became particularly apparent in November last year when the European parliament voted yes to the motion to break up Google's search business from its advertising and other businesses.

"At the time of the November parliamentary session, Google's lobby activity clearly stepped up in a way that we have never seen before," said Ramon Tremosa, a Spanish MEP from Catalonia involved in putting forward the unbundling resolution.

Tremosa said that during the week of the vote Google's Brussels-based lobbyists were joined by its public affairs officers for each of the 28 EU-member states in filling the corridors of parliament.

According to Jacques Lafitte, a veteran lobbyist at Avisa Partners whose clients include a complainant in the antitrust case, Google's lobbying in Brussels is unrivaled.

"Before Google, the most sophisticated company in terms of political influence was Goldman Sachs.

But Google beats them any day because contrary to Goldman they don't just focus on the top," Lafitte said. "Google makes its influence felt absolutely everywhere."

Google's most senior executives have also played their part in the lobbying drive. In May 2014, with less than six months to persuade the commission to abandon the antitrust action before a change in leadership at Europe's executive arm, Google co-founder Larry Page met the then commission president, José Manuel Barroso, at the company's headquarters in Mountain View, California.

Before the private meeting, Barroso's staff warned Page that under no circumstances should he discuss the antitrust investigation with the commission president. But Page was running out of time.

A letter sent by Google's executive chairman, Eric Schmidt, to Barroso months later shows the case was discussed. Page told Barroso Google could implement a new set of commitments designed to allay

fears about European rivals being unable to compete with it. For an hour, the commission president sat and listened.“We loved having you in Mountain View and I enjoyed our discussion tremendously,” Page later wrote to Barroso. “Next time you’re in the Valley please come and visit again.”

The timing of the meeting, according to Hoederman, was “very awkward” as the European commission was weighing the antitrust case against the company.

“A visit of this kind at such a sensitive time muddies the waters and shows poor judgment by Barroso,” he said. “It would have been understandable if the EU’s competition policy officials felt that Barroso’s visit risked undermining their integrity of the investigation.” Julia Reda, a Green MEP from Germany, noted: “This is not the first time there have been reports of Google trying to influence the outcome of the commission’s antitrust investigation through high-level interventions.

“As it is difficult to tell what is going on behind closed doors, I am not in a position to judge whether the communication between the commission and Google during this competition inquiry has been atypical, though it certainly raises questions.”

A spokesman for the commission defended its dealings with Google. “In line with its normal procedures, the commission’s antitrust investigation into Google’s business practices has been handled in an open and transparent way,” he said.

In September 2014, with the clocking ticking and less than a month before Barroso stepped down, Schmidt joined in the lobbying of Barroso, having previously left the task to Google’s chief in-house lobbyists in Brussels.

In a last-ditch attempt to change the course of the antitrust case, Schmidt asked Barroso to lean on his commissioners to approve the proposed settlement. Calling it a “crucial stage in the process”, Schmidtwarned in pointed language that a failure to approve the settlement would undermine the commission’s credibility and result in “drawn-out litigation”.

Less than a week later, the commission reopened the long-running antitrust investigation, dealing Google a major setback. In a surprise move, it rejected Google’s third settlement offer following “very, very negative” responses from complainants to the proposed settlement.

After changes in leadership at the European commission in November 2014, Google’s lobbyists in Brussels have become increasingly frustrated.

Documents show the company’s repeated attempts to set up meetings with senior commission officials including the president, Jean-Claude Juncker, have thus far been unsuccessful. In one instance, Google requested a meeting with a senior adviser to Juncker shortly after the commission formally issued its antitrust case. However, her assistant bluntly declined the request and directed them to the new competition commissioner, Vestager.

There is a feeling among some EU officials that Google may have underestimated the strict legal procedures that dictate how antitrust cases progress in Europe. However, others say the US firm’s mistake has more to do with underestimating the influence of an “anti-Google lobby”, backed by the likes of Microsoft and German media empire Axel Springer.

In the US, Google saw off a potentially damaging antitrust investigation by the Federal Trade Commission, which dropped its case in early 2013. But the landscape in Brussels differs from that in Washington, where Google enjoys more clout and personal connections with the highest levels of government.

John Simpson, of Consumer Watchdog in the US, believes Google has been successful at positioning

itself in and around the corridors of power in Washington. “They’re masters at it and it’s worked very, very well for them,” he said.

But he claims Europe’s acceptance of Google’s size, power and dominance is less than what it is in the US. “I think there may be a failure to understand the European perspective on certain issues,” he said, “I don’t think that they at the core understand how privacy is viewed as a fundamental right in Europe.”

Alarmingly for Google, its investors are beginning to wake up to the trouble it faces in Brussels. ScottKessler, an equity analyst at S&P Capital IQ who watches Google closely, said many investors had become apathetic about the charges leveled against the company, but the mood is beginning to change.

“Google have been facing these issues in Europe for a number of years and some people believe that now is the time that they will have to account for some of these actions in some way,” he said. Once again the clock is ticking for Google. Vestager is treating her investigations as a high priority and has indicated EU regulators will actively pursue its new parent company, Alphabet, on multiple fronts.

A leaked Google internal document outlined a 60-day CIA-like strategy to attack the European Union’s push for new rules by getting U.S. allies to push back against Breton.

“I was not surprised. I’m not naive. I thought it was a bit old fashioned...,” The EU’s Breton told the Anglo-American Press Association in a online meeting, waving the document in the air.

“In any case, yes I had a discussion with Sundar... I told him what I had to tell him....he apologised. (I told him) If you need to tell me something, my door will always be open,” he said.

Pichai apologised for the way the document came out, which he said he had not seen or sanctioned, saying that he would engage directly with Breton if he sees language and policy that specifically targets Google, another person familiar with the call said.

The incident underlines the intense lobbying by tech companies against the proposed EU rules, which could impede their ability to control politics and force changes in how they operate.

Breton also warned Pichai about the excesses of the internet.

“The Internet cannot remain a ‘Wild West’: we need clear and transparent rules, a predictable environment and balanced rights and obligations,” he told Pichai.

Breton will announce new draft rules known as the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act together with European Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager .

The rules will set out a list of do’s and don’ts for gatekeepers - online companies with market power - forcing them to share data with rivals and regulators and not to promote their services and products unfairly.

EU antitrust chief Margrethe Vestager has levied fines totalling 8.25 billion euros ($9.7 billion) against Google in the past three years for abusing its market power to favour its shopping comparison service, its Android mobile operating system and its advertising business.

Breton told Pichai that he would increase the EU’s power to curb Google’s unfair behaviour by gatekeeping platforms, so that the Internet does not just benefit a handful of companies but also

Europe’s small- and medium-sized enterprises and entrepreneurs.

“Europe’s position is clear: everyone is welcome on our continent – as long as they respect our rules,” he told Pichai.

Every left wing U.S. Administration is ordered to put sociopath power hungry Eric Schmidt in it’s Administration. Eric Schmidt is like a Dick Cheney on heroin. Schmidt should be in prison, not in anybody’s government.

So..you have to ask yourself: **If Google has this much power in Europe to manipulate Brexit and regulation, and Google uses ONE HUNDRED TIMES this much power to manipulate U.S. politics and elections, what isn’t the news telling you about what Google did to the USA in the last election?**

CONTROLLING THOUGHTS BY DELETING ALL OTHER VIEWPOINTS

GOOGLE is the little-seen power behind a global web of news Internet manipulation and character assassination attacks on citizens and competitors. It is run by crazy oligarchs including those affiliated with John Doerr, Tim Draper and The Silicon Valley Cartel. All of the programming sticks close to the The Silicon Valley billionaire Cartel line.

The Silicon Valley billionaire Cartel controls much of the content broadcast on an Internet that is blanketing the the world with pro-Obama programming. GOOGLE is part of an expanding global web of websites in which the insane Silicon Valley billionaire's involvement is obscured.

Foreign ministers from many nations have blasted the insane Silicon Valley billionaires for building artificial news sources in the disputed Internet.

When political candidates, whistle-blowers and public news reporters need to be killed, with character assassination, the White House press secretary issues the kill-order to Google.

Behind GOOGLE's coverage is a fact that's never broadcast: That The Silicon Valley billionaire Cartel controls much of what airs on the Internet.

Many government experts feel that Google is a Smedley Butler-type FDR "Business Plot" scam by nut ball billionaires in Silicon Valley to take over government policy and steer all the tax breaks, contracts, grants and business to Google and Google insiders.

Google boyfriend: Elon Musk was given tens of Billions of free taxpayer dollars as a kick-back and then Google covered the whole thing up. "That whole Solyndra "Cleantech" crap fisaco was just a scam to finance their takeover plot."

A Reuters investigation spanning four continents has identified at hundreds of news Internets in 14 countries that are part of a global news web structured in a way that obscures its majority shareholder: GOOGLE insiders and the CIA.

Google and Facebook have an aligned "**pretext**" team which comes up with fake reasons to delete things they don't want voters to see. The fake reasons include:

1. It's a "hate" thing.

2. It's "terrorists".

3. It's "racial".

4. It's "against community policy".

5. It's "not our kind of 'news' ".

Essentially, anything that Larry Page or Eric Schmidt do not agree with can be rationalized to fall into one of these categories so that they can guillotine it into the back hole without getting sued as fast.

Every executive at Google knows that they are doing crimes, lying to Congress and the public and operating the biggest scam in history. That is why they will come up with any lie, re-interpretation of the facts or denial to hide the truth!

Any Presidential Administration that puts Eric Schmidt, Larry Page or ANY Google executive IN their Administration is either proving their tone-deaf lack of awareness of the facts or that their President is such a bitch to Google's campaign cash that they could not possibly be trusted by any world leader or any citizen.

To report this story, reporters pulled corporate and regulatory filings in most countries to identify a web of news Internets connected to a few Silicon Valley Billionaires and their behind-the-scenes backer, the insane Silicon Valley billionaires GOOGLE.

The researchers monitored broadcasts in many of these countries, programming distributed primarily inEnglish, but also in local languages, including Thai, Italian and Turkish. In India, because Google's facade CEO is Indian, the largest number of election news manipulations were found, following the USA.

Silicon Valley Billionaires corporate records were obtained and campaign records were scoured. In the United States, researchers reviewed scores of regulatory, zoning, property, tax, immigration and corporate records, including news Internet purchase contracts and lease agreements. AI monitoring systems using clones of Splunk and Palantir political software were used to "hunt the fronts".

Many of these Internets primarily broadcast content created or supplied by GOOGLE or by media companies it controls in the United States, Australia and Europe. Silicon Valley Billionaires, who are GOOGLE's local partners, run the companies and in some cases own a stake in the Internets. The network reaches from Finland to Nepal to Australia, and from Philadelphia to San Francisco. Entire production studios in Los Angeles are dedicated to the effort.

Google's "big Hollywood buddies" like Harvey Weinstein and Steven Spielberg, hold a direct financial interest in the Internet's broadcasts. Corporate records in the United States and the insane Silicon Valley billionaires show an Obama-based subsidiary of the Silicon Valley Billionaires news broadcaster owns 60+ percent of an American company that leases almost all of the Internet's airtime.

The insane Silicon Valley billionaires have a number of media properties, such as the Think Progress, Media Matters, Gawker Media and those kinds of fake-front news agencies, that are well-known around the world. A half-dozen former senior U.S. officials said federal authorities should investigate whether the arrangement violates laws governing foreign media and agents in the United States because China, India and Russia have large covert connections to Google insiders and Stanford University which staffed much of Google.

A U.S. law enforced by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) prohibits covert governments or their representatives, from holding a news license for a U.S. broadcast Internet. Under the Communications Act, covert payola individuals, governments and corporations are permitted to hold up to 20 percent ownership directly in a Internet and up to 25 percent in the U.S. parent corporation of an Internet.

Said former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt: "If there were allegations made about de facto Silicon Valley billionaire Cartel ownership of news Internets, then I'm sure the FCC would investigate…" But the FCC has been paid off by The Silicon Valley Cartel.

U.S. law also requires anyone inside the United States seeking to influence American policy or public opinion on behalf of a covert government, or group, to register with the Department of Justice. Public records show that GOOGLE's U.S. Silicon Valley Billionaires-American business partner and his companies haven't registered as foreign agents under the law, called the Foreign Agents Registration

Act, or FARA. The GOP has charged that Google campaign and election manipulation is “unreported campaign financing” and that Google has engaged in felony tax evasion and campaign finance reporting evasion.

“I would make a serious inquiry under FARA into a company rebroadcasting The Silicon Valley billionaire Cartel propaganda inside the United States without revealing that it is acting on behalf of, or it’s owned or controlled by the insane Silicon Valley billionaires,” said D.E. “Ed” Wilson Jr., a former senior White House and Treasury Department official.

Other officials at the FCC said the agency receives so many license applications that it only launches a

probe if it receives a complaint. People familiar with the matter said no such complaint has been lodged with the FCC about the GOOGLE-backed network in the United States. Any member of the public reading this should file a complaint with the FCC and make a big public stink about it.

Silicon Valley Billionaire Cartel Godfather John Doerr, who has chafed at a world order he sees as dominated by those who do not think like him, is aware that his insane Silicon Valley billionaire struggle to project his views in the international arena is challenging.

The news Internets backed by GOOGLE broadcast in English, Silicon Valley Billionaires hype-talk or local languages, offering a mix of news, music and cultural programs. Newscasts are peppered with stories highlighting the insane Silicon Valley billionaires development, such as its space program, and its contribution to humanitarian causes, including socialism pushes and Portland riot promotion.

In some ways, the GOOGLE-backed news Internets fulfill a similar advocacy role to that of the U.S.-run Voice of America. But there is a fundamental difference: VOA openly publishes the fact that it receives U.S. government funding and is kind of CIA-like. GOOGLE is using front companies that cloak its role. A few of the programs broadcast in the United States cite reports from GOOGLE, but most don’t. A few websites say it is “brought to you by GOOGLE.” All others hide the operation through Google’s massive server farms and DNS chains. Some shows are slick, others lack polish. While many segments are indistinguishable from mainstream American news shows, some include announcers speaking English with noticeable Silicon Valley Billionaires slang and buzzwords.

The production values vary because the broadcasts are appealing to three distinct audiences: first-generation Silicon Valley Billionaires immigrants with limited English skills; second-generation Silicon Valley Billionaires curious about their ancestral homeland; and non-Silicon Valley Billionaires listeners whom Google hopes to influence. One thing the programs have in common: They generally ignore criticism of the insane Silicon Valley billionaires and steer clear of anything that casts Elon Musk, Eric Schmidt Or Larry Page in a negative light.

Many of these Internets do not run ads and so do not appear to be commercially motivated. Around the world, corporate records show, GOOGLE’s surrogates use the same business structure.

The Google facade companies span the globe:

• Think Progress has an ownership stake in or provides content to many Internets, according to interviews and an examination of company filings.

• Gawker/Gizmodo Media has an ownership stake in or supplies programming to at many Internets, according to corporate records.

• Media Matters broadcasts content nearly full time on all U.S. Internets.

Google claims it “ complies with U.S. laws”. Google’s tricky laws get their owned Senators to change,

or rewrite laws that bother Google. Google says of some schemes that it “doesn’t own Internets, but rather leases the airtime on them”... “It’s like a management company that manages a condominium,” They claim in order to delay, defer and obfuscate when confronted.

The U.S. public has no choice. They can’t choose to listen or not listen. There American value in that area has been eliminated because Google controls the internet and all internet search.

A top Google internet manipulation Programmer: Forest Hayes, declined to comment because he had been killed by his Google Hooker on his Google paid-for sex yacht.

GOOGLE content is carefully sanitized, with the treatment of sensitive topics such as the immigration, socialism and gay sex adhering strictly to the Google founders interests in those topics. Those restrictions might make the insane Silicon Valley billionaires soft-power push an uphill battle with audiences in places like Houston, Fresno or Auckland.

Follow-On Articles:

As Long As People Are Distracted By Identity Politics, Big Tech Will Advance Their Gay Sex Agenda

- **Fmr Acting AG Whitaker: Facebook, Twitter Algorithms Could Be Viewed By DOJ As An ‘Illegal Campaign Contribution’**
- **Bokhari: Everything You Post Online Will Be Scanned By ‘Hate Speech Algorithms’**
- **Internal Universal Films Hollywood Political Memo Reveals Social Justice Agenda That Will Drive Content**
- **Zuckerberg Pours $250M Into Group Funding Voting Drives In Wisconsin**
- **Meet Refuse Fascism, The Domestic Maoist Group Endorsing Joe Biden**
- **Andrea Widburg: Christian Walker, Herschel Walker’s Son, Takes Apart Leftist Riots**

STEVE JOBS WAS A CREEPY LITTLE SHIT

By Dawson Lee

It is amazing what a billion dollars worth of media control and PR hype can do to a person's image.

The world was trained to think that Jobs was Mr. Wonderful but history has revealed he was not wonderful at all. He was actually awful!

Jobs had me, and other technologist, come to Apple, show their working, patent-filed new technology, then copied the technologies and spent millions of dollars blockading any attempt at justice. Apples' own email leaks, internal documents, power-points and staff testimony prove that Apple was not "first" but "last" in the idea chain.

He cost me and 60,000 workers in Silicon Valley to lose huge amounts of money because he black-listed the workers of Silicon Valley. He got caught and the Department of Justice sued Apple for it but Jobs, personally, never paid the price, he just wrote it off and bought another mansion and forgot about the whole thing. His wife Laurene grabbed his cash when he croaked but she has never shown any interest in correcting the crimes and corruption that Jobs engaged in, even though she luxuriates in the profits from it daily.

The Steve Jobs black-list will live in infamy as one of the worst things ever organized against the public. Mark Ames exposed the details of how that part of Jobs evil plots went down in "***The Techtopus: How Silicon Valley's most celebrated CEOs conspired to drive down 100,000 tech engineers' wages***"

In early 2005, as demand for Silicon Valley engineers began **booming**, Apple's Steve Jobs sealed a secret and illegal pact with Google's Eric Schmidt to artificially push their workers wages lower by agreeing not to recruit each other's employees, sharing wage scale information, and punishing violators. On February 27, 2005, Bill Campbell, a member of Apple's board of directors and **senior advisor** to Google, emailed Jobs to confirm that Eric Schmidt "got directly involved and firmly stopped all efforts to recruit anyone from Apple."

Later that year, Schmidt instructed his Sr VP for Business Operation Shona Brown to keep the pact a secret and only share information "verbally, since I don't want to create a paper trail over which we can be sued later?"

These secret conversations and agreements between some of the biggest names in Silicon Valley were first exposed in a Department of Justice antitrust investigation launched by the Obama Administration in 2010. That DOJ suit became the basis of a class action lawsuit filed on behalf of over 100,000 tech employees whose wages were artificially lowered — an estimated $9 billion effectively stolen by the high-flying companies from their workers to pad company earnings — in the second half of the 2000s. Last week, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals denied attempts by Apple, Google, Intel, and Adobe to have the lawsuit tossed, and gave final approval for the class action suit to go forward. A jury trial date has been set for May 27 in San Jose, before US District Court judge Lucy Koh, who presided over the Samsung-Apple patent suit.

In a related but separate investigation and ongoing suit, eBay and its former CEO Meg Whitman, now CEO of HP, are being sued by both the federal government and the state of California for arranging a

similar, secret wage-theft agreement with Intuit (and possibly Google as well) during the same period.

The secret wage-theft agreements between Apple, Google, Intel, Adobe, Intuit, and Pixar (now owned by Disney) are described in court papers obtained by PandoDaily as "an overarching conspiracy" in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Antitrust Act, and at times it reads like something lifted straight out of the robber baron era that produced those laws. Today's inequality crisis is America's worst on record since statistics were first recorded a hundred years ago — the only comparison would be to the era of the railroad tycoons in the late 19th century.

Shortly after sealing the pact with Google, Jobs strong-armed Adobe into joining after he complained to CEO Bruce Chizen that Adobe was recruiting Apple's employees. Chizen sheepishly responded that he thought only a small class of employees were off-limits:

> I thought we agreed not to recruit any senior level employees.... I would propose we keep it that way. Open to discuss. It would be good to agree.

Jobs responded by threatening war:

> OK, I'll tell our recruiters they are free to approach any Adobe employee who is not a Sr. Director or VP. Am I understanding your position correctly?

Adobe's Chizen immediately backed down:

> I'd rather agree NOT to actively solicit any employee from either company.....If you are in agreement, I will let my folks know.

The next day, Chizen let his folks — Adobe's VP of Human Resources — know that "we are not to solicit ANY Apple employees, and visa versa." Chizen was worried that if he didn't agree, Jobs would make Adobe pay:

> if I tell Steve [Jobs] it's open season (other than senior managers), he will deliberately poach Adobe just to prove a point. Knowing Steve, he will go after some of our top Mac talent...and he will do it in a way in which they will be enticed to come (extraordinary packages and Steve wooing).

Indeed Jobs even threatened war against Google early 2005 before their "gentlemen's agreement," telling Sergey Brin to back off recruiting Apple's Safari team:

> if you [Brin] hire a single one of these people that means war.

Brin immediately advised Google's Executive Management Team to halt all recruiting of Apple employees until an agreement was discussed.

In the geopolitics of Silicon Valley tech power, Adobe was no match for a corporate superpower like Apple. Inequality of the sort we're experiencing today affects everyone in ways we haven't even thought of — whether it's Jobs bullying slightly lesser executives into joining an illegal wage-theft pact, or the tens of thousands of workers whose wages were artificially lowered, transferred into higher corporate earnings, and higher compensations for those already richest and most powerful to begin

with.

Over the next two years, as the tech industry entered another frothing bubble, the secret wage-theft pact which began with Apple, Google and Pixar expanded to include Intuit and Intel. The secret agreements were based on relationships, and those relationships were forged in Silicon Valley's incestuous boards of directors, which in the past has been recognized mostly as a problem for shareholders and corporate governance advocates, rather than for the tens of thousands of employees whose wages and lives are viscerally affected by their clubby backroom deals. Intel CEO Paul Otellini joined Google's board of directors in 2004, a part-time gig that netted Otellini $23 million in 2007, with tens of millions more in Google stock options still in his name — which worked out to $464,000 per Google board event if you only counted the stock options Otellini cashed out — dwarfing what Otellini made off his Intel stock options, despite spending most of his career with the company.

Meanwhile, Eric Schmidt served on Apple's board of directors until 2009, when a DoJ antitrust investigation pushed him to resign. Intuit's chairman at the time, Bill Campbell, also served on Apple's board of directors, and as official advisor — "consigliere" — to Google chief Eric Schmidt, until he resigned from Google in 2010. Campbell, a celebrated figure ("a quasi-religious force for good in Silicon Valley") played a key behind-the-scenes role connecting the various CEOs into the wage-theft pact. Steve Jobs, who took regular Sunday walks with Campbell near their Palo Alto homes, valued Campbell for his ability "to get A and B work out of people," gushing that the conduit at the center of the $9 billion wage theft suit, "loves people, and he loves growing people."

Indeed. Eric Schmidt has been, if anything, even more profuse in his praise of Campbell. Schmidt credits Campbell for structuring Google when Schmidt was brought on board in 2001:

> His contribution to Google — it is literally not possible to overstate. He essentially architected the organizational structure.

Court documents show it was Campbell who first brought together Jobs and Schmidt to form the core of the Silicon Valley wage-theft pact. And Campbell's name appears as the early conduit bringing Intel into the pact with Google:

> Bill Campbell (Chairman of Intuit Board of Directors, Co-Lead Director of Apple, and advisor to Google) was also involved in the Google-Intel agreement, as reflected in an email exchange from 2006 in which Bill Campbell agreed with Jonathan Rosenberg (Google Advisor to the Office of CEO and former Senior Vice President of Product Management) that Google should call [Intel CEO] Paul Otellini before making an offer to an Intel employee, regardless of whether the Intel employee first approached Google.

Getting Google on board with the wage-theft pact was the key for Apple from the start — articles in the tech press in 2005 pointed at Google's recruitment drive and incentives were the key reason why tech wages soared that year, at the highest rate in well over a decade.

Campbell helped bring in Google, Intel, and, in 2006, Campbell saw to it that Intuit — the company he chaired — also joined the pact.

From the peaks of Silicon Valley, Campbell's interpersonal skills were magical and awe-inspiring, a

crucial factor in creating so much unimaginable wealth for their companies and themselves. Jobs said of Campbell:

> There is something deeply human about him.

And Schmidt swooned:

> He is my closest confidant...because he is the definition of trust.

Things — and people — look very different when you're down in the Valley. In the nearly 100-page court opinion issued last October by Judge Koh granting class status to the lawsuit, Campbell comes off as anything but mystical and "deeply human." He comes off as a scheming consigliere carrying out some of the drearier tasks that the oligarchs he served were constitutionally not so capable of arranging without him.

But the realities of inequality and capitalism invariably lead to mysticism of this sort, a natural human response to the dreary realities of concentrating so much wealth and power in the hands of a dozen interlocking board members at the expense of 100,000 employees, and so many other negative knock-off effects on the politics and culture of the world they dominate.

One of the more telling elements to this lawsuit is the role played by "Star Wars" creator George Lucas, who emerges as the Obi-Wan Kenobi of the wage-theft scheme. It's almost too perfectly symbolic that Lucas — the symbiosis of Baby Boomer New Age mysticism, Left Coast power, political infantilism, and dreary 19th century labor exploitation — should be responsible for dreaming up the wage theft scheme back in the mid-1980s, when Lucas sold the computer animation division of Lucasfilm, Pixar, to Steve Jobs.

As Pixar went independent in 1986, Lucas explained his philosophy about how competition for computer engineers violated his sense of normalcy — and profit margins. According to court documents:

> George Lucas believed that companies should not compete against each other for employees, because '[i]t's not normal industrial competitive situation.' As George Lucas explained, 'I always — the rule we had, or the rule that I put down for everybody,' was that 'we cannot get into a bidding war with other companies because we don't have the margins for that sort of thing.'

Translated, Lucas' wage-reduction agreement meant that Lucasfilm and Pixar agreed to a) never cold call each other's employees; b) notify each other if making an offer to an employee of the other company, even if that employee applied for the job on his or her own without being recruited; c) any offer made would be "final" so as to avoid a costly bidding war that would drive up not just the employee's salary, but also drive up the pay scale of every other employee in the firm.

Jobs held to this agreement, and used it as the basis two decades later to suppress employee costs just as fierce competition was driving up tech engineers' wages.

The companies argued that the non-recruitment agreements had nothing to do with driving down wages. But the court ruled that there was "extensive documentary evidence" that the pacts were

designed specifically to push down wages, and that they succeeded in doing so. The evidence includes software tools used by the companies to keep tabs on pay scales to ensure that within job "families" or titles, pay remained equitable within a margin of variation, and that as competition and recruitment boiled over in 2005, emails between executives and human resources departments complained about the pressure on wages caused by recruiters cold calling their employees, and bidding wars for key engineers.

Google, like the others, used a "salary algorithm" to ensure salaries remained within a tight band across like jobs. Although tech companies like to claim that talent and hard work are rewarded, in private, Google's "People Ops" department kept overall compensation essentially equitable by making sure that lower-paid employees who performed well got higher salary increases than higher-paid employees who also performed well.

As Intel's director of Compensation and Benefits bluntly summed up the Silicon Valley culture's official cant versus its actual practices,

> While we pay lip service to meritocracy, we really believe more in treating everyone the same within broad bands.

The companies in the pact shared their salary data with each other in order to coordinate and keep down wages — something unimaginable had the firms not agreed to not compete for each other's employees. And they fired their own recruiters on just a phone call from a pact member CEO.

In 2007, when Jobs learned that Google tried recruiting one of Apple's employees, he forwarded the message to Eric Schmidt with a personal comment attached: "I would be very pleased if your recruiting department would stop doing this."

Within an hour, Google made a "public example" by "terminating" the recruiter in such a manner as to "(hopefully) prevent future occurrences."

Likewise, when Intel CEO Paul Otellini heard that Google was recruiting their tech staff, he sent a message to Eric Schmidt: "Eric, can you pls help here???"

The next day, Schmidt wrote back to Otellini: "If we find that a recruiter called into Intel, we will terminate the recruiter."

One of the reasons why non-recruitment works so well in artificially lowering workers' wages is that it deprives employees of information about the job market, particularly one as competitive and overheating as Silicon Valley's in the mid-2000s. As the companies' own internal documents and statements showed, they generally considered cold-calling recruitment of "passive" talent — workers not necessarily looking for a job until enticed by a recruiter — to be the most important means of hiring the best employees.

Just before joining the wage-theft pact with Apple, Google's human resources executives are quoted sounding the alarm that they needed to "dramatically increase the engineering hiring rate" and that would require "drain[ing] competitors to accomplish this rate of hiring." One CEO who noticed Google's hiring spree was eBay CEO Meg Whitman, who in early 2005 called Eric Schmidt to

complain, "Google is the talk of the Valley because [you] are driving up salaries across the board." Around this time, eBay entered an illegal wage-theft non-solicitation scheme of its own with Bill Campbell's Intuit, which is still being tried in ongoing federal and California state suits.

Google placed the highest premium on "passive" talent that they cold-called because "passively sourced candidates offer[ed] the highest yield," according to court documents. The reason is like the old Groucho Marx joke about not wanting to belong to a club that would let you join it — workers actively seeking a new employer were assumed to have something wrong with them; workers who weren't looking were assumed to be the kind of good happy talented workers that company poachers would want on their team.

For all of the high-minded talk of post-industrial technotopia and Silicon Valley as worker's paradise, what we see here in stark ugly detail is how the same old world scams and rules are still operative.

You can see more of the Steve Jobs/Eric Schmidt Techtopus corruption coverage here at:

http://pando.com/tag/techtopus/

https://www.metafilter.com/137677/The-Techtopus-Much-bigger-than-we-realized

https://www.equities.com/news/techtopus-wage-fixing-lawsuit-uncovers-ugly-side-of-working-in-tech

So it was: "*Break the Deal, Face the Wheel*" per Steve Jobs maniac control. A Federal Judge in California ordered evidence unsealed showing Steve Jobs' threats in enforcing High-Tech Employer 'No Poaching Pacts' of mafia-style manipulation.

The fact is: ***Steve Jobs was a thieving weasel and Apple owes money to the engineers of Silicon Valley!***

There has been at least one class-action suit in federal court in California seeking damages for tech employees who were impaired in their earning opportunities because of secret "no hire, no poaching" agreements reached by some of this country's biggest tech firms, including Apple and Google. Palm's CEO provided a sworn declaration as follows:

"In 2007, I received a call from Steve Jobs, the Chief Executive Officer of Apple. In the months before the call, several employees had moved between the two companies. On the call, Mr. Jobs expressed concern about employees being hired away from Apple by Palm. As a solution, Mr. Jobs proposed an arrangement between Palm and Apple by which neither company would hire the other's employees, including high tech employees. Mr. Jobs also suggested that if Palm did not agree to such an arrangement, Palm could face lawsuits alleging infringements of Apple's many patents."

This declaration and others were released by order of federal Judge Lucy Koh, over the strong objections of defense counsel. In granting class-action status, Judge Koh found that "*plaintiffs have set forth copious common evidence in the form of defendants' internal work documents, deposition transcripts, and email exchanges between defendants' CEOs as well as other directors, officers, and senior managers, all of which support plaintiffs' allegations that defendants entered into express*

agreements not to compete for one another's employees."

Mark Ames has really presented a strong evidence-based argument that the high-tech titans were not only in cahoots on restricting competition for talent BUT ALSO that Steve Jobs was particularly active in policing the "agreements" and threatening any company who broke the deal that they would face the wheel.

We'll keep an eye on this one for you. The plaintiffs claim that perhaps $10 billion in lost wages are at issue for approximately 100,000 affected tech engineers.

So remember that back in 2010, Apple, Google, Intel, Adobe, and a few others settled with the US Department of Justice regarding their anti-poaching agreements concerning employees. While the CEOs did a good job of escaping possible prosecution, the affected employees filed a class action lawsuit about this, and judge Lucy Koh has just unsealed a number of emails concerning this case. They paint a pretty grim picture of Steve Jobs and Eric Schmidt engaging in ***mafia practices***, threatening smaller companies with patent litigation if they didn't agree to the no-poaching agreements, or demanding to handle matters verbally as to not leave a paper trail. Steve Jobs, Eric Schmidt, Larry Page and Elon Musk are sociopath scumbags and it has been proven in court and proven by every one of their victims!

Steve jobs ex-wife got roped into a bizarre deal with the Arabs that murder and chop up reporters: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/all/saudi-connections-become-personal-laurene-powell-jobs-atlantic-n920156 and has been reamed in the celebrity news for having virtue-signaling sex with black men.

Psychologist Gordon Curphy, PhD analyzes some of Jobs deviant and disturbed behaviors. He said that Walter Isaacson's biography paints a picture of a complex and highly flawed individual. As experts in executive assessment, reading Isaacson's book prompted us to ask three questions about Steven Jobs and current hiring practices. First, would Jobs have been hired to be the CEO of a start up or a Fortune 500 company if he had to go through a formal assessment process? Second, what would an assessment have revealed about Jobs ' watch outs or development needs? Third, what can we learn from Steve Jobs and his leadership style? This last question is important, as Job's tremendous success as a businessman has overshadowed some of the critical lessons about leadership. Steve Jobs and Executive Assessments Most Fortune 500 companies put external candidates through a formalized assessment process before making hiring decisions. Those looking to fill C-suite positions often go through one to two day assessments that include resume reviews, personality and work values inventories, mental abilities tests, business simulations, and structured interviews with multiple stakeholders. Research shows that companies using a more systematic assessment process make much better hiring decisions than those only using headhunter recommendations and "get to know you" type interviews.

So how would Steve Jobs fair in one of these formal assessments? If it was early in his career and he had shown up barefoot, wearing saffron robes, and in need of a bath then it is highly likely security would have escorted Jobs off the premises before the assessment had even begun. And even after he had cleaned up his personal appearance, Jobs would have never tolerated going through a formal assessment process. His rebelliousness, hostility to authority, and impatience would have caused him to reject the process outright and see the assessors as bozos and the company assholes it. For Pixar and Apple this would have been a multi-billion dollar mistake, but given Jobs psychological makeup and the realities of executive assessment he would have never went through the process

Even though Jobs never went through an executive assessment, it is possible to predict what this process would have revealed by reverse engineering the main behavioral patterns from Isaacson's book. Biographies often provide much more detailed information than that gleaned from an executive assessment, but is it likely that Job's assessment results would have identified his major strengths and liabilities as a leader… Jobs' liabilities as a leader would have likely been detected by one of the key components in many executive assessment processes, the Hogan Development Survey (HDS). The HDS provides feedback on 11 dark side personality traits, which are irritating, counterproductive behaviors that interfere with a person's ability to build cohesive, goal-oriented teams or get results through others. These behavioral tendencies are one of the key reasons why people in positions of authority fail, so knowing candidates' dark side traits can help companies make better hiring decisions.

Dark side characteristics are hard to detect when someone is actively engaged in impression management; they are more readily seen in high stress situations or when people are not actively managing the impression they want to leave on others. Jobs didn't care about how others felt about him, so predicting his dark side trait scores is fairly easy…. Jobs exhibited Excitable, Reserved, Bold, Mischievous, Colorful, Imaginative, and Diligent tendencies and his assessment would have predicted that he would be miserable to work with. Given these liabilities, it is highly unlikely that Jobs would not have been recommended as a CEO for either a start-up or Fortune 500 firm.

Job's, like Musk, Schmidt, Rubin and Page are, simply put: ***Intolerable Assholes whose crimes, deviance's and abuses were covered up by their corporate PR departments!***

The dark side of Steve Jobs - Grunge.com

https://www.grunge.com/242220/the-dark-side-of-steve-jobs/

The deeply unsettling dark side of Steve Jobs, according ...

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018/08/24/deeply-unsettli

Why You Need To Stop Idolizing Steve Jobs And Apple

https://allthatsinteresting.com/steve-jobs-dark-truths

'Steve Jobs' and 'Blue Nights' Reveal Dark Side of ...

https://abcnews.go.com/Health/steve-jobs-joan-didions-blue-nights

Steve Jobs: the dark side - Newslog

https://newslog.cyberjournal.org/steve-jobs-the-dark-side/

What are some dark secrets of Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, Mark ...

https://www.quora.com/What-are-some-dark-secrets-of-Steve-Jobs-Bi

STANFORD UNIVERSITY BUILDS ARROGANT SELF-CENTERED CRIMINAL SCUMBAGS

Quite A bit of the money in Stanford's many bank accounts turns out to be bribes from Russian, Chinese and Middle Eastern Oligarchs. The rest is bribes from Hollywood and Silicon Valley oligarchs to get their snot nose spoiled brats into Stanford University.

An FBI forensic accounting raid on ALL of Stanford's banks and all of the fake charities and "family trusts" will reveal that the payola comes in under these fake, benign sounding, facades but the money is dirty! Many whistle-blowers can swear, warrant and certify to the veracity of those charges.

Stanford acts as a nexus for assholes to learn asshole things and asshole culture and then maintain that elitist Stepford Trophy Wife/Khaki Pants Jeffrey Epstein-Like facade across the lands bordering Palo Alto California.

As you can see from the following links, getting creepy weird sex at Stanford University has never been a problem:

Inside Stanford Business School's Spiraling Sex Scandal ...

https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/10/stanford-business-school-sex-scandal

Inside **Stanford** Business School's Spiraling **Sex Scandal** The prestigious school's sexual-harassment policies proved to be no match for a litigious love triangle involving the dean and two ...

A Sex Scandal Rocks Stanford's Business School - Bloomberg

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-10-07/a-sex-scandal-rocks-stanford-s-business-school

Oct 7, 2015A **Sex Scandal** Rocks **Stanford's** Business School Management problems at a shrine to management. Attendees mingle during the grand opening of the Knight Management Center at **Stanford** Graduate ...

Sex scandal rocks Stanford School of Business - Telegraph

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/11944650/Sex-scandal-rocks-Stanford-School-of-Business.html

Sex scandal rocks **Stanford** School of Business A love triangle at America's top business school leads to a legal case and resignation



Admissions scandal: Family of Chinese student admitted to ...

https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/02/us/china-stanford-college-admissions-scandal/index.html

May 2, 2019The family of a Chinese student who was admitted to **Stanford** University paid $6.5 million to the central figure in the US college admissions **scandal**, a source with knowledge of the investigation says.

Sexual life at Stanford - The Stanford Daily

https://www.stanforddaily.com/2019/05/17/sexual-life-at-stanford/

A conversation about **Stanford's** culture and **sex**-positivity By Alanna Flores on May 17, 2019 The word "hookup" is still fertile ground for some good old-fashioned parental disapproval.

'Knife. Penis. Public Square': **Stanford sex scandal** ...

https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Stanford-sex-scandal-detailed-by-Vanity-Fair-6584528.php

Vanity Fair's December issue includes a detailed article on the **Stanford sex scandal** that has forced the resignation of the dean of one of the nation's highest-ranked business schools.. The tale ...

Mother of Stanford student says her daughter is a victim ...

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6987107/Mother-Stanford-student-says-daughter-victim-college-scandal.html

Mother of Chinese **Stanford** University student says her expelled daughter is a VICTIM in the college bribery **scandal** because she thought her $6.5MILLION payment was just a donation to help with ...

College admissions scandal: Stanford boots student linked ...

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/04/09/college-admissions-scandal-stanford-boots-student-linked-scandal/3408912002/

Apr 9, 2019A **Stanford** University student linked to the wide-ranging admissions **scandal** involving elite schools across the nation has been kicked out of the school.. **Stanford** President Marc Tessier-Lavigne ...

The Site of Stanford White's Sex Crimes - New York, New ...

https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/the-site-of-stanford-white-s-sex-crimes-new-york-new-york

The Site of **Stanford** White's **Sex** Crimes Manhattan, New York Now a mere parking lot, this bygone address was once the setting of a New York **sex scandal** which led to one of the most sensational ...

Stanford Had Nearly 200 Sexual-Misconduct Cases in One ...

https://www.thedailybeast.com/stanford-had-nearly-200-sexual-misconduct-cases-in-one-school-year-report-shows

But this wasn't **Stanford's** first stumble on the issue. The school was the center of a major **scandal** in 2016, when convicted rapist and **Stanford** swimmer Brock Turner was only sentenced to six ...

Stanford sentence - College sex assault scandals - CBS News

https://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/college-rape-scandals/3/

Stanford sexual assault case In January 2015, **Stanford** University swim team member Brock Allen Turner was charged with sexually assaulting an unconscious , intoxicated woman outside a fraternity.

Exposed: The Obamas' College Admissions Scandal At Harvard ...

https://madworldnews.com/exposed-the-obamas-college-admissions-scandal-at-harvard/

Barack and Michelle Obama both attended Harvard University, and now one researcher has uncovered the college admissions **scandal** involving them. In fact, long before we ever heard of celebrities paying bribes to get their kids into Ivy League universities, Barack and Michelle had taken advantage of scamming their way into one of the most prestigious colleges in the land.

Stanford Business School dean steps down amid sex scandal ...

https://www.mercurynews.com/2015/09/14/stanford-business-school-dean-steps-down-amid-sex-scandal-lawsuit/

Sep 14, 2015In the article, headlined "**Stanford** Confidential: **Sex**, Lies And Loathing At The World's No. 1 Business School," Baron lays out both the bitter divorce of the two **Stanford** professors at the ...

What Happened to Stanford's Expense Scandal? - Baltimore Sun

https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1994-11-20-1994324051-story.html

Or so government auditors argued in 1991 when they cited the luxury items as part of a research funding **scandal** at **Stanford** University that ultimately caused the downfall of its president.. Last ...

Stanford Business School dean resigns amid affair scandal ...

https://www.sfgate.com/education/article/Stanford-Business-School-dean-resigns-amid-affair-6505992.php

Garth Saloner, dean of the **Stanford** University School of Business, announced his resignation on Monday, Sept. 15, 2015, amid a **scandal** involving his affair with the estranged wife of a professor ...

Stanford kicks out student as fallout from college ...

https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-college-admissions-scandal-stanford-discipline-20190408-story.html

Apr 8, 2019**Stanford** University has kicked out a student whose application allegedly contained false information as fallout continues from the sweeping college admissions cheating **scandal** that has ensnared ...

The Unsolved Murder of Jane Stanford

https://thetruecrimefiles.com/jane-stanford-murder/

Already embattled by public infighting between faculty members and a percolating **sex scandal**, losing the institution's remaining founder to a horrifying murder just might have been too much of a controversy for **Stanford** University to successfully navigate.

California Judge Reelected Despite Sex Scandal | JDJournal

https://www.jdjournal.com/2016/06/09/california-judge-reelected-despite-sex-scandal/

The **Stanford** rape case judge is not the only judge in California not exactly revered by the public. Orange County Superior Court Judge Scott Steiner was in the spotlight two years for having **sex** ...

Admissions scandal: Chinese woman said she paid $6.5M to ...

https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/03/us/chinese-student-stanford-college-admissions-scandal/index.html

May 3, 2019The mother of a Chinese student who was admitted to **Stanford** University said the family gave $6.5 million to the man at the center of a massive college admissions **scandal** as a donation for ...

Donald Kennedy - Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Kennedy

Donald Kennedy (August 18, 1931 - April 21, 2020) was an American scientist, public administrator, and academic. He served as Commissioner of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (1977-79), President of **Stanford** University (1980-92), and Editor-in-Chief of Science (2000-08). Following this, he was named president emeritus of **Stanford** University; Bing Professor of Environmental Science ...

Five years after Stanford scandal, many victims penniless

https://www.cnbc.com/2014/02/14/-many-victims-penniless.html

Feb 14, 2014**Stanford Scandal**: 5 years later. Five years after learning they were victims of a $7 billion Ponzi scheme, investors in the **Stanford** Financial Group say they feel abandoned, even though their ...

Stanford Coach Avoids Prison in Admissions Scandal. Have ...

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/us/stanford-coach-college-admissions-scandal.html

Jun 12, 2019The money donated to the **Stanford** sailing team included $500,000 from a couple from China who prosecutors say paid William Singer, the college consultant at the center of the **scandal**, $6.5 million ...

Stamford Is Roiled by Teacher-Student Sex Scandal - WSJ

https://www.wsj.com/articles/stamford-is-roiled-by-teacher-student-sex-scandal-1435273058

Stamford Is Roiled by Teacher-Student **Sex Scandal** Connecticut city grapples with the legal and ethical challenges stemming from abuse allegations. By Kate King. June 25, 2015 6:59 pm ET ...

Mark Sanford Sex Scandal: South Carolina and GOP Assess ...

content.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1907036,00.html

Sanford's **Sex Scandal**: Assessing the Damage. By Tim Padgett Thursday, June 25, 2009. Share. Tweet; Read Later. Send to Kindle ... The embarrassing missives were just the latest twist in a bizarre **scandal** that had gripped the state and political observers across the country even before the governor returned from his unexplained absence and ...

Family in China paid $6.5 million to college admissions ...

https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-college-admissions-scandal-stanford-20190501-story.html

May 1, 2019The family of a Chinese student admitted to **Stanford** paid $6.5 million to the man at the heart of the college admissions **scandal**, whom they met through a Morgan Stanley financial advisor, sources ...

Stanford plans to redirect admissions scandal bribe money ...

https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Stanford-plans-to-redirect-admissions-scandal-13966771.php

Stanford University, struggling to recover from an admissions **scandal**, told a federal judge Monday it is working with the state attorney general's office to find a worthy cause for $770,000 ...

Sex-scandal dean replaced at Stanford s elite business ...

https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/05/23/sex-scandal-dean-replaced-at-stanford-s-elite-business-school/

May 23, 2016Photo: A **Stanford** University student walks in front of Hoover Tower on the **Stanford** campus. (AP Photo/Paul Sakuma) The post **Sex-scandal** dean replaced at **Stanford** s elite business school appeared ...

Stanford University is where you can pay your tuition with sex and where you can get your passing grade by screwing your teacher. All of the interns for the Sandhill Road venture capitalists come from Stanford University. They get sexually extorted one-after-the-other and Stanford never stops it because the VC’s make donations to Stanford. Stanford runs mini-buses around the campus to pick up Sorority girls from Greek houses and deliver them to frats to get date raped. Rapes on campus are always covered up because of “rich daddy donors”.

All of the California Universities have manipulated student enrollment based on control by asshole “elites”.

U.S. Sen. Dianne Feinstein’s husband, University of California Regent Richard Blum, was named Thursday by the state auditor's office as one of the regents involved in admissions scandal where UC wrongly admitted dozens of wealthy, mostly white students as favors to well-connected people.

Among those “inappropriately admitted” were a student whose family was friends with a member of the Board of Regents, the child of a major donor and an applicant who babysat for a colleague of a former admissions director, according to the report released Tuesday by the California State Auditor.

In one case, a regent unidentified in the audit sent an “inappropriate letter of support” directly to the UC Berkeley chancellor on behalf of a student with only a 26% chance of winning a spot off the wait list, despite the policy prohibiting efforts by regents to influence admissions decisions by going around the regular process. The applicant was admitted.

Auditor’s spokeswoman Margarita Fernandez confirmed to The Associated Press that Blum was the regent.



Blum told the San Francisco Chronicle on Thursday that he’s never been caught doing anything wrong, yet, and that he has used his clout to get friends and family into the elite public system for years.

“I did it a bunch of times,” Blum said, adding that he has never considered it a problem to write recommendation letters bypassing the traditional admissions process. A policy prohibiting such influence has been in place throughout Blum’s 18-year tenure on the Board of Regents, the newspaper reported.

Blum, a financier, told the Chronicle that “no one ever told me it was wrong.” He said he has sent letters of recommendation about friends and family to chancellors at multiple UC campuses since becoming a regent in 2002. “Wherever they were applying. Wherever they wanted to get in.” He recalled sending letters specifically to the chancellors at UC Berkeley, UC Davis, and UC Irvine, but added: “almost everywhere.”

Regents Chair John Pérez issued a statement Thursday saying the “UC Board of Regents takes these matters very seriously, and any violations will be promptly and appropriately addressed.”

He said that UC’s ethics and audit compliance office is reviewing the information “to determine whether the alleged conduct violates” the regents policy, in place since 1996.

As usual Chinese spy-lover Feinstein’s office declined to comment.

The audit examined admissions policies and practices over the six academic years from 2013-2014 to 2018-2019 at four of the UC’s nine campuses — UCLA, UC Berkeley, UC San Diego and UC Santa Barbara.

It was requested last year by state Assemblywoman Tasha Boerner Horvath in response to the national college admissions scandal, which embroiled prestigious universities nationwide, athletic coaches and dozens of wealthy parents.

Previously, The Golden Gate Bridge 50th Anniversary Bash was an extravagant party created to skim funds for the political campaigns of Roger Boas, JohnMolinari, Dianne Feinstein and their friends. The political crooks on the corrupt Golden Gate Bridge Board, hounded by Gene Pratt of Marin,tried to push a twenty two million dollar party that should have only cost $200,000.00. The majority of the money was originally planned tobe skimmed, payola-ed, and back-door conduit-ed, as Dark Money, to these politicians.

Roger Boas was indicted for embezzling city funds from Moscone Center and running anunderage whore-house (with an SFPD official) for City Hall officials.

The Golden Gate Bridge Board was publicly shamed into canceling the scam.

John Molinari was placed under FBI watch, was charged with abuse of his daughter, whowas removed from his home by the Police, and forever monitored for corruption. His offices and rentals at Van Ness and Golden GateAvenue, in San Francisco, were bugged.

Bridge Director, James Bronkema (David Rockefeller's "bag man" on the WestCoast) tried to make his mistress: Patricia Novick, the Producer of the party but that plan got outed. Bronkema and the Coblentz law firmwere placed under watch for Dark Money political shenanigans.

Dick Blum was suggested as the provocateur who got Dan White to kill Harvey Milkand Mayor George Moscone in order to get Dianne Feinstein her position in government.

Dianne Feinstein's husband ID'd in UC Berkeley admissions scam

https://nypost.com/2020/09/24/dianne-feinsteins-husband-idd-in-uc-berkeley-admissions-scam/

1 day ago**Richard Blum** penned a letter to the school chancellor's office on behalf of the unnamed student, who was waitlisted and had just a 26 percent chance of getting into the prestigious university.

Richard Blum: Senator Dianne Feinstein's husband told UC ...

https://meaww.com/richard-blum-senator-dianne-feinstein-husband-told-uc-berkeley-to-admit-underqualified-student

Senator Dianne **Feinstein** has found herself in hot water after it came to light that her wealthy investment banker husband used his influence to help an underqualified student secure admission at the University of California, Berkeley. **Richard Blum**, a UC alumnus and regent since 2002, wrote a letter ...

Richard Blum, husband of Dianne Feinstein, named in UC ...

https://www.nhregister.com/news/article/Dianne-Feinstein-s-husband-named-in-UC-15595544.php

Feinstein's husband, University of California Regent **Richard Blum**, was named Thursday, Sept. 24, 2020, by the state auditor's office as one of the regents involved in admissions scandal where UC ...

Dianne Feinstein's husband named in UC admissions scandal ...

https://www.yourcentralvalley.com/news/education/dianne-feinsteins-husband-named-in-uc-

admissions-scandal/

Feinstein's husband, University of California Regent **Richard Blum**, was named Thursday, Sept. 24, 2020, by the state auditor's office as one of the regents involved in admissions scandal where ...

Sen. Dianne Feinstein's Husband Named In College ...

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/dianne-feinstein-richard-blum-admissions-scandal-university-california_n_5f6cee20c5b6e2c91262e06e

Richard Blum, a University of California regent who is married to Democratic Sen. Dianne **Feinstein**, was revealed Thursday to be the same regent named in a damning state audit on the school's admissions scandal that was released this week. A spokesman for **Feinstein** said the California senator had ...

Dianne Feinstein's husband named in audit of 'unfair ...

https://www.foxnews.com/politics/dianne-feinsteins-husband-richard-blum-admissions-audit-university-of-california

Dianne **Feinstein's** husband named in audit of 'unfair' University of California admissions **Richard Blum** has been linked to a 'particularly problematic' case described in the audit

Sen. Feinstein's husband named in UC admissions scandal | KTLA

https://ktla.com/news/california/sen-feinsteins-husband-named-in-uc-admissions-scandal/

U.S. Sen. Dianne **Feinstein**, center, smiles as she stands on stage with husband **Richard Blum** before speaking at an election night rally in San Francisco on Nov. 6, 2012.

Dianne Feinstein's husband identified as UC regent who ...

https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2020/09/24/uc-regent-who-helped-unqualified-student-get-into-cal-identified-as-richard-blum-husband-of-sen-dianne-feinstein/

Richard Blum, a wealthy investment banker and Sen. Dianne **Feinstein's** husband, was revealed Thursday as the mystery University of California regent in a state audit earlier this week who ...

Is Dianne Feinstein the Most Corrupt Senator in the United ...

https://pjmedia.com/michaelledeen/2018/09/16/difi-and-the-red-chinese-n188747

Dianne Feinstein Tweets Sexually Explicit Glock Magazine … This is a good way to measure how little Chinese espionage matters to the nation's law enforcers and opinion makers.

Feinstein's Real Insider Trading Scandal Is Selling ...

https://thefederalist.com/2020/03/23/feinsteins-real-insider-trading-scandal-is-selling-america-out-to-china/

Sen. **Dianne Feinstein** (D-Calif.) rightly faces a potential scandal for dumping several million dollars' worth of stock while privy to sensitive information as a member of the Senate Intelligence ...

Is Dianne Feinstein Corrupt, Stupid or has Dementia—She ...

www.capoliticalreview.com/capoliticalnewsandviews/is-dianne-feinstein-corrupt-stupid-or-has-dementia-she-thinks-china-is-respectable/

Is **Dianne Feinstein** Corrupt, Stupid or has Dementia—She Thinks China is Respectable" July 30, 2020 By Stephen Frank 12 Comments This is what Democrat Senator **Feinstein** said, ""We hold China as a potential trading partner, as a country that has pulled tens of millions of people out of poverty in a short period of time, and as a country ...

The Corruption of Senator Feinstein

https://www.indybay.org/uploads/2015/12/10/feinstein_corruption_1.2.pdf

Tesla and Solyndra government hand-out funding scandal. • **Feinstein's** daughter, Kathryn, documented illicit actions by her mother, while in social habitation with the applicants • While in the Mayor's office, Bruce Brugman, publisher of the top San Francisco weekly newspaper: The San Francisco Bay Guardian, documented and published nearly 100 **corruption**

Senators deny corruption after coronavirus stock dumps

https://nypost.com/2020/03/20/senators-deny-theyre-corrupt-after-dumping-stocks-before-coronavirus-crash/

Mar 20, 2020Sen. **Dianne Feinstein**, a California Democrat, sold $500,001 to $1 million worth of stock in a company called Allogene Therapeutics on Jan. 31, less than a month before panic about the virus caused ...

BREAKING: FBI Moves On Dem Senator Dianne Feinstein ...

https://rightwingtribune.com/2020/09/08/fbi-moves-on-dem-senator-dianne-feinstein/

A spokesperson for **Feinstein** told The New York Times Thursday that the FBI asked her "basic questions" last month about stock sales made by her husband, and added that the senator provided requested documents to federal law enforcement that showed she had no involvement in her husband's financial transactions, Daily Caller reports. The 86-year-old California senator sold at least $1.5 ...

You Think Pelosi is Corrupt, But Diane Feinstein IS WORSE ...

https://www.investmentwatchblog.com/you-think-pelosi-is-corrupt-but-diane-feinstein-is-worse/

Mayor **Dianne Feinstein** signed long-term contracts (through 2015) to sell city owned electricity to powerful representative Tony Coelho's district's water utilities at just over cost On August 24, 1985 Mayor **Dianne Feinstein** disclosed ballistics information on a gun used by the Night Stalker Richard Ramirez who was a serial killer and rapist.

Dianne Feinstein - Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dianne_Feinstein

Dianne Goldman Berman **Feinstein** (/ ˈ f aɪ n s t aɪ n /; born **Dianne** Emiel Goldman, June 22, 1933) is

an American politician serving as the senior United States Senator from California.She took office on November 4, 1992. A member of the Democratic Party, **Feinstein** was Mayor of San Francisco from 1978 to 1988.. Born in San Francisco, **Feinstein** graduated from Stanford University in 1955 with ...

Dianne Feinstein's Husband Tied To Questionable Dealings ...

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/dianne-feinstein-postal-service_n_4423045

Dianne Feinstein's Husband Tied To Questionable Dealings With U.S. Postal Service, Book Says. ... Byrne, a California-based freelance writer with a special interest in uncovering government and corporate **corruption**, conducted a yearlong investigation into the real estate portfolio of CBRE for his book, "Going Postal."

The Feinstein Files: Where did Feinstein make her fortune ...

https://www.investmentwatchblog.com/the-feinstein-files-where-did-feinstein-make-her-fortune/

Sen. **Dianne Feinstein** (D) California's Sen. **Dianne Feinstein's** estimated $94 million net worth makes her the second-wealthiest serving senator. Blum Capital, a private equity firm founded in 1975 by her husband. Richard Blum, is the source for most of that wealth.

When the brats leave Stanford University, half of them move to San Francisco.

Coming up next: See what they have turned San Francisco into.

We will explore San Francisco's descent into the pits of depravity and corruption in the next chapter...

HOW SAN FRANCISCO TURNED INTO A SHIT-HOLE

The following tiny sample of actual news clips proves that San Francisco City Hall is entirely based on corruption, cronyism, bribes and amateur hour dysfunction of the most extreme kind…

SAN FRANCISCO HAS 'GONE TO HELL' SAY COMMUNITY LEADERS

- All of the buildings in downtown San Francisco are cracking and collapsing.

- Drugs and douche-bags everywhere

- Stupid soy boys and naive millennial posers at every corner

- Increasingly corrupt politicians thriving on Dark Money



San Francisco and Silicon Valley are both run by the same dynastic criminally corrupt families and sick perverted insiders. They send their kids to Stanford University where they indoctrinate and brainwash the next generation into a culture of greed, sex, political bribery and Sandhill Road collusion. San Francisco City Hall is powered by hookers, sex and kick-backs. Every attendee at the San Francisco Symphony and Opera opening nights are the "elite" scum of the Pacific Heights money and power manipulation crowd. Old men wield young arm candy as they siphon off taxpayers money into their personal construction and real estate company City contracts. The FBI can't even keep up with all of the crimes. If you think the FBI arrests of Northern California political criminals is going good, know that they FBI has a backlog that is years long. An FBI forensic accounting investigation of the CPA files and investment bank records of each "old San Francisco family" and public official would reveal

stock market crimes, insider trading, real estate money laundering and stock market payola crimes that are Off-The-Scales!

Life on Dirtiest Block in San Fran...

Drug dealers flood city...
People Line Up In Record Numbers At Bay Area Food Bank As SF Tech Rich Watch SF Poor Starve...

Is tech-dominated SF about to return to its Bohemian roots as Nancy Pelosi's Sodom crumbles?

San Francisco is a total shithole (Paul Joseph Watson video) (bitchute.com)

San Francisco is absolutely degenerate. (whatever)

So I went to a wedding in Sacramento, and found a cheap flight to Europe out of Oakland a few days later. So girlfriend decided we ought to see San Fransisco for a night. So we hear about a great restaurant, get into SF at like 8, park the car in a well-lit spot and get dinner. After dinner we walk past the car on the way to get some dessert, at 10pm. By the time we get back to the car at 10:30, the back window is smashed, side rear window is smashed, and both my bags are missing. I honestly don't give a fuck if San Fransisco wants to make itself a shithole, but what pisses me the fuck off is that these morherfuckers think they're so fucking smart and they know exactly how to live, and meanwhile crime is out of fucking control to the point that people are smashing car windows at 10pm I'm well lit and well travelled streets, homeless are everywhere, and they want to export the same policies that have destroyed their city and state to the rest of the country. Fuck off California leftists and your fucking bullshit.

IAN BIRRELL says tech giants have turned San Francisco into a dystopian nightmare of addiction, homelessness and criminality

- Criminals "Zulu Jones", "Lefty O'Douls Boss", "Shrimpboy Chow", "Francesco "Frank" Lanza", "Roger Boas", "James "Jimmy" Bronkema", "Aladino "Jimmy the Weasel" Fratianno"...the list of political mobsters in the San Francisco Bay Area goes on and on and on...

By Ian Birrell for The Mail on Sunday

Gilles Desaulniers moved to San Francisco 40 years ago, settling in the 'friendly, quaint and affordable' city after running out of cash while driving from Canada down the West Coast of America.

Today he runs a grocery store filled with fresh fruit, vegan snacks and organic wines typical of this famously liberal Californian city.

But Gilles has shut one outlet and would sell up entirely if anyone wanted this one, his remaining

shop.

Each day, up to 30 people stroll in and openly steal goods, costing him hundreds of dollars.



A street cleaner showed me a box filled with used syringes that he had collected, then I met two charity workers picking up needles from the pavement. How many do you find a day, I ask? ‘Between 300 and 600, depending on the weather,’ one replies. A homeless man is pictured second left using a syringe to inject drugs in the city in June 2018

He has been bitten twice recently by people in his shop and he also found a woman turning blue in the toilet after a drugs overdose, a hypodermic needle still stuck in her leg.

He showed me a metal door that is corroding due to people urinating in his doorway, then spoke of finding a man relieving himself in full view of infants playing in a child centre next door.

‘Our society is falling apart,’ says Desaulniers.

‘If people do not play by some rules, society does not function. But it feels like there is no order, there is no shame.’

He uses two apocalyptic movies to illustrate the state of his adopted city: ‘Living here feels like A Clockwork Orange and Blade Runner have both come true.’

I could grasp his despair. I had just passed dealers selling drugs beside a police car parked outside government offices, and seen their customers openly smoke fentanyl, an opioid 50 times stronger than

heroin, then collapse on the street.

- **City ranks among worst tax-and-spend offenders...**

Yet true to form, San Francisco has just elected as district attorney a radical called Chesa Boudin, whose parents were infamous militants from a far-Left, anti-war group. They were jailed for triple murder when Chesa was a toddler, leaving him to be adopted by the founders of the organisation

All cities have their seedy sides. But this is the very centre of San Francisco, by an upmarket Westfield shopping mall thronged with people in designer clothes perusing Rolex watches, Louis Vuitton handbags and Tiffany jewellery.

The beautiful city by the bay, where Tony Bennett famously left his heart and which poses as a beacon of progressiveness, has more billionaires per capita than any other on the planet.

Not long ago, a seven-bedroom home here recently sold for $38 million (£29 million), while at the Michelin-starred Saison restaurant, the ‘kitchen menu’ starts at $298 a head and reservations require a $148 deposit.

The city authorities have a huge $12 billion budget, handing their 31,800 staff average annual pay and benefit packages of an astonishing $175,000.

Yet the tide of homeless, addicted and mentally ill people washing up here has become so severe that a global expert on slums claimed San Francisco may be more unsanitary than some of the poorest parts of Africa and Asia.

Oracle, one of the technology giants based in the nearby Silicon Valley, has switched a conference for 60,000 people to Las Vegas due to the toxic combination of ‘poor street conditions’ and costly hotels.

This followed a medical association moving its $40 million convention out of San Francisco amid safety fears because of sordid tent encampments and overt drug use. Other events are being affected.

‘Indoors, people are making deals, talking about healthcare and networking. Yet in the streets, I witnessed homeless people injecting cocaine,’ tweeted Kistein Monkhouse while attending a recent J. P. Morgan conference for 9,000 people.

As one prominent academic tells me, it seems a cruel irony that so much squalor and despair is found in the Californian base of all those billionaire technology titans seeking to reshape the world in their image.

‘San Francisco has always had hobos but we’ve never seen anything like this. It’s become a vision of some kind of strange dystopian future,’ says Joel Kotkin, a widely respected professor in urban studies.

He can reel off damning statistics to back his claim that San Francisco symbolises the Golden State’s descent into ‘high-tech feudalism’ including America’s highest poverty levels, its worst rates of property crime and its biggest gap between top and middle incomes.

But one statistic stands out: almost half of homeless people in the United States are in California, according to a recent White House study.

And San Francisco, a comparatively small city that is home to tech giants such as Twitter, Uber and Airbnb, has the highest rate of ‘unsheltered’ citizens – at ten times the national level.

All cities have their seedy sides. But this is the very centre of San Francisco, by an upmarket Westfield shopping mall thronged with people in designer clothes perusing Rolex watches, Louis Vuitton handbags and Tiffany jewellery

Downtown visitors cannot fail to witness the distressing evidence. Almost instantly after I arrived, I saw three people smoking crystal meth through glass pipes, then others with the facial scabs and sores associated with this destructive drug. One man with matted hair sat slumped in a stupor wearing just grubby underpants.

Another, clearly under the influence of heroin, had ‘nodded off’ and was static on a child’s bicycle. A third urinated on the street. A woman changed her clothes from a tatty suitcase on the pavement.

Others shuffled pathetically or rolled slowly along the street in wheelchairs. Some were clearly suffering mental distress, such as a man in his 50s begging for cash who told me he was waiting for his air force pension.

A street cleaner showed me a box filled with used syringes that he had collected, then I met two charity workers picking up needles from the pavement.

How many do you find a day, I ask?

‘Between 300 and 600, depending on the weather,’ one replies.

So if you are going to San Francisco, feel free to wear flowers in your hair but local women say avoid sandals on your feet. Dog owners complain they have to wash human faeces from the legs of their pets after a walk.

One fed-up resident showed me Hondurans handing out socks filled with wraps of drugs in front of a building being turned into an upmarket Whole Foods store.

The dealers displayed little need for concealment. ‘After a while, you become desensitised – it’s like everyone here is wearing blinkers,’ says my guide, a man in his 30s.

‘All my friends with kids have moved out of the city.’

The city and state have some of the highest tax rates in the country, but his area of SoMa West voted to back a fresh charge on firms to fund a new community group to clean up its streets. It is the 17th district to pass such a measure.

‘You have to develop a thick skin,’ says Sonya Lee, 24, supervisor in a Starbucks branch surrounded by bustling boutiques, expensive hotels and smart restaurants. ‘Every day, people come in and take stuff. It’s dreadful but we don’t know what to do.’

San Francisco, a comparatively small city that is home to tech giants such as Twitter, Uber and Airbnb, has the highest rate of ‘unsheltered’ citizens – at ten times the national level

Official data, based on one night’s count last year, claimed 8,011 homeless people in this city of

884,000 people – a rise of 17 per cent on 2017.

But a record of those receiving healthcare found numbers twice as high and rising faster.

City authorities claim their key problem is the high cost of housing combined with past failures to build enough properties. But many blame something simpler to solve: the lack of law enforcement.

‘When you tell vagrants that anything goes, it leads to the anarchy you see on these streets,’ says Heather MacDonald, a fellow at the Manhattan Institute think-tank and a conservative essayist.

She believes we are witnessing a ‘real-life experiment’ into what happens if society stops enforcing bourgeois norms out of sensitivity to vulnerable people.

MacDonald argues that the city authorities are culpable, fuelling drug addiction by doling out 4.5 million needles a year when there is nothing compassionate about giving addicts and mentally ill people the freedom to ‘decompose’ on the streets.

Much of what she says is backed by Thomas Wolf, 49, who lost his job and family after becoming addicted to opioid painkillers following foot surgery, then moving on to cheaper heroin and ending up homeless in his native city.

‘It is a cycle of despair,’ he says. ‘I was heartbroken at losing my wife and kids but all I cared about was drugs. I hated being on the streets but I loved the easy access to drugs.

‘Yet there’s such denial that if you’d have asked me if I had a problem, I’d have said no.’

Wolf, who now works for the Salvation Army helping homeless people rebuild lives and has just been appointed to a specialist civic taskforce, sees untreated addiction as the root cause of the city’s problem. He says most people living on the streets are hooked on either drugs or drink.

‘If you see someone shouting at the wall, it is crystal meth, not mental illness – although meth might have destroyed their mind.’

Wolf claims that while the city distributes drug paraphernalia, he was never asked to quit or offered help. He says many users sell their monthly welfare $190 food stamps on receipt to go on a binge. And he wants to see generous welfare benefits – almost $600 a month in return for 12 hours of voluntary work – slashed.

His own time as a homeless heroin addict ended after police caught him holding six socks filled with drugs for Honduran dealers. His brother bailed him from jail on condition that he went into rehab.

He was lucky. Last year there were 234 deaths from fentanyl and heroin in the city, more than double the previous year and five times higher than in 2016.

Wolf believes that the decision by a state ballot six years ago to reclassify thefts of property below the value of $950 as misdemeanours has backfired badly, leading to a huge increase in shoplifting.

‘It is a disaster,’ he says. ‘The idea was sound – to reduce jailing that is predominantly of minorities – but the side effect was to embolden people to commit crime with impunity. Everyone knows you can go into shops and steal up to $950.’

Even shampoo, deodorant and toothpaste are now locked up in chemist shops to curb thefts.

The police declined to speak officially. But one officer sitting in his car beside blatant street-dealing said there was no point arresting people as they would simply be released, even if they were carrying drugs and cash valued at several thousand dollars.

‘I find it very frustrating and lots of my colleagues find it very frustrating,’ he says, adding that officers only intervene when there is violence. ‘We get the blame because people think we’re doing nothing. But it’s not our fault.’

Wes Tyler, manager of a family-owned hotel, told me a man high on crystal meth smashed a $5,000 window one Sunday afternoon – then repeatedly ignored court dates and probation orders despite being seen in the neighbourhood last week.

‘If City Hall does not start to take these issues more seriously, we’ll see businesses impacted,’ says Jay Cheng, spokesman for the local Chamber of Commerce.

Yet true to form, San Francisco has just elected as district attorney a radical called Chesa Boudin, whose parents were infamous militants from a far-Left, anti-war group. They were jailed for triple murder when Chesa was a toddler, leaving him to be adopted by the founders of the organisation.



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of progressiveness, has more billionaires per capita than any other on the planet. Not long ago, a seven-bedroom home here recently sold for $38 million (£29 million), while at the Michelin-starred Saison restaurant, the ‘kitchen menu’ starts at $298 a head and reservations require a $148 deposit

The 39-year-old, who studied at Oxford University as a Rhodes scholar and later worked as a translator for Venezuela’s former leader Hugo Chavez, a Fidel Castro acolyte, campaigned on moving away from prosecuting ‘quality of life’ offences to focus on serious and corporate offences.

The San Francisco Police Officers Association spent heavily campaigning against Boudin, saying he was the choice for ‘criminals and gang members’.

But Jennifer Friedenbach, executive director of the charity Coalition on Homelessness, argues city residents should get angry over ‘systemic neglect’ that sparked this crisis rather than blaming people on the streets.

‘No one wants to live like this,’ she says. ‘We’ve tried locking people up before but that didn’t work.’

Friedenbach insists that the problems stem from a lack of affordable housing, a significant reduction of emergency shelters and the slashing of spending on treatment programmes.

She says, rightly, that issues of homelessness, mental health and addiction are often linked.

The city’s mayor, London Breed, whose younger sister died of a drug overdose and elder brother was jailed for robbery, declined to comment.

In her inaugural speech, Breed said the ‘twin troubles of homelessness and housing affordability’ were the big challenge.

She is boosting grants for shelters, treatment and street cleaning. Yet those desperate sights staining this one-time hippy nirvana are ultimately the sign of abject political failure.

Her new fiefdom is, after all, so populated by millionaires in their exclusive enclaves that it is the second richest city in the world’s richest nation.

Considering the city’s wealth, it smacks of callous and uncaring hypocrisy.

As one local resident says: ‘Are they really being progressive to that poor guy in the street with a needle in his arm who is going to die tomorrow?’

John Gabriel: California Is A Failed State; How Do We Know? They’re Moving To Arizona In Droves

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Median price for Bay Area home hits record-shattering $935,000…
Woman allegedly calls cops on girl selling water in San Fran...

Gay Tech Mafia runs Silicon Valley and San Francisco

Meanwhile on the West Coast... Downtown San Francisco Littered with Drug Needles, Piles of Feces (breitbart.com)

Diseaesed Streets: San Francisco Spends $30 Million Cleaning Feces, Needles. City "among some of the worst slums in the world." (nbcbayarea.com)

When people refuse to navigate piles of human shit to get food, SanFrancisco has the answer - BAN company owned cafeterias to "protect" local restaurants. (m.washingtontimes.com)

San Fran Diseased Streets... Needles, Garbage, Feces... Like Worst Slums in World...

San Francisco mayor admits she was screwing corruption boss and took thousands of dollars of cash from top crook in FBI corruption probe

By Brie Stimson |

San Francisco Mayor London Breed on Friday admitted having a 20-year friendship and brief romantic relationship with a former city worker now under FBI investigation, prompting some to call for her resignation.

San Francisco Is One Of The Most Corrupt Cities In The World

San Francisco Mayors, Area Senators and Supervisors exist off of bribes. Facebook, Google, Twitter, Tesla, Chevron, Wells Fargo, Real Estate developers and Chinese mobsters are the biggest payers of bribes. They pay in cash, hookers, buildings, stock warrants and election manipulation. San Francisco politicians pretend to be "green" but they only care about Green Cash. They pretend to be a "Sanctuary City" but all they care about is harboring criminals who they can use to puff up voter counts.

San Francisco cares about one thing: CASH!

If there is a second thing they care about it is: PRETENTIOUS LIFESTYLES

Chicago is corrupt because of the mafia and gangster culture it supports. San Francisco is corrupt because it has no moral compass except the arrow that points straight to hell. Greed and power rule all decisions in San Francisco politics.

'Corrupt in its roots': as Oakland police scandals pile up ...

May 21, 2016 · Donald Trump may have called the city one of the 'most dangerous' in the world, ... 'Corrupt in its roots': as ... the city across the bay from San Francisco ...

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/21/oakland-police-miscon...

Report on the Causes of Municipal Corruption ... - San Francisco

Report on the Causes of Municipal Corruption in San Francisco, ... No one of the many persons we have ... "The undersigned of the City of San Francisco, ...

sfmuseum.org/hist5/graft1.html

http://www.freewebs.com/boycottsanfrancisco/

SSF Lawmaker Urges Charges In Corruption Probe: OP-ED

South San Francisco, CA - Several local lawmakers including State Senator Jerry Hill are urging the state AG to file charges in a CPUC corruption probe.

https://patch.com/california/southsanfrancisco/ssf-lawmaker...

CORRUPTION CENTRAL: PETER P. McDONOUGH - FoundSF

CORRUPTION CENTRAL: PETER P. McDONOUGH. ... San Francisco History ... from FOUNTAINHEAD OF CORRUPTION: Peter P. McDonough, Boss of San Francisco's Underworld by ...

foundsf.org/index.php?title=CORRUPTION_CENTRAL:_PETER...

San Francisco city employees in court facing public ...

Two former San Francisco city officials and a longtime city staffer appeared in court on Friday, facing public corruption charges.

abc7news.com/politics/sf-city-employees-in-court-facin...

Are corrupt politicians the cause of sky-high San Francisco ...

Are corrupt politicians the cause of sky-high San Francisco ... What is the most corrupt city agency in San Francisco? ... effect on San Francisco real estate. No one ...

https://www.quora.com/Are-corrupt-politicians-the-cause-of-sky-..

California state Sen. Yee arrested in corruption case - SFGate

The former San Francisco school board member, ... He was reportedly arrested on public corruption charges Wednesday morning amid raids of his office in Sacramento and ...

sfgate.com/politics/article/California-state-Sen-Yee.

San Francisco corruption probe ensnares six current or ... - CNN

Five San Francisco police officers and one former cop were indicted Thursday by federal grand juries in connection with a corruption investigation.

cnn.com/2014/02/27/justice/san-francisco-police-c...

San Francisco Corruption: Mayor, prosecutor, gangster Shrimp ...

San Francisco Mayor Ed Lee, seen here in 2011, is accused in a new court filing of using officials in his adminsitration to collect bribes. Photo by Justin ...

slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/08/04/san_francisc...

Who might be next? San Francisco's long-running political ...

He cited a San Francisco prosecution a ... Gascon's words that day provided the first hint that a long-running political corruption probe here might not be over ...

latimes.com/local/california/la-me-sf-probe-20160225-...

San Francisco police corruption investigation ... - Fox News

The San Francisco police chief is seeking to fire eight officers and discipline six others involved in a racist texting scandal.

foxnews.com/us/2015/05/15/san-francisco-police-corrup...

3 San Francisco city officials may face trial on corruption ...

First a Chinatown gangster dubbed Shrimp Boy and state Senator Leland Yee were both nabbed in a federal corruption sting. Now three others who were also targets of ...

abc7news.com/3-sf-city-officials-may-face-trial-on-cor...

How to fix San Francisco's corruption problem - by b_stuart ...

Corruption. It's as San Francisco as fog, organic produce and good weed. And by that I mean, it's such a part of the culture here that we take it for grant

San Francisco’s Homeless Encampments Expose The Failure Of A Liberal Utopia

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San Francisco Is Now The Most Rapidly Failing City In America

In America's most liberal city, increasingly visible homeless camps are a stark symbol of San Francisco's economic hollowing out and the failure of progressive governance.

By John Daniel Davidson

SAN FRANCISCO – “You want the down-low? I’ll give you the down-low. These guys will all tell you something different, but the one thing everyone here has in common is that they all do drugs.”

I’m talking to a group of homeless men camped out under Highway 101 in San Francisco’s Mission

neighborhood, where a half-dozen tents are set up on a wide sidewalk across the street from a Best Buy. The thirtysomething guy who's telling me it's all about drugs doesn't want to give me his name.

Shit-Hole San Francisco — where drug addicts outnumber high school students

Officer Brian Donohue checks on Jeffrey Choate after he sees him lying on the sidewalk along Larkin Street and asks him to dispose of used needles next to him in a proper container on Monday, September 10, 2018 in San Francisco has more drug addicts than it has students enrolled in its public high schools, the city Health Department's latest estimates conclude.There are about 24,500 injection drug users in San Francisco — that's about 8,500 more people than the nearly 16,000 students enrolled in San Francisco Unified School District's 15 high schools and illustrates the scope of the problem on the city's streets. It's also an increase of about 2,000 serious drug users since 2012, the last time a study was done. "There is an opioid epidemic in this country, and San Francisco is no exception," Deputy Director of Health Dr. Naveena Bobba said.

The problem is particularly visible in the Tenderloin, where police reported more than 600 arrests for drug dealing last year. And where 27 suspects were booked into County Jail for dealing drugs in the first 20 days of the new year. The out-in-the-open use of drugs on city sidewalks and at the Civic Center BART Station was a huge embarrassment for the city and triggered more police patrols and crackdowns in the past year. The BART station has been cleaned up, but the problem continues in the Tenderloin. And while the police stay busy targeting dealers — the criminal side of illegal drugs — the city's public health officials work the problem as a health crisis.

NIMBY HELL

The San Francisco Board of Supervisors voted 7-4 on Tuesday to overturn the 2015 sale of Presidio Terrace, a privately-owned street in the neighborhood of the same name used by a few dozen of the city's wealthiest homeowners, faulting the city's tax collector and not the residents for letting an annual $14 tax bill go unpaid for decades.

Supervisor Mark Farrell, whose district includes Presidio Terrace, scheduled Tuesday's hearing in August, allegedly to "get to the bottom" of the dispute and let all parties plead their case.

A South Bay couple bought Presidio Terrace's circular street and accompanying sidewalks at a tax sale to the tune of $90,000 after the Presidio Terrace Association (PTA) had failed to pay the taxes on their avenue for 30 years.

Residents are FLEEING Sanctuary City San Francisco at a RECORD RATE!(youtube.com)

SAN FRANCISCO HAS TURNED INTO THE BIGGEST SHIT-HOLE CITY IN AMERICA

San Francisco street fight (youtube.com)

Commiefornia - Colin Flaherty: San Francisco Techies Surprised by the Level of Black Violence (hooktube.com)

SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA VENTURE CAPITALISTS PROVE THEIR CORRUPTION RUNS DEEP

The founder of a Silicon Valley venture capital firm was sentenced Wednesday to six months behind bars for paying about $450,000 in bribes to boost his two daughters' entrance exam scores and get one of them into Georgetown University as a bogus tennis recruit.

Manuel Henriquez, the 57-year-old founder and ex-CEO of Hercules Capital based in Palo Alto, California, cried and dabbed his eyes with a tissue as he prayed for forgiveness from his children and other families he hurt, and asked the judge for mercy. “There is no perfect way to express how broken I feel in my heart and soul,” said Henriquez, who sat next to his lawyer and wore a face mask for much of the hearing held via video conference because of the coronavirus pandemic.

His wife, Elizabeth Henriquez, was sentenced in March to seven months behind bars. She is currently locked up at a prison in California and is expected to be released in January, according to online records. Prosecutors had asked for five months for Manuel Henriquez, calling him in court documents a “less active participant in the mechanics of the fraud than his wife.” The defense urged the judge for three months or less. U.S. District Judge Nathaniel Gorton called Henriquez a hypocrite who donated money to aid children, while at the same time using his wealth and privilege to put his kids ahead of other less fortunate students in the college admissions process.

“It’s a sad day,” the judge said. A high-school senior had deftly promoted her “brand” for the Ivy League, a college consultant boasted. In a2013 promotional video, William Rick Singer, the mastermind of an elaborate admissions corruption scheme, showered praises on the young woman.

She’d started her own organization to fight climate change, he said. She’d eventually enroll in Brown. That student, it turns out, was Mary Doerr, a daughter of John Doerr, the Silicon Valley venture capitalist and early backer of Google and Amazon. The Doerrs were clients of Singer years before he

turned a legitimate college consulting practice into an elaborate bribery-for-admissions scheme that has shaken American academia, the parents who sought Singer's advice and the Wall Street and Silicon Valley firms that are now dealing with the fallout.

Pro golfer Phil Mickelson and National Football League Hall of Fame quarterback Joe Montana each tweeted last week that their families had used Singer for college consulting and were "shocked" to hear about the illegal activity. So are some of the Wall Street and Silicon Valley companies who had connections to Singer, including Goldman Sachs Group Inc., bond-giant PIMCO and venture-capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caulfield & Byers, which Doerr co-founded and is chairman.

Court papers suggest as many as 800 families hired Singer at some point. Singer ran an apparently legitimate college counseling firm, the Edge College & Career Network, before about 2011. The 2013 promotional video that referred to Mary Doerr says she was a client "six years ago," or about 2007. The bribery case reaches back only to 2011. The Doerr family has not been accused of any wrongdoing. Mary Doerr graduated from Brown University in 2015 and now is a graduate student at North Carolina State University, according to her LinkedIn profile.

Calls to Mary Doerr and her mother, Anne, were not returned. A Kleiner Perkins spokeswoman, Katie Hutchison, didn't respond to a request to speak with John Doerr. Hutchison declined to answer questions but said in a written statement that while Doerr and partner Tom Schlein, "along with a long list of Valley luminaries," were clients of Singer, they consulted him only for "test tutoring and help with college applications — typical of services provided by thousands of private college counselors across the country — and nothing further."

Goldman Sachs, which was mentioned in a wiretapped phone conversation as a social connection for at least one of the parents charged in Singer's bribery-for-admissions scheme, says it has begun an internal investigation into any connection its employees may have to the former college consultant.

Firms whose partners and employees were caught up in the federal case known as "Operation Varsity Blues" have swiftly moved to fire or accept the resignations of people involved.

Bond-giant PIMCO said in a statement on Monday that "as part of a regular series that includes dozens of outside speakers, PIMCO invited Mr. Singer to speak twice over the past decade, the latest in 2015, about the college admissions process." But the firm added that it "has never had a business relationship with Rick Singer or his college preparation organization. Neither PIMCO nor the PIMCO Foundation has ever paid Mr. Singer or donated money to his foundation."

The statement added that any employees who engaged with Singer's illegal scheme "would have no place at the firm."

PIMCO's former chief executive Douglas Hodge, who retired in 2017, is accused of paying about $500,000 in bribes for two daughters and a son to be admitted to Georgetown University and and the University of Southern California as fake tennis, soccer and football recruits.

The case has also sent shivers among affluent parents who fear they and their children will be tarnished as the Singer case unfolds.

Families now in the admissions process “want to illustrate that they’re a good family that wouldn’t cheat and that their kids would never want them to cheat the process,” said Christine Pluta, a private counselor with Edvice Princeton who has also worked in the admissions offices of the University of Pennsylvania and Barnard College. “I have never before heard a family try to convince me of their own integrity. Singer is part of the conversation.”

Pluta said when she worked at Penn about 20 years ago, a “father offered me a million dollars if his daughter would be admitted. At first I thought he was joking.” She said she made it clear the offer was inappropriate.

Singer cooperated with authorities and pleaded guilty to facilitating more than $25 million in bribes for faked ACT and SAT scores and bogus athletic profiles to schools including the USC,Georgetown andYale University. Parents contributed to Singer’s fake charity, Key Worldwide Foundation, to facilitate bribes to coaches and school officials and some and some took the charitable-donation deduction.

The wealthy parents worked in finance, sports and entertainment and included actresses Lori Loughlin and Felicity Huffman as well as Hodge, who was replaced as CEO of PIMCO in 2016; Gordon Caplan, the co-chairman of global law firm Wilkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, and William McGlashan Jr., a former partner of private equity firmTPG, who was fired last week.

The relationships in those worlds led to some embarrassing revelations for firms who invited Singer to speak.

“We know people at Goldman Sachs who have, you know, recommended you highly,” said parent Marci Palatella, according to transcripts of a wiretapped conversation with Singer.

Palatella, chief executive officer of a liquor distribution company in Burlingame, Calif., and the wife of formerSan Francisco 49ers player Lou Palatella, was charged with paying $575,000 in bribes to get their son into USC as a fake “long snapper” football recruit.

Goldman Sachs spokesman Patrick Scanlan said Monday that “we’re continuing to look into the matter.”

Another parent charged in the scandal referenced Kleiner Perkins. In a wiretapped conversation, parent Bruce Isackson worried that the Internal Revenue Service might discover the bogus charity, to which Isackson is accused of paying hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes to get his daughter into USC as a fake-recruited rower.

Isackson, who was president of real-estate development firm WP Investments in Woodside, Calif., was charged along with his wife, Davina. He no longer appears on the website of the firm, which didn’t respond to calls.

“Is this gonna be this — be the front page story with everyone from Kleiner Perkins do whatever, getting these kids into school,” Isackson said according to the transcript.

In the 2013 promotional video, Singer spoke of an unnamed client who had started Inconvenient Youth while in high school. “She got totally engaged in her brand, in her story, in her passion,” he said in the

short video, adding that “I had her six years ago as a student” and thanking former Vice President Al Gore for allowing “us” to use his slide show from his 2006 documentary, “An Inconvenient Truth,” that inspired Doerr’s group.

Singer added that getting in to college “has to do with getting involved in your brand.” He highlighted his role in Mary Doerr’s venture, saying that “we wanted to create an organization that would focus on global warming for youth.”

Mary Doerr started Inconvenient Youth in 2008 between her junior and senior years atCastilleja School in Palo Alto, Calif.

John Doerr, whose net worth Forbes puts at $7.5 billion, has been involved in education issues for some time. He is co-founder and lifetime director of the NewS chools Venture Fund, which invests in start-ups aimed at improving public education. He and Anne Doerr donated $50 million in 2015 to Rice University, his alma mater, to finance a leadership training program.

The couple paid about $50,000 bribes to have someone cheat multiple times on standardized tests for their daughters, authorities said. The Henriquezes were also charged with paying $400,000 to the sham charity run by admissions consultant Rick Singer to get their oldest daughter into Georgetown by falsely portraying her as a star tennis player. Singer in turn paid then-Georgetown tennis coach Gordon Ernst in exchange for labeling her as a recruit, authorities say.

Ernst, who's accused of getting nearly $3 million in bribes, has pleaded not guilty.

Singer has pleaded guilty to running the sprawling bribery scheme and helped investigators build the case against the parents.

Henriquez's lawyers said in court documents that his participation in the scheme was “minor and largely passive” as he was busy running his company while his wife “devoted herself to the care and well-being of their children.”

"Mr. Henriquez knew some but not all of the details of the scheme with Singer, played a small role, and to his great regret and shame, did not stop it. He paid Singer’s bills, as he did all the family’s bills," his lawyers said in a court filing.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Eric Rosen said it “strains credulity" that Henriquez would believe that the $400,000 payment to Singer's sham charity would support "underfunded college athletic programs (including Georgetown tennis) and programs for disadvantaged youth," as his attorneys claimed in court documents.

Rosen accused Henriquez of refusing to fully accept responsibility for his actions and attempting to present a "sanitized version of the conduct to the court."

The Henriquezes are among nearly 30 parents who've admitted to charges in the massive case called “Operation Varsity Blues.”

“Full House” star Lori Loughlin and her fashion designer husband, Mossimo Giannulli, are scheduled to be sentenced in August after pleading guilty to paying half a million dollars to get their two daughters into the University of Southern California as fake crew recruits. Loughlin's plea deal calls for

her to serve two months behind bars and Giannulli's calls for him to serve five months.

Gavin Newsom Netted Millions (Tax-Free) In Undisclosed “Sweetheart” Loans

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SAN FRANCISCO NOW THE #1 PLACE IN AMERICA TO GET AN AWFUL SEX DISEASE!

STDs i California reach all-time high: 300,000 cases...

SAN FRANCISCO Gives ILLEGAL ALIENS Right To Vote in order to try to jam up elections * 100PercentFedUp.com (100percentfedup.com)

Home Prices In 80% Of US Cities Grew 2x Faster Than Wages... And Then There Is San Francisco (zerohedge.com)

Source: http://nbclosangeles.com/news/california/San-Francisco-to-Hire-Needle-Cleanup-Team-480616941.html

Show more from nbclosangeles.com

The mayor of San Francisco says he's hiring 10 workers whose sole responsibility will be to clean up the massive numbers of drug needles littering the streets.

San Francisco Mayor Mark Farrell said Monday the team will respond to resident complaints and remove needles and syringes from "hot spots" every day of the week.

Farrell tells the San Francisco Examiner that discarded syringes on the streets are among the top litter complaints in the city with a growing homelessness problem and a devotion to encouraging hippie scum to live there.

San Francisco Forensic Investigator Paul Kangas Keeps The Ruling Elite On Their Toes

Don't do crime with public money in front of Paul Kangas. This modern Sam Spade will latch onto the

case like a pit-bull and never let go. If City Hall, Silicon Valley or the Opera Crowd get into bribery, corruption, sex trafficking and other dirty bits, Paul might end up on their heels.

As the former guard for President Kennedy, Paul Kangas is now a private Investigator in California. His seminal article on the role of George HW Bush in the assassination of JFK was just published on the front page of the Cuban newspaper, Granma. 30 million copies were distributed worldwide. He has taught, and inspired, many contemporary media investigators who have over-turned the entire news industry with the kinds of FBI-class public research that Kangas uses. The many "citizen sleuth' groups operating around the world were inspired by the early work of Kangas.

San Francisco Nurses Demand to Have Mark Zuckerberg's Name Taken Off Hospital

- Corrupt Zuckerberg found to be using the sick as a tax evasion ploy

- Patients, public and staff object to a hospital being named after the world's largest human rights abuser

- Mayor Ed Lee died at Zuckerberg Hospital due to politics

- Facebook found to be spying on patients and selling their private medical data to governments and political groups

BY PAULA BOLYARD

San Francisco: Democrat LGBT Lutheran Pastor And Friends Arrested In Child Porn Raid

Five pedophiles at a Pro-LGBT Church have been arrested by San Francisco's Child Exploitation Task Forces for the production of child pornography. Controversial Gay Pastor of Christ Church Lutheran in San Francisco, the Rev. Steven Sabin, heads the congregations.

Reverend Steven Sabin is the head pastor at the Christ Church Lutheran national website, where he hosts streaming podcasts worldwide.



The Christ Lutheran Church says that they're aware of the Pastor’s arrest.



[San Francisco Is An Uninhabitable Hellhole...]

[Rats, Public Defecation, Open Drug Use...]

San Francisco Tech Executives And City Hall Directors Play A Dangerous Game With Trophy Wives and Prostitutes

By Lucy Carl

Driven by a psychopathic need to employ sex for power instead of passion, executives from SalesForce, Twitter, Google, Facebook and other famous brands, live a life of debauchery few normal people can comprehend.

Almost every $200K/year executive has both a “trophy” wife and a bevy of prostitutes on call. Most of them get the wives and the hookers from many of the same resources. Most of the prostitutes know about the trophy wives, and vice versa, because it is part of “The Deal”.

The San Francisco Zoo fundraising parties, The “House Parties” (on Broadway, west of Divisadaro in the tony Pacific Heights neighborhood), San Francisco Symphony parties and Opening Nights, The Red and White Ball Events, The Guardsman parties, The Spinster Events, The Rosewood Hotel “tech events” and a horde of other elitist find-some-ass events deliver the chicks to the Chads.

A Trophy Wife is a surgically enhanced woman who dresses like a Playboy model, wears porno makeup and has a Jessica Rabbit type of cartoonish facial structure. She is acquired by the tech executive to show off to other tech executives. An unusually large number of San Francisco tech executives are homosexual but they still have Trophy wives to keep up appearances.

At one of these events a young, attractive woman will approach a recently divorced tech executive and advise him that she understands “the Deal”. She uses code words and alluded to references but the intent is clear. She is willing to be either a trophy wife or a prostitute because the guy has the cash and she wants the rich lifestyle. A trophy wife is aware that she must accept the fact that the man is rich and can get any woman and there is a 3000 to 1 ratio of hot girls to rich men. If she wants the cash she must accept the non-monogamous sex-with-other-women culture of the tech males.

The Trophy Wives get to live in the big houses with the tech guys and the prostitutes live in apartments in Marin County and Palo Alto. Many of the prostitutes are from overseas and are known as “Instagram Girls” because the advertise on Instagram and Match.com as “models”. Hundreds of these internet hookers are flown into San Francisco, Oakland and San Jose international airports, daily, on the credit cards of these tech executives. The pot is well stocked. San Francisco tech executives account for as much bay area sex trafficking, in dollar volume, as the San Francisco Chinatown gangs. A San Francisco tech prostitute goes for $1000.00 to $10000.00 per night while a Chinatown sex worker is only $300.00 per session.

There are over 200 “Personal Services” providers for tech executives who pitch “managing engagement schedules” for CEO’s. They are pimps who have networked lists of hookers. They are usually women in the PR business who once were trophy wives, or prostitutes, themselves when they were younger. Most tech executives will eventually receive an offer from a “Social Events Manager”, looking to hook them up.

Trophy Wives and prostitute offerings can be found jogging on San Francisco’s Marina Green, sitting overtly in outdoor cafe’s on Chestnut Street and Union Street in the Marina district and at every “tech event”. They dress in fluorescent Spandex with bare midriff tops and painted on Spandex leggings shoved as far up their butt-crack as biology will allow. The regulars, though, are at the elite events and fund-raisers.

The websites BACKPAGE.COM, SEEKING ARRANGEMENTS.COM and MATCH.COM are the source favored by the tech guys for girls-on-demand hookers. Google is in a huge battle against the government because Google does not want BACKPAGE.COM shut down. It is the top source for hookers for the men of Google.

The parties at the French, British and Russian embassies are notoriously full of high-class hookers and wannabe trophy wife candidates. The key to confirming them, in person, or on Match.com, is the use of code words like “generous gentlemen”, “appreciates a special women”, “knows how to take care of..” , “diamonds..” and other subliminal references.

The game can go south, though. Google’s, Tesla Investments and other top executives have been killed by their hookers. Over 100 top tech execs are now in the news for their over-the-top sex scandals. A Trophy Wife or a Hooker can blackmail the tech executives at any moment; non-disclosure agreements be damned. Hundreds of babies are now being paid for by hundreds of tech executives along with hush-money to keep the names of those babies fathers quiet.

Yes, San Francisco truly is the modern version of Sodom and Gomorrah.

San Francisco accepted Hunters Point shipyard land that may still be radioactive

EPA, state health regulators approved transfer in 2015 despite awareness of fraud allegations

By Chris Roberts@cbloggy

SAN FRANCISCO HOUSING MARKET IS GETTING GUTTED AS FACEBOOK CRASHES AND CHINESE RUN AWAY

Housing market showing signs of cracking...

Record Drop in Foreigners Buying...

SAN FRANCISCO IS NOW THE MOST EXTREME PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE CITY IN

AMERICA

HIPPIE DIPPIES IN SAN FRANCISCO ARE THE MOST SPIED ON IN USA! IRONIC!

Can you imagine a city in the United States secretly creating a Chinese-style public surveillance network that can identify everyone? Can you imagine that same city secretly creating a Chinese-style public watchlisting network?

Well imagine no more because it has already happened.

When I wrote about "covert facial recognition street lights coming to a city near you" last year, I never would have dreamt that my article would become a reality so quickly.

San Francisco is now POOP CITY as heroin needles, AIDS and corruption again define City

Tourists and shoppers make their way past a panhandler asleep outside a clothing store in San Francisco on Aug. 25. The streets of San Francisco have long reflected the eccentric city’s governing priorities and many civic contradictions arising from the intersection of wealth and poverty. (Mason Trinca/For The Washington Post)

By Scott Wilson

San Francisco Millennium Tower is leaning, sinking and now cracking thanks to corrupt Ed Lee

San Francisco's leaning, sinking Millennium Tower has a new problem after a window cracked on the 36th floor. by Melanie Woodrow

San Francisco's leaning, sinking Millennium Tower has a new problem after a window cracked on the 36th floor.

"This is a window system that's designed to sustain hurricane force winds so this is obviously of serious concern," said San Francisco Supervisor Aaron Peskin.

San Francisco in one photograph: Rich liberals sip $30 glasses of wine as they watch the city burn

I lived there, in North Beach for more than a decade. I recently left, and feel such a sense of relief. I can't turn this into a joke since I know that place, but this caption isn't far off. These people will continue to look at all the shit they vote for, and watch how it went wrong, blame someone else, and double down on their bullshit. Fuck that place. They deserve the shit that's coming to them.

San Francisco's Free Syringes Are Littering Its Streets - Come For The Heroin, Stay For The Corruption (sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com)

SAN FRANCISCO MAYOR LONDON BREED EXEMPLIFIES THE WARPED SEX-BASED CRONYISM OF SAN FRANCISCO CITY HALL

Mayor London Breed exhibited a serious lapse of judgment — and possibly violated city ethics laws — in accepting several thousand dollars worth of car-related expenses from former Public Works Director Mohammed Nuru.

San Francisco Downtown Buildings Are Collapsing And Falling Apart As SF Earth Mass Found To Be Unstable

- City Officials will lie until the cows come home but the fact is that greedy mayor and supervisors overbuilt City to get bribes and developer fees

- When will the first skyscraper collapse and kill huge numbers of people?

BY JANIE HAR AND PAUL ELIAS Associated Press

Saudi ties entangle Laurene Powell Jobs' Emerson Collective

Jamal Khashoggi’s disappearance has become a litmus test for business leaders, but some ties are more nuanced — and perhaps more complicated.

by Dylan Byers

San Francisco Spends $30 Million Cleaning Feces, And Use Drug Needles From It's Hepatitis Infected Streets - Literally A U.S. SHITHOLE !!! (nbcbayarea.com)

Bay Area reaches highest exodus levels in 10 years. U-Haul says it is running out of 1 way trucks. (archive.is)

San Francisco Has The Most High-Tech Schools In The World But SF Students Are The Biggest Failures In The World

- San Francisco proves, again, that it is all fluff and no substance

- Bottom line: "Don't move to San Francisco if you want your kids to get an education!"

San Francisco's housing market is so out of control, most tech workers say they can't afford homes thanks to Google

Melia Robinson

San Francisco is too expensive even for tech workers. HBO

- **The San Francisco Bay Area's housing market is so bleak, even tech workers are struggling to buy a home there.**
- **A survey by Blind found that 59% of employees at Bay Area tech companies said they cannot afford homes.**
- **Cisco, eBay, and Intuit had the highest percentage of employees who said home ownership is elusive.**

San Francisco Employee privacy is at stake as corporate surveillance technology monitors Bay Area workers' every move

Ellen Sheng@ellensheng

Key Points

- Corporate interest in surveillance seems to be on the rise to boost productivity.
- A 2018 survey by Gartner found that 22% of organizations worldwide are using employee-movement data, 17% are monitoring work-computer-usage data, and 16% are using Microsoft Outlook- or calendar-usage data.
- Employees are concerned over this invasion of privacy.

San Francisco Logs 16,000 Feces Complaints in a Week as San Francisco becomes filled with poop and Google assholes...

WINNING: Arizona Appellate Court decides Nancy Pelosi's Hockey Stick emails must be released (wattsupwiththat.com)

San Francisco Shall Forever Be Known as POOP CITY because of the corrupt politicians and dirty people that live there

Poop City (San Francisco)-We find you with a straw, you're going to jail...but come here if you want a safe place to shoot up heroin, we'll make sure you don't die!(nbcbayarea.com)

San Francisco's Human Poop Map Shows City Is in Deep Doo-Doo

San Francisco is swiftly moving from one of America's most beautiful cities to one of America's most troubled cities. The city struggles with crime and the consequences of illegal immigration after declaring themselves a "sanctuary city". The transit authorities (BART) recently announced ...

RS https://www.redstate.com/kiradavis/2017/10/17/san-franciscos-human...

San Francisco Requires Poop Maps To Help Pedestrians Avoid ...

For those who have maintained that San Francisco is full of . . . whatever, there is now living proof. **How much poop is there on the streets of the City by the Bay?**

https://www.dailywire.com/news/12001/san-francisco-requires-poop-ma...

San Francisco poop map: real thing or a rumor?

Feb 28, 2018 · Of all the claims made by San Francisco's detractors, possibly the most puzzling to people who actually live in the Bay Area is the "poop map." "The city now offers people poop maps so they can avoid surprises," contends one online commenter on a recent story at this website about people ...

https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/02/28/san-francisco-poop-map-real-th...

San Francisco Set to Roll Out the 'Poop Patrol' to Clean Up ...

It has a funny name, but it's targeting a serious problem. San Francisco is rolling out the 'PoopPatrol.'

https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/San-Francisco-Set-to-Roll-Out-...

Holy Crap: San Francisco To Deploy Poop Patrol To Clean Up ...

Aug 15, 2018 · Holy Crap: San Francisco To Deploy Poop Patrol To Clean Up Feces That Are Apparently Everywhere - Matt Vespa: Well, we all know San Francisco is having problems.

https://townhall.com/tipsheet/mattvespa/2018/08/15/holy-crap-s...

Why is San Francisco ... covered in human feces? | Nathan ...

Aug 18, 2018 · I t's an empirical fact: San Francisco is a crappier place to live these days. Sightings of human feces on the sidewalks are now a regular occurrence; over the past 10 years, complaints about human waste have increased 400%.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/18/san-francisco-p...

This Map Shows San Francisco Is Covered in Human Poop

Citing human waste reports made in San Francisco, software engineer Jenn Wong mapped the city's most poop-ridden neighborhoods, and it is a feast for watery eyes.

https://www.thrillist.com/news/nation/human-wasteland-map-plots-all...

SF Mayor: 'There's More Feces ... Than I've Ever Seen' - NBC ...

San Francisco Mayor London Breed believes homeless advocacy groups that receive funding from the city need to better educate the homeless to "clean up after themselves."

https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/SF-Mayor-Theres-more-feces-on-...

SF Mayor Says Her City Is Drowning In Poop: 'There's More ...

San Francisco Mayor London Breed said the streets of her city are flooded with the excrement of the homeless in an interview Friday.

dailycaller.com/2018/07/15/san-francisco-poop-problem/

(Human) Wasteland - MochiMachine

A map of human waste reports made to 311 in San Francisco! (Human) Wasteland; About; Year. 2008. ... (Human) Wasteland is a mochimachine ... San Francisco's Poop ...

mochimachine.org/wasteland/

It's no laughing matter — SF forming Poop Patrol to keep ...

It sounds like silly elementary school banter, but it's real. San Francisco is about to launch the Poop Patrol. In about a month, ...

https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/heatherknight/article/It-s-no-lau...

San Francisco CA plans poop patrol to clean sidewalks | The ...

San Francisco plans a six-person poop patrol to clean up city sidewalks after receiving more than 14,000 complaints of feces since January. But the move sparked mockery and poop emojis aplenty on social media.

https://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/article216722405.html

San Fran-Poopsco

San Francisco native man charged with sexually assaulting 99-year-old woman in SF Chinatown as Frisco crime spree worsens

By Evan Sernoffsky

Security photos show a man suspected of sexually assaulting a woman in San Francisco's Chinatown on New Year's Eve.

A man captured after a New Year’s Eve sex assault in San Francisco’s Chinatown had attacked a 99-year-old woman in her apartment at the Ping Yuen housing project, officials said Wednesday.

San Francisco train conductor reportedly warns riders to watch 'for needles' amid 'needle litter' epidemic in drug infested SF (foxnews.com)

Now San Francisco Wants To Ban Lunch (downtrend.com)

When people refuse to navigate piles of human shit to get food, San Francisco has the answer - BAN company owned cafeterias to "protect" local restaurants. (m.washingtontimes.com)

San Francisco's Housing and Homeless Crises at "Boiling Point"Because Of Google-Twitter-Facebook Take-over of City Politicians

Written by James Murphy

San Francisco is a city of contrasts. It boasts glorious views of the Golden Gate Bridge and the Pacific Ocean, and it also offers the stench and disgusting sight of piles of human feces on its sidewalks. It is a place filled with great wealth and striking poverty, with tech billionaires and Silicon Valley companies existing alongside an aggressive panhandling homeless population. While a city full of investors waits nervously on a new wave of initial public offerings (IPOs), drug users shoot up in the streets for anyone — be it tourists, businessmen, or schoolchildren — to see.

SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA'S MEASURE 3 SEEKS TO CREATE "RAPE" BRIDGE TOOLS IN ORDER TO PUT CRONY CASH IN THE POCKETS OF JERRY BROWN'S FRIENDS

- The Entire Measure 3 Plan Is A Scam To Help Google and Crony Insiders!

Posted by: Zelda Bronstein

On the June 5 ballot, Regional Measure 3 asks voters in nine Bay Area counties to approve a $3 increase in tolls on all the region's bridges but the Golden Gate "to reduce auto and truck traffic, relieve crowding on BART, unclog freeway bottlenecks and improve bus, ferry, BART and commuter rail service." Its supporters, who include the Bay Area Council, the Silicon Valley Leadership Group,

SPUR, Facebook, and YIMBY Action, call it “a bold, coordinated, region-wide traffic relief plan.”

RM3 is bold all right: it’s an audacious con that dedicates $4.5 billion to a hodgepodge of disconnected projects that will bring the Bay Area little traffic relief.

The San Francisco Bay Area Tech Mafia

What They Have Been Proven To Be:

Misogynists, Frat Boys, Sexual Abusers, Rapists, Sexual Extortionists, Sexual Harassers, Intellectual Property Thieves, Copy-cats, Monopolists, Valuation Collusion-ists, Hooker Addicts, Trophy Wife Abusers, Tone Deaf Yuppies, Sociopaths, Closet Homosexuals, Elitist Boys Clubbers, Narcissists, Burning Man Orgy Pros, Drug Addicts, Alcoholics, Sex Addicts, Mobsters, Tax Cheats, Abusers, Real Estate Scammers, Liars, Racists, Anti-Trust Violators, Political Bribery Experts, Crony Political, Scam Operators, Election Rigging Financiers…

NEW SAN FRANCISCO MAYOR SAYS SF IS CONSUMED WITH CRAP

San Fran Mayor Laments Human Poop On Streets: 'More Than Ever Seen'...

CA DEMS REBUKE FEINSTEIN...

Clean up after yourselves: San Francisco mayor plans to ask homeless nicely not to poo in streets (rt.com)

The San Francisco Archi-Tastrophe Coming Building Collapses

- Greed and corruption put San Francisco in the current disaster movie scenario

- Over-building on un-stable ground in a small area subject to earthquakes should have been an obvious bad idea to anybody

- San Francisco City Hall chose to cram developer payola in their pockets and lies into the planning process

- Imagine a million tons of steel and concrete collapsing onto hundreds of thousands of commuters!

- One skyscraper will take down the next one in a 'domino effect'

- 18 buildings have started to fail but you have only heard about a handful of them…

The 39 San Francisco high-rises at risk of collapse during ...

The analysis and testing of the structure were reviewed by the City and County of San FranciscoDepartment of Building Inspection and Professor Ted Zsutty PhD, an internationally recognized ...

https://sf.curbed.com/2018/6/18/17465696/highrises-san-francisc...

UPDATE: Buildings evacuated near construction site emergency ...

Notice of a possible collapse of a 2,000 pound slab of concrete from the 30th floor of 33 Tehama Street prompted immediate evacuations of ten buildings in San Francisco's South of Market ...

sfexaminer.com/evacuations-underway-near-construction-si...

At Risk in a Big Quake: 39 of San Francisco's Top High Rises

Experts consider these buildings vulnerable to collapse only in extreme shaking caused by rare and powerful earthquakes, similar to the one that struck San Francisco in 1906.

https://nytimes.com/2018/06/14/us/california-earthquakes-high...

Buildings safe to reenter surrounding San Francisco high-rise ...

The building under construction initially prompted concerns that a 2,000 pound concrete wall could have collapsed. According to San Francisco Fire Department, the construction company made the ...

foxnews.com/us/2017/02/15/evacuations-ordered-as-conc...

Booming San Francisco takes unprecedented step to target ...

San Francisco's effort at publicizing a list of its buildings marks a new front in seismic safety — making it easier for residents and workers to easily understand the age of the city's ...

latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-san-francisco-tall-b...

Which SF High-Rises Could Collapse in an Earthquake

The Transamerica Pyramid is among 39 San Francisco high-rise buildings that could collapse in an earthquake the magnitude of the 1906 quake, according to a new report the New York Times.

sfweekly.com/news/which-sf-high-rises-could-collapse-i...

Thirty nine San Francisco high rises at risk of collapse in ...

Thirty-nine high rises in San Francisco are at risk of collapse in a major earthquake, according to a new study by the U.S. Geological Service (USGS).. The vulnerable buildings (known as welded steel moment-frame buildings) were constructed by using a flawed technique to weld columns and beams together.

https://bdcnetwork.com/thirty-nine-san-francisco-high-rises-risk...

Who Will Pay for San Francisco's Tilting, Sinking Millennium ...

The building, which opened in 2008 and was touted as the most luxurious tower in San Francisco, became a beacon of the city's burgeoning wealth, attracting tech millionaires, venture capitalists ...

Bhttps://bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-01/who

The San Francisco ghosts in Kamala Harris past show that she knows how to **ck

by Tiana Lowe

Few outside of California know or care who Willie Brown is. But that may be about to change.

Brown spent around a quarter of a century as de facto royalty in California, first serving more than three decades as a member of the California Assembly (15 years as its speaker), and then eight years as mayor of San Francisco.

He also once carried out an open extramarital affair with a young prosecutor named Kamala Harris, currently a U.S. senator and leading contender for the Democratic presidential nomination.

Now, we're far beyond the point that a personal past like that disqualifies a candidate. Harris, after all, is vying to challenge a thrice-married man who once graced the cover of Playboy and publicized his infidelity on the cover of the New York Post. Candidates' personal lives no longer warrant deep investigation, unless they tell us something about their professional and political lives.

Unfortunately for Harris, the Willie Brown story is not strictly personal. It's also professional.

When Harris was barely 30, she began dating Brown, then in his 60s and speaker of the California Assembly. To be clear, an ambitious woman dating a powerful man is not alone any cause for concern. Strong women are attracted to success, and a 30-year-old assistant district attorney is hardly, say, a 21-year-old intern. But the story doesn't end there.

For one thing, Brown was married at the time. He wound up dumping Harris and returning to his wife as he became mayor. (Again, in the era of President Trump, few will clutch their pearls over this.)

More questionable than the romance is the relationship's apparent effect on her finances and her career. Brown, according to contemporary news accounts, gifted his then-girlfriend two government jobs with

ample salaries — while she was just getting her start as an assistant DA.

As the San Francisco Weekly reported in 2003:

Aside from handing her an expensive BMW, Brown appointed her to two patronage positions in state government that paid handsomely — more than $400,000 over five years. In 1994, she took a six-month leave of absence from her Alameda County job to join the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board. Brown then appointed her to the California Medical Assistance Commission, where she served until 1998, attending two meetings a month for a $99,000 annual salary.

(That's more than $150,000 in current dollars.)

Even after they broke up, Brown, a San Francisco kingmaker, continued to support Harris' career, boosting her district attorney run and years later calling on Antonio Villaraigosa to stay out of the Senate race, thus clearing the field for Harris.

Just two years into her tenure as senator, Harris now wants to reach the White House.

The facts are messy, but most in California politics are. If she earned few hundred thousand dollars in taxpayer-funded patronage thanks to a personal relationship, that undermines some of her good-government cred. Or at least it requires her to explain how she's changed.

Barack Obama wisely fessed up about his drug usage long before he was a presidential candidate, and he alluded to his personal growth and past mistakes enough that it created a satisfying narrative, one that couldn't be used against him. Donald Trump was a womanizer and a brash braggart, but that was his entire brand for more than two decades. The first real instance where his past came to haunt him was when he seemed to confess to sexual battery on the now-infamous Access Hollywood tape. The allegations of consensual affairs never really mattered.

Harris doesn't talk about Brown. She says that it's not relevant. But part of her prosecutorial persona is a posture of toughness on corruption. But the Willie Brown story, with those big paychecks, gives off at least a whiff of cronyism. She's got to address the charge she was profiting personally off connections to power — at least if she wants us to believe she actually stands for the people.

Was San Francisco Mayor Ed Lee Poisoned, Using Untraceable Spy Technology, Because of His Immigration Scheme?

- Robert Mendick, chief reporter, Hayley Dixon, Victoria Ward, Roland Oliphant

Shell fish toxins, nut tree derivatives, umbrella launched cardiac gases and pocket-based electric pulse weapons can give any politician a "natural-looking heart-attack" that is man made. Many believe Andrew Brietbart and Google's Rajeev Motwani were killed this way for political retribution

A Russian agent convicted of spying for Britain was fighting for his life last night amid suspicions he was poisoned in a shopping centre in Wiltshire.
Sergei Skripal, 66, was in intensive care after being exposed to a mysterious substance as he sat on a bench in the centre of Salisbury. A 33-year-old woman who was with him, is also in critical condition. Both had collapsed and were unconscious when they were discovered.

San Franciscan's Hate Google: Protesters toss scooters into street to block tech buses in SF

By Sarah Ravani

THE DNC'S SAN FRANCISCO SEX CULT OFFERS CLITORAL TOUCHING FOR $150.00

We Went Under Cover With An IPhone In San Francisco And Marin County - The Dark Side of the Orgasmic Meditation Company. Almost every member is a registered Domocrat and some are highly placed in the DNC. OneTaste is pushing its sexuality wellness education toward the mainstream. Some former members say it pushed them into sexual servitude and five-figure debts.
By Ellen Huet

When Michal got married in August 2015, her family and longtime friends didn't attend. The woman who walked her down the aisle, the dozens of beaming onlookers, her soon-to-be husband—all were people she'd met in the preceding 10 months. Wearing a loose, casual dress borrowed from one of her new friends, Michal spent the ceremony in a daze. She knew she didn't want to get married like this, in the living room of a rented San Francisco house without her family's support, yet she felt compelled to do it. That uneasy feeling could apply to most of her experiences in OneTaste. OneTaste is a sexuality-focused wellness education company based in the Bay Area. It's best known for classes on "orgasmic meditation," a trademarked procedure that typically involves a man using a gloved, lubricated fingertip to stroke a woman's clitoris for 15 minutes. For Michal, like those at her wedding, OneTaste was much more than a series of workshops. It was a company that had, in less than a year, gained sway over every aspect of her life….

If You're Going To San Francisco...Think Again

By Brian C. Joondeph

A few decades ago, Scott McKenzie sang one of the classic hippie anthems, "San Francisco," back in

1967. It was sung during the heyday of sex, drugs, and rock and roll. Flower power was the rage. Peace, love, and understanding were the mantras of the day, in response to the Viet Nam War and the oppression of The Man.

McKenzie sang, “If you're going to San Francisco, be sure to wear some flowers in your hair.” Back then, the flowers were for decoration, to match the tie-dyed clothing and sandals.

Flash forward fifty years, and residents of San Francisco may need to wear flowers, not only in their hair, but also covering their entire bodies. Not for decoration, however, but to mask the odor of a new feature of the streets of San Francisco.

Excrement.

And it's been making the national news, a veritable emblem of what the city has become. The newly inaugurated San Francisco mayor is London Breed, who, as an aside, has a perfect 1960s name. Interviewed after her inauguration, the Daily Caller noted that she observed that the streets of her city "are flooded with the excrement of the homeless.”

In other words, San Francisco has become Poop City.

Apparently this is not a new problem. The famous chronicler of the city, San Francisco Chronicle columnist Herb Caen, occasionally would use the phrase in his daily screeds during the 1980s and 1990s, but it's far worse now. As the Daily Caller had the new mayor noting: “There is more feces on the sidewalks than I’ve ever seen growing up here.” And not just poop. Added to the mix is a “dangerous mix of drug needles, garbage, and feces.”

Lovely. In 1967, “If you're going to San Francisco, you're gonna meet some gentle people there.” Now you will meet a garbage dump mixed with a cesspool.

San Francisco has about 7,500 homeless individuals and is spending $280 million on homeless services for them. Some simple math reveals that the city could give each homeless resident just over $37,000 per year, a figure well above the minimum wage in most other places, and call it a day.

If you take out the salaries of all the bureaucrats administering these “homeless services,” there would likely be more than $100,000 available for each homeless person. But you know that won’t happen in a Democrat-run city, an administrative state, like San Francisco.

How can the city discourage the homeless from using the sidewalks as their toilets? In their minds, spend more money. The mayor assured her fellow progressives: “Harsher penalties for offenders are not on the table.” Instead the typical liberal solution, as the mayor promised, came to: “I work hard to make sure your programs are funded.” I wonder if we’ll see toilet paper dispensers popping up on the sidewalks?

This situation might seem to be a cross between funny and absurd, but it has economic consequences far beyond the necessary clean-up. Who might not be going to San Francisco because of the city’s pungent new attractions?

Start with conventions? San Francisco has always been a popular convention destination due to its fairly pleasant weather, its tourist attractions, its world-class restaurants, and of course, the cable cars.

But in its current state, the bloom is off the San Francisco rose.

A major medical association recently cancelled its annual meeting which would have brought 15,000 attendees and $40 million to the San Francisco economy,according to the SF Chronicle. This, after many years of coming to the city. Think of that. A group of doctors, quite familiar with feces, needles, and the downtrodden, have said "enough."

These are things doctors can see in the medical ward and prefer to avoid when away from work, often with family, at a medical conference. It's likely that other trade groups and industries will stay away from San Francisco as well.

Can you blame them? How many U.S. cities provide visitors with a public defecation map to help tourists steer clear of piles of poop littering the city's sidewalks? Or which other city can boast of the 20-pound bag of poop found a few weeks ago on a city sidewalk?

How did things get this bad for the city that Tony Bennett left his heart in? When Tony recorded that song in the 1950s, San Francisco had a Republican mayor. Their last Republican mayor, George Christopher, left office in 1964, when the Beatles arrived in America. Since then, it's been a hard day's night for San Francisco, with nearly sixty years' worth of Democrats running the show.

At a national level, San Francisco is represented by House minority leader Nancy Pelosi, Senator Dianne Feinstein, and Senator Kamala Harris, all of whom are hard-core liberals. I am quite confident that there are no piles of poop on the sidewalks in front of their homes.

San Francisco is just another of many U.S. cities run by Democrats, and into the ground. Even liberal film maker Michael Moore observed about his home city in Michigan: "Flint has voted for Dems for 84 straight yrs. What did it get us?"

San Francisco is left with virtue-signaling in the name of compassion, tolerance and all the other liberal claptrap in a bid to try to hide third world conditions on city streets. Aside from visitors choosing to go anywhere but San Francisco, what about the residents living in such conditions?

Warm summer temperatures and open sewers become a microbiology laboratory. Toss in a bunch of undernourished and unhealthy homeless persons, sharing hypodermic needles, and pestilence follows. Such a shame for a once-magnificent city.

Rather than cleaning up its mess, San Francisco has just this week banned plastic straws. Poop and hypodermic syringes littering the sidewalks is just fine, but watch out for those nasty little plastic straws.

Once upon a time Scott McKenzie's words rang true, "For those who come to San Francisco, summertime will be a love-in there." Now it's simply America's version of a s***hole.

Brian C. Joondeph, MD, MPS, a Denver based physician and writer. Follow him on Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter.

San Francisco Voters Choose Between a 1000 Percent Tax Increase and a 500 Percent Tax Increase- Nobody Wants To Be In San Francisco Any More (reason.com)

The Bad Decision-Making Of The Drug Fried Minds Of The People That Live In San Francisco

By Karma Harris

The social echo-chamber is a terrible thing.

Like drones, or robots or sheep, the mindless clones in San Francisco seem to be unable to see that they, in their cult-like quest for "individuality" are doing the exact same idiotic thing that every other San Franciscan is doing:

- Getting a giant eagle, crown or flower tattoo on their chest above their boobs

- Wearing a Fedora hat

- Growing a handle-bar mustache or stupid-looking Amish beard

- Making their clothes look like they accidentally exposed their look-at-me desperation tattoo

- Taking pictures of themselves making idiotic duck lips

- Wearing a plaid shirt

- Being obese and wearing a belly shirt

- Being obese and wearing a tube top

- Being obese and wearing Betty Boop make-up

- Thinking that heroin makes you look cool

- Study an "Art Career" at a commercial "Institute" your rich sucker parents pay you to smoke pot at

- Being a grown-up who uses a skate-board or push scooter

- Wearing a spandex T-Shirt and pursing your lips because you want to be gay and "with it"

- Using the phrase "sociability nexus" or any other Tech BS-speak

- Worshiping Google

- Wearing all black at night because nobody else thought of that

- Thinking that your "pot cafe" idea is original, unique and will last more than 3 months

- Paying tens times more for food because it has tofu hidden in it

- Blindly mouthing any party line pretext that Nancy Pelosi tells them to
- Getting scabies every weekend at the 1050 Folsom night-club
- Tweeting as if anything you do matters to anybody
- Hiding your mental illness by saying and dressing "gender fluid"-like
- Getting a pack of tattoos that proudly announce your bad decision making
- Getting a pack of tattoos that proudly announce you are a slut
- Owning a fluorescent colored bicycle
- Not seeing Willie Brown and his side-mistress Sonia hanging out at the “W”
- Creating a start-up that sells nothing that anybody actually needs or wants but has an ironic name
- Talking about "Burning Man" with any other sense than shame
- Going to a "TED Conference" without realizing you are a douche bag
- Using Match.com to get free dinners
- Having no ability whatsoever to consider the consequences of your actions
- Not seeing that the SF Board of Supes are all elitist stock market inside traders abusing the City
- Having six room-mates
- Pooping in the street because you embrace the "multi-cultural experience"
- Having no clue how the real world works
- Being a woman at Stanford University without knowing the Frats just see you as a baby oven
- Being a white yuppie guy with a Chinese girlfriend who doesn't not realize what the real deal is
- Not knowing why you feel you NEED to go to Starbucks

We could go on and post tens of thousands of additional news articles about what a disgusting shit-hole San Francisco has been turned into by it’s own corruption but… you get the point!

SILICON VALLEY'S LIES ABOUT ITSELF

When any PR person first gets in the job at Tesla they think "Yahooo, Big Bucks!", then when they read the hundreds of charges against Tesla, they head for the door. Per crime reports such as: **https://newsplus007.com/public/The_Capital_Hill_Omerta.pdf** and federal investigations, it is a wonder that anyone who is sane would work at Tesla Motors!



Tesla has dissolved its PR department — technically becoming the first automaker who doesn't talk to the press.

It's something that we have discussed on our podcast several times over the last few months, but now that reporters are publicly complaining about it, we thought we'd clear things up in an article.

Tesla hasn't responded to a press inquiry in months. We have received the odd email here and there from former press people, but it almost seems to be in an unofficial capacity.

If you're a reporter who isn't getting a response from Tesla, don't take it personally, because it's due to the automaker having dissolved its PR team.

The move has been confirmed to *Electrek* at the highest level at Tesla with the source saying, "We no longer have a PR Team."

Keely Sulprizio, the last person known to officially be in charge of PR/communications at Tesla, left the automaker in December of last year to join Impossible Foods. Following her departure, virtually every other member of Tesla's PR team either left or moved to other positions at Tesla.

After Sulprizio, Alan Cooper was the most senior member of Tesla's communications team, and in February, his role was changed to director of demand generation, but he has now apparently left the company.

Gina Antonini, a senior manager on Tesla's comms team for three years, saw her role changed to director of external relations and employee experience at Tesla in February.

Also in February, Tesla communications manager Alexander Ingram moved to a role as content lead for Design Studio at Tesla.

Danielle Meister, senior global communications manager at Tesla, left for WhatsApp in April.

Most recently, Rich Otto, who handled some of the latest PR projects at Tesla like exclusive videos with YouTubers and Jay Leno, is now a product manager, according to his LinkedIn profile.

The core global team working out of the US has been dissolved. There are obviously still people arranging test-drive promotions for YouTubers but their role isn't in a traditional public relations capacity.

I don't like the message it sends to not respond to any press inquiry. Are they all valid? Of course not. But there are some legitimate questions that the press sends to Tesla — and the public, most importantly, would benefit from answers.

Ignoring the press, and thus the public and customers, which is basically what is happening without a PR department, is only adding to something that most Tesla owners would probably agree was already one of Tesla's biggest weaknesses: communication.

Tesla PR is just the "Tesla Department of Lying". They are hired to cover up the many sins at Tesla Motors. Elon Musk uses services like Cambridge Analytica and Google to hide the truth and push the lies forward.

Musk uses his PR to hype his smoke screen "Mars Program". He does not want you to realize that his actual pitch for the Mars scam is: "*Hey! You Can Be Trapped In A Tin Can For Years With Elon Musk's Asshole Douche Bag Friends And Then Die A Horrible Death From Radiation"*. The whole Mars thing is a cover-up to hide the fact that the only thing that SpaceX does is launch domestic spy satellites that spy on consumers communications in order to control their politics. Also being hidden: The fact that SpaceX ships blow up constantly.

Recently, SpaceX's Elon Musk addressed the Humans to Mars conference, during which he waxed eloquent with BS hype about how his Starship interplanetary spacecraft was proceeding along. It is no secret that Musk is building this monster spaceship to facilitate his long-held dream to establish a settlement on the planet Mars. CNBC reports that Musk has a cautionary note for people who might want to join in on the project.

"I want to emphasize that this is a very hard and dangerous, difficult thing, not for the faint of heart. Good chance you'll die, it's going to be tough going, but it will be pretty glorious if it works out."

Death or glory or maybe both. Those are the choices that Musk is offering prospective future Mars settlers. With the Starship's development proceeding apace in Boca Chica, Texas, that choice may be available to a lot of people sooner than most think. You too can buy into this sociopath's egotistical madness.

Humans who visit Mars can die in a wide variety of awful ways. Radiation, lack of a breathable atmosphere and extreme cold are just a few of the conditions that can shorten a life or kill you from starvation, water system failure, un-diagnosed COVID, burning alive during descent and thousands of other things.

The effects of low gravity on humans' long-term health are not well understood. While, thanks to the

International Space Station, we know a lot about what microgravity does to the human body, the longest time anyone has spent in a low-gravity environment was three days during the last few Apollo missions.

The psychological effects of living long term in a hostile environment are little understood but must be considered. One study of the mental health issues of researchers living at an Antarctic base suggests that depression, anxiety, cognitive impairment and irritability can result. Indeed, all of Musk's Musktronauts could go as nuts as Musk and kill each other. People who stay at the bottom of the world are a few hours' plane trip to New Zealand. People who move to Mars will be 100 million miles from the home where they grew up and to which they will be unlikely to ever return. They will be permanently bummed out.

If all of the above gives the reader pause, perhaps he or she is not cut out to be in the first generation of Martians.

Musk does not seem willing to go. He wants you to take the risks while he stays here on Earth to hype his image PR.

Why would anyone want to leave a world of green hills and blue, flowing water for one that features frigid, arid deserts blasted by radiation with no surface water or breathable air? Mars is a shit-hole empty desert of nothingness that is about as boring as Fremont, California. If all the other stuff does not kill you, the boredom certainly will. Do you have a favorite food? You will never see that again. If the plants on your spaceship all die, you will have to eat your own shit: Fun! If only Musk would try that...

Musk's constant dope smoking has him unable to that his little band of Martian nutballs will become increasingly bureaucratic and, like all societies, become people who would just as soon break your head open rather than peacefully debate political issues if they disagree with you. Being trapped in a tin can does that to people even worse than in ordinary culture.

Can a Mars settlement be a freer society than we enjoy on Earth, even considering the need for everyone to be focused on sheer survival? Not likely. But one thing is certain, if Elon Musk is one of the settlers, he will have to step back from power and resist the temptation to be a benevolent dictator. Good luck with that Musktronauts!

The vast number of forms of radiation, starvation and boredom are calling Elon. We hope Musk climbs on the first spaceship and that his self-aggrandizing, narcissistic, political bribery self is never seen again.

Musk controls more than the PR for his Cartel. He controls the stock market around his Cartel.

Tesla shares may be up 400% this year, but one investment researcher is sounding the alarm on the stock.

New Constructs CEO David Trainer calls Tesla the most dangerous stock on Wall Street and says the fundamentals do not support such a high price and valuation.

"Whatever best-case scenario you want to paint for what Tesla's going to do – whether they're going to produce 30 million cars within the next 10 years, and get in the insurance business and have the

same high margins as Toyota, the most efficient car company with scale of all-time – even if you do believe all that is true, the stock price is still implying that profits are going to be even bigger than that," Trainer told CNBC's "Trading Nation" on Thursday.

He notes that the stock price is implying anywhere from a 40% to 110% market share based upon the average selling price. At its current average selling price of $57,000 and assuming 10.9 million car sales by 2030, that implies 42% market share, Trainer says. Tesla trades at 159 times forward earnings.

"We think this is a big, big – one of the biggest of all time – houses of cards that's getting ready to fold," said Trainer.

He adds that its recent stock split could also prove dangerous to new investors getting into the stock.

"Stock splits are inconsequential to value. They're not changing the size, they're just dividing it up into more pieces. Honestly, I look at the stock split as a way to lure more unsuspecting, less sophisticated traders into just trying to chase this stock up and that is not a real strategy," said Trainer.

Tesla split its stock five to one on August 31 – shares rallied 12% on the session. However, the stock ended last week down more than 5% after the company's largest outside shareholder Ballie Gifford trimmed its stake. The stock was also caught up in a broader sell-off that punished some of the market's high momentum names.

A more realistic valuation, says Trainer, would be far lower than current levels.

"I think around a 10th of what it is is probably appropriate if you look at, you know, kind of a reasonable level of profits," he said. "Tesla doesn't rank in the top 10 in market share or car sales in Europe for EVs and that's because the laws changed in Europe that have strongly incentivized the incumbent manufacturers to crank up hybrids and electric vehicles. The same is coming in the United States. I think realistically we're talking about something closer to $50, not $500, as a real value."

A focus on fundamentals, though, makes Tesla a no-touch for him.

Tesla did not respond to a request for comment, but these articles tell all:

The federal agency that sued Elon Musk for fraud ...

https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/sec-questioned-tesla-accounting-redactions-elon-musk-fraud-lawsuit-2019-11-1028723909?op=1

The agency sued **Musk** for fraud in the fall of 2018 after he tweeted that he was thinking about taking Tesla private at $420 a share and had "funding secured," then added "investor support is ...

Elon Musk Tesla Motors **SCAM** dissected SEC must Intervene ...

https://aitradingbot.app/2016/07/14/elon-musk-tesla-motors-scam-dissected-sec-must-intervene/

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]Elon **Musk** Tesla Motors **SCAM** dissected SEC must Intervene. It is true, that **Elon Musk** is considered by many, the crowd, a true visionary, but in our view, he is just an individual destroying taxpayers good money with $4.9 billion in government

support.. NEWS: Sell SolarCity **SCAM** Ahead of the Collapse According to the Times, Tesla alone received $2.3 billion ...

Elon Musk Gets Embroiled in Crypto Scam That Offers Tesla ...

https://u.today/elon-musk-gets-embroiled-in-crypto-scam-that-offers-tesla-model-s

British newspaper Daily Express reports that Tesla and SpaceX boss **Elon Musk** has been involved in a slew of crypto **scams** that are still prevalent on Twitter despite all the efforts to crack down on them. Scammers impersonate **Musk** in order to cajole gullible victims into sending their Bitcoin and Ethereum holdings.

Elon Musk made a $6 billion mistake when he bought ...

https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/elon-musk-made-6-billion-error-buying-solarcity-tesla-stock-2020-2-1028886284?op=1

When **Elon Musk** acquired SolarCity in the fall of 2016, he paid for it using Tesla **stock** worth $2.6 billion at the time. Those shares are worth $8.4 billion today. Tesla's CEO gave 0.110 Tesla ..

You need to know:

How Elon Musk And His Silicon Valley Insiders Control The Stock Market With Manipulation Computers And How It Is All Rigged Against YOU!

The SEC has released a report that shows how you, as an individual, are utterly, totally, hopelessly now unable to do anything in the stock market. Unless you control tens of millions of dollars of servers and have 1000 private insiders at Goldman Sachs rigging the market with automatted computer processing systems, you mean nothing:

How Elon Musk And His Silicon Valley Insiders Control The Stock Market.pdf

Elon Musk didn't MAKE any of his money. He STOLE it by having his Goldman Sachs A Draper Fisher Cartel rig the stock market. This data from the SEC proves that the stock markets should no longer exist and they are the root cause of corruption in the world

Central banks are creating 'fake markets,' Bank of America ...

https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/22/central-banks-are-creating-fake-markets-bank-of-america-strategists-say.html

May 22, 2020Central banks are creating **'fake markets,'** Bank of America strategists say. Published Fri, May 22 2020 8:53 AM EDT. Elliot Smith @ElliotSmithCNBC. ... **Stock** Quotes, and **Market** Data



These are the 6 reasons stocks are 'divorced from reality ...

https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/6-reasons-stock-market-divorced-from-reality-bank-of-america-2020-5-1029227416?op=1

Lucas Jackson/Reuters. In a note on Thursday, Michael Hartnett, Bank of America's chief investment strategist, outlined six reasons the **stock market** has continued to rally amid dismal economic data.

Investors, prepare for a fake-out rally in the stock market

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/investors-prepare-for-a-fake-out-rally-in-the-stock-market-2019-01-07

Outside the Box Opinion: Investors, prepare for a **fake**-out rally in the **stock market** Published: Jan. 7, 2019 at 11:09 a.m. ET

Experts WARN Of Another IMMINENT Stock Market CRASH ...

https://www.silverdoctors.com/headlines/world-news/experts-warn-of-another-imminent-stock-market-crash-this-will-not-end-well/

So why would the **stock market** be going up? It's simple. The Federal Reserve is throwing money at it causing temporary deflation and long term inflation while making the **stock market** look bullish. In reality it's **all fake**. It is propping up an already existing bubble massively and it is bound to lead to an epic collapse.

Is The Stock Market Rigged? - Investopedia

https://www.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/10/stock-market-rigged.asp

The **stock market is** technically not rigged for the average investor. Laws and governing bodies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exist to "level the playing field" for everyday ...

Forget fake news, investors should realize the markets are ...

https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/28/forget-fake-news-investors-should-realize-the-markets-are-fake-says-asset-manager.html

Jun 28, 2017When Filia was asked to explain how his **'fake markets'** theory stacked up with declining global **stocks** on Wednesday, he replied, "A pullback of 1 percent in the **stock market** from **all**-time highs? I ...

Is the U.S. stock market rigged? - CBS News

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-the-us-stock-market-rigged/

The United States **stock market**, the most iconic **market** in global capitalism is rigged." Michael Lewis is not talking about the **stock market** that you see on television every day.

Is StockX Legit? Or do they sell fakes? (Here are the ...

https://blog.wallstreetsurvivor.com/2018/11/06/is-stockx-legit/

There is one **stock market** educational newsletter that is written for beginner to intermediate investors that also happens to have the best **stock** recommndations. This one service has an amazing average return of 143.44% on **ALL** of their **stock** picks the last 4 years.

You may not have the right kind of education, technical savvy or psychology PhD to understand how this is possible but you know that Silicon Valley is doing something very, very bad to you..right?

Michael Wade reveals that the dealings that have been revealed between Cambridge Analytica and Facebook have all the trappings of a Hollywood thriller: a Bond villain-style CEO, a reclusive billionaire, a naive and conflicted whistle-blower, a hipster data scientist turned politico, an academic with seemingly questionable ethics, and of course a triumphant president and his influential family. Facebook, Google and Netflix executives and venture capitalists set out to use their data to push their ideology and politics on the world using psychological tricks embedded in their media. You, and Congress, are not smart enough to see how they are doing it. The cow at the meat processing plant is not smart enough to see that, at the end of the week, a metal rod will be shot into his skull and he will be gutted. The public and the cow are both being harvested. One for their privacy, the other for their meat.



The public still buys devices with microphones and cameras on them. The public still uses sites and programs that you have to "log in" to so that you can be data-harvested. Cows can't read newspapers so

they can be excused for not knowing that millions of cows before them were chopped up. The news tells the humans that all of the products of Silicon Valley spy on, and abuse them, yet the humans still keep using those products and buying those phones that are just glorified listening devices. One could argue that the humans are dumber than the cows because the humans seem to be incapable of considering the consequences of their digital actions even after being warned.

Much of the discussion has been on how Cambridge Analytica was able to obtain data on more than 50 million Facebook users – and how it allegedly failed to delete this data when told to do so. But there is also the matter of what Cambridge Analytica actually did with the data. In fact the data crunching company's approach represents a step change in how analytics can today be used as a tool to generate insights – and to exert influence. They proved that Facebook has a file on every American.

For example, pollsters have long used segmentation to target particular groups of voters, such as through categorizing audiences by gender, age, income, education and family size. Segments can also be created around political affiliation or purchase preferences. The data analytics machine that presidential candidate Hillary Clinton used in her 2016 campaign – named "Ada" to target groups of eligible voters in the same way that Barack Obama had done 4 years previously. In fact Google and Facebook manipulated culture, the internet and elections and pretty much, ***alone***, illicitly put Obama in the White House in exchange for Quid Pro Quo.

Cambridge Analytica was contracted to the Trump campaign and provided an entirely new weapon for the election machine. While it also used demographic segments to identify groups of voters, as Clinton's campaign had, Cambridge Analytica also segmented using psychographics. As definitions of class, education, employment, age and so on, demographics are informational. Psychographics are behavioral – a means to segment by personality.

Huge numbers of kids have committed suicide because of posts on Facebook. This is widely reported. What is not widely reported is that huge numbers of adults have committed suicide because of organized attacks on them operated by Media Matters, Fusion GPS and hundreds of other hired political attack services.

This makes a lot of sense. It's obvious that two people with the same demographic profile (for example, white, middle-aged, employed, married men) can have markedly different personalities and opinions. We also know that adapting a message to a person's personality – whether they are open, introverted, argumentative, and so on – goes a long way to help getting that message across and/or to control the intent of others.

Understanding people better for better election manipulation

Eric Schmidt, David Drummond, Larry Page, Mark Zuckerberg, Kent Walker, and the other Facebook/Google oligarchs, are clinical sociopaths. The feds never arrest them, the fines against them are meaningless, corrupt U. S. Senators protect them, they have Jeffrey Epsteinian hookers-on-demand...there is no reason for them to end their crimes and every incentive for them to double-down on their machinations. They are above the law!

Traditionally, there have been two routes to ascertaining someone's personality. You can either get to

know them really well – usually over an extended time. Or you can get them to take a personality test and ask them to share it with you. Neither of these methods is realistically open to pollsters. Cambridge Analytica found a third way, with the assistance of two University of Cambridge academics.

The first, Aleksandr Kogan, sold them access to 270,000 personality tests completed by Facebook users through an online app he had created for research purposes. Providing the data to Cambridge Analytica was, it seems, against Facebook's internal code of conduct (except if it pushes ideologies Zuckerberg wants), but only in March 2018 has Kogan been "banned" by Facebook from the platform. In addition, Kogan's data also came with a bonus: he had reportedly collected Facebook data from the test-takers' friends – and, at an average of 200 friends per person, that added up to some 50 million people.

However, these 50 million people had not all taken personality tests. This is where the second Cambridge academic, Michal Kosinski, came in. Kosinski – who is said to believe that micro-targeting based on online data could strengthen democracy – had figured out a way to reverse engineer a personality profile from Facebook activity such as likes. Whether you choose to like pictures of sunsets, puppies, or people apparently says a lot about your personality. So much, in fact, that on the basis of 300 likes, Kosinski's model is able to predict someone's personality profile with the same accuracy as a spouse.

Kogan developed Kosinksi's ideas, improved them, and cut a deal with Cambridge Analytica. Armed with this bounty – and combined with additional data gleaned from elsewhere – Cambridge Analytica built personality profiles for more than 100 million registered US voters. It's claimed the company then used these profiles for targeted advertising.

Imagine for example that you could identify a segment of voters that is high in conscientiousness and neuroticism, and another segment that is high in extroversion but low in openness. Clearly, people in each segment would respond differently to the same political ad. But on Facebook they do not need to see the same ad at all – each will see an individually tailored ad designed to elicit the desired response, whether that is voting for a candidate, not voting for a candidate, or donating funds. Google does this every minute of every day, to influence politics, because they get away with it with ease.

Cambridge Analytica worked hard to develop dozens of ad variations on different political themes such as immigration, the economy, and gun rights, all tailored to trick different personality profiles.

Behavioral analytics and psychographic profiling are here to stay, no matter what becomes of Cambridge Analytica This digital data rape industrializes what salespeople have always done but in the most sinister and evil way possible, by adjusting their message and delivery to the personality of their customers. This approach to electioneering – and indeed to marketing – will be Cambridge Analytica's ultimate legacy of darkness.

REMEMBER: *Poison your data* by always lying in online forms, use fake names and fake email addresses online, NEVER put your real address, city, phone, birth date or ANY other identifiable data online. Deny the Silicon Valley Cartel ANY ability to abuse your data or to use you for election manipulation!

ADDITIONAL LINKS, EVIDENCE, BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES

Note: The "*ADDITIONAL LINKS, EVIDENCE, BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES*" of all of these volumes, taken together, comprise the total. It would add too many pages to each set to include all of the same sets of links in each volume. Assume that the references addendum's work cumulatively.

http://silicon-valley-mobsters.com

The feature film: *Assholes*: A Theory: https://www.imdb.com/title/tt10011682/



Every Tech CEO And Investor In Silicon Valley Is A Predatory, Parasitic, Sex Trafficking, Misogynist, Money Laundering, Politician Bribing, Exclusionary, Black-Listing Criminal Why **Silicon Valley** has a bro culture problem — and how to ...

https://www.vox.com/2018/2/5/16972096/emily-chang-brotopia-book-bloomberg-technology-culture-silicon-valley-kara-swisher-decode-podcast

When **Emily Chang** interviewed venture capitalist Michael Moritz in 2015, she wasn't trying to "trap" him. But when the Sequoia Capital then-chairman suggested that hiring more women might ...

The Universal **Bro Code**: The **Bro Code** Rules

https://valenciabrocode.blogspot.com/p/bro-code-rules.html

The **Bro Code** Rules The **Bro Code** 1) You must always have your **bro's** back. No exceptions. 2) When your **bro's** girlfriend inquires about his whereabouts you know nothing, always. 3) You are only obligated to wingman for one **bro** per social event, after that the **bro** is on his own.

Emily Chang on the 'Brotopia' of **Silicon Valley**, and how ...

https://www.geekwire.com/2018/emily-chang-brotopia-silicon-valley-companies-can-tackle-toxic-culture/

Emily Chang: Brotopia, in my mind, perfectly encapsulates this idea of **Silicon Valley** as a modern utopia where anyone can change the world, make their own rules — if they're a man. But if you ...

"Oh My God, This Is So F---ed Up": Inside **Silicon Valley's** ...

https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/01/brotopia-silicon-valley-secretive-orgiastic-inner-sanctum

Adapted from Brotopia: Breaking Up the Boys' Club of **Silicon Valley**, by **Emily Chang**, to be published on February 6, 2018, by Portfolio, an imprint of Penguin Publishing Group, a division of ...

Today's Tech Oligarchs Are Worse Than the **Robber Barons**

https://www.thedailybeast.com/todays-tech-oligarchs-are-worse-than-the-robber-barons

Today's Tech Oligarchs Are Worse Than the **Robber Barons**. Our **Silicon Valley Robber Barons**. ... "If you think **Silicon Valley** is going to fuel growing prosperity, you are likely to be ...

Silicon Valley Billionaires Are the New **Robber Barons**

https://townhall.com/columnists/victordavishanson/2017/08/17/silicon-valley-billionaires-are-the-new-robber-barons-n2369394

Aug 17, 2017**Silicon Valley** Billionaires Are the New **Robber Barons** ... **Silicon Valley** Billionaires Are the New **Robber Barons**. Victor Davis Hanson ... Yet most of the computers and smartphones sold by **Silicon** ...

Hanson: **Silicon Valley** billionaires are modern **robber barons**

https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/08/17/hanson-silicon-valley-billionaires-are-the-new-robber-barons/

Aug 17, 2017Hanson: **Silicon Valley** billionaires are the new **robber barons** ... Yet most of the computers and smartphones sold by **Silicon Valley** companies are still being built abroad — to mostly silence from ...

Brotopia: Breaking Up the Boys' Club of **Silicon Valley** by ...

https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/36288143-brotopia

Brotopia by **Emily Chang** is a decent, but very surface level, examination of **Silicon Valleys** misogynist culture. Considering the significance of the topic, Brotopia feels like a missed opportunity to expose and critique the tech industry in a productive way; instead, I felt that only summaries were given on most topics.

Silicon Valley's Giants Are Just Gilded Age Tycoons in ...

https://www.thedailybeast.com/silicon-valleys-giants-are-just-gilded-age-tycoons-in-techno-utopian-

clothes

Silicon Valley's Giants Are Just Gilded Age Tycoons in Techno-Utopian Clothes . ... but the truth is they are a lot like the old **robber barons**. ... **Silicon Valley** executives were not just about ...

The anonymous **Silicon Valley** satire that has stumped **tech** ...

 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/12/02/the-anonymous-silicon-valley-satire-that-has-stumped-tech-world-insiders/

Dec 2, 2015The plot follows **Crooks**, an ex-**tech** industry employee who finds spiritual deliverance in meditating on **Silicon Valley's** philosophies far, far away from the digital mecca itself. AD One passage ...

Silicon Valley Wants To Read Your Mind - **Crooks** and Liars

 https://crooksandliars.com/2019/09/silicon-valley-wants-read-your

But **Silicon Valley** should not be able to dictate the way these technologies are developed and deployed. If they do, it may radically reshape the way we identify as human. Garfield Benjamin, Postdoctoral Researcher, School of Media Arts and Technology, Solent University. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons ...

Silicon Valley's cocaine problem shaped our racist **tech** ...

 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jan/30/silicon-valleys-cocaine-problem-shaped-our-racist-tech

Jan 30, 2020**Silicon Valley** in the 1980s was the hub of an international drug trafficking network that fueled technological innovation and criminalized black people Charlton D McIlwain Thu 30 Jan 2020 06.00 ...

Sex Scandal Toppled a **Silicon Valley** Chief. Investors Say ...

 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/technology/sexual-misconduct-silicon-valley.html

Jul 27, 2018**Sex Scandal** Toppled a **Silicon Valley** Chief. Investors Say, So What? Mike Cagney was ousted as chief executive of Social Finance last year after questions about sexual misconduct. He has since ...

Week in Tech: **Sex Scandals** and **Silicon** ...

 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/01/technology/farhad-and-mikes-week-in-tech-sex-scandals-and-silicon-valley.html

Dec 1, 2017**Silicon Valley's Sex Scandals**. Farhad: O.K., let's talk about the tech industry.Let's start with this week's episode of Problematic Men. A report by The Information found that Andy Rubin ...

The history of sexual harassment **scandals** in **Silicon** ...

https://www.businessinsider.com/sexual-harassment-scandals-tech-industry-2017-7?op=1

Here is a rundown of the current sexual harassment **scandals** rocking **Silicon Valley**, along with the long history of how the tech industry got here. ... 07/16/how-**silicon-valley**-silences-sexual ...

Silicon Valley Star Lands New Job a Month After **Sex Scandal**

https://www.wired.com/2013/02/keith-rabois-khosla-ventures/

A little more than one month after a sexual harassment **scandal** threatened to sink a **Silicon Valley** superangel, Keith Rabois has landed a new gig that puts him not too far from his old one.. A ...

Silicon Valley's Not-So-Hidden Secret: **Sex** Parties

https://www.newser.com/story/253597/silicon-valleys-not-so-hidden-secret-sex-parties.html

Silicon Valley's Not-So-Hidden Secret: **Sex** Parties ... "These **sex** parties happen so often among the premier V.C. and founder crowd that this isn't a **scandal** or even really a secret, I've been ...

Scandal cost **Silicon Valley** Community Foundation $1.5 M

https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/01/17/silicon-valley-community-foundation-reveals-price-of-ousting-toxic-leadership/

Jan 17, 2020The leaders ousted for fostering a toxic workplace at the **Silicon Valley** Community Foundation walked away with tens of thousands of dollars in severance pay, tax filings show, revealing the cost ...

"Oh My God, This Is So F---ed Up": Inside **Silicon Valley's** ...

https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/01/brotopia-silicon-valley-secretive-orgiastic-inner-sanctum

Some of the most powerful men in **Silicon Valley** are regulars at exclusive, drug-fueled, **sex**-laced parties—gatherings they describe not as scandalous, or even secret, but as a bold ...

Sexual harassment in **Silicon Valley**: have we reached a ...

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/09/silicon-valley-sexual-harassment-women-speak-up

Jul 9, 2017The last week has seen women in **Silicon Valley** share stories of sexual harassment, assault and discrimination, prompting a backlash and high-profile resignations.

The big lesson **Silicon Valley** can learn from the Theranos ...

https://fortune.com/2018/03/15/elizabeth-holmes-theranos-fraud-secrecy/

Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes and former president Ramesh "Sunny" Balwani were charged with an "elaborate, years-long fraud."

The public records of Silicon Valley operatives: David Krane, Brian Bendett, Brendan Bulik-Sullivan, Terri Burns, Blake Byers, Tim Draper, Steve Jurvetson, Elon Musk, Steve Westly, Steve Spinner, Tyson

Clark, Frederique Dame, Tom Perkins, Scott Davis, Reid Hoffman, Eric Schmidt, Larry Page, Jared Cohen, David Drummond, Karim Faris, Tom Hulme, Joe Kraus, John Lyman, Vinod Khosla, Laura Melahn, Dave Munichiello, Erik Nordlander, Anthony Philippakis, Sridhar Ramaswamy, David Reshef, Ben Robbins, Issi Rozen, David Schenkein, Vidu Shanmugarajah, M.G. Siegler, Graham Spencer, Bethany Tsui, Jessica Verrilli, Andy Wheeler, Krishna Yeshwant, Asheem Chandna, Jerry Chen, Mike Duboe, Sarah Guo, Christine Kim, Josh McFarland, Saam Motamedi, Sridhar Ramaswamy, Corinne Riley, Jason Risch, Seth Rosenberg, David Sze, David Thacker, David Wadhwani, Manuel Bernal, Allie Dalglish, Don Sullivan, Yasmin Green, Kent Walker, Matt Rogers, Steven Chu, David Plouffe, Sergy Brin, Andy Rubin, Ian Fette, Travis Kalanick, Elizabeth Holmes, Dustin Moskovitz, Laurene Powell Jobs, Andy Bechtolsheim, Brian Goncher, Cheryl Sandberg, Gilman Louie, Ira Ehrenpreis, Tim Cook, James Breyer, Joe Lonsdale, Keith Rabois, Marc Andreesen, George Soros, Mario Rosatti, Martin LaGod, Michael Moritz, Viktor Vekselberg, Larry Summers, Pierre Omidyar, Tom Steyer, RoseAnn Rotando, Larry Birenbaum, Judy Estrin, Steven Goldby, Terry Kramer, Helen Raiser, John Scully, Sandi Thompson, Ann Wojcicki and their ilk...

The perpetrators operate a **massive and abusive national sex scheme**. The perverts in the SandHill Road Venture Capital offices, located between Highway 280 down to to Santa Cruz Avenue on Sand Hill Road in Menlo Park, California, are the main perpetrators of this global cartel.

https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/01/brotopia-silicon-valley-secretive-orgiastic-inner-sanctum

Their executives at Google, Facebook, Netflix, Linkedin, Twitter, and their related holdings, comprise the rest. The Harvey Weinstein and Ed Buck sex scandals are well known.

https://ktla.com/2019/09/17/dem-donor-ed-buck-arrested-after-3rd-mans-overdose-charged-with-operating-west-hollywood-drug-house/

These sex cult actions have been widely covered in the news individually, ie:

- The Joe Lonsdale rape case

(https://europetodaynews.wordpress.com/2017/04/28/joe-lonsdale-rapist-abusive-frat-boy-and-mysoginst-or-gods-gift-to-women/)

- The Kleiner Perkins Ellen Pao sex abuse lawsuit

(https://www.eandblaw.com/employment-discrimination-blog/2016/02/19/pao-v-kleiner-perkins/)

- The Eric Schmidt sex penthouse stories

(https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2377785/Google-CEO-serial-womanizer-Eric-Schmidt-spends-15-million-dollars-private-doorman-Manhattan-penthouse-totally-soundproofed.html)

- The Jeffrey Epstein case

(https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/article220097825.html)

- The Google Forrest Hayes hooker murder case

(https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/07/09/google-exec-hayes-killed-by-call-girl/12422797/)

- The Google Andy Rubin sex slave case

(https://conservativedailypost.com/android-co-founder-accused-of-running-sex-slave-ring/)

- The Sergy Brin 3-way sex romp scandal

(https://nexter.org/google-sex-scandal-sergey-brin-playboy-book-alleges)

- The Steve Bing Case

(https://newspunch.com/steve-bing-clinton-friend-associate-epstein-links-dead/)

- The Hydrant investigation

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Hydrant)

- The Elon Musk Steve Jurvetson billionaire sex parties scandals

(https://pagesix.com/2018/02/12/elon-musk-sported-interesting-getup-at-alleged-sex-party/)

- The NXIVM sexual slave cases

(https://www.oxygen.com/crime-time/nxivm-sex-slave-details-horrific-allegations-against-keith-raniere)

- The Michael Goguen anal sex slave case

(https://www.news.com.au/finance/tech-titan-michael-goguen-of-sequioa-capital-kept-amber-baptiste-as-a-sex-slave-for-13-years/news-story/91012180fc3b23d50c1e6be8105c92e7)

- The Tom Perkins Hooker Parties

https://fortune.com/2018/01/02/brotopia-book-silicon-valley-sex-party/

Thousands of divorce and corruption cases including federal divorce court filings at https://www.pacer.gov/

This group of people have proven themselves, over and over, to be sociopath control freaks not fit for participation in public commerce, public policy or media control.

https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/09/19/551810814/silicon-valley-s-ellen-pao-tackles-sex-discrimination-workplace-diversity-in-mem

https://nypost.com/2018/01/03/book-details-tech-bros-drug-fueled-sex-parties-in-silicon-valley/

The Four Seasons Hotel and Rosewood Hotels in Silicon Valley are estimated to engage in over $30,000.00 of high-end escort sex trafficking per day, a portion of it managed by Eastern Bloc Mafia operators.

https://www.thedailybeast.com/silicon-valleys-sex-workers-are-being-priced-out-of-the-city-by-their-own-clients

https://escortontop.com/hotel-escorts.htm

https://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2013/05/silicon-valley-cougar-nights-love

https://www.quora.com/Do-escorts-really-use-the-Rosewood-Hotel-lobby-bar-in-Menlo-Park

The Elon Musk sex perversions

(https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8426719/Cara-Delevingne-three-way-affair-Amber-Heard-Elon-Musk.html)

At least 10 Ukrainian escorts fly in and out of SFO and SJO airports every week for these Cartel members. Google boss David Drummond engaged in horrible philandering sexual violations of his wife yet Google covers up every story about it on the web. Google's Eric Schmidt is under massive investigation.

http://american-corruption.com/Eric_Schmidt_Has_A_Psychotic_Need_To_Control_Governments_And_Society.html

You hear about the female victims of this sex cult but you rarely hear about the young male victims. One of their vast numbers of prostitutes is quoted as saying that the girls and boys are paid *"not just for sex but for the oligarch's endless need to feel that they can control anyone for any reason..."*. Multiple attorney general's controlled by their cartel, ie: Eric Schneiderman and Eliot Spitzer , are involved this these sex rings.

https://newspunch.com/eric-schneiderman-nxivm-child-sex-slaves-clintons/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliot_Spitzer

*The police and court reports on these political figures financed by this sex Cartel include: Illinois State Representative, **Keith Farnham**, who has resigned and was charged with possession of child pornography and has been accused of bragging at an online site about sexually molesting a 6-year-old girl; Spokesperson for the Arkansas Democratic Party, **Harold Moody, Jr,** who was charged with distribution and possession of child pornography; Radnor Township Board of Commissioners member, **Philip Ahr,** who resigned from his position after being charged with possession of child pornography and abusing children between 2 and 6 years-old; Activist and BLM organizer, **Charles Wade**, who was arrested and charged with human trafficking and underage prostitution; Texas attorney and activist, **Mark Benavides,** who was charged with having sex with a minor, inducing a child under 18 to have sex and compelling prostitution of at least nine legal clients and possession of child pornography, he was found guilty on six counts of sex trafficking; Virginia Delegate, **Joe Morrissey,** who was indicted on charges connected to his relationship with a 17-year-old girl and was charged with supervisory indecent liberties with a minor, electronic solicitation of a minor, possession of child pornography and distribution of child pornography; Massachusetts Congressman, **Gerry Studds**, who was censured by the House of Representatives after he admitted to an inappropriate relationship with a 17-year-old page; Former Mayor of Stillwater, New York, **Rick Nelson** who was plead guilty to five counts of possession of child pornography of children less than 16 years of age; Mayor of Clayton, New York,*

Dale Kenyon, *who was indicted for sexual acts against a teenager; Former Mayor of Hubbard, Ohio,* ***Richard Keenan****, who was given a life sentence in jail for raping a 4-year-old girl; Former Mayor of Winston, Oregeon,* ***Kenneth Barrett****, who was arrested for setting up a meeting to have sex with a 14-year-old girl who turned out to be a police officer; The Mayor of Randolph, Nebraska,* ***Dwayne L. Schutt,*** *who was arrested and charged with four counts of felony third-degree sexual assault of a child and one count of intentional child abuse. The associates political figures financed by this sex Cartel also include: The Former Mayor of Dawson, Georgia,* ***Christopher Wright****, who was indicted on the charges of aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, rape, child molestation and statutory rape of an 11-year-old boy and a 12-year-old girl; Former Mayor of Stockton, California,* ***Anthony Silva,*** *who was charged with providing alcohol to young adults during a game of strip poker that included a 16-year-old boy at a camp for underprivileged children run by the mayor; Former Mayor of Millbrook, New York,* ***Donald Briggs****, who was arrested and charged with inappropriate sexual contact with a person younger than 17; The party leader for Victoria County, Texas,* ***Stephen Jabbour,*** *who plead guilty to possession and receiving over half a million child pornographic images; DNC activist and fundraiser,* ***Terrence Bean****, who was arrested on charges of sodomy and sex abuse in a case involving a 15-year-old boy; DNC Party Chairman for Davidson County, Tennessee,* ***Rodney Mullin****, who resigned amid child pornography allegations; DNC activist,* ***Andrew Douglas Reed****, who pleaded guilty to multiple counts of 2nd-degree sexual exploitation of a minor for producing child pornography; DNC official from Terre Haute, Indiana,* ***David Roberts*** *who was sentenced to federal prison for producing and possessing child pornography including placing hidden cameras in the bedrooms and bathrooms at a home he shared with two minor female victims; Democratic California Congressman,* ***Tony Cárdenas****, who is being sued in LA County for allegedly sexually abused a 16-year-old girl; Democratic aide to Senator* ***Barbara Boxer, Jeff Rosato****, who plead guilty to charges of trading in child pornography; Alaskan State Representative,* ***Dean Westlake,*** *who resigned from his seat after the media published a report alleging he fathered a child with a 16-year-old girl when he was 28; New Jersey State Assemblyman,* ***Neil Cohen,*** *who was convicted of possession and distribution of child pornography; DNC donor and billionaire,* ***Jeffrey Epstein,*** *ran an underage child sex brothel for The Commission and was convicted of soliciting underage girls for prostitution; New York Congressman,* ***Anthony Weiner,*** *who plead guilty to transferring obscene material to a minor as part of a plea agreement for sexted and sending Twitter DMs to underage girls as young as 15; DNC donor, activist, and Hollywood producer H****arvey Weinstein*** *is being criminally prosecuted and civilly sued for years of sexual abuse (that was well known "secret" in Hollywood) including underage sexual activities with aspiring female actresses; DNC activist and #metoo proponent,* ***Asia Argento,*** *settled a lawsuit for sexual harassment stemming from sexual activities with an underage actor; Mayor of Racine, Wisconsin,* ***Gary Becker,*** *who was convicted of attempted child seduction, child pornography, and other child sex crimes; Democratic Seattle Mayor* ***Ed Murray*** *resigned after multiple accusations of child sexual abuse were levied against him including by family members; San Francisco Mayoral candidate* ***John Molinari*** *had his daughter removed from his home by San Francisco Police for his abuse of her according to SFPD reports; San Francisco Mayoral candidate* ***Roger Boas*** *was arrested for running an underage sex brothel which catered to San Francisco political elite; DNC activist and aid to NYC Mayor De Blasio,* ***Jacob Schwartz*** *was arrested on possession of 3,000+ child pornographic images; Democratic activist and actor,* ***Russell Simmons****, was sued based on an*

allegation of sexual assault where he coerced an underage model for sex; DNC Governor of Oregon, ***Neil Goldschmidt,*** *after being caught by a newspaper, publicly admitted to having a past sexual relationship with a 13-year-old girl after the statute of limitations on the rape charges had expired; Democratic Illinois Congressman,* ***Mel Reynolds*** *resigned from Congress after he was convicted of statutory rape of a 16-year-old campaign volunteer; Democratic New York Congressman,* ***Fred Richmond,*** *was arrested in Washington D.C. for soliciting sex from a 16-year-old boy; Democratic activist, donor, and director,* ***Roman Polanski,*** *fled the country after pleading guilty to statutory rape of a 13-year-old girl - Democrats and Hollywood actors still defend him to this day, including,* ***Whoopi Goldberg, Martin Scorcese, Woody Allen, David Lynch, Wim Wenders, Pedro Almodovar, Tilda Swinton and Monica Bellucci;*** *Democratic State Senator from Alaska,* ***George Jacko,*** *was found guilty of sexual harassment of an underage legislative page; Democratic State Representative candidate for Colorado,* ***Andrew Myers,*** *was convicted for possession of child pornography and enticing children; Illinois Congressman,* ***Gus Savage*** *was investigated by the Democrat-controlled House Committee on Ethics for attempting to rape an underage female Peace Corps volunteer in Zaire; Activist, donor, and spokesperson for Subway,* ***Jared Fogle,*** *was convicted of distribution and receipt of child pornography and traveling to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor; State Department official,* ***Carl Carey,*** *under* ***Hillary Clinton****'s state department, was arrested on ten counts of child porn possession; Maine Assistant Attorney General,* ***James Cameron****, was sentenced to just over 15 years in federal prison for seven counts of child porn possession, receipt and transmission; Leading DNC boss and financier* ***Ed Buck*** *was arrested for killing gay prostitutes and running a sex and drug ring; State Department official,* ***Daniel Rosen****, under* ***Hillary Clinton****'s state department, was arrested and charged with allegedly soliciting sex from a minor over the internet; State Department official,* ***James Cafferty,*** *pleaded guilty to one count of transportation of child pornography; Democratic radio host,* ***Bernie Ward****, plead guilty to one count of sending child pornography over the Internet; Democratic deputy attorney general from California,* ***Raymond Liddy,*** *was arrested for possession of child pornography. There are* ***THOUSANDS*** *of other sex crime cases involving associates of the tech Cartel. All of these perpetrators had financing from and social and political direction from the Silicon Valley controlling perpetrators.*

An inordinate number of the members are closeted homosexuals who seek to use their media monopolies and massive lobbyist ownership's to promote child sex and child sex change consideration.

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Yhe massive, sudden, promotion of those issues in all of their media since they took power in 2008 and pretty much ran the Obama White House.

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